WiM&^Mm. 


h I  *  1*1*1*1*1*1*1*1*1* 1*1*1*1* 

f"i*]r*]*j[*l*l*[*j*l*I*l*l*l*y* 

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*T*I*T*T*T*T*T*T*T*T*T*T* 


* 

"* 


^^  PRINCETON,  N.  J.  ^ 


Library  of  Br.  A.  A.  Hodge.      Presented. 


BL  181  .W5  1883 
Wilson,  W.  D.  1816-1900. 
The  foundations  of  religious 
belief 


* 

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*I* i*I*T*T*T*T*T*T*T*M*T* 


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^^L   1  ^r  I  ^r  I  ^r  i  ^^^  i  ^^^  i  ^^^  i  ^^^  i  ^r  i  ^r  i  ^r  i   x" 

1  ^n  1  Tn  I  Tl  1  ^r  I  ^P  1  jP  L  ^P  I  Tl  1  TP  I  ^P  1  ^^ 

^-▼-.  T  lYj  T  ^t^  T  ^L  T  J^  T  >-▼-'  T  ^■'  I  ^^^  r  lT^  ■  ^1^  T  kT^  I  'J4 

TP   1  ^P  I   T^  I  ^P  I  ^P  I  Ti    I  TP  1  rP   1  TT  I   Tt^  I  ^P  I  ^P 

Ti     I  ^p    I    r|^    I  ^p  I    ^p^  I    ^^    1  ^^  I    ^^    1  pp  I    ^p    I    ^^  1    '^* 

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^P   1    ^P   I   ^P   I   ^P   I  ^^L     1   T^   1   T^   I   T^  1    ^P   I   ^P  I   ^P   I  ''A"' 
TT   I    ^r   1  ^P  1  ^P   I  ^P    1  ^P   1  TP   1   ^P       T7   1    <r  L  T^    I  T^ 


rr  I  ^r  I  ^r  I  TT  I  ^P  I  tP  1  ^P  1  TP  1  Tk  I  Tk    I  TT  I  T^ 

>-▼-'  T  ■■▼-'  T  ■-▼^  T  ^^  T  v'T'-.  T  tjTL.  T  «■▼■■  1  ^^  T  t-V-^  1  ^L  T  C^  T   ^9^ 

^P  I  ^P  I  ^P  [  ^P  I  ^P  I  T^       jP  iP  I  iP  I  T^  I    iP  I  ^P 

Jd  I  >-▼-■  I  >Y"^  T  wY^    T   k.Y'..  T  ^"y^   1    ^TL.  I  ^Y^  T  JT^  T  ..Y^  T    t.Y^    ]   wY-. 


®l]c  l3isl)op  pabbock  Cccturcs,  1883 


THE    FOUNDATIONS 


Religious    Belief 


THE  METHODS  OF  NATURAL   THEOLOGY 

VINDICATED  AGAINST  MODERN 

OBJECTIONS 


Rev.  W.   D.  WILSON,  D.  D. 

PRESBYTER   IN   THE   DIOCESE   OF   CENTRAL  NEW   YORK,   AND   PROFESSOR   IN 
CORNELL   UNIVERSITY 


NEW   YORK 
D.     APPLETON     AND     COMPANY 

I,    3,   AND    5    BOND   STREET 
1883 


COPYRIGHT   BY 

Rev.  W.  D.  WILSON,  D.  D. 


THE  BISHOP  PADDOCK  LECTURES. 


In  the  summer  of  the  year  1880,  George  A.  Jarvis  of  Brooklyn, 
N.  Y.,  moved  by  his  sense  of  the  great  good  which  might  thereby 
accrue  to  the  cause  of  Christ  and  to  the  Church,  of  which  he  was 
an  ever  grateful  member,  gave  to  the  General  Theological  Seminary 
of  the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  certain  securities  exceeding  in 
value  eleven  thousand  dollars  for  the  foundation  and  maintenance 
of  a  Lectureship  in  said  Seminary. 

Out  of  love  to  a  former  Pastor  and  enduring  friend,  the  Rt.  Rev. 
Benjamin  Henry  Paddock,  D.D.,  Bishop  of  Massachusetts,  he 
named  his  Foundation  "The  Bishop  Paddock  Lectureship." 

The  deed  of  trust  declares  that : 

"  The  subjects  of  the  Lectures  shall  be  such  as  appertain  to  the 
defence  of  the  religion  of  Jesus  Christ,  as  revealed  in  the  Holy 
Bible  and  illustrated  in  the  Book  of  Com??ion  Prayer  against  the  va- 
rying errors  of  the  day,  whether  materialistic,  rationalistic,  or  pro- 
fessedly religious,  and  also  to  its  defence  and  confirmation  in  respect 
of  such  central  truths  as  the  Trinity,  the  Atonement,  Justification 
and  the  Inspiration  of  the  Word  of  God  and  of  such  central  facts  as 
the  Church'' s  Divine  Order  and  Sacrainents,  her  historical  Reforma- 
tion and  her  rights  and  powers  as  a  pure  and  National  Church. 
^«^  other  subjects  may  be  chosen  if  unanimously  approved  by  the 
Board  of  Appointment  as  being  both  timely  and  also  within  the  true 
intent  of  this  Lectureship." 

Under  the  appointment  of  the  Board  created  by  the  Trust,  viz., 
the  Dean  of  the  General  Theological  Seminary  and  the  Bishops 
respectively  of  Massachusetts,  Connecticut,  and  Long  Island,  the 
Rev.  William  D.  Wilson,  D.D.,  LL.D.,  L.H.D.,  Professor  of 
Moral  and  Intellectual  Philosophy,  Cornell  University,  delivered 
the  Lectures  for  the  year  1883,  contained  in  this  volume. 


PREFACE. 


The  request  to  deliver  these  Lectures  took  me 
entirely  by  surprise,  and  was  not  accompanied  by 
any  intimation  of  the  subject  on  which  it  was  ex- 
pected that  I  would  lecture,  any  farther  than  as 
the  subject  is  prescribed  in  the  Deed  of  Trust  which 
creates  the  Lectureship. 

In  selecting  my  specific  subject  I  was  guided  by 
a  consideration  of  what  my  past  experience  and 
studies  had,  in  my  own  judgment,  best  quaHfied  me 
to  undertake,  rather  than  by  any  estimate  I  could 
have  made  of  what  is  most  needed  just  now,  or 
what  would  be  likely  to  produce  the  most  immediate 
good  results.     No7i  omnes  omnia  possiinms. 

I  was  confirmed  in  the  selection  of  the  subject 
which,  for  these  reasons,  I  had  made,  by  the  two  fol- 
lowing considerations : 


vi  Preface. 

1.  There  can  be,  in  my  estimation,  no  satisfac- 
tory or  successful  presentation  of  the  Evidences  of 
Christianity  that  does  not  assume  the  truths  of 
Natural  Theology  and  the  legitimacy  of  the  Methods 
by  which  they  are  obtained. 

2.  There  is  no  objection  that  is  urged,  or  that 
can  be  urged,  against  the  doctrines  of  Natural  The- 
<^logy,  that  may  not  be  and  is  not  in  fact  urged 
with  far  greater  force  and  appearance  of  reason 
against  the  doctrines  of  Christianity  as  taught  by 
Revelation. 

In  selecting  my  topics  for  discussion  I  have  en- 
deavored to  include  in  my  list  all  those  that  are 
current  in  the  popular  thought  of  the  day,  or  are 
seen  in  its  literature  and  the  predominant  tone  of 
conversation  ;  and  to  trace  them  back,  if  not  to  their 
original  source,  yet  at  least  to  some  name  that  has 
given  them  prestige  and  influence. 

It  will  be  observed  that  I  have  given  to  the  sub- 
ject of  Evolution  a  large  share  of  attention.  This 
could  hardly  have  been    otherwise,   since  that  is, 


Preface.  vii 

in  many  respects,  the  great  question  of  the  age.  It 
occupies,  under  one  form  or  another,  the  largest 
part  of  the  Second  and  the  Sixth  Lectures  in  this 
course.  And  I  think  that  it  will  be  seen  that  that 
theory,  in  any  form  in  which  the  facts  and  reason- 
ing from  them  justify  us  in  holding  it,  only  makes 
the  argument  for  the  existence  and  attributes  of 
God  stronger  and  more  precise  and  explicit  than  it 
was  before. 

In  the  pursuit  of  my  subject  it  has  been  my  good 
fortune  to  find  no  occasion  to  controvert  with  any 
one  of  the  authors  from  whose  general  views  I  dis- 
sent, any  fact  that  either  he  or  I  can  regard  as  of 
fundamental  or  controlling  importance,  or  to  assert 
any  conclusion,  as  derived  from  these  facts,  which  I 
have  not  been  able  to  express  in  words  selected 
from  their  own  writings. 

And  yet  I  think  that  not  even  the  most  staunch 
advocate  of  Revelation  and  a  Supernatural  Religion 
will  find  any  occasion  to  complain  that  I  have  not 
maintained  all  the  ground  he  can  ask  for  his  cause 
so  far  as  it  is  included  in  the  domain  of  Natural 
Theology. 


viii  Preface. 

It  is  proper  to  add  that  in  delivering  the  Lectures 
I  omitted  the  Fourth,  the  last  part  of  the  Third  and 
the  first  of  the  Fifth,  as  being  so  abstruse  and  tedious 
to  those  who  are  not  metaphysically  inclined,  that  I 
could  not  have  heart  to  inflict  that  part  of  my  dis- 
cussion upon  those  whose  duty  it  was  to  attend  ; 
and  yet  they  form  such  an  essential  part  of  the  line 
of  argument,  that  I  could  not  omit  them  entirely. 
The  reader,  if  he  chooses  to  do  so,  can  omit  these 
parts  of  the  Lectures  as  he  looks  through  the  vol- 
ume, now  that  it  is  published. 

Perhaps  I  ought  also  to  state  that  in  consequence 
of  the  length  of  the  Lectures,  I  was  obliged  to  omit 
some  parts  and  to  condense  other  parts  of  the  Lect- 
ures I  delivered  when  I  gave  them  before  the  students 
in  the  General  Seminary. 

w.  D.  w. 

Ithaca,  June,  1883. 


CONTENTS. 


LECTURE  I. 
The  Subject  Stated  and  the  Two  Methods  Described. 

Introduction,  Subject  Stated. 3 

Reasons  for  Choosing  it -  6 

I.    The  Objective  Method 14 

Paley's  Illustration 18 

II.    The  Subjective  Method 20 

The  Law  of  Co-ordination 22 

Plato's  Theory  of  Ideas 33 

Mediaeval  Philosophers 38 

Descartes'  a  priori  Argument 43 

Modern  Idealistic  Theories 47 

LECTURE  II. 

Physical  Objections  ;  Theories  of  Evolution  and  Causa- 
tion. 

The  Objections  Stated 5<5 

I.    The  Claims  of  Evolution 5^ 

The  Idea  of  Creation 62 

1.  Evolution  implies  a  Supreme  Being 63 

2.  The  Nature  of  Matter  makes  a  Personal  Agent  necessary.  65 

3.  ThebeginningofLifeimpliessomethingmore  than  Matter  77 

II.    Theories  of  Causation 

1.  The  Equivalence  of  Causes  and  Effects 86 

2.  Causation  implies  a  First  Cause 92 

3.  Characteristics  of  a  First  Canse 100 


Contents. 


LECTURE  III. 
Metaphysical  Objections  ;  Theories  of  KiNowledge. 

The  Objections  to  be  Considered 107 

I.    Proof  of  the  Recality  of  Mind 108 

1.  Physiological  Proof. 116 

2.  Psychological  Proof 125 

3.  What  we  learn  of  Mind  from  Consciousness 133 

II.    Limits  to  the  Certainty  of  Knowledge 137 

1.  The  Extent  of  Knowledge  by  Sensation 141 

2.  The  Relativity  of  Knowledge 144 

3.  The  Extent  of  Certainty 152 

LECTURE  IV. 
Logical  Objections  and  Theories  of  Reasoning. 

The  Influences  of  Training  on  Opinion i6l 

I.  Logical  Objections 167 

1.  Objections  to  the  Form  of  Reasoning 1 70 

2.  Difficulties  that  arise  from  the  Use  of  Words 1 72 

II.  Kant's  Objections 186 

1.  Bearing  of  his  Theory  of  Perception 187 

2.  His  Limitation  of  Certainty 188 

3.  His  Antinomies 190 

4.  The  General  Result , 205 

LECTURE  V. 

The  Attributes  and  Personality  of  God. 

I.  The  Influence  of  Language  upon  Thought 216 

Abstractions  and  Fictions 218 

Three  Classes  of  Realities 238 

The  Existence  of  God  from  this  Point  of  View 249 

II.  Objections  to  the  Personality  of  God 255 

The  Essence  of  Personality 259 

God  a  Person 262 

All  Conceptions  of  Him  inadequate 264 


Contents.  xi 


LECTURE  VI. 
Miracles  and  Inspiration. 

Revelation  Miraculous  in  its  Nature 273 

I.    The  Essential  Character  of  Miracles 275 

1.  The  Miracle  of  Creation  or  Beginning 282 

2.  Miracle  of  the  Beginning  of  Life 284 

3.  Miracle  of  the  Origin  of  Species 294 

4.  Miracle  at  the  Origin  of  Man 310 

II.    Inspiration;  its  Nature 320 

1.  Difficulty  of  Discriminating 325 

2.  Time  and  Results  as  a  Test 329 

LECTURE  VII. 

Providence  and  Moral  Government. 

Moral  Government  shown  chiefly  in  Human  History 334 

1.  Examples  from  History 337 

2.  The  Objections  of  Pessimists 344 

3.  Pain  as  a  Means  of  Good , 350 

4.  Necessary  Laws  and  Conditions 358 

5.  Man's  Relation  to  these  Laws 365 

6.  The  Use  made  of  Wicked  Men 372 

7.  Suffering  as  a  Means  of  Holiness 376 

8.  Christ  and  Christianity  the  Solution 3S1 


LECTURE  I. 

THE  SUBJECT  STATED;   REASONS  FOR  CHOOSING 
IT;    THE  TWO  METHODS  DESCRIBED. 

Heb.  II,  6.— For  he  that  cometh  to  God  must  believe  that  He  is  and  that  He  is 
a  rewarder  of  them  that  diligently  seek  Him. 


THE  METHODS  OF  NATURAL  THEOLOGY 
VLNDICATED. 


THE  METHODS  DESCRIBED. 

Two  avenues  open  out  from  the  human  self  towards 
the  ultimate  and  highest  Being,  Whom  we  acknowl- 
edge and  worship  as  God.  Both  of  these  are  ways 
of  knowledge ;  and  each  of  them  may  be  pursued 
with  the  strictest  conformity  to  scientific  methods 
and  with  the  most  entire  certainty  in  the  results. 

It  is  my  purpose,  in  these  Lectures,  to  point  out 
and  to  vindicate,  as  best  I  can,  these  two  methods, 
which,  taken  together,  may  be  called  the  Methods  of 
Natural  Theology. 

For  my  ability  to  do  so,  and  for  my  fitness  for 
the  ofiice  and  work  to  which  I  have  been  called, 
those  who  appointed  me  to  this  Lectureship  must 
be  held  responsible;  for  the  earnestness  and  fidelity 
with  which  I  discharge  the  duty  thus  devolved  upon 
me,  I  alone  and  by  myself  am  responsible. 


4  TIic  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

If  we  glance  backward  over  the  half  century  that 
is  past  we  see  great  changes  In  the  attitude  of  the 
world  towards  the  Christian  Religion.  Then  Paley's 
Natural  Theology  and  Butler's  Analogy  were  In 
general  use,  and  in  the  highest  esteem.  They  were 
considered,  each  in  its  place  and  way,  as  presenting 
unanswerable  arguments  in  favor  of  the  propositions 
which  they  attempted  to  prove :  the  one,  the  existence 
of  a  God  of  infinite  wisdom,  power  and  goodness  as 
manifested  in  Nature;  and  the  other  maintained 
that  the  Religion  of  Christ,  as  revealed  In  the  Holy 
Scriptures,  and  taught  in  the  Christian  Church,  is  in 
harmony  with  human  reason  and  the  constitution 
and  course  of  Nature. 

Before  the  work  of  Paley,  however,  there  had  ap- 
peared the  work  of  Dr.  SAMUEL  Clarke,  which 
had  been  delivered  as  the  Boyle  Lecture  for  1704, 
on  The  Being  and  Attributes  of  God,  differing  from 
those  of  Paley  and  Butler,  in  that  it  proceeded  from 
a  different  starting  point  and  pursued  a  much 
more  metaphysical  method. 

But  all  these  books,  and  many  others  like  them, 
have  fallen  into  disrepute  and  neglect.  And  there 
seems  to  be  a  growing  impression  that  this  line  of 
argumentation  is  worth  but  very  Httle,  if  anything, 
towards  laying  a  foundation  for  religious  belief  and 
culture. 


The  Methods  Described.  5 


Since  these  works  were  written  new  facts  have 
been  discovered  and  new  theories  adopted  in  science. 
And  it  is  claimed  that  metaphysical  principles  which 
were  then  generally  held,  or  allowed  to  pass  unques- 
tioned, are  now  no  longer  held  by  anybody;  and 
these  facts  and  principles,  it  Is  claimed,  constituted 
the  very  foundation  and  basis  of  those  arguments — 
and  that,  the  foundation  being  removed,  the  super- 
structure must  fall. 

Now  it  is  no  part  of  my  purpose  to  enter  upon 
any  warfare  with  modern  science.  I  have  no  occa- 
sion to  dispute  its  facts,  or  to  disparage  its  impor- 
tance. On  the  other  hand,  I  think  that  there  are 
but  few  persons  who  appreciate  these  facts  and 
principles  more  highly  than  I  do.  Next  to  Religion, 
Science  is  the  greatest  benefactor  of  mankind.  And 
if  man  has  no  soul,  and  is,  as  many  contend,  only  a 
being  of  time — destined  to  perish  with  the  brutes 
and  like  a  brute — science  is  worth  more  to  him  than 
even  Religion.  And  the  preference  can  be  given  to 
Christianity,  in  my  estimation,  only  because  the  soul 
can  be  saved  by  faith,  through  Christ,  without  Sci- 
ence or  much  knowledge  of  the  affairs  of  this  world. 

It  is,  therefore,  my  purpose  in  these  Lectures 
rather  to  show  that  whatever  may  have  been  taken, 
by  the  advance  in  modern  science,  from  the  founda- 
tion of  those  old  arguments  was  but  hay  and  stubble 


6  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

and  sand,  and  that  it  has  been  replaced  by  some- 
thing that  is  more  substantial  and  enduring — as 
enduring  as  eternal  truth  itself;  and  that  whatever 
new  facts  have  been  discovered  in  the  physical  sci- 
ences, and  whatever  new  truths  may  have  been 
reached  in  metaphysics,  only  tend  to  make  the  ar- 
gument stronger,  and  to  give  to  the  conclusion  more 
of  point  and  precision  as  well  as  greater  certainty. 

I  have  spoken  of  the  general  subject  of  these 
Lectures  as  a  statement  and  vindication  of  the  Meth- 
ods of  Natural  Theology.  In  this  I  assume  that 
Natural  Theology  is  the  basis  of  a  Supernatural 
Theology,  and  that  what  we  can  learn  in  this  way 
of  the  character  and  attributes  of  God,  constitutes  a 
groundwork  which  we  can  accept,  and  on  which  we 
can  erect,  as  a  superstructure,  the  doctrines  of  the 
Revelation  that  has  been  communicated  to  us  in  a 
supernatural  way  by  God  Himself 

And  I  take  up  this  subject  the  more  gladly  be- 
cause, so  far  as  I  know,  there  is  no  objection,  or 
ground  of  objection,  to  any  doctrine  of  Natural  The- 
ology that  may  not  be,  and  is  not  in  fact,  urged  with 
as  great  if  not  with  greater  force  against  the  doctrines 
of  the  Christian  Religion.  Whatever  undermines 
the  basis  will  in  the  end  subvert  the  superstructure. 
If  there  are  objections  that  are  fatal  to  Natural 
Theology  they  will  doubtless  prove  much  more  fatal 


The  Methods  Described. 


to  a  reception  of  the  teachings  of  Revelation.  No 
one,  as  I  believe,  can  be  persuaded  to  accept  Chris- 
tianity as  a  Revelation  from  God,  having  authority 
over  conscience  and  will,  who  has  any  serious  doubts 
about  any  of  the  doctrines  of  Natural  Theology. 

There  Is  a  passage  in  the  Epistle  to  the  Hebrews 
that  seems  to  me  to  inculcate  this  view  of  the  gen- 
eral subject.  I  refer  to  those  earnest  and  profound 
words  which  occur  near  the  beginning  of  the  eleventh 
chapter.  Transposing  their  order  a  little,  they  read 
as  follows  :  "  For  he  that  cometh  to  God  must  be- 
lieve that  He  is,  and  that  He  is  a  rewarder  of  them 
that  diligently  seek  Him.  But  without  faith  It  is 
impossible  to  please  Him." 

This  latter  clause  of  the  text  needs  no  comment. 
Mere  outward  service  cannot  be  acceptable  to  God, 
or  in  any  way  pleasing  to  Him ;  for  we  are  abun- 
dantly assured  that  if  there  is  any  one  thing  that  He 
hates  above  all  others,  it  is  hypocrisy  and  mere  pre- 
tense of  service  when  the  heart  is  far  from  Him. 

But  does  the  Apostle  mean  to  teach  us  also  that, 
in  order  to  accept  a  revelation  as  a  supernatural  re- 
ligion, we  must  first,  and  as  a  prerequisite,  believe 
in  the  existence  of  God  and  of  His  Moral  Govern- 
ment ?  If  so,  then  It  must  be,  of  course,  on  the 
basis  of  a  natural  theology — of  some  insight  of  that 
invisible  power  and  godhead,  which,  as  the  Apostle 


8  TJie  MetJiods  of  Natural  Theology. 

says,  is  manifest  in  the  phenomena  of  nature,  or 
what,  in  another  view,  we  may  call  an  instinct  im- 
planted in  our  very  nature,  which  must  and  will, 
from  the  very  nature  of  the  case,  be  developed  into 
dogmas  and  dogmatic  form  by  the  operation  of  the 
mind  in  the  years  of  thought  and  reflection. 

Now,  whether  this  is  precisely  what  the  Apostle 
intended  to  say  in  these  words,  I  shall  neither  assume 
nor  attempt  to  prove  in  this  place.  But  I  do  most 
earnestly  believe  it  myself,  and  shall  assume  it  as 
one  of  the  starting  points  in  these  Lectures. 

To  state  my  proposition  otherwise  and  more 
briefly  and  distinctly,  I  believe  there  is  in  every 
human  soul  a  natural  insight  of  things  divine ;  or, 
in  the  words  of  a  Greek  philosopher,  v  xoiv?]  rov 
Qeov  vbr}6iz^  and  that  this  beHef  can  be  justified, 
elaborated  and  vindicated  by  most  unanswerable 
arguments,  drawn  from  the  facts  and  phenomena  of 
the  external  world  and  from  the  nature  of  mind  and 
of  knowledge  itself^ 

1  DiOG.  LaERT.,  B.  X.  C.  I.   %   122. 

2  Max  MiJLLER  says,  Science  of  Language^  Second  Series,  p.  477, 
"  It  was  one  of  the  first  articles  in  the  primitive  faith  of  mankind, 
that,  in  one  sense  or  another,  they  had  a  father  in  heaven,"  for 
whom,  "  neither  the  language  of  the  Vedie  Rishis,  nor  that  of  any 
other  poets  or  prophets  had  yet  suggested  a  fitting  name,"  p.  536. 

In  regard  to  Egypt,  as  a  sample  of  the  other  civilized  nations  of 
antiquity,  China,  India,  Mesopotomia,  etc.,  I  cite  from  Rawlinson, 
The  Religions  of  the  Ancient  World.     He  says,  p.  43,  of  the  better 


The  Methods  Described. 


For  the  great  mass  of  mankind,  the  uneducated 
and  the  unsophisticated — ''  the  rank  and  file  of  hu- 
manity " — we  appeal  to  this  instinct,  the  feelings  and 
the  wants  of  men,  and  we  show  them  how  Chris- 
tianity, in  its  doctrines  and  its  discipline,  in  its  helps 
and  its  hopes,  meets  their  wants,  satisfies  their  hearts, 
and  gives  them  what  nothing  on  earth,  nothing  else 
that  comes  within  the  range  of  their  thoughts  and 
conceptions,  can  give  them,  or  even  so  much  as  con- 
fidently promise  them. 

But  there  are  those  who  cannot  be  reached  in  this 
way  ;  they  will  not  be  satisfied  with  this  sort  of  ap- 
peal. Somehow  or  another  doubts  and  questionings 
arise  in  their  minds,  and  they  are  disposed  to  regard 

minds,  that  they  ' '  understood  clearly  that  the  many  gods  of  the  popu- 
lar mythology  were  mere  names,  personified  attributes  of  the  one  true 
Deity,  or  parts  of  the  nature  which  He  had  created,  considered  as 
informed  and  inspired  by  Him." 

And  on  p.  43  he  says,  "The  better  educated  Egyptian  had  a 
firmer  grasp  of  the  truths  of  natural  religion.  Below  the  popular 
mythology  there  lay  concealed  from  general  view,  but  open  to  the 
educated  classes  a  theological  system  which  was  not  far  removed 
from  pure  natural  theology." 

It  would  be  easy  to  show  the  same  state  of  things  with  regard  to 
the  Religions  of  China,  India,  Persia,  and  in  fact  all  the  earlier  na- 
tions which  rose  into  existence  as  leaders  of  civilization  in  primeval 
times.  And  the  question  arises  as  both  interesting  and  suggestive— 
was  this  the  result  of  an  early  revelation,  the  lingering  twilight  of 
an  earlier  and  brighter  day — or  was  it  the  result  of  discoveries  by 
the  methods  of  Natural  Theology  ?  In  either  case,  it  adds  interest 
and  strength  to  our  argument. 


10  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

these  instinctive  wants  and  feelings  as  only  a  weak- 
ness of  their  nature,  and  to  look  upon  the  religion 
which  would  supply  them  as  merely  a  delusion — a 
cunningly  devised  imposture  which  women  and 
children  may  do  well  to  accept,  and  which  unscru- 
pulous priestcraft  may  use  for  its  own  ends,  but  from 
which  men  of  scientific  attainments  and  those  with 
a  philosophical  turn  of  mind  had  better  keep  them- 
selves aloof 

The  position  and  impol'tance  of  these  men,  how- 
ever, when  considered  from  our  point  of  view,  can- 
not be  estimated  by  their  numbers  merely.  They 
claim  to  be  the  most  intellectual  men — men  who  are 
in  advance  of  all  others,  in  advance  of  their  age ;  the 
men  who  ought  to  speak,  who  ought  to  be  heard ; 
the  men  with  whom  wisdom  will  die;  or  if  it  will  not 
die  with  them,  it  has  yet  made  in  them  an  advance 
beyond  which  nothing  but  unimportant  details  by 
way  of  confirmation  can  be  reasonably  expected ; 
the  men  who  now  hold  what  all  men  will  in  a  few  gen- 
erations come  to  hold  as  the  truth  and  the  accepted 
views  of  all  mankind. 

The  claim  is  indeed  a  pretentious  one,  and  it  is 
seductive  as  well.  No  one  in  this  age  likes  to  be 
thought  deficient.  However  humble  and  ignorant 
he  may  be,  he  has  a  natural  ambition  to  be  thought, 
if  not  wise  himself,  yet  at  least  capable  of  appreciat- 


The  Methods  Described.  1 1 

ing  wisdom,  even  the  highest  wisdom  he  can  any- 
where get  a  glimpse  of.  Thousands  will  follow  the 
leading  of  one  self-confident  man  without  the  slight- 
est appreciation  of  his  fundamental  principles,  or  any 
foresight  of  their  consequences,  if  only  he  can  suc- 
ceed in  raising  a  glamour  of  applause  in  his  favor. 
And  this  is  often  much  helped  by  the  assumption  of 
a  confident  manner,  by  a  pomposity  of  style,  or  by 
an  obscurity — a  seductive  obscurity — of  diction  that 
goes  far  to  conceal  whatever  of  real  meaning,  whether 
of  truth  or  of  falsehood,  there  may  be  in  what  is  said. 
This  result  is  often  helped  on  also,  and  in  many  cases 
It  is  most  effectually  helped  on,  by  some  pandering 
to  passions  that  ought  to  be  kept  in  check,  or  by 
some  promise  of  liberty  there  where  what  is  called 
liberty  can  prove  to  be  only  licentiousness. 

When,  for  example.  Sir  William  Hamilton  says, 
with  all  the  confidence  of  assured  truth,  that  *'  all 
knowledge  is  only  relative,"  that  "  we  know  nothing 
of  things  themselves,"  and  that  *'  in  any  attempt  to 
prove  the  existence  of  the  Absolute  "  our  **  syllogism 
would  collect  in  the  conclusion  what  is  not  distribu- 
ted in  the  premises,"  or  when  Kant  says,  ''  there 
are  four  pairs  of  antinomies  on  which  all  that  we 
may  claim  or  pretend  to  know  depends,  and  yet  that 
these  antinomies  involve  irreconcilable  contradic- 
tions," thousands  and  tens  of  thousands  who  have  no 


The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology, 


adequate  conception  of  what  these  profound  philoso- 
phers really  meant  by  these  oracular  declarations, 
and  who  for  the  most  part  do  not  care  to  know,  and 
are  perhaps  rather  glad,  on  the  whole,  that  they  do 
not  know,  take  them  as  a  declaration  of  release  from 
all  obligation  to  know  or  to  believe  in  anything  be- 
yond the  necessities  and  the  pleasures  of  the  passing 
hour.  Or  when  some  disciple  of  Darwin,  out-Dar- 
wining  Darwin  himself,  proclaims  the  theory  of 
evolution  as  explaining  all  things  here  below,  with- 
out the  intervention  or  agency  of  God,  or  when 
Huxley  declares  in  magisterial  and  defiant  tones 
that  this  doctrine  of  evolution  is  as  well  established 
as  the  Copernican  theory  of  the  solar  system,^  mul- 
titudes who  know  but  little  or  nothing  of  science,  as 
they  ought  to  know,  take  courage,  and  go  on  in  the 
ways  of  irreligion  and  unbelief,  in  the  ways  of  sin 
and  transgression,  that  lead  down  to  eternal  death. 

1  I  quote  from  memory  from  Huxley's  Address  in  America  in 
1876,  as  reported  at  the  time  in  the  New  York  Tribune.  He  has 
greatly  modified  his  expressions  of  confidence  in  the  certainty  of  evo- 
lution, as  well  as  in  the  adequacy  of  its  solution  of  the  problems  of 
the  universe  since  that  time. 

In  his  Address  before  the  Department  of  Anthropology  in  Dub- 
lin, August,  1878,  as  published  in  Appleton's  Popular  Science 
Monthly  for  Oct.,  1878,  p.  674,  he  says  in  regard  to  this  very  ques- 
tion of  evolution:  "  It  is  a  difficult  question,  and  one  for  which  a 
complete  answer  may  possibly  be  looked  for  in  the  next  century.  .  . 
In  what  sense  I  cannot  tell  you.  I  have  my  own  notion  about  it, 
but  the  question  for  the  future  is  the  attainment,  by  scientific  pro- 
cesses and  methods,  of  a  solution  of  that  question." 


The  Methods  Described.  1 3 

We  must,  I  think,  distinctly  recognize  and  admit, 
moreover,  the  fact  of  "an  evil  heart  of  unbelief"  in 
man,  which  prevails  to  some  extent  in  all  men  in 
their  natural  condition,  though  it  is  more  powerful 
in  some  than  in  others,  and  which  inclines  them  to 
accept  and  urge  anything  that  may  be  available,  as 
an  excuse  or  pretense  for  rejecting  a  religion  that 
imposes  restraints  upon  their  liberty  of  choice  and 
action,  even  when  they  know  that  without  such  re- 
straint freedom  would  result,  in  the  case  of  the  great 
multitude,  in  what  all  men  would  regard  as  evil. 

Were  it  not  for  this  natural  tendency  in  man  to 
evade  restraints  which  are  acknowledged,  indeed,  to 
be  wholesome,  I  doubt  if  many,  or  indeed  any,  of 
the  objections  I  am  about  to  consider  would  have 
ever  been  seriously  felt  or  much  urged  against  Re- 
ligion, whether  Natural  or  Revealed. 

It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  very  appropriate,  and  the 
best  service  I  can  render,  under  the  circumstances, 
to  do  what  I  can  to  dispel  the  illusion  that  these 
doctrines  and  theories  of  metaphysicians  and  physi- 
cists have  created.  And  if  the  subject  is,  as  I  suppose 
it  to  be,  one  which,  from  its  very  nature,  cannot 
be  brought  within  the  comprehension  of  all,  or  made 
attractive  to  the  masses  that  gather  "  to  hear  and 
read  some  new  thing,"  I  think  that  I  cannot  be  ac- 
cused of  having  judged  amiss,  when  we  consider 


14  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

that  I  am  addressing  those  who  are  to  be  themselves 
the  teachers  of  the  masses,  and  who  will  encounter 
in  their  life-work  almost,  if  not  quite,  daily,  one  or 
more  of  those  whose  minds  and  hearts  are  affected 
by  the  forms  of  agnosticism  and  unbelief  to  which  I 
have  alluded. 

As  a  preparation  for  a  fuller  and  more  detailed 
consideration  of  the  objections  that  have  been  urged 
against  these  methods,  I  will  devote  the  remainder 
of  this  Lecture  to  a  statement  and  illustration  of  the 
two  methods. 

I.  We  begin  our  acquisition  of  knowledge  by  the 
observation  of  objects  and  events  in  the  world  around 
us.  These  objects  are,  for  the  most  part,  visible  and 
tangible.  Many  of  them  also  move  about  in  space, 
and  others  are  seen  to  change  in  their  properties  and 
appearance.  To  those  that  move  about  we  ascribe 
life  and  spontaneity  of  action.  For  those  that  change, 
without  moving,  we  soon  find  an  antecedent  or  cause 
of  the  change,  in  something  which  is  out  of  them- 
selves, and  which  existed  before  the  change  began. 

And  thus,  early  in  life  and  with  but  little  reflec- 
tion comparatively,  *'  the  idea  of  causation,"  as  it  is 
called,  is  fixed  in  our  minds  as  one  of  its  ruling  and 
controlling  principles. 

Naturally  enough  we  accept  the  axiom  that  every 
event  or  change  has  had  a  cause.     And  for  the 


The  Methods  Described.  1 5 

changes  and  motions  of  living  beings  we  are  con- 
tent, for  the  time,  to  refer  to  the  self  or  soul  within, 
as  a  spontaneously  acting  agent.  But  for  mere  in- 
organic matter,  whether  in  masses,  molecules  or 
atoms,  we  assume  an  inertia  that  compels  us  to  look 
for  something  else,  something  out  of  themselves,  as 
the  cause  of  their  motion  and  their  changes. 

This  hne  of  thought  soon  leads  us  back,  naturally, 
and  as  I  think  necessarily,  to  a  Beginning  and  a 
Beginner ;  a  first  Cause,  Who  was  before  all  things, 
is  over  all  things,  and  in  all  things,  and  Is  Himself 
uncaused.  Further  thought  leads  us  to  ascribe  to 
this  Being  personality,  with  intelligence,  moral  pur- 
pose and  spontaneity  of  action. 

Recent  investigations  into  the  early  history  of 
mankind  have  shown  that  the  first  inhabitants  of  our 
earth  were  more  Impressible  than  we  are.  They 
were  filled  with  what  Max  Miiller  has  described  as  a 
kind  of  unconscious  monotheism.^  They  saw  God, 
or  rather  they  felt  him  to  be  present  in  all  things.  =* 

1  Origin  and  Growth  of  Religion,  Lect.  VI. 

2  The  recent  investigations  into  the  earlier  history  of  mankind 
and  into  their  pre-historic  notions  and  beliefs  have  been  instructive 
in  many  ways.  They  bring  to  light  facts  that  are  inconsistent  with, 
and  totally  antagonistic  to,  the  modern  theory  of  the  evolution  of 
man  from  the  lower  animals. 

Thus  Renouf,  Religion  of  Ancient  Egypt,  says,  p.  130 :  *'To  take 
for  granted  that  what  the  savages  now  are,  perhaps  after  milleniums 
of  degradation,  all  other  people  must  have  been,  and  that  modes  of 


1 6  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

As  yet  they  had  no  name  for  this  unseen,  every- 
where present  and  ever  active  Agent.  They  said, 
as  we  do,  ''  it  dawns,"  "  it  rains,"  *'  it  thunders." 
But  soon  came  a  time  when  they  began  to  inquire 
who  gives  light  in  the  morning?  Who  is  it  that 
sends  the  rain  and  speaks  in  the  thunder?  Who 
makes  the  plants  to  grow  and  clothes  the  earth  with 
verdure  ?  ^ 

The  pursuit  of  an  answer  to  these  questions,  as 
Max  Miiller  and  others  have  shown,  early  led  to  the 
conversion  of  that  simple  unconscious  monotheism — 
which  was  a  pantheism  as  well — into  a  polytheism, 
with  a  consequent  mythology  and  idol-worship. 

These  early  inquiries  and  speculations  it  is  likely, 
as  Hearne  has  well  suggested,^  were  set  on  foot  quite 
as  much,  if  not  indeed  much  more,  and  much  rather, 
especially  among  the  Aryans,  to  satisfy  a  scientific 
instinct  and  want,  than  to  gratify  any  religious  pro- 
pensity which  those  unsophisticated  children  of  the 

thought  through  which  they  are  now  passing  have  been  passed 
through  by  others,  is  a  most  unscientific  assumption,  and  you  will 
seldom  meet  with  it  in  any  essay  or  book  without  also  finding  proof 
that  the  writer  did  not  know  how  to  deal  with  historical  evidence."*^ 
He  says  of  Egypt,  p.  84:  "Of  a  state  of  barbarism  or  case  of 
patriarchal  life  anterior  to  the  monumental  period,  there  is  no  his- 
torical vestige." 

1  See  especially  Muller's  "Comparative  Mythology,"  Chips 
from  a  German  Workshops  Vol.  II.  pp.  I-142. 

2  The  Aryan  Household,  p.  286,  etc.  following. 


The  Methods  Described.  17 

earth's  early  day  may  have  had.  For  no  more  then 
than  now  did  men  believe,  or  can  they  believe,  in  a 
mere  materialism  as  explaining  all  the  phenomena 
of  the  visible  universe.  In  that  day  they  invented  a 
Zeus,  a  Ceres,  and  a  Neptune,  whom  they  regarded 
as  the  sufficient  causes  and  explanation  of  the  vari- 
ous phenomena  of  nature  that  were  observed  by 
them  in  the  earth,  the  air  and  the  seas,  and  those 
who  were  religiously  incHned  worshiped  these  fan- 
cies of  the  scientists  as  gods. 

In  these  latter  days  we  shall  find,  as  I  think,  that 
men  have  been  doing  much  the  same  thing,  and 
find  what  they  are  disposed  to  regard  as  the  ade- 
quate causes  of  the  phenomena  of  nature,  without, 
however,  the  same  religious  feelings  towards  them. 

But  to  return :  the  Method  of  Natural  Theology, 
which  was  at  first  scarcely  more  than  an  instinct,  or, 
as  I  shall  prefer  to  call  it,  an  act  of  unconscious  in- 
sight, has  been  carefully  elaborated  into  a  protracted 
argumentation  in  these  latter  days.  Nor  is  the  line 
of  argument  exclusively  modern.  Socrates^  and 
Plato  ^  urged  it  with  great  force  in  their  day. 

1  Xenophon,  Memorab.,  B.  IV.,  c.  iii.  Here  occurs  that  argu- 
ment, so  often  used  since,  from  the  eye  lashes,  and  the  conformation 
of  the  eye  brows,  the  one  to  protect  the  eye  from  dust  and  the  other 
to  protect  it  from  the  violence  of  blows. 

2  Plato,  Rcpub.,  B.  X,,  c.  i.,  and  De  Leg.  X.  $  11.  In  this  lat- 
ter  place  he  assumes  as  admitted  that  **  the  gods  "  know,  see  and 


1 8  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  within  the  last  century  the  line  of  argument 
has  been  urged  by  such  men  as  Paley,  Chalmers, 
Whewell,  and  Lord  Brougham,  andintheBridgewater 
Treatises,  until  all  well  educated  persons  are  familiar 
with  its  general  outline  and  character. 

We  may  as  well  state  this  method  of  argument 
by  the  use  of  Paley 's  illustration.  I  see  a  watch 
before  me.  By  means  which  I  need  not  now  discuss 
or  describe,  I  know  that  it  has  not  existed  always. 
Whatever  may  be  said  of  the  particles  of  the  metals 
used  in  it,  brass  and  steel  and  gold,  or  of  the  mole- 
cules in  the  glass  of  the  crystal,  the  watch,  as  the 
piece  of  mechanism  that  it  is,  has  not  existed  always. 
Hence  it  had  a  maker,  and  its  construction  and 
movements  show  that  the  watchmaker  was  a  beine 
of  intelligence  and  purpose,  and  possessed  of  power 
or  physical  force  sufficient  to  work  the  raw  materi- 
als of  metal  and  mineral  into  their  present  shape. 

Now  note:  I  here  claim  that  from  the  watch, 
considered  as  an  effect,  I  infer  the  watchmaker,  and 
I  infer  not  only  his  existence,  the  mere  fact  that  he 
isy  but  also  much  of  his  character,  or  of  what  he  is. 
I  see  that  he  must  have  been  an  intelligent  personal 
agent  with  something  of  bodily  strength. 

hear  all  things,"  and  then  proceeds  to  argue  that  from  their  essential 
activity  they  can  no  more  be  indifferent  to  or  inactive  in  the  affairs 
of  men  than  from  their  knowledge  they  can  be  ignorant  of  them. 
His  argument  is  a  good  answer  to  many  of  the  objections  we  meet 
with  in  these  days. 


The  Methods  Described.  19 

But  what  else  do  I  know  of  him  ?  Confining  my- 
self merely  to  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  but 
Httle  else ;  perhaps  nothing  else.  But  on  inquiry  I 
should  find,  most  likely,  that  there  were  several  men 
engaged  in  the  work  of  making  the  watch.  I  might 
also,  if  that  were  important  to  my  purpose,  learn 
much  more  about  them — find  their  names  and  ascer- 
tain much  that  is  interesting  of  their  personal  ap- 
pearance and  of  their  history. 

By  the  method  of  reasoning  from  effect  to  cause, 
however,  I  could  neither  ascertain  nor  find  grounds 
to  believe  much  in  answer  to  such  inquiries.  I 
could  not,  or  at  least  I  need  not,  know  that  there 
was  more  than  one  such  being.  But  what  is  more 
to  our  purpose,  I  should  not  know,  and  I  could  not 
know,  by  this  process,  that  he  was  not  himself  eter- 
nal, or  that  he  had  had  a  parentage  and  a  line  of 
ancestry  reaching  far  back  in  the  line  of  cause  and 
effect  into  the  darkness  of  the  irrecoverable  past. 

But  availing  myself  of  my  general  knowledge  on 
the  subject  I  assume  that  this  man  had,  like  all  the 
other  men  that  I  have  ever  known,  ancestors  reach- 
ing back  in  the  line  of  genealogy  to  the  first  human 
pair;  and  thus  I  encounter  the  question  of  their 
origin  and  its  Cause. 

Or,  starting  from  any  other  objects  my  eyes  can 
see,  or  my  hand  can  touch,  I  might  pass  along  a 


20  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

line  of  objects  in  the  same  method  of  reasoning  from 
effects  to  their  causes  until  I  should  come  to  the 
same  result.  Omnia  exeunt  in  Denm.  Everywhere 
do  we  find  Him  as  the  First  Cause,  and  the  only- 
adequate  explanation  of  the  existence  of  the  things 
we  see  or  know  around  us. 

It  would  be  most  natural  to  proceed  at  once  from 
this  point  to  consider  the  objections  to  this  method. 
They  fall  under  two  forms  of  objection  when  con- 
sidered in  reference  to  their  surface  appearance, 
the  theory  of  Evolution  and  some  recent  doctrines 
concerning  Causation.  But  I  have  decided  rather  to 
go  on  and  state  and  illustrate  the  other  the  subjective 
or  the  a  priori  method,  before  taking  up  the  consid- 
eration of  those  objections;  and  this,  because  the 
two  methods  are  so  connected  that  many  of  the  ob- 
jections to  the  one  are  damaging  if  not  fatal  to  the 
other  as  well,  unless  they  can  be  successfully  an- 
swered. 

II.  All  reflecting  persons  begin  at  an  early  day  in 
their  Hves  to  look  within  themselves  and  to  see  there 
thoughts  and  feelings  that  come  and  go  in  a  myste- 
rious manner ;  and  they  naturally  think  that  where 
there  is  thought  there  must  be  a  thinker.  Cogito 
ergo  Slim  is  but  a  natural  expression  of  a  natural 
instinct. 


The  Methods  Described.  2 1 

This  may  indeed  be  but  a  step  in  the  matter  of 
cause  and  effect.  But  tliere  is  another  phenomenon 
in  our  consciousness  that  brings  this  idea,  or  this  law, 
into  a  greater  prominence,  and  gives  to  it  its  posi- 
tion as  the  corner-stone  and  first  principle  of  all 
knowledge  of  everything  and  anything  besides  mere 
thought  itself 

We  see  the  motions  of  our  limbs,  our  hands  and 
our  feet,  and  we  are  conscious  of  the  effort  we  make 
to  move  them  ;  that  is,  we  are  conscious  of  ourselves 
as  causes  of  their  motions.  This  consciousness  be- 
comes more  conspicuous  when  we  have  occasion  to 
move  something  that  is  heavy,  or  which,  for  any 
cause,  resists  our  effort.  We  thus  learn  that  there  is 
something  that  is  not  ourselves  in  the  world  around 
us  which  is  also  an  active  and  an  efficient  cause. 

We  soon  come  to  the  conclusion  that  whatever  is 
recognized  or  in  any  way  known  as  an  effect^  must 
have  had  a  cause,  the  existence  and  reality  of  which 
is  known  in  and  by  the  very  act  by  which  we  know 
the  immediate  object  of  our  knowledge  to  be  an 
effect. 

But  cause  and  effect  are  in  a  series.  Before  the 
effect  there  must  have  been  the  cause ;  and  this,  if 
not  the  First  Cause,  must  have  been  an  effect  also, 
and  so  have  had  a  cause ;  and  so  on,  in  a  retrogres- 
sion,  until  we   come  to  a  First    Cause,    which   as 


22  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

the  First  Cause  must  be  the  Cause  of  all  things,  and 
so — in  the  only  sense  in  which  we  can  understand 
or  predicate  the  word — the  Creator  of  all  things. 

Another  line  of  reflection  and  argumentation^ 
starting  still  from  within  and  adhering  to  the  inte- 
rior method,  leads  to  the  same  result. 

We  soon  find  that  all  knowledge  is  by  means  of 
co-ordination.  There  must  be  a  co-ordination  of 
two  objects  in  all  possible  acts  of  cognition  that  take 
place  in  time  and  are  performed  by  a  finite  and  im- 
perfect being. 

In  the  case  of  the  blind  man,  all  persons  are 
familiar  with  the  fact  that  he  has  no  idea  of  light,  or 
of  the  colors  that  we  discriminate  in  ordinary  day- 
light. But  on  a  Htde  reflection  we  find  that  it  is 
just  as  certain  that  he  has  no  idea  of  darkness  either, 
and  can  attach  no  more  meaning  to  that  word, 
although  he  is  immersed  in  the  most  profound  dark- 
ness all  the  while,  than  he  can  to  the  words  light, 
red,  blue  or  white.  But  open  his  eyes  and  enable 
him  to  see,  and  he  very  soon  comes  to  understand 
the  meaning  of  both  words,  darkness  and  light,  and 
all  the  varied  terms  that  denote  the  colors  of  objects 
that  are  seen  in  the  light.  But  until  this  experience, 
and  without  it,  he  had  no  idea  of  either  of  the  co- 
ordinates, hght  and  darkness,  nor  yet  of  any  of  the 
subordinates  of  either;  or  of  the  different  colors 
which  objects  seen  in  the  Hght  appear  to  have. 


The  Methods  Described,  23 

Much  the  same  may  be  said  of  the  deaf  man,  with 
regard  to  the  two  co-ordinates  silence  and  sound, 
and  to  the  co-ordination  of  the  one — silence,  with 
any  of  the  subordinates  of  the  other,  as  a  loud  sound, 
a  shrill  sound,  a  whisper,  a  murmur,  a  strain  of  mu- 
sic or  a  peal  of  bells. 

Now  this  law  and  this  fact  of  co-ordination  runs 
through  all  known  human  knowledge,  and  appHes 
to,  and  controls,  every  act  of  cognition  that  takes 
place  in  time.  It  appHes,  therefore,  to  all  the  words 
and  terms  that  we  may  use  in  any  language  with 
which  to  express  our  thoughts  and  behefs.  Hence, 
all  things  that  are  known  or  thought  of  go  in  pairs ; 
the  one  impHes  the  other,  so  that  without  both,  or 
the  thought  of  both,  we  could  have  no  idea  or 
knowledge  of  either. 

It  is  said  that  no  savage  tribe  has  ever  been  found 
with  a  name  for  their  social  condition — savagery. 
But  people  who  have  become  civilized  have  a  name 
for  both  conditions — civilization  and  savagery. 

Thus,  by  this  law  of  co-ordination,  the  cognition  or 
thought  of  any  thing  as  an  effect  implies  the  thought 
or  cognition  of  something  as  cause ;  and  so  the  very 
idea  of  cause  implies  an  effect,  just  as  the  word  and 
idea  of  child  impHes  that  of  parent.  And  the  two 
are  co-ordinates  as  objects  of  cognition  and  of 
thought.     We  might  know  a  human  being,  indeed. 


24  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

without  knowing  that  it  was  either  parent  or  child. 
But  we  could  not  know  it  to  be  either  the  one  or  the 
other  without  knowing  that  there  are  now  existing, 
or  have  been  existing  at  some  time  in  the  past,  the 
two ;  and  one  of  them  as  certainly  as  the  other. 

The  a  priori  demonstration  of  this  law  is  very  ab- 
struse and  difficult  of  comprehension,  although,  as  I 
think,  it  is  irrefragable  and  overwhelmingly  conclu- 
sive. But  I  shall  not  attempt  to  present  it  here.  I 
have  aimed  rather  to  state  the  law  and  to  illustrate 
it  with  such  examples  as  will  make  it  easily  intelli- 
gible. 

After  having  expressed  myself  so  confidently  with 
regard  to  the  universality  and  the  certainty  of  this 
law,  it  is  but  fair  that  I  should  give  notice  that  there 
are  certain  cautions  to  be  observed  in  its  application 
to  words  that  may  have  been  used,  which,  however, 
I  have  not  time  to  discuss  in  this  place.  One  of 
these  only  will  I  mention.  In  order  to  be  a  basis  of 
proof  of  the  existence  of  anything  the  two  co-ordi- 
nates must  have  some  property  that  is  not  common 
to  both,  otherwise  one  of  them  may  be  merely  an 
other  name  for  the  same  thing  or  for  some  fiction, 
like  that  of  a  centaur,  for  example,  which  has  no 
property  that  is  not  found  in  some  real  object,  and 
hence  the  idea  may  be  a  pure  creation  of  fancy. 

Now  let  us  apply  this  law  to  a  few  of  the  ques- 
tions that  are  before  us. 


The  Methods  Described.  25 

In  every  act  of  perception  there  are  the  two,  the 
self  that  perceives  and  the  object  perceived.  Whether 
I  see  this  paper,  or  hear  the  voice  of  a  friend,  both 
the  paper  and  the  friend  must  exist,  as  realities,  as 
truly  as  myself,  or  no  such  act  of  perception  could 
take  place.  Hence  the  co-ordinates  of  self  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  objects  in  the  outward  world,  the 
not- me  of  the  philosophers,  on  the  other. 

So  again  I  am  conscious  of  myself  as  acting  spon- 
taneously, or,  as  we  often  say  for  brevity's  sake,  I 
am  conscious  of  spontaneity.  If  this  is  so,  there 
must  be  something — and  we  must  have  had  knowl- 
edge of  it  somewhere  and  somehow — that  is  not 
spontaneous,  a  something  that  acts  under  the  law  of 
inertia  which  is  the  co-ordinate  of  spontaneity;  and 
this  we  hold  to  be  the  case  with  all  the  mere  mate- 
rial objects  in  the  world  of  inorganic  matter. 

This  fact  is  important  in  its  bearing  on  the  ques- 
tion of  free-will,  so  often  discussed  among  philoso- 
phers, and  so  important  in  its  bearing  on  many  of 
the  subordinate  points  of  Natural  Theology.  There 
must  be  freedom  and  free-will  somewhere  or  there 
would  be  no  thought  or  conception  of  it,  and  no 
question  about  it  in  the  minds  of  men ;  and  no  name 
or  word  for  it  in  any  of  the  languages  that  are  un- 
derstood or  spoken  by  any  of  the  inhabitants  of  the 
earth. 


26  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

I  cite  as  a  further  illustration  of  this  law  of  co- 
ordination, Herbert  Spencer's  criticism  of  the  argu- 
ment which  Sir  William  Hamilton  and  Dean  Mansel 
had  elaborated  and  urged  to  show  that,  on  purely 
logical  and  metaphysical  grounds,  we  have,  and  can 
have,  no  proof  of  the  existence  and  attributes  of 
God. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  had  maintained  that  all  our 
knowledge  is  "  relative  "  ;  that  we  know  nothing  of 
things  themselves,  or  **  in  themselves,"  as  he  prefers 
to  express  it,  and  that  our  idea  of  God,  whether  we 
regard  Him  as  "  the  Absolute,"  "  the  Infinite,"  or 
''  the  Unconditioned,"  is  only  *'  negative,"  and  of 
such  a  nature  as  neither  to  imply  any  proof  of  His 
existence  or  afford  any  knowledge  of  His  attributes. 
But  Spencer  rephes  and  insists,  with  his  pecuHar 
clearness  of  expression  and  force  of  reasoning,  that 
the  very  existence  of ''  the  finite  "  implies  the  exist- 
ence of  "  the  Infinite  "  ;  the  very  existence  of  any 
thing  "  Hmited  "  and  '*  conditioned  "  impHes  the  re- 
aHty  of  something  that  is  **  unconditioned "  and 
"  absolute."  He  admits,  indeed,  that  this  Something 
may  not  be,  and  in  fact  is  not,  an  object  of  immedi- 
ate knowledge,  whether  by  consciousness  or  sense- 
perception.  But  he  insists  upon  its  existence,  and 
its  reahty,  as  implied  in  the  very  nature  and  laws  of 
thought. 


The  Methods  Described. 


Spencer  recognizes  the  fundamental  distinction  of 
all  things  into  two  classes — phe7ioniena  which  appear 
to  and  are  cognizable  by  the  senses  and  noiunena, 
denoting  by  this  latter  word  such  things  as  are 
known  to  us  only  by  insight  and  a  process  of  rea- 
soning, apprehended,  as  Plato  had  said,  by  reason 
and  insight,  but  not  by  sight. 

This  distinction  between  phenomena  and  noume- 
nia — things  seen  and  things  unseen — was  sharply 
drawn  by  Plato.  He  speaks  of  things  to  which  we 
are  led  by  the  insight  of  reason,  and  not  by  the  see- 
ing of  the  eyes,  voj'jijeiv,  aW  ovk  ofxjxaair} 

At  a  later  date  St.  Paul  recognizes  the  distinction 
and  gives  to  it  the  sanction  and  weight  of  his  great 
authority  when  he  says,^  speaking  of  God,  that  "  the 
invisible  things  of  Him,  the  aoparcx,  things  which 
the  eyes  of  the  body  cannot  see,  are  nevertheless 
voovjueva,  "  noumena,  made  apparent,  that  is  phe- 
nomenal, by  the  things  that  are  seen  by  the  bodily 
eyes,  even  His  eternal  power  and  godhead." 

But  Spencer  is  very  emphatic ;  and  although  his 
language  contains  words  and  expressions  that  I  do 
not  altogether  like,  and  should  not  use,  yet  I  cannot 

1  Plato,  Reptib.,  B.  VII,  c.  x.,  xi.,  529  B.  And  a  little  further 
on  he  indicates  the  same  contrast  in  still  other  words,  speaking  of 
things  as  a"  8rj  Xoycp  xal  diaroia  Xt^Ttrd  6:ipei  6^  6v,  received 
or  accepted  by  reason  and  insight  but  not  by  the  sight  of  the  eyes, 

2  Rom.  I.,  20. 


28  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology, 

forbear  quoting  it.  After  a  long  review  and  criti- 
cism of  Sir  William's  doctrine,  and  the  fuller  expo- 
sition of  it  given  by  Dean  Mansel  in  his  Limits  of 
Religious  Thought^  he  proceeds  to  say  :  ^  "  Observe 
in  the  first  place,  that  any  one  of  the  arguments  by 
which  the  relativity  of  our  knowledge  is  demon- 
strated distinctly  postulates  the  positive  existence  of 
something  beyond  the  relative.  To  say  that  we 
cannot  know  the  Absolute  [God]  is  by  implication 
to  affirm  that  there  is  an  Absolute  [God].  In  the 
very  denial  of  our  power  to  learn  what  the  Absolute 
[God]  is,  there  lies  hidden  the  assumption  that  it 
[He]  is ;  and  the  making  of  this  assumption  proves 
that  the  Absolute  [God]  has  been  present  to  the 
mind,  not  as  a  nothing,  but  as  a  something.  Simi- 
larly, with  every  step  in  the  reasoning  by  which  this 
doctrine  is  upheld.  The  Noumenon,  everywhere 
named  as  the  antithesis  [co-ordinate  as  I  would 
call  it]  of  the  Phenomenon,  is  throughout  necessarily 
thought  of  as  an  actuality.  It  is  rigorously  impos- 
sible to  conceive  that  our  knowledge  is  a  knowledge 
of  Appearances  only,  without,  at  the  same  time, 
conceiving  a  Reality  of  which  they  are  appearances 
[or  manifestations]  .  .  .  Strike  out  from  the  argument 
the  terms  Unconditioned,  Infinite,  Absolute,  with 
their  equivalents,  and  in  place  of  them  write  nega- 

^  First  Principles,  Pt.  I.,  $  26. 


The  Methods  Described.  29 

tion  of  conceivability  or  absence  of  the  conditions 
under  which  consciousness  [cognition]  is  possible, 
and  you  find  that  the  argument  becomes  nonsense. 
Truly  to  realize  in  thought  any  one  of  the  proposi- 
tions of  which  the  argument  consists,  the  Uncondi- 
tioned [God]  must  be  represented  as  positive  and 
not  negative.  How,  then,  can  it  be  a  legitimate 
conclusion  from  the  argument  that  our  conscious- 
ness [cognition]  of  it  is  negative  ?  An  argument, 
the  very  construction  of  which  assigns  to  a  certain 
term  a  certain  meaning,  but  which  ends  in  showing 
that  this  term  has  no  such  meaning,  is  simply  an 
elaborate  suicide.  Clearly,  then,  the  very  demonstra- 
tion that  a  definite  consciousness  [cognition]  of  the 
Absolute  [God]  is  impossible  to  us,  unavoidably 
presupposes  an  indefinite  consciousness  [cognition] 
of  it." 

This  is  strong,  and  it  seems  to  me  unanswerable. 
I  have  taken  the  liberty  to  bracket  in,  in  several 
places,  words  which  will  explain  his  meaning  in  my 
own  terms.     In  this  I  do  his  thought  no  injustice. 

If  Spencer  intended  to  use  the  word  "phenomena" 
in  the  strict  Kantian  sense,  the  word  "  noumena " 
must  be  understood  to  include  all  substantial  reali- 
ties of  whatever  kind — everything,  in  fact,  except 
the  thoughts  which  we  have  of  the  things.  This, 
however,  is  doubtful. '    But,  in  any  view,  his  language 


30  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

must  be  understood  to  Include  the  existence  of  God  ; 
and  his  argument  is  just  or  conclusive,  and  as  much 
to  my  present  purpose  as  though  he  had  had  no 
other  object  in  mind.  But  be  this  as  it  may,  the 
language  constantly  used  by  Hamilton  and  Mansel 
leave  no  room  to  doubt  that  they  did  intend  to  de- 
note the  Supreme  Being,  the  Christian's  God,  by  the 
words  they  used  in  the  argument  to  which  Spencer 
replies. 

This,  however,  is  not  the  only  way,  nor  the  only 
instance  in  which  Spencer  has  recognized  and  ac- 
knowledged the  existence  of  God  as  a  First  and  Uni- 
versal Cause.  He  says,^  **  We  are  obliged  to  regard 
every  phenomena  as  a  manifestation  of  some  Power 
by  which  we  are  acted  upon ;  phenomena  being,  so 
far  as  we  can  ascertain,  unlimited  in  their  diffusion, 
we  are  obliged  to  regard  this  Power  as  omnipresent." 
Again,^  *'  He  [the  philosopher]  like  any  other  man 
may  properly  consider  himself  as  one  of  the  myriad 
agencies  through  whom  the  Unknown  cause  acts." 

A  more  distinct  recognition  and  admission  of  a 
First  Cause,  now  and  ever,  everywhere  and  universally 
acting,  not  only  in  the  phenomena  of  nature,  but  in 
the  thoughts  and  feelings  of  our  own  minds,  could 
hardly  be  made. 

"^  First  Principles,  Pt.  I.,  §  27,  p.  99. 
2  First  Principles,  Pt.  I.,  §  34,  p.  123. 


The  Methods  Described.  3 1 

This,  however,  is  not  the  first  or  only  instance  in 
which  Spencer,  under  the  guidance  of  his  clear  in- 
sight and  sound  logic,  marches  up  squarely  to,  and 
sees  a  truth  face  to  face,  acknowledges  it,  and  then 
turns  away,  and  speaks  and  acts  as  though  he  had 
never  seen  it.  Nay,  he  even  virtually  denies  that 
he  has  seen  it,  by  consigning  it  and  its  object  to  the 
region  of  the  Unknown  and  Unknowable. 

But  surely  that,  or  He,  of  whom  so  much  can  be 
said  is  not  unknowable  nor  altogether  "  unknown." 
It  would  seem  rather  that,  though  incomprehensible. 
He  is  about  the  best  known  of  all  things.^ 

It  is  worthy  of  note,  it  seems  to  me,  as  a  piece  of 
grim  irony,  this  attempt  of  Spencer  to  refute  such 
men  as  Hamilton  and  Mansel,  in  a  matter  of  this 
kind.  They  were  both  Christian  believers  and  ear- 
nest Christian  men.  He  is  professedly  an  agnostic, 
and  has  admitted  that  agnosticism  is  practically 
atheism.^  *'  The  knowledge  that  is  within  .us  is  the 
only  knowledge  that  can  be  of  service  to  us,"  are  his 
words.  And  yet  we  have  the  strange  spectacle  of 
Spencer,  the  confessed  agnostic,  trying  to  convince 

1  If  Spencer  would  only  change  his  phraseology  and  substitute  for 
**  unknowable  "  the  good  honest  English  word  *'  incomprehensible," 
we  could  readily  agree  with  him,  and  he  would  moreover  express 
much  more  adequately  what  is  really  the  legitimate  conclusion  from 
his  premises. 

2  §  25,  p.  86. 


32  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

these  professing  Christians,  on  purely  philosophical 
grounds,  that  God  is  not  an  abstraction  or  a  mere 
negation,  but  is  rather  a  most  positive  Reality,  a 
reahty  without  which  nothing  else  can  be  real,  and 
declaring  that  all  their  arguments  are  absurd  and 
**  elaborately  suicidal." 

And  Kant  has  argued  in  one  of  his  world-famous 
Ajttmomies,  of  which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  say 
something  more  in  a  subsequent  Lecture,  that  the 
existence  of  God  is  so  involved  in  the  very  laws  and 
conditions  of  thought  that  it  is  about  the  only  thing 
that  we  cannot  deny  without  involving  ourselves  in 
a  contradiction  of  terms.  And  yet  neither  of  these 
philosophers — neither  Kant  nor  Spencer — accepted 
as  a  part  of  their  philosophy  the  doctrine  which  they 
had  so  earnestly  asserted,  and  had  defended  with  so 
much  ingenuity. 

I  have  already  said  that  this  law  of  co-ordination 
requires  some  caution  in  its  application.  It  applies 
only  to  the  origination  of  what  we  may  call  simple 
or  elementary  ideas.  Thus  I  regard  the  color  red- 
ness as  such  an  elementary  property.  Hence  I 
suppose  that  one  who,  although  he  had  seen  objects 
of  any  other  color,  had  seen  nothing  that  is  red, 
could  not  imagine,  or  even  so  much  as  dream  of,  one 
that  is  red.  But  suppose  he  had  seen  some  objects 
that  are  red  and  others  that  are  blue,  I  presume  he 


The  Methods  Described.  33 

could  originate  the  idea  of  purple  without  actual 
cognition  of  any  purple  object. 

This  law  applies  only  to  the  origi7tation  of  knowl- 
edge— the  original  act  of  cognition,  and  hence  it  can 
have  no  application  to  the  Divine  Mind,  as  there 
was  no  beginning  to  His  knowledge. 

But  let  us  return  to  the  consideration  of  the 
a  priori  method.  It  is  about  as  old  as  the  other, 
although  it  has  not  always  been  presented  in  quite 
the  same  form.  It  is  implied  and  used  by  Plato. 
It  was  made  necessary,  in  fact,  by  his  theory  of 
ideas  as  the  elementary  parts  of  knowledge.  As 
these  ideas  do  not  originate  in  the  human  mind,  but 
are  retained  as  the  result  of  a  past  experience  in 
some  former  state  of  existence,  they  imply  both  the 
pre-existence  and  the  future  immortality  of  the 
soul. 

His  doctrine  of  ideas  implied  their  eternal  exist- 
ence; and  also,  and  of  necessity,  the  eternal  existence 
of  the  Logos,  God  Himself,  as  the  ground  of  their 
possibility,  while  they  were  the  patterns  or  arche- 
types by  which  He  created  all  things  out  of  the 
matter,  which,  without  Him  and  the  ideas,  had  no 
properties  and  no  specific  forms  or  modes  of  exist- 
ence. 

As  the  Platonic  theories  and  speculations  so  ex- 
tensively underlie  and  give  explanation  to  most  or 


34  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

all  the  arguments  in  the  subjective  method,  I  will  go 
a  little  more  fully  into  a  statement  of  them. 

The  first  passage  I  shall  cite  is  found  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  tenth  Book  of  the  Republic.  Plato 
is  there  giving  a  very  elementary  explanation  of 
what  he  means  by  ideas.  He  says  of  the  artisan 
who  is  making  household  furniture,  that  in  order  to 
make  tables,  bedsteads,  etc.,  he  must  have  in  his 
mind  an  idea,  a  pattern,  or  paradigm  of  the  bed  or 
table  to  guide  him  in  his  works ;  otherwise,  though 
he  may  hew  and  hack  and  waste  lumber,  he  will  not 
make  any  one  definite  or  useful  thing.  He  then 
proceeds  to  do  what  Plato  never  loses  an  opportu- 
nity for  doing.  He  alludes  to  the  creation,  and  says 
that  in  the  same  way  as  the  human  cabinet  maker 
must  have  an  idea  of  the  table,  etc.,  in  his  mind  be- 
fore he  does  his  work,  and  while  he  is  doing  it,  so 
the  great  Artificer  and  Creator  of  the  Universe  must 
have  had  in  His  mind  ideas  or  patterns  of  all  the 
things  that  are  in  it  before  he  made  this  universe. 

The  next  passage  I  shall  cite  is  from  the  Meno. 
Plato  is  here  trying  to  prove  that  ideas  are  innate 
and  not  acquired  from  observations  and  experience. 
He — or  rather  Socrates — calls  a  boy  before  him  and 
asks  him  a  question  with  regard  to  the  area  of  a 
rectangle.  The  boy  at  first  answers  wrong.  Socra- 
tes proceeds  to  ask  question  after  question  until  he 


The  Methods  Described.  35 

gets  the  right  answer.  He  then  turns  to  his  com- 
panions and  says  to  them,  "  You  see  I  have  told  him 
nothing  and  yet  he  answers  right  now ;  the  idea  was 
in  his  mind  and  all  I  had  to  do  was  to  draw  it  out." 

Then  follow  some  remarks  with  regard  to  "  edu- 
cation." It  consists  as  Plato  teaches  in  drawing 
out — not  the  mind  as  we  say — but  in  drawing  out 
the  ideas  which  are  already  there — innate  in  the 
mind. 

He  then  goes  on  to  teach  that  all  ideas  are  in  the 
Divine  mind,  constitute  its  very  essence,  were  always 
there  and  were  communicated  to  us— put  into  our 
minds — in  some  pre-existing  state  of  being,  and  at 
the  time  of  our  birth  we  forgot  them  ;  that  what  we 
call  education  should  rather  be  regarded  as  remin- 
iscence, recollection,  dva/ivr/ffzg.  And  in  the 
Ph(Ed0y  Plato  used  the  same  line  of  argument  to 
prove  the  future  hfe  and  the  immortality  of  the 
soul. 

In  the  Timmis,  chapters  xxvii  and  following,  we 
have  an  account  of  the  creation.  He  assumes  that 
there  is  a  certain  pre-existing  matter,  ro  ov  for 
which  Aristotle  introduced  the  word  v\r]  or  matter, 
vXrf  V7toK£i}xeyriy  underlying  matter,  and  which 
came  at  a  later  day,  especially  by  the  Stoics,  to  be 
called  vXrf  anoioz^  or  material  substance  without 
properties  or  specific  kinds  or  character. 


S6  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology, 

Now  in  this  we  must  carefully  notice  the  fact  that 
Plato's  theory  of  ideas  makes  them  to  be  things  in 
the  mind.  They  are  not  mere  states  of  the  miridy  as 
warmth  is  a  state  of  the  body,  but  they  are  things 
in  the  mind,  as  the  heart  and  lungs  are  in  the  body, 
or  the  blood  is  in  the  veins.  These  ideas  Plato  re- 
garded as  the  proper  object  of  study  in  order  that 
we  may  obtain  '*  true  knowledge  " — eTtiarrjixr/ — or 
general  principles  and  absolute  truths,  as  distinct 
from  the  mere  first  impressions — do^a — as  he  calls 
them,  which  the  mere  unreflecting  mind  gets  from 
observation  of  external  things. 

But  in  his  discussion  of  the  relation  of  these 
''  ideas  "  to  creation,  Plato  has  two  points  to  be  con- 
sidered. The  first  is  that  which  I  have  already  al- 
luded to,  namely,  that  they  were  the  patterns,  ideals, 
or  paradigms  after  which,  or  in  accordance  with 
which,  the  Creator  formed  all  the  things  that  are 
made. 

The  other  point  is  more  obscure.  In  the  Parme- 
nides}  and  again  in  the  Cratylus^  and  in  the  Timceus^ 
as  well  as  other  places,  Plato  discusses  the  relation 
of  these  ideas  to  external  things  and  to  the  acts  of 
creation,  whereby  the  primeval,  formless  matter  came 
to  be,  by  the  Divine  agency,  what  we  see  it  to  be  in 
the  material  objects  around  us. 

1  $  10.     2  §  up.     3  §$  25,  26. 


The  Methods  Described.  37 

In  these  discussions  Plato  assumes,  as  before,  that 
ideas  ar^e  things.  If  we  regard  them  as  only  in  the 
mindy  they  are  ideas,  and  ideas  only.  But  if  we  con- 
sider them  as  external  to  the  mind,  they  are  the 
properties  of  the  objects  which  we  see  around  us  in 
nature.  Thus  *^ whiteness"  considered  as  in  the 
mind  is  only  an  idea;  considered  as  an  objective 
reality,  it  is  a  property  of  the  objects  around  us  that 
we  call  white,  the  paper,  the  snow,  and  whatever 
else  appears  to  us  to  be  white.  So,  too,  take  the 
word  humanity:  as  a  thought  within  us,  it  is  an 
idea ;  as  a  property  without,  it  is  a  characteristic  of 
man — a  property  that  is  common  to  all  men.  And 
Plato  explains  the  process  of  creation  in  the  passages 
above  cited,  and  speaks  of  it  as  imparting^  as  the 
actual  transference  of,  these  ideas  of  the  Divine  mind 
to  mere  substantial  matter,  thus  making  of  it  the 
various  objects  and  the  different  kinds  of  matter  in 
the  universe.  He  imparted  the  idea  of  whiteness  to 
some,  and  they  became  white ;  hardness  to  others, 
and  they  became  hard ;  the  properties  of  iron  to 
some,  and  it  became  iron ;  and  so  of  all  the  other 
kinds  of  matter.     He  gave  animality  to  some,  and 

1  This  relation  or  transference  of  ideas  is  denoted  by  such  words 
zsiA.ETaXajLifia.vEiVyiJ.ETax£iy,  M^Oezi'^,  Ttapovdia  Koivcovia, 
etc.     I  am  indebted  to  a  Note  in  Zeller's  Hisf.  Greek  Phil.,  vol. 
Plato,  p.  335,  for  this  list  of  words. 
3 


38  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

they  became  animals ;  humanity  to  others,  and  they 
became  human  beings,  men  and  women. 

And  so,  too,  among  the  Philosophers  of  the  Middle 
Ages.  Whenever  any  one  of  them  had  occasion  to 
imply  or  expressly  state  any  of  the  grounds  of  be- 
lieving in  the  existence  of  God  as  a  doctrine  of  Nat- 
ural Theology,  they  pursued  a  line  of  argument 
similar  to  the  one  we  are  now  considering.  I  have 
space  and  time  to  mention  only  a  few. 

Thus  John  Scott  Erigena,  born  in  the  beginning 
of  the  9th  century,  and  died  Z^J  A.  D.  He  insists 
very  strenuously  that  the  very  name  or  idea  of  God 
implies  his  existence.  In  his  view  God  can  be  no 
mere  phenomenon,  not  a  thing  or  being  that  can  be 
seen  by  the  bodily  organs.  He  is  nevertheless  really 
notimenony  seen  by  the  insight  of  reason,  and  is 
"  manifest  "  everywhere  and  in  all  things ;  seen,  as 
Plato  had  said,  vorjaeir,  a\X  ovk  o}X}xa6iv,  by  the 
insight  of  reason  and  not  by  the  bodily  eyes,  so  that 
all  phenomena  or  objects  are  but  the  manifestation 
of  .some  noumenal  Power  whose  presence  is  seen 
throughout  creation. 

Plato's  theory  of  ideas  was,  with  him,  the  founda- 
tion of  the  argument.  In  that  view  God  and  ideas 
alone  have  essential  or  substantial  existence.  God 
is  the  First  Cause  of  all  things,  and  they  are  ''pri- 
mordial causes  "  {causce  primordiales]  in  Him.    God 


The  Methods  Described.  39 

is  in  His  essence  incognizable,  both  for  men  and  for 
angels.  Nevertheless  His  being  and  attributes  are 
seen  and  manifest  in  visible  things.  They  are  His 
manifestation.  His  wisdom  is  seen  in  their  order, 
and  His  life  in  their  motion  and  change.  All  predi- 
cates may  be  affirmed  of  Him  which  have  not  in 
their  nature  an  opposite  such  as  to  imply  limitation, 
and  so,  imperfection.  Hence  God  may  be  called 
truth,  goodness,  light,  justice,  and  many  other 
things,  figuratively,  or  symbohcally.  But  strictly 
speaking  and  literally  He  can  be  called  Being,  es- 
sentia^  ovaia,  alone.  Hence  in  the  view  of  Erigena, 
the  nature  of  God  is,  in  fact,  superessential, 
VTtepoixTia,  above  the  ten  categories  of  Aristotle 
and  cannot  be  expressed  or  represented  in  either  of 
them. 

God  created  ideas.  They  were  first  in  the  order 
of  creation.  And  hence  they  were  called  primor- 
dial causes,  or  in  the  terms  of  Plato  paradigms  and 
patterns.  These  ideas  make  up  the  Divine  Wisdom. 
When  imparted  to  matter  and  made  manifest,  that 
is,  visible  and  tangible,  they  become  and  constitute 
the  objects  which  make  up  the  external  or  material 
world. 

Anselm,  Archbishop  of  Canterbury  and  a  great 
scholar,  was  born  about  two  centuries  after  Erigena, 
A.  D.  1033.     He  seems  to  have  taken  a  most  com- 


40  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

prehensive  view  of  things.  His  fundamental  axiom 
that  all  knowledge  exists  on  faith,  credo  ut  intelli- 
gam,  has  a  broader  appHcation  than  is  generally- 
conceded  to  it.  By  faith  in  our  senses  we  begin  to 
know  and  understand  the  phenomena  of  the  exter- 
nal world.  In  like  manner  by  faith  in  the  teachings 
of  the  Church,  we  believe  the  Creed,  and  then  pro- 
ceed to  consider  and  understand  the  articles  of  the 
Christian  Faith.  But,  as  in  the  former  case,  no  one 
feels  at  liberty  or  thinks  it  wise  to  deny  the  reality 
of  the  external  world  around  us,  because  he  cannot 
understand  and  comprehend  all  its  mysteries;  so, 
on  the  other  hand,  no  one  may  reject  the  Christian 
Faith  because  he  finds  many  things  in  its  facts  and 
doctrines  that  are  beyond  his  comprehension,  nojt  a 
fide  recedere  si  intelligere  noit  valet. 

Anselm  thought  the  observation  of  external  phe- 
nomena naturally  turned  the  thoughts  in  upon  them- 
selves, and  thus,  in  his  view,  we  find  the  thought  or 
idea  of  a  Supreme  Being.  He  then  proceeds,  by 
way  of  analysis,  to  argue  that  the  very  idea  of  this 
Being  in  our  minds  implies  His  reality  and  existence 
somewhere,  out  of  our  minds.  *'  One  is  convinced, 
therefore,"  says  he,  "  that  there  must  be  somewhere, 
either  in  the  mind  or  out  of  it,  a  Being  than  Whom 
there  can  be  no  greater,  because  when  he  hears 
these  words  he    understands   their   meaning,   and 


The  Methods  Described.  41 

whatever  is  understood  is  in  the  mind."  But  cer- 
tainly that  Being  than  Whom  there  can  be  no 
greater,  cannot  exist  in  the  mind  alotte  {in  intellectu 
solo).  It  may  add  a  Httle  to  the  right  comprehen- 
sion and  the  rhetorical  effect  of  this  argument  to 
consider  that  St.  Anselm  is  speaking  with  reference 
to  "  the  fool "  [insipiens)  whom  David  had  repre- 
sented as  saying,  "in  his  heart,  there  is  no  God." 

St.  Aquinas,  born  A.  D.  1225,  about  two  hun- 
dred years  after  Anselm,  and  about  four  hundred 
after  Scott  Erigena,  was  perhaps  the  greatest  man 
in  all  the  Middle  Ages,  taking  into  account  both 
theological  attainment  and  philosophical  acumen. 
The  discussions  of  the  preceding  centuries  between 
the  Realists  and  the  Nominalists  had  had  their  effect 
on  him.  He  yielded  certain  points  which  may  be 
regarded  as  in  some  sense  concessions  to  the  Nomi- 
nalists, and  he  came  in  consequence  much  more 
nearly  to  a  common  sense  view  of  things  than  the 
earlier  Realists  had  done.  He  reversed  the  order 
of  Anselm,  and  held  that  knowledge  is  in  fact  the 
basis  of  faith.  He  called  the  beginning  of  knowl- 
edge the  prceambida  fideiy  the  morning  walks  of 
faith.  We  must  know  something,  in  his  opinion, 
before  we  can  begin  to  exercise  faith. 

I  think,  however,  that  in  this  he  meant  merely  to 
recognize  the  obvious  fact  that  we  begin  to  exercise 


42  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

our  minds  by  the  observation  of  the  objects  in  the 
external  world  by  sense-perception,  before  we  begin 
to  reflect  much  on  their  origin  and  cause,  or  on  the 
existence  of  God.  In  doing  this  we  have  faith  in 
our  faculties,  and  in  our  theological  speculations  we 
need  do  only  the  same  tiling. 

However,  this  is  not  very  important  for  our  pres* 
ent  purpose.  St.  Thomas  fully  recognized  and  ap- 
preciated the  external  or  synthetic  method.  He 
believed  that  from  the  first  step  in  knowledge,  which 
consists  in  the  act  of  perceiving  objects  individually 
and  one  by  one,  and  seeing  the  relation  of  cause  and 
efifect  here  and  there  in  separate  instances,  we  nat- 
urally, and  by  a  sort  of  unreasoning  instinct,  proceed 
by  generalization  and  synthesis,  until  we  reach  the 
idea  of  a  First  Cause  and  a  summiiin  genus,  which 
includes  all  being ;  or,  as  I  should  prefer  to  say,  in 
deference  to  modern  usages,  a  genus  which  includes 
and  in  some  way  comprehends  all  the  individual 
objects  that  exist,  or  can  exist  anywhere. 

Thus  St.  Thomas  held  that  the  existence  of  God 
cannot  be  regarded  as  a  self-evident  truth,  although 
it  is  a  truth  which  may  be  proved ;  and  the  grounds 
of  this  demonstration  are  to  be  sought  in  what  is 
more  and  better  known,  and  very  much  in  accord- 
ance with  the  a  posteriori  methods  of  more  recent 
times. 


The  Methods  Described.  43 


This  mode  of  proof  consists,  in  his  estimation,  of 
two  elements,  (i)  Assuming,  as  Aristotle  had  done, 
the  inertia  of  all  material  objects  considered  as  mere 
matter,  there  must  be  something  that  is  not  inert,  a 
first  Mover,  whose  existence  is  implied  in  all  mo- 
tion. And  (2)  St.  Thomas  held  that  in  any  reces- 
sion  along  the  line  of  effect  and  cause  we  must  come 
at  last  to  a  First  Cause,  before  Whom  there  was  no 
other.  But  when  he  had  arrived,  by  his  exterior  or 
synthetic  method,  at  the  idea  of  God,  he  adopts  the 
interior  and  analytic  method  of  developing  the  idea, 
with  as  much  confidence,  and  he  develops  it  with  as 
much  energy  and  clearness,  as  any  of  the  philoso- 
phers we  know  of,  and  as  confidently,  too,  as  though 
he  knew  of  no  other  method, 

I  cannot  do  justice  to  this  part  of  my  subject 
although  I  have  already  lingered  long  upon  it,  with- 
out mentioning  one  more  great  name — a  name  which 
is,  in  some  respects,  better  worth  mention  than  any 
we  have  had  before  us.     I  mean  Rene  Descartes. 

Descartes  was  born  in  A.  D.  1596.  Inferior  to  no 
one  of  his  predecessors  in  acuteness  of  penetration, 
or  in  logical  precision  of  expression,  he  surpassed 
them  all  in  the  comprehensive  grasp  of  his  subject, 
and  he  had  the  advantage  of  them  all  by  the  three 
and  a  half  centuries  of  controversy  upon  this  and 
kindred  subjects,  that  had  passed  away  since  the 
time  of  St.  Thomas. 


44  The  Methods  of  Nahtral  Theology. 

He  considered  all  knowledge,  all  thought  in  fact, 
as  made  up  of  primary  and  elementary  parts,  just  as 
the  visible  universe  is  made  up  of  the  individual 
objects  which  we  see  and  feel,  suns  and  stars,  mount- 
ains and  streams,  rocks  and  trees,  plants  and  animals, 
from  the  largest  cosmic  mass  to  the  smallest  grain 
of  sand  or  molecule  of  water.  These  parts  he  called 
ideas ;  and  taken  together,  they  make  up  the  sum 
total  of  our  knowledge.  They  are  our  thoughts  of 
objects — all  objects,  whether  seen  or  unseen,  real  or 
imaginary. 

These  ideas  he  referred  to  three  classes:  (i)  In- 
nate, nees  avec  moi\  (2)  Adventitious,  etrangeres  et 
venir  de  dehoi's ;  (3)  Factitious,  faites  et  inventees 
par  moi  mcme} 

The  "  adventitious  "  ideas  he  supposed  to  be  made 
within  the  mind,  either  by  the  mind  itself,  or  by  ex- 
ternal objects  acting  through  the  organs  of  sense ; 
and  hence  they  represent  real  but  material  objects. 

The  "  factitious  "  ideas  are,  in  his  estimation,  pure 
creations  of  fancy ;  they  may  or  they  may  not  rep- 
resent objects  that  exist  in  reality. 

He  considered  the  innate  ideas  as  the  result  of 
the  action  of  God  within  the  mind.  Hence  they 
were  a  sort  of  revelation,  or  inspiration,  and  the  best 
proof  he  could  have  of  the  existence  of  God. 

1  Meditation,  III.,  Cousin's  edition,  vol.  i.,  p.  268. 


The  Methods  Described.  45 

Factitious  ideas  are  of  necessity  complex  ideas, 
and  can  be  made  up  of  only  such  simple  ideas  as  are 
found  in  one  or  the  other  of  the  other  two  classes, 
and  they  must  be  either  innate  or  adventitious 
ideas.  In  the  one  case  they  represent  eternal  reali- 
ties ;  in  the  other  the  properties  of  material  objects ; 
although  the  combination  may  be  entirely  arbitrary 
and  represent  no  really  existing  thing  anywhere,  as 
a  centaur,  and  hippogriff,  and  the  thousand  and  one 
monsters  of  heathen  mythology,  or  Christian  super- 
stition. 

Now  among  these  *'  innate  ideas,"  as  he  regards 
them  and  calls  them,  Descartes  finds  the  idea  of  God, 
Who  appears  in  this  connection  as  the  Perfect  and 
the  Infinite  one. 

The  points  of  the  argument  in  Descartes'  argu- 
mentation may  be  stated  as  three  in  number. 

1st.  The  idea  of  God  is  a  perfect  idea,  or  the 
idea  of  perfection  ;  and  he  does  not  appear  to  make 
any  distinction  between  a  perfect  idea  and  the  idea 
of  perfection.  But,  as  he  argues,  I  am  imperfect, 
hence  I  cannot  have  originated  the  idea  of  God, 
Who  is,  from  the  necessities  of  His  nature,  a  perfect 
Being. 

2d.  The  very  idea  of  perfection  is  seen,  on  analysis, 
to  Imply  the  existence  and  reality  of  that  which  is 
perfect;  as  without  existence  or  being  the  idea  would 


46  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

lack  at  least  one  element  of  perfection  or  complete- 
ness. What  is  not  and  does  not  exist,  cannot  be 
perfect,  since  an  object  can  be  perfect  only  in  the 
mode  of  its  existence. 

3d.  In  the  third  place,  Descartes  presupposes  and 
applies  the  doctrine  of  co-ordination,  used  with  so 
much  force,  as  we  have  seen,  by  Herbert  Spencer 
in  his  answer  to  Hamilton  and  Mansel. 

In  this  brief  historic  review  it  is  impossible  to  do 
so  much  as  name  the  many  men  who  have  rendered 
admirable  service  in  this  hne  of  argument.  Before 
coming,  in  conclusion,  to  one  or  two  that  are  now 
living,  I  must  not  omit  to  mention  at  least  the  name 
of  one  more  honored  man — that  of  Dr.  Samuel 
Clarke.  His  Boyle  Lecture  on  the  Being  arid  Attri- 
butes of  God  mark  an  era  in  this  controversy.  Con- 
temporary with  Berkeley  and  Butler,  his  work  was 
in  an  important  sense  a  preliminary  to  Butler's  An- 
alogy, and  a  correction  to  Berkeley's  excessive  ideal- 
ism— an  idealism  which  amounted  well  nigh  to  a 
form  of  pantheism.  He  held,  as  Descartes  had  done, 
that  the  Perfect  Being  must  be  a  Reahty,  since  ex- 
istence is  more  and  better,  for  anything  that  is  good, 
than  non-existence.  Without  His  existence  we  must 
believe  in  a  series  either  without  beginning,  which 
is  absurd,  or  without  anything  to  begin  it,  which 
also  would  be  absurd.     It  would  also  suppose  finite 


The  Methods  Described.  47 


things  without  anything  infinite ;  dependent  things 
without  anything  to  depend  upon ;  or  compel  us  to 
beheve  in  an  infinite  space  and  time  without  anything 
to  occupy  them — any  objects  existing  in  space,  or 
any  events  that  had  occurred  in  time.  And  he  held, 
as  we  do,  that  the  attributes  of  this  Being,  aside 
from  His  necessary  and  eternal  existence,  must  be 
inferred  from  His  works. 

The  theories  of  sense-perception,  introduced  by 
Malebranche,  Berkeley,  and  Fichte,  have  prepared 
the  way  for  another  modification  of  this  internal  or 
subjective  method.  I  have  not  seen  this  hne  of  ar- 
gumentation presented  anywhere  with  more  clear- 
ness, force  of  reasoning,  and  ingenuity  of  statement 
and  illustration,  than  in  the  recent  work  on  Natural 
Theology y  by  Dr.  Bascom,^  President  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  Wisconsin.  And  I  quote  him  the  more  gladly 
because  I  shall  have  occasion  very  soon  to  cite  him 
for  another  purpose,  and  in  regard  to  a  matter  in 
which  I  shall  have  occasion  to  dissent  from  his  view 
and  criticise  his  admission. 

In  this  view,  mind  is  essentially  the  creator  of 
matter;  and  matter  and  material  things  can  hardly, 
if  at  all,  be  said  to  have  any  existence,  substantial 
or  phenomenal,  except  while  the  creative  act  con- 
tinues.    With  Berkeley  it  was  a  favorite  and  a  funda- 

1  Bascom's  Natural  Theology,  Chap,  iii.,  $  7  and  following. 


48  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology, 

mental  saying,  with  regard  to  material  things,  esse 
est  pei'cipi,  to  be  is  to  be  perceived. 

In  an  extreme  presentation  of  this  theory,  it  is 
held  that  each  human  mind,  for  itself,  creates  the 
material  objects  which  it  supposes  it  sees  in  the 
world  around  it.  But,  in  a  more  moderate  form,  it 
holds  that  this  individual  energy  is  insufficient  to 
account  for  the  phenomena  which  are  observed  by 
so  many  millions  of  beings,  and  under  such  endlessly 
varied  conditions  and  circumstances.  Hence  it  is 
held  that  there  must  be  an  eternal  Mind,  everywhere 
present,  and  everywhere  active.  Whose  activity  is 
essentially  creative.  It  is  represented  to  be,  in  some 
most  important  particulars,  analogous  to  the  activity 
of  our  own  minds  in  producing — creating — our 
thoughts ;  they  are  while  it  acts,  and  they  cease  to 
be  with  the  cessation  of  its  activity. 

One  argument  for  this  view  is  derived  from  the 
nature  of  matter,  and  the  impossibility  of  supposing 
it  to  have  any  independent  substantial  existence. 

Another  argument,  and  one  that  is  presented  with 
great  force  and  ingenuity  by  President  Bascom,  is 
derived  from  the  mind's  control  over  the  body  and 
material  things.  They  are  inert,  but  we  can  move 
and  control  them  pretty  much  at  will.  This  influence 
rises  to  its  highest  manifestation  in  those  cases  where 
we  become  insensible  to  pain  even,  In  consequence 


The  Methods  Described,  49 

of  the  intense  occupation  and  absorption  of  the  mind 
with  matters  of  its  own.  In  such  cases,  bones  are 
broken  and  flesh  extensively  lacerated,  with  no  con- 
sciousness of  pain;  the  mind  proves  itself  to  be 
thoroughly  master  of  the  body,  as  much  so  as  though 
it  were  its  creator,  and  the  body  were  itself  but  a 
''visualized''  thought. 

It  would  be  easy  for  me  to  add  many  more  to  this 
list  of  names  in  our  effort  to  describe  something  of 
this  interior,  analytic,  or  a  priori  method  of  Natural 
Theology,  but  time  and  space  alike  forbid. 

I  note  in  conclusion  two  things  that  are  specially 
worthy  to  be  considered  and  remembered. 

1st.  The  two  methods,  though  starting  by  differ- 
ent routes,  come  together  and  run  into  each  other 
before  they  reach  their  final  result.  Or  perhaps  I 
had  better  say  that  the  two,  each  of  them,  imply 
something  of  the  other,  and  neither  of  them  is  quite 
complete  in  itself  without  the  other. 

2d.  The  second  remark  is  that  a  method  that  has 
been  so  long  in  use,  confided  in  and  depended  upon 
by  so  many  of  the  profoundest,  keenest,  and  most 
comprehensive  intellects  that  have  blessed  humanity 
with  their  lives  and  their  thoughts,  may  not  be 
lightly  regarded  or  set  aside  as  worthy  of  no  further 
consideration. 

I  might  add  to  these  remarks  that  this  historic 


50  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

review,  brief  and  imperfect  as  it  has  necessarily  been, 
has  shown  what  could  have  been  shown  much  more 
fully  if  that  had  been  my  object,  namely,  that  the 
truths  of  Natural  Theology  are  really  the  first  in  the 
natural  order,  the  basis  on  which  to  erect  the  super- 
structure of  a  supernatural  theology,  the  prcsambtila, 
the  very  "  morning  walks  "  of  religion,  to  use  again 
St.  Thomas  Aquinas's  expression.  Doubtless  mill- 
ions may  believe  and  be  saved  without  any  such 
knowledge  or  mental  exercise.  But  for  those  whom 
we  are  educating  in  our  schools  and  colleges,  those 
whom  we  are  encouraging  to  enter  the  paths  of  sci- 
ence and  of  scientific  pursuits,  those  with  whom  we 
have  to  deal  as  men  who  have  been  taught  to  think 
for  themselves,  and  even  for  those  who,  with  no  good 
right  to  do  so,  claim  to  be  able  "  to  think  for  them- 
selves," and  to  be  free  and  independent  in  their 
thoughts,  something  more  is  necessary.  They  cannot 
be  expected  to  take,  and  will  not  take,  opinions  and 
doctrines  on  mere  trust.  Least  of  all  will  they  take  the 
Articles  of  the  Christian  Faith,  or  of  any  other  faith 
or  philosophy  that  calls  for  self-denial  and  submis- 
sion to  the  will  of  another,  unless  the  grounds  and 
first  principles  of  that  faith  can  be  cleared  from  all 
reasonable  doubt,  not  even  though  that  other  be 
Infinite  Goodness  itself. 


LECTURE  II. 

PHYSICAL    OBJECTIONS ;    NATURE    OF  MATTER; 
THEORIES  OF  EVOLUTION  AND  CAUSATION. 

Rom.  I,  20.     For  the  invisible  things  of  Him,  from  the  creation  of  the  world  are 
manifest  .  .  .  even  His  eternal  power  and  godhead. 


PHYSICAL  OBJECTIONS. 

In  the  preceding  Lecture  I  stated  the  two  Meth- 
ods that  are  open  to  the  student  of  Natural  Theology, 
and  endeavored  to  illustrate  them  so  far  as  may  be 
necessary  for  a  due  appreciation  of  the  criticisms  "I 
have  to  make  on  the  objections  that  are  urged  against 
them. 

These  objections  are  of  two  kinds:  those  that 
refer  more  especially  to  the  a  posterzoi'iy  or  object- 
ive, method,  and  those  that  are  more  particularly 
aimed  at  the  a  priori^  or  subjective,  method.  I  be- 
gin with  the  former  class. 

I.  The  a  posteriori  or  objective  line  of  argument 
has  been  based  largely  on  the  principle  of  causa- 
tion. 

But  to  this  it  has  been  objected  (i)  that  we  know 
nothing  about  the  relations  of  cause  and  effect ;  (2) 
that  the  modern  doctrine  of  "  the  equivalence  of  ef- 
fects and  their  causes "  precludes  the  idea  of  any 
personal  agency,  whether  by  way  of  creation  or  sub- 
sequent miraculous  intervention ;  (3)  that  in  the  re- 


54  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

cession  from  observed  effects  to  their  causes  we 
nowhere  find  a  veritable  First  Cause;  that,  stop 
wherever  we  will,  we  stop  arbitrarily,  and  with  as 
much  demand  for  our  supposed,  or  assumed.  First 
Cause  as  for  any  one  of  the  objects  or  events  in  the 
series  which  we  had  regarded  as  an  effect. 

2.  Then,  in  the  second  place,  much  stress  has 
been  laid  upon  the  argument  from  design  and  the 
evidences  of  what  we  regard  as  design  in  nature. 

But  it  is  objected  that  what  we  call  design  is  a 
mere  assumption  on  our  part ;  that  we  have  no  right 
to  call  it  design  until  we  have  proved  that  there  is  a 
Being  capable  of  designing.  The  objection  may  be 
thus  stated :  Suppose  I  am  standing  on  the  sea- 
shore, desirous  of  a  shell  of  a  peculiar  kind.  If  a 
friend  brings  it  to  me,  I  may  reasonably  suppose 
that  he  has  some  design  to  gratify  my  wants.  But 
if  a  wave  of  the  sea  should  cast  it  up  at  my  feet,  I 
could  not  suppose  that  either  the  wind  or  the  waves 
had  consciousness  of  my  want,  or  any  purpose  or 
design  in  the  matter;  although  the  shell  comes  to 
relieve  my  want  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other. 

3.  But  again.  It  has  been  argued  that  the  proba- 
bilities are  untold  millions  against  such  an  order  as 
we  see  in  nature  without  a  Designing  Mind.  To 
this  the  objector  assents.  But  he  adds,  it  is  not  a 
question  of  probabilities  now;  it  is  now  an  accom- 


Physical  Objections.  55 

plished  fact.  Take  the  case  of  a  dice,  and  the  proba- 
bility beforehand  of  any  particular  side  falling  upper- 
most— say  the  ace — is  one  to  five  against  it ;  and  no 
prudent  man  would  risk  anything  needlessly  with 
such  an  odds  against  him.  But  after  the  dice  has 
been  cast  the  case  is  altered ;  there  was  no  reason 
why  the  ace  should  not  have  fallen  uppermost — no 
reason  against  that  way  of  falling  any  more  than 
against  any  one  of  the  other  five  faces  faUing  upper- 
most; and  consequently  this  fall  no  more  proves 
design  than  any  one  of  the  others  would  have  done. 

So  it  is,  say  the  objectors,  with  the  order  and 
course  of  nature.  The  present  order  is  one  of  those 
that  were  possible,  but  having  occurred  as  a  past 
fact,  it  no  more  proves  design  than  any  other  one 
of  the  untold  millions  of  ways  would  have  done  if  it 
had  occurred. 

4.  Then  finally  comes  the  theory  of  Evolution, 
which  assumes  to  explain  all  things  in  accordance 
with  mere  natural  laws,  and  without  any  recognition 
of  the  existence  and  agency  of  God. 

I  proceed  to  consider  the  first  and  last  named 
forms  of  objection — Evolution,  and  Theories  of  Causa- 
tion— in  the  confident  belief  that  whatever  force  the 
other  two  I  have  named  may  have  been  thought  to 
possess,  will  disappear  as  we  proceed  with  our  dis- 
cussion. 


56  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

I.  The  theory  of  Evolution,  by  assuming  the  eter- 
nal existence  of  matter,  will  leave  us  no  means  of 
proving  the  act  of  creation,  or  the  existence  of  God 
as  a  Creator.  And,  in  the  estimation  of  some  of  its 
advocates,  it  goes  much  further  than  this,  and  by 
accounting  for  and  explaining  all  the  facts  and  phe- 
nomena of  the  universe,  precludes  us  from  any  means 
of  proving  the  existence  and  agency  of  God  as  an 
Organizer  and  Moral  Governor. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  discuss  the  theory  of 
Evolution  as  a  whole ;  nor  yet  to  deny  it  altogether. 
There  are  certain  observed  processes  in  nature  which 
we  may  call  Evolution  or  not,  as  we  please.  It  is 
merely  a  question  of  words,  and  not  worth  many 
words  at  that.  What  I  aim  to  show  is  that  Evolu- 
tion itself  implies  and  proves  the  existence  of  God, 
and  makes  the  argument  for  His  existence  stronger 
and  the  illustrations  of  His  attributes  clearer  and 
more  striking  than  they  were  before. 

The  term  Evolution  has  gotten  such  a  hold  on 
scientific  men,  that  I  presume  it  will  always  remain 
in  use,  in  one  sense  or  another.  But  the  word  is 
only  a  name  for  a  process ;  and  the  process,  by  itself 
and  alone,  is  no  adequate  explanation  of  anything. 

Herbert  Spencer,  if  not  the  most  able,  is  yet  in 
many  respects  the  most  noteworthy  of  all  the  advo- 
cates of  the  doctrine  of  the  evolution  and  develop- 


Physical  Objections.  57 

ment  of  all  things  now  existing  in  the  universe  out 
of  a  formless  chaos  of  matter,  without  Divine  agency. 
And  beside  this  position  in  relation  to  the  theory, 
which  he  unquestionably  occupies,  he  and  his  works 
are  by  far  the  best  known,  as  well  as  the  most  com- 
plete exposition  of  the  theory  in  all  its  bearings  and 
relations  that  the  readers  of  these  Lectures  are  Hkely 
to  have  known. 

In  citing  Herbert  Spencer,  however,  as  I  shall 
freely  do,  I  wish  to  have  two  things  kept  constantly 
in  mind.  The  first  is,  that  I  shall  cite  and  criticise 
— though  citing  from  him — only  those  features  or 
principles  that  are  common  to  all  theories  and  views 
of  Evolution  that  do  not  recognize  God  as  its  agent 
and  cause;  and  the  second  is,  that,  in  citing  from 
him  admissions  or  concessions,  I  shall  cite  none  that 
are  not  inevitable  deductions  from  principles  or  as- 
sumptions that  are  essential  to  the  theory  in  any 
of  its  atheistic  forms  or  statements,  by  whomsoever 
it  may  have  been  expounded  or  advocated. 

Spencer  says:^  "Respecting  the  origin  of  the 
universe,  three  verbally  intelligible  suppositions  may 
be  made.  We  may  assert  that  it  is  self-existent ;  or 
that  it  is  self- created,  or  that  it  is  created  by  exter- 
nal  agency."     But   without   attempting   to   prove 

1  First  Principles,  Pt.  I.,  $  ii. 


5  8  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

either  of  these  propositions,  he  rightly,  as  I  think, 
regards  the  second — self-created — as  absurd,  and 
accepts  the  first,  which  means,  of  course,  that  mat- 
ter is  uncreated  and  eternal. 

If  then  this  visible  universe  is  uncreated  and  eter- 
nal, the  mere  fact  of  its  existence  is  no  proof  of  the 
existence  of  a  Creator.  And  if  Evolution  by  itself 
explains  all  that  has  occurred,  or  now  exists  in  its 
diversified  forms  and  objects,  or  in  its  changing  phe- 
nomena, no  proof  can  be  found  in  nature  of  the  in- 
terposition and  agency  of  any  Being  outside  of  the 
universe,  or  different  in  character  from  the  objects 
of  which  it  is  made  up ;  and  we  are  precluded  from 
any  argument  in  favor  of  the  existence  and  attributes 
of  God  that  might  otherwise  be  drawn  from  either 
the  objects,  or  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature. 

However,  Herbert  Spencer  is  not  always  quite 
consistent  with  himself  in  his  adherence  to  this 
theory ;  and  it  is  but  fair  to  give  him  the  credit  for 
whatever  he  may  have  said  that  is  of  an  opposite 
character  and  tendency.  Thus  he  says  (§  27) :  "  We 
are  obliged  to  regard  every  phenomenon  as  a  mani- 
festation of  some  Power  by  which  we  are  acted  upon  ; 
phenomena  being,  so  far  as  we  can  ascertain,  unlim- 
ited in  their  diffusion,  we  are  obliged  to  regard 
this  Power  as  omnipresent ;  and  criticism  teaches  us 
that  this  Power  is  wholly  incomprehensible."     And 


Physical  Objections.  59 

again,  speaking  of  the  philosopher,  our  author  says 
(§  34) :  **  He  must  remember  that  while  he  is  a 
descendant  of  the  past,  he  is  a  parent  of  the  future, 
and  that  his  thoughts  are  his  children  born  to  him, 
which  he  may  not  carelessly  let  die.  He,  like  any 
other  man,  may  properly  consider  himself  as  one  of 
the  myriad  agencies  through  whom  works  the  Un- 
known Cause." 

Now,  here,  in  germ  and  principle,  is  all  that  I  care 
to  assert  or  prove  in  these  Lectures.  The  existe7ice 
and  omnipresence  of  God  as  First  Cause  are  admit- 
ted, nay,  rather,  asserted.  And  we  have  only  to 
study  *'  the  phenomena  "  of  nature  in  which  he  works 
and  inafiifests  Himself,  to  learn  all  that  we  can  know 
by  the  objective  method  of  Natural  Theology,  of 
His  attributes  and  character ;  of  His  plans  and  pur- 
poses; ofour  origin  and  destiny ;  of  our  duties  here, 
and  of  our  hopes  for  a  hereafter.  And  for  anything 
more  than  can  be  obtained  by  this  method  by  the 
careful  study  of  the  phenomena  of  nature  and  of  the 
human  soul  and  its  thoughts,  feelings,  and  aspira- 
tions, and  by  legitimate  inference  from  the  facts 
thus  observed,  we  are  prepared  to  look  to,  expect, 
accept  and  depend  upon,  a  Revelation  from  God 
Himself. 

But  we  have  the  admission  of  the  existence  of  a 
God  Whose  agency  in  all  things  and  all  phenomena 


6o  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

is  conceded ;  and  Whose  omnipresence  is  not  only 
distinctly  recognized  as  obviously  and  necessarily 
implied  in  the  phenomena  which  manifests  His  ex- 
istence and  presence. 

This,  however,  is  not  the  attitude  which  Spencer 
is  generally  understood  to  hold  towards  the  doctrines 
of  either  Natural  or  Revealed  Religion.  Few  of  the 
scholars  who  read  his  books,  and  still  fewer  of  the 
thousands  who  claim  to  be  his  disciples,  and  cite  his 
authority,  have  ever,  apparently,  noted  these  admis- 
sions of  his.  And  still  fewer  have  comprehended 
their  importance,  or  given  them  a  place  and  posi- 
tion in  what  they  regard  as  Spencer's  philosophy. 

I  return,  then,  to  the  consideration  of  that  doc- 
trine with  regard  to  the  origin  of  matter  and  the 
theory  of  the  evolution  of  all  things  from  it,  for  which 
he  is  mostly  known,  and  for  the  influence  of  which 
upon  the  minds  and  the  thoughts  of  men — upon  their 
lives  here  and  their  destiny  hereafter— he  is  justly 
held  responsible. 

Now  I  am  not  going  to  dispute  or  deny  Herbert 
Spencer's  doctrine  concerning  what  he  calls  the  ^'self- 
existence  "  of  matter,  implying  its  eternal  existence, 
or  its  existence  without  beginning  or  any  act  of  crea- 
tion. For  it  is  a  subject  about  which,  aside  from 
Revelation,  I  know  nothing,  and  about  which  it 
may  be  a  matter  of  doubt  whether  philosophy  and 


Physical  Objections.  6i 

Natural  Theology  can  ever  prove  anything  either 
way,  that  will  be  finally  accepted  as  satisfactory.  It 
is  a  matter  of  which,  as  I  am  willing  to  admit,  noth- 
ing can  be  known,  aside  from  Revelation.  And  it 
may  be  fairly  questioned  whether  what  we  thus 
gain  from  Revelation  should  not  be  called  faith  or 
belief,  rather  than  knowledge. 

And  as  to  knowledge,  of  course  we  have  had  no 
personal  observation  or  experience  of  any  act  of 
creation  properly  so  called.  The  act  itself  may  be, 
and,  indeed,  I  think  it  is,  incomprehensible  to  us  in 
so  much  that  no  one  can  explain  it,  or  tell  precisely 
how  it  may  have  occurred.  I  freely  acknowledge, 
that  while  I  can  imagine^  while  I  can  and  do  believe 
it  to  have  occurred,  I  can  form  no  such  conception 
of  it  as  would  allow  me  to  reason  about  it,  whether 
to  prove  it  had  occurred,  or  to  deny  its  possibility.^ 

1  I  think  it  worthy  of  note  in  this  connection  that  none  of  the 
ancient  philosophers,  none  of  the  heathen  philosophers,  in  fact, 
so  far  as  I  can  remember,  have  had  any  doctrine  of  a  creation  of 
matter.  All  the  old  religions  had  a  lingering  tradition  of  some  such 
act  of  creation,  which  had  already  become  a  mere  travesty  before 
their  dogmas  were  reduced  to  writing.  But  in  regard  to  the  Phil- 
osophies, I  cannot  now  recall  one  of  them  that  did  not  assume  the 
eternal  existence  and  the  uncreated  nature  of  matter  in  some  form 
and  under  some  name  or  another. 

Now,  while  the  religions  may  be  regarded  as  traditional — with  an 

undercurrent  of  Natural  Theology — the  philosophies  were  almost, 

if   not   quite   wholly,    intuitional   and  rational;    expressing   such 

views  of  man  and  nature  as  insight  and  fancy  might  suggest.     But 

4 


62  TJie  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

For  these  reasons  I  shall  allow  Spencer's  assump- 
tion with  regard  to  the  "  self-existence  "  of  matter, 
whatever  it  may  mean,  to  pass  without  challenge  or 
contradiction. 

And  yet,  in  a  certain  sense,  all  that  is  necessary 
to  a  belief  in  the  creation  of  matter  out  of  nothing, 
occurs  and  may  be  seen  in  any  day's  experience. 
When  we  look  into  the  clear  sky  of  a  summer's  day, 
and  see  a  small  cloud  appear  where  there  was  noth- 
ing visible  a  moment  before,  we  have  for  the  sight 
and  for  imagination  all  there  is  in  an  act  of  creation. 
Modern  science  has  taught  us,  indeed,  that  here  is 
only  a  case  in  which  something  that  was  not 
visible  before,  has  become  visible  now ;  and  science 
cannot  explain  how  the  thing  happened.  That  is 
all.  Science  has  raised  a  question — a  perfectly  legiti- 
mate question,  indeed — that  did  not  exist  before. 
And  it  is  a  question  which  even  science  cannot 
answer.  But  this  fact  by  no  means  proves  the  crea- 
tion of  something  out  of  nothing,  impossible. 

John  Stuart  MilF  has  recognized  this  fact.  He 
says :  "  All  that  is  necessary  for  imagining  matter  an- 
nihilated is  presented  in  our  daily  experience.  We 
see  apparent  annihilation  whenever  water  dries  up 

even  so,  they  were  based  on  observation,  and  to  some  extent,  at  least, 
under  the  restraints  of  reason  and  common  sense. 

1  Examhjation  of  Sir  William  Hamiltoti's  Philosophy^  vol.  II, 
pp.  29,  30. 


Physical  Objections.  6'^ 

or  fuel  is  consumed  without  visible  residuum.  The 
fact  could  not  offer  itself  to  our  immediate  percep- 
tion in  a  more  palpable  shape  if  the  annihilation 
were  real." 

What  is  thus  true  of  annihilation  is  just  as  true  of 
its  opposite — creation.  The  visible  appearance  of  a 
cloud  of  steam  on  a  cold  morning,  just  above  the 
safety-valve  of  a  steam-engine,  is  to  our  perception 
and  imagination  as  much  a  case  of  ^'  the  creation  of 
something  out  of  nothing  "  as  one  could  have  had 
if  he  had  stood  by  as  an  observer  at  the  time  of  its 
creation. 

To  the  adequacy  of  Evolution  as  an  explanation 
of  the  phenomenon  of  the  universe,  I  offer  the  fol- 
lowing three  objections,  each  of  which  seems  to  me 
to  be  fatal : 

I .  If  the  present  order  of  things  had  no  beginning, 
Evolution  must  have  produced  a  Supreme  Being  long 
before  this  time. 

If  matter  is  eternal,  and  Evolution  is  the  law  or 
mode.  Evolution  must  be  as  eternal  as  matter  itself. 

Eternity  may,  for  our  purpose,  be  assumed  to  be 
the  same  as  unlimited  time ;  for  so  the  theory  we 
are  discussing  assumes  it  to  be,  and  so  its  advocates 
treat  it  in  all  their  discussions  and  reasonings. 

Now,  in  the  infinity  of  time,  and  with  no  over- 


64  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

ruling  Power  to  prevent  it,  all  things  that  are  possi- 
ble, whether  good  or  bad,  and  however  good  or  bad, 
must  have  become  real.  Evolution  has  already, 
on  their  theory,  produced  man.  Why  not  some- 
thing higher  than  man  ?  infinitely  higher  ?  even  a 
Being  of  infinite  power  and  goodness  ? 

Surely  no  one  will  say  that  such  a  Being  is  im- 
possible. Too  many  millions  of  men  have  believed 
in  Him  to  allow  that  objection  to  have  much  influ- 
ence now.  Nay,  the  very  name  by  which  we  indi- 
cate His  existence,  for  this  purpose,  implies  His  pos- 
sibility. We  ask  for  what  is  merely  the  highest 
possible  Being. 

Has  then  Evolution  produced  such  a  Being  ?  It 
won't  do  to  say  "  not  yet,"  for  in  the  infinity  of  time 
there  is  all  time,  and  time  enough  for  all  things,  and 
for  each  thing,  many  times  over. 

Here,  then,  we  have  the  dilemma.  Either  Evolu- 
tion had  a  beginning,  and  so  a  Beginner,  in  which 
case  we  have  the  existence  of  God  confessed,  or  it 
must  have  produced  a  Supreme  Being  long  before 
this  time.  In  the  one  case  we  have  God  as  Creator, 
and  in  the  other  as  a  result.  But  in  each  case,  and 
ahke,  a  God  over  all  and  through  all  and  in  all,  *'  in 
whom,"  in  the  words  of  the  Apostle,  "  we  live  and 
move  and  have  our  being." 

If,  the^i,  there  was  a  beginning  to  Evolution  there 


Physical  Objections.  65 

was  a  Beginner,  and  His  will  is  its  law  and  limit. 
If  there  was  no  beginning  it  would  have  produced  a 
Supreme  Being  long  before  this  time,  so  long  that 
we  may  say  that  He  has  existed  from  eternity;  and 
this  seems  to  me  to  be  about  the  same  as  God 
"  in  the  beginning." 

2.  I  come  now  to  my  second  point.  The  present 
order  of  things  had  a  beginning. 

Evolution  is  but  a  process.  It  has  successive 
stages  or  steps,  and  must  have  had  a  first  stage  and 
a  beginning. 

The  universe,  in  this  aspect  of  it,  consists  of  a 
series  of  events  or  stages.  These  events  constitute 
a  Series;  beginning  somewhere  and  tending  to 
something.  This  is  inseparable  from  the  nature  of 
the  case. 

Herbert  Spencer  speaks  (§  44)  of  a  primary  stage 
— a  primitive  condition — in  which  all  matter  was  in 
a  gaseous  state,  diffused  to  a  maximum  of  diffusion, 
so  as,  in  his  own  words,  "to  fill  all  space." ^  *'The 
first  advance,"  says  he  (§  44),  "•  towards  consolida- 
tion resulted  in  a  differentiation  between  the  occu- 
pied space  which  the  nebulous  mass  still  filled  and 
the  unoccupied  space  which  it  previously  filled." 
With  this,  as  he  goes  on  to  state,  there  came  a  dlf- 

1  It  seems  difficult  to  understand  how  anything  that  is  infinite,  as 
Spencer  says  that  space  is,  can  be  considered  as//^// of  anything. 


66  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

ference  in  density  among  the  parts,  with  also  a  dif- 
ference in  temperature ;  and  in  due  time  and  order, 
light,  electricity,  and  all  the  other  **  forces,"  so  called, 
made  their  appearance  and  began  their  career  of 
activity. 

Now,  as  the  process  of  condensation  goes  on  it 
must  always  tend  to,  and  ultimately  reach,  the  oppo- 
site extreme,  or  the  minimum  of  expansion  and  dif- 
fusion. This  Spencer  sees  and  admits.  As  there 
was  a  time — a  stage — in  this  progress  when  life  be- 
gan on  the  earth,  so  there  must  and  will  be  a  time 
when  **  this  process  must  bring  Evolution  [itself]  to 
a  close  in  Universal  Death"  (§  136).  Nor  is  that 
all.  Even  the  *'  forces,"  light,  heat,  etc.,  must  be- 
come extinct,  or  retired  to  a  state  of  inaction.  But 
Spencer  adds :  "  When  pushing  to  its  extreme  the 
argument  that  Evolution  must  come  to  a  close  in 
complete  equilibrium  or  rest,  the  reader  suggests  that 
for  aught  that  appears  to  the  contrary,  the  Universal 
Death  thus  implied  will  continue  indefinitely,  it  is 
legitimate  to  point  out  how,  on  carrying  the  argu- 
ment still  farther,  we  are  led  to  infer  a  subsequent 
universal  life."  *'  It  would  be  unwise,"  however,  he 
admits,  **  to  accept  this  in  any  positive  sense." 

Since  Spencer  has  admitted  this  result — a  "  uni- 
versal death  "  and  "  a  complete  equihbrium  or  rest " 
— it  would  seem  to  spare  us  the  labor  and  trouble 


Physical  Objections.  6y 

of  showing  its  inevitable  necessity.     This,  however, 
can  easily  be  shown. 

Spencer  holds  that  these  "  modes  of  force,"  light, 
heat,  etc.  (he  enumerates  seven,  light,  heat,  electricity, 
magnetism,  affinity,  and  gravity),  are  all  *' alike 
transformable  into  each  other"  (§  82).  But  if  they 
can  be  transformed  into  each  other,  it  is  a  fact  which 
Mr.  Spencer  knows  as  well  as  anybody  that  they 
cannot  always  be  got  back  into  their  original  form. 
I  am  not  aware  that  any  means  has  yet  been  found 
for  converting  either  gravity  into  heat  or  heat  into 
gravity.  But  with  regard  to  all  the  rest  of  them  it 
is  conceded,  I  believe,  and  proved  by  experiment, 
that  they  may  be  transformed  or  converted  into 
heat.  But  when  converted  into  heat,  the  heat  be- 
comes diffused  by  radiation,  until  all  objects  coming 
to  be  of  the  same  temperature  they  cease  to  act  on 
each  other  at  all.  The  heat  cannot  be  gotten  back 
into  its  original  form,  and  we  have,  as  Spencer  has 
called  it,  *'  a  perfect  equihbrium  or  rest,"  with  no 
force  causing  further  change,  and  Evolution  itself  is 
at  an  end.^ 

1  It  is  hardly  any  part  of  my  duty  to  assist  these  gentlemen  to  a 
more  favorable,  or  at  least  a  less  objectionable,  statement  of  their 
theory.  But  I  can  see  no  good  reason  for  speaking  of  this  extreme 
as  an  "equilibrium  or  rest,"  when  "all  force  is  latent."  Accept- 
ing this  theory  of  "the  conservation  and  correlation  of  forces,"  I 
W'Ould  suggest  that  they  all — the  whole  seven  of  them — may  have 


6S  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

The  material  forces  in  nature  are  of  two  kinds. 
The  one  act  by  impact,  and  produce  motion  in 
straight  lines,  with  uniform  velocity  and  with  no  re- 
currence to  the  same  point  or  condition  of  existence. 
The  others  act  constantly,  and  when  combined  with 
those  of  the  first  class,  may  produce  motion  in  curve 
lines  with  recurrence  to  the  same  point  or  condition. 
As  examples,  we  have  the  sun  in  its  action  on  the 
planets ;  the  earth  on  the  pendulum  that  swings  back 
and  forth  in  space;  the  air  that  resists  whatever 
would  pass  through  it;  the  steam  that  keeps  the 
piston  moving  back  and  forth  in  the  cylinder.  But 
in  all  these  cases  the  force  that  acts  constantly  is 
outside  of  the  moving  mass — the  sun,  the  air  that 
resists  the  bodies  that  are  passing  through  it,  the 
earth  that  attracts  the  swinging  pendulum,  and  the 
steam  that  moves  the  piston-rod. 

Even  in  the  phenomena  of  animal  life,  where  we 
find  animal  sensibility,  the  law  is  the  same.     The 

been  "converted"  into  the  one,  heat,  in  the  state  of  the  greatest 
diffusion,  which  may  be  very  intensely  active,  as  repdsioft,  keep- 
ing the  atoms  apart  in  a  gaseous  form,  and  at  the  other  extreme  they 
may  all  be  "  converted"  into  attraction,  and  so  keep  the  atoms  in 
the  closest  condensation  and  unity.  They,  or  it — the  forces  I  mean 
— may  be  active  as  gravity,  affinity  and  cohesion,  or  these  forces  may 
be,  as  some  philosophers  maintain  that  they  are,  only  different 
forms  of  one  force.  But  whether  as  one  or  as  three,  there  is  no 
reason  that  I  can  see  why  they  should  not  be  most  intensely  active 
in  the  state  of  the  greatest  condensation  of  the  matter  of  the  uni- 
verse. 


Physical  Objections.  69 

expansion  and  contraction  of  the  chest  in  breathing 
would  not  occur  but  for  the  heart  sending  the  blood 
to  the  lungs.  Nor  would  the  heart  contract  but  for 
the  constant  action  of  the  capillaries  in  sending  the 
blood  to  the  heart  through  the  veins. 

The  only  case  in  which  we  know  of  any  recur- 
rence to  the  same  place  or  condition,  without  the 
action  of  some  such  outside  force,  is  found  in  the 
actions  of  man.  But  here  we  have  a  soul,  a  per- 
sonal agent  or  force  acting  within  the  man,  the  mov- 
ing mass,  which  is  the  body  itself 

The  forces  of  nature  can  always  be  represented 
by  a  "  variable  "  in  an  analytic  equation,  and  the 
rates  of  motion  or  change  which  they  produce  can 
be  expressed  by  a  coefficient  in  a  differential  equa- 
tion.^    In  this  respect  they  are  unlike  the  will-power 


1  In  order  that  there  may  be  maxima  or  minima,  nodes,  cyclic  or 
cycloidal  returns  to  the  same  place  or  condition,  there  must  be  two 
variables.  These  variables  represent  forces  so  situated,  ontologically , 
that  the  one  may  be  active  and  producing  its  results,  while  the  other 
is  inactive,  or  kept  in  equilibrium  so  as  to  produce  no  result  or 
change ;  for  at  these  points  the  differential  coefficient  of  one  of  the 
variables  must  become  zero,  in  its  passage  from  a  positive  to  a  nega- 
tive value,  or  the  reverse.  Thus  in  the  common  cycloid  generated 
by  a  point  in  the  wheel  of  a  carriage,  as  it  passes  along  the  road, 
while  X,  denoting  the  abscissa,  distances  in  space  and  time,  is  con- 
stantly increasing,  y,  denoting  the  ordinates,  is  alternately  becom- 
ing zero  or  2R,  the  diameter  of  the  wheel,  and  at  each  of  these  points 
dy  becomes,  for  the  instant  zero,  or  nothing.  So  with  evolution. 
When  dy  is  nothing  or  the  "forces  "  spoken  of  are  at  their  "equi- 
librium "  or  "rest,"  the  Force  or  Power  represented  by  x  must  be 


70  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

in  man,  and  the  emotional  power  or  force  in  animals. 
Hence,  with  regard  to  the  forces  that  are  at  work  in 
inanimate  nature,  we  can  always,  by  means  of  the 
mathematical  formulae,  ascertain  the  bounds  and 
limits  to  the  possibilities  of  which  they  are  capable. 
With  a  constant  variable  we  have  only  straight  Hnes 
with  no  maxima  or  minima,  no  return  to  the  same 
points  or  over  the  same  track ;  while  with  the  varia- 
ble coefficients  which  represent  the  constantly  acting 
forces  combined  with  the  constant,  we  can  have  such 
nodes  or  cyclic  recurrences. 

But  for  the  material  universe  itself,  there  can  be 
no  such  outside  mass  to  carry  it  through  these  ex- 
tremes. The  only  alternative,  therefore,  is  that  there 
is  a  Moving  Mind  in  the  universe,  as  in  the  body  of 
man.  He  can  go  back  and  forth  from  point  to  point 
and  state  to  state  at  will.  So  it  is  with  God  in  this 
material  universe. 

I  do  not  know  that  it  is  necessary  to  assume  or 
prove  that  matter  has  ever  actually  been  in  either 
of  these  extreme  conditions.  And  yet,  without  the 
intervention  of  some  personal  Agent  to  prevent  it, 
I  do  not  see  how  it  could  have  been  otherwise. 
We  do  know,  however,  that  for  many  miUions  of 

active  in  order  to  carry  the  mass  through  its  extremes,  or  maxima 
and  minima  points,  as  truly  as  the  horse  that  draws  the  carriage 
and  keeps  the  wheel  turning  on  its  axletree. 


Physical  Objections,  71 

years  now  past  it  has  been  going  and  changing  from 
a  state  of  greater  heat  and  diffusion  to  one  of  great- 
er cold  and  condensation.  And  this  process  is  still 
going  on,  as  recent  attainments  both  in  geology  and 
astronomy  abundantly  prove.^ 

At  these  cosmological  extremes,  therefore,  the 
atoms  of  matter  must  either  change  their  nature  and 
become  spontaneously  active,  or  there  must  be  the 
intervention  of  some  Force  or  Agent  of  a  nature 
entirely  different  from  theirs.  At  these  points  of 
extreme  diffusion  and  extreme  condensation,  where 
there  is,  as  Spencer  calls  it,  a  *'  complete  equiHbrium 
or  rest,"  either  these  atoms  must  become  spontane- 

1  The  reality  of  such  extremes  is  not  wholly  a  matter  of  specula- 
tion ;  nor  is  the  time  when  they  occur  wholly  beyond  computation. 

Professor  Tait,  Recent  Advances  in  Physical  Science,  Lect.  VII. 
gives  three  computations,  (i)  One  based  on  the  loss  of  internal 
heat  as  about  ten  millions  of  years  since  the  earth  was  cool  enough 
for  plants  to  grow  on  its  surface.  (2)  One  based  on  the  retarda- 
tion of  the  earth's  revolutions  by  the  tidal  influences  of  the  moon, 
which  reduces  the  period  to  something  less  than  ten  millions  of 
years.  (3)  The  length  of  time  that  the  sun,  from  its  radiation,  can 
have  "  kept  the  earth  in  a  state  fit  for  the  habitation  of  animals  and 
vegetables."  This  ''tends  to  about  the  same  result."  Professor 
Young,  (work  on  The  Sun,  p.  276),  computing  by  a  somewhat 
different  process,  gives  us  a  4th  result,  which  is  about  sixteen  mill- 
ions of  years.  And  then  Wallace,  in  his  Island  Life,  Part  I.,  c. 
X.,  by  a  purely  geological  computation,  reaches  a  result  somewhat 
larger — say  about  twenty  or  twenty-five  millions  of  years,  giving  an 
average  in  all,  of  about  fifteen  millions  of  years  of  time  since  the 
earth  became  sufficiently  cooled  and  consolidated  for  the  beginning 
of  animal  and  vegetable  life. 


72  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

oiisly  active  and  start  into  action  of  themselves — ac- 
tion both  mechanical  and  chemical — or  there  must 
be  some  spontaneously  acting  Being  or  Agent  to 
start  them  out  of  their  equilibrium  of  perfect  rest 
and  inactivity.  It  is  not  a  question  of  moving  on 
through  time  and  space,  but  it  is  the  question  of  the 
beginning  of  motion  and  action  in  time  and  space, 
by  atoms  of  matter  which  nowhere  else,  and  at  no 
other  time,  have  shown  themselves  capable  of  origi- 
nating such  kinds  of  action. 

Our  author  thinks  that  he  is  provided  against  this 
emergency,  for  he  has  prepared  himself,  or  rather 
his  theory,  with  what  becomes  at  this  point  an  "  out- 
side agency,"  to  use  his  own  expression.  He  has 
Force,  or  one  force  that  becomes  diversified  into  the 
seven  already  named,  light,  heat,  etc.,  and  they  help 
him,  as  he  thinks,  through  this  ''dead  point"  in 
nature,  to  use  an  expression  familiar  to  engineers 
and  machinists. 

But  do  you  see  where  we  are  ?  These  modern 
scientists  are  in  the  same  difficulty  as  their  early 
Aryan  congeners  of  whom  I  have  already  spoken. 
Seeing  that  there  must  be  something  beside  the  visi- 
ble objects  in  nature,  they  invented  a  Jupiter  to 
•*  compel "  the  clouds  and  send  down  the  rain ;  a 
Neptune  to  control  the  seas  and  look  after  the  tides ; 
an  ^olus  to  restrain  the  winds;  and  a  Ceres  to 
cause  the  earth  to  bring  forth  its  fruit  in  due  season. 


Physical  Objections.  73 

This  view  of  the  matter  seems  to  have  occurred 
to  Tylor  also,  for  he  says  :  ^  "  The  scientific  concep- 
tions current  in  my  own  school-boy  days,  of  heat 
and  electricity  as  invisible  fluids  passing  in  and  out 
of  soHd  bodies,  are  ideas  which  reproduce,  with  ex- 
treme closeness,  the  special  doctrines  of  fetichism." 

If  now  men  may  invent  causes  rather  than  discover 
them,  no  effective  argument  can  be  derived  from  any 
of  the  phenomena  of  nature  to  prove  the  existence 
of  God,  or  any  other  proposition  that  the  objector 
does  not  choose  to  admit ;  for  in  any  case  and  in 
reference  to  any  phenomenon  or  class  of  phenomena, 
he  has  but  to  invent  a  cause,  call  it  up  from  the  vast 
*'  unknowable  "  that  these  men  talk  so  much  about, 
and  make  it  what  the  case  demands;  clothe  it  with 
all  the  attributes  that  may  be  necessary  to  make  it 
adequate  to  the  observed  effects,  and  all  is  done  that 
the  demands  of  science  call  for.  There  is  no  need 
of  a  Personal  Creator,  and  it  may  be  triumphantly 
claimed  that  there  is  no  proof  of  His  existence  or  of 
the  manifestation  of  his  attributes  anywhere. 

But  never  mind.  Even  so  there  is  a  confession 
of  the  existence  of  something  besides  matter,  some- 
thing that  is  immaterial  in  its  nature  and  that  can 
act,  and  act  on  matter,  too,  when  matter  in  all  its 

^  Primitive  Culture,  vol.  i,  p.  147. 


74  'The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

forms,  whether  mass  or  molecule,  is  at  rest — ''  in  the 
perfect  equilibrium  of  rest." 

I  have  not  taken  much  notice  in  this  discussion  of 
the  theory  which  is  a  favorite  with  many  persons 
just  now,  which  holds  that  "force,"  hke  matter,  is 
eternal,  and  incapable  of  either  increase  or  diminu- 
tion. This  is  a  *'  good  working  hypothesis  "  for  most 
purposes  of  the  physical  sciences.  But  it  is  not  held, 
and  cannot  be  held,  as  I  understand  the  matter,  ex- 
cept as  we  recognize  two  distinct  and  opposite  con- 
ditions of  force,  the  "  kinetic  "  and  the  ''  latent " 
or  *'  potential,"  as  they  are  called.  The  following 
has  been  given  as  an  illustration.  If  I  throw  a  ball 
upwards  into  the  air  it  has  a  force  while  moving  up 
which  is  a  product  of  the  weight  into  the  velocity. 
But  at  its  highest  point,  its  maximum  or  extreme  of 
elevation,  it  is  at  rest  for  a  moment,  and  has  in  con- 
sequence no  force,  although  in  the  process  of  de- 
scending it  regains  all  that  it  had  in  starting.  But 
it  is  held  that  the  force  is  not  lost  during  its  ascent, 
it  only  passes  over  from  being  kinetic  to  being 
latent  or  only  potential. 

In  the  case  of  -the  ball,  it  is  the  attraction  of  the 
earth  that  starts  it  back  again  after  it  had  reached  its 
greatest  elevation,  and  awakes  the  force  out  of  its 
"latency"  and  rouses  it  to  a  kinetic  mood  again. 
But  in  the  case  of  the  material  universe  there  is  no 


Physical  Objections.  75 

such  outside  mass  to  act  upon  it.  It  can  be  only  a 
Personal  Agent,  with  will-power  or  psychical  force 
— in  short  a  Spiritual  Being — that  can  start  the  dead 
matter  into  life  and  action  again  after  its  force  has 
become  latent  and  inoperative,  and  has  for  all  practi- 
cal purposes  ceased  to  be  a  force  at  all. 

We  reach  the  conclusion,  therefore,  that  mere  in- 
animate matter  with  such  properties  and  forces  as  it 
now  has  is  not  adequate  to  the  explanation  of  the 
phenomena  of  the  universe  by  the  mode  of  Evolu- 
tion or  any  other  mode  without  the  intervention  of 
a  personal  Cause  and  Creator. 

Aristotle^  came  to  the  same  conclusion  from  a 
study  of  the  phenomena  of  motion.  He  held  that 
matter  v\r(  is  mere  capacity,  capable  of  being  moved 
and  put  into  motion.  And  he  argues  that  it  is  pos- 
sible that  that  which  is  only  moved  or  capable  of 
being  moved  has  no  necessary  existence,  and  may 
be  supposed  not  to  exist.  But  he  adds  :  "  It  is  there- 
fore necessary  that  there  should  be  a  first  Principle 
or  Being  Whose  very  nature  is  energy,  and  the 
cause  of  motion." 

The  late  Professor  Benjamin  Peirce,  of  Harvard 
University,  in  his  great  work  on  Analytic  Mechanics , 
which  is  doubtless  the  profoundest  mathematical 
work  that  has  ever  been  produced  in  this  country, 

1  Metaphysics^  B.  xi,  c.  vi. 


'J 6  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

begins  and  ends  his  volume  with  the  declaration  that 
motion  in  matter  implies  a  Cause  and  Agent  that  is 
immaterial  and  personal.  *'  Motion  is  an  essential 
element  in  all  physical  phenomena ;  and  its  intro- 
duction into  the  universe  of  matter  was  necessarily 
the  preliminary  act  of  creation."  And  in  conclud- 
ing his  work  he  says  :  "  But  it  is  time  to  return  to 
nature  and  learn  from  her  actual  solutions  the 
recondite  analysis  of  the  more  obscure  problehis  of 
celestial  and  physical  mechanics.  In  these  researches 
there  is  one  lesson  which  cannot  escape  the  profound 
observer.  Every  portion  of  the  material  universe  is 
pervaded  by  the  same  laws  of  mechanical  action, 
which  are  incorporated  into  the  very  constitution  of 
the  human  mind.  The  solution  of  the  problem  of 
this  universal  presence  of  such  a  spiritual  element  is 
obvious  and  necessary.  There  is  one  God  and 
Science  is  the  knowledge  of  Him." 

Unless  we  deny  to  matter  that  inertia  which  is 
assumed  as  its  fundamental  property  and  character 
in  all  our  physical  sciences,  whether  chemical  or 
mechanical,  and  ascribe  to  it  life  and  the  capacity 
for  voluntary  action,  this  conclusion  seems  to  be  in- 
evitable. 

Here,  then,  we  have  what  seems  to  me  to  be  a 
demonstration  of  the  existence  of  a  being  Who  acts 
spontaneously,  of  His  own  will  and  motion,   and 


Physical  Objections.  77 

Whose  works  must,  in  the  words  of  St.  Paul,  show 
forth  the  invisible  things  of  Him — even  His  eternal 
power  and  godhead,  the  attributes  that  make  up  the 
essentials  of  a  personal  character. 

3.  I  have  one  point  more  for  consideration  :  Evo- 
lution withotit  God  docs  not  account  for  all  the  phe- 
nomena since  the  begijining. 

I  do  not  propose,  as  I  have  said,  to  discuss  Evo- 
lution in  all  its  phases  and  assumptions.  It  is  enough 
for  my  purpose  to  show  that  it  does  not  destroy  or 
even  weaken  the  force  of  the  argument  for  the  ex- 
istence of  God.  It  may  be  a  divine  method  with 
such  limits  as  scientific  investigation  has  already  or 
may  hereafter  fix  to  it  as  a  legitimate  part  of  scien- 
tific truth. 

Nor  again,  do  I  intend  to  urge  against  it  in  this 
place,^  the  objection,  so  forcibly  urged  by  Wal- 
lace, Mivart,  Quatrefages,  Virchow,  Elam,  and  many 
others,  that  in  fact  no  case  of  the  actual  evolution 
of  one  species  from  a  stock  belonging  to  another  in 
any  proper  scientific  classification,  has  ever  been 
seen  or  actually  proved  to  have  taken  place.  I  be- 
lieve this  line  of  objection  is  well  chosen  and  fatal 
to  any  theory  of  Evolution,  which  does  not  regard  it 
as  a  part,  and  only  a  part,  of  the  divine  method,  or 

1  For  this  part  of  the  argument  see  the  first  part  of  Lecture  VI. 


78  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

that  looks  to  Evolution  alone  as  solving  all  the  phe- 
nomena of  the  universe. 

My  line  of  objection  is  for  the  present  of  a  very 
different  character,  and,  as  I  believe,  it  affords  a  still 
more  insuperable  obstacle  to  the  reception  of  that 
theory  in  any  form  that  can  operate  as  an  objection 
to  our  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  and  "  in  the 
operations  of  His  hands,"  which  we  call  Miracles, 
Inspiration,  and  Providence. 

It  is  as  well  ascertained  as  any  fact  in  science  can 
be,  that  this  earth  through  a  long  period  of  its  early 
history  was  without  any  living  thing,  plant  or  ani- 
mal, on  its  surface.  At  a  time  life  began  ;  and  it  is 
beyond  dispute  that  it  began  in  some  of  its  lowest 
forms.  Whether  the  first  living  thing  on  this  earth 
were  a  simple  cell,  without  yet  a  nucleus  or  cell- 
wall,  or  were  an  animal  with  an  organization  of 
parts  and  organs,  and  whether  it  belonged  to  the 
animal  or  the  vegetable  kingdom,  is  a  matter  of  no 
importance  to  our  present  inquiry. 

With  this  first  living  thing  there  was  a  new  com- 
pound of  the  chemical  elements,  such  as  did  not  in 
fact  exist  before,  and  could  not  have  existed  at  a 
much  earlier  period.  It  Is  an  exceedingly  unstable 
compound,  which  ignites  and  burns  at  a  tempera- 
ture somewhat  above  that  of  boiling  water,  and 
always  at  or  below  that  of  red  heat.    This  compound 


Physical  Objections.  79 

is  such  that  no  chemist  has  yet  been  able  to  produce 
it  in  his  laboratory.  He  cannot  even  tell  under 
what  circumstances  it  would  occur  or  why  he  can- 
not produce  it  himself. 

Was  there  then  a  Divine  Agent  ?  I  only  ask  the 
question.  The  chemist  will  very  likely  say  that 
there  was  in  that  act  no  violation  or  contravention 
of  the  well  known  laws  of  chemistry.  Very  likely ; 
but  the  same  may  be  said  of  miracles  in  general. 
They  are  not  violations  of  the  laws  of  nature ;  not 
departures  from  its  ordinary  courses,  except  in  the 
one  thing, — the  intervention  of  a  new  Agent — the 
Miracle  Worker  Himself.  He  it  is,  and  not  the 
method  or  the  result  in  itself  considered,  that  makes 
the  miracle. 

But  this  is  not  all.  Here  was  the  beginning  of  a 
new  process,  a  new  order.  We  have  now  life, 
growth,  development  of  parts  and  organs,  with  re- 
production, decay  and  death.  Nothing  like  it  had 
occurred  or  been  seen  on  earth  before.  No  crystal 
—-no  mere  mineral — undergoes  these  changes  or 
performs  these  functions.  The  crystal  had  no  par- 
entage, produces  no  offspring,  and  will  have  no  hne 
of  posterity.  What  it  was,  it  is,  and  will  be,  with 
none  of  the  phenomena  or  indications  of  life,  and  no 
life  history  in  the  records  of  its  existence. 

Professor  Tyndall  has  stated  the  problem  here 


8o  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

presented  very  sharply,  in  his  way.  "  Two  views," 
he  says,^  *'thus  offer  themselves  to  us.  Life  was 
present  potentially  in  matter  when  in  the  nebulous 
form,  and  was  unfolded  from  it  by  the  way  of  nat- 
ural development,  or  it  is  a  principle  inserted  into 
matter  at  a  later  date." 

Putting  this  problem  into  plain  English,  without 
metaphysics  or  rhetorical  embellishment,  we  have: 
either  there  were  living  beings  on  the  earth  at  this 
early  stage,  or  there  is  such  a  thing  as  life  which  is 
a  substantial  entity  capable  of  a  separate  existence, 
which  came  into  the  earth  at  a  later  period,  as  some 
meteoric  stone,  or  new  chemical  element,  possibly  an 
invisible  gas,  might  have  done. 

But  I  can  suggest  a  third  alternative :  there  was  a 
Creator  who  organized  this  dust  of  the  earth  and 
made  what  He  had  thus  produced  out  of  these  or- 
ganic elements,  a  living  being ;  and  gave  to  it  the 
power  of  perpetuating  itself  and  its  species  through 
all  coming  time. 

Of  the  three  "  suppositions  "  which,  in  the  words 
of  Spencer,  are  ''verbally  intelligible,"  one  is  not  to 
be  held  for  an  instant.  There  were  no  living  things 
on  earth  when  it  was  in  its  incandescent  or  nebulous 
condition ;  living  things  did  not  appear  until  long 
after  that  period  had  passed  away. 

1  Fragments  of  Science,  Appleton's  Ed.,  1872,  p.  156. 


Physical  Objections.  8i 

Only  two  hypotheses  then  remain :  the  one  is  that 
there  is  a  Hving  God  Who  is  the  Creator  of  all  living 
things,  and  Whose  presence  and  agency  were  mani- 
fested in  this  new  phenomenon,  or  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  life,  which  is  not  a  mere  mode  of  existence, 
but  a  ^^  substantiated  reality  "  like  the  gases,  oxygen, 
hydrogen,  etc.,  which  at  the  time  came  into  the 
world,  or  which  at  the  least  entered  at  that  time,  and 
then  for  the  first  time,  into  new  relations  and  began 
a  new  career  of  existence. 

But  even  so,  are  we  not  doing  as  our  early  Aryan 
fathers  did,  creating  a  new  god  for  our  mythology  ? 
Are  we  not  ascribing  to  "life"  something  of  per- 
sonality, the  power  of  choice  and  spontaneity  of 
action  ? 

Anyhow,  *'  Hfe  "  did  not  begin  without  something 
more,  and  something  besides  and  different  from  mere 
evolution  ;  for  if  we  accept  what  Tyndall  declares  to 
be  the  *'  scientific  idea,"  evolution  can  be  only  the 
way  in  which  molecules  act  upon  each  other. -^  This 
surely  precludes  all  idea  of  *'  forces  "  to  be  denoted 
by  such  abstract  terms  as  heat,  light,  etc.,  or,  as 
Tyndall  calls  it,  *'  the  intervention  of  slave  labor," 


"^  Fragments  of  Science,  Appleton's  edition,  1872,  p.  114. 

**  The  scientific  idea  is  that  the  molecules  act  upon  each  other  .  .  . 
that  they  attract  each  other  at  certain  definite  points  or  poles  and  in 
certain  definite  directions." 


82  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

and  reduces  us  to  the  dilemma,  either  the  atoms  of 
matter  were  endowed  with  intelligence  and  capable 
of  plan  and  purpose,  or  there  was  a  Personal  God, 
Who  planned  and  executed  whatever  we  see,  whether 
we  call  the  phenomena  a  creation  or  an  evolution. 

There  was  also  at  the  introduction  of  organic  hfe 
the  beginning  of  another  new  thing,  which  Dr.  Elam 
has  well  and  sharply  pointed  out.^  **  The  organic 
force  in  vegetable  tissue  can  decompose  carbonic 
acid  at  ordinary  temperatures  into  carbon  and  oxy- 
gen. Now  this  cannot  be  effected  by  the  intensifi- 
cation of  any  one,  or  by  any  combination  of  the  or- 
dinary forces  of  the  inorganic  world."  And  we  may 
add,  no  chemist  can  do  it,  or  knows  how  it  can  be 
done  in  his  laboratory.  And  yet  it  takes  place  daily 
in  the  vegetable  world  and  in  the  growth  of  every 
plant  in  that  world. 

I  am  aware  that  there  are  those  who  would  meet 
my  argument  with  the  claim  of  what  is  called  "  spon- 
taneous generation,"  although,  as  I  understand  it, 
they  do  not  claim  that  living  beings  have  been  pro- 
duced out  of  inorganic  matter  by  mere  chemical 
processes.  And  the  claim  in  any  form  is  not  allowed 
by  the  best  authorities  on  the  subject. 

I  know  too,  that  there  are  chemists  who,  in  the 

1  Winds  of  Doctrine,  being  an  Examination  into  the  modern  theo- 
ries of  automatism  and  evolution,  London,  1876,  p.  89. 


Physical  Objections.  Zl 

ardor  of  their  enthusiasm  for  their  favorite  science, 
claim  that  the  time  will  come  and  is  in  fact  fast  ap- 
proaching— pretty  nearly  here — when  the  chemist 
can  do  all  these  things  in  his  laboratory — put  together 
in  proper  proportion,  and  in  the  right  way,  the  ele- 
ments that  are  essential  to  organic  compounds,  and 
produce  the  Hving  being  in  his  crucibles  and  under 
our  very  eyes. 

Well,  I  do  not  care  to  discourage  their  enthusiastic 
hopes.  He  would  be  a  rash  man  who  should  venture 
to  set  any  limits  to  the  progress  of  discovery  and  to 
say  what  may  and  what  may  not  be  attained  in  the 
future. 

But  it  is  just  as  much  to  my  purpose,  and  the 
purpose  of  my  argument,  to  say  that  whatever  yott. 
may  be  able  to  do  in  the  future^  there  was  Some- 
body, millions  of  years  ago,  Who  knew  how  to  do 
these  very  things  thetiy  and  did  them,  too,  as  the 
geological  records  of  the  past  most  incontestably 
prove.  He  knew  how  and  did  then  with  a  certainty 
and  a  success  that  shows  no  defect  or  imperfection, 
no  indication  of  a  limit  to  His  knowledge  or  His 
power,  what  you  cannot  do  now,  and  do  not  even 
know  why  it  cannot  be  done.  Did  the  molecules  of 
matter  inake  themselves  into  living  beings  ?  Are 
they  wiser  than  we  are  ?  Did  they  know  more  theit 
than  we  do  noiv  f  or  was  there  a  Personal  Agent 


84  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Who  showed  Himself  in  this  to  be  a  First  Cause  and 
Creator  ? 

I  have  confined  myself  here  to  the  three  objections 
to  the  theory  of  Evolution  that  are  of  the  most  gen- 
eral character.  I  shall  have  occasion  to  say  some- 
thing more  which  will  be  more  specific  in  the  sixth 
Lecture. 

But  I  think  we  have  seen  enough  to  justify  the 
proposition  with  which  I  started.  The  word  evolu- 
tion is  only  a  term  to  denote  a  process,  and  the 
process  in  itself  and  alone  is  no  adequate  explana- 
tion of  anything. 

The  mere  evolutionist  seems  to  me  to  reason  very 
much  as  we  might  expect  a  very  inteUigent  savage 
to  do  who  might  happen  to  be  visiting,  for  the  first 
time,  a  highly  civilized  country,  and  seeing  all  the 
comforts  and  conveniencies  of  life  which  our  modern 
civilization  has  accumulated  in  our  modern  homes. 
He  would  be  taken,  of  course,  into  our  mines,  our 
manufactories,  and  wherever  else  our  industries  are 
most  successfully  prosecuted ;  and  he  would  see  the 
machinery  we  use  in  all  its  complicated  forms  and 
in  the  performance  of  all  its  wonders.  He  would 
most  Hkely  conclude  that  it  was  machinery,  and  the 
use  of  machinery,  that  has  constituted  the  superiority 
of  our  home  life,  and  the  splendors  of  our  towns  and 
cities,  whatever,  in  fact,  makes  our  homes  superior 


Physical  Objections.  85 

to  his.  He  would  extol  the  glories  of  machinery 
and  machine  manufactures  as  the  cause  of  what  he 
had  seen. 

And  he  would  be  right  as  far  as  his  theory  goes. 
But  he  would  be  seen  to  have  overlooked,  or  failed 
to  discern,  the  fact  that  machinery,  however  perfect 
and  complete  in  itself,  can  do  nothing  without  a 
moving  Power.  There  must  be  wind  or  steam  or 
falling  water  to  propel  the  machinery  or  it  can  do 
nothing. 

So  with  nature.  Call  its  manifold  on-going  proc- 
esses evolution  or  whatever  else  you  will,  it  is  itself 
but  a  piece  of  machinery,  and  its  evolutions  and 
changes  are  but  processes  which  imply  a  moving 
Power  or  First  Cause. 

But  I  must  hasten  to  the  consideration  of  the 
remaining  objections  that  belong  to  this  group — the 
objections  to  the  a  posteriori  method, 

II.  The  objections  that  are  urged  under  this  head 
come  before  us  in  two  forms :  the  one  is  based  on 
what  is  called  "  the  equivalence  of  effects  and  their 
causes,"  and  the  other  on  the  ground  that  there  can 
be  no  First  Cause  except  as  we  arbitrarily  assume 
some  one  to  be  the  first. 

I.  The  first  of  these  objections,  though  very  fully 
elaborated  by  Sir  William  Hamilton,  is  so  well  stated 


86  The  MetJiods  of  Natural  Theology. 

by  President  Bascom  in  the  book  already  referred 
to/  that  I  will  state  it  in  his  words.  "This  line  of 
argument,"  he  claims,  involves  **  the  exact  equiva- 
lence of  causes  and  effects."  This  law  he  regards  as 
inexorable ;  and,  as  he  says,  "  it  carries  with  it  the 
uniformity  of  nature  as  a  congeries  of  causes.  These 
causes  remaining  the  same,  can  produce  no  other 
effects  than  those  which  now  belong  to  them.  But 
causes  cannot  change  themselves  within  their  own 
circle,  for  that  change  would  be  an  effect  without  a 
cause.  Still  further,  the  notion  of  causation  includes 
the  unbroken  continuity  of  causes  and  effects  in  their 
several  series.  Hence  the  correlation  of  forces — 
their  indestructibility — is  a  corollary  of  the  law  of 
causation.  .  .  .  We  are  quite  certain  that  no  force, 
either  in  aid  of  our  purposes  or  in  opposition  to  them, 
will  ever  disappear,  no  matter  how  great  a  variety 

of  forms  it  may  assume With  this  notion  of 

causation  .  .  .  what  argument  can  be  constructed  for 
the  being  of  God  ?  We  answer,  no  argument  that 
offers  the  least  proof.  The  results  reached  are  quite 
the  reverse  of  those  sought  for.  .  .  We  may  affirm 
that  we  are  thus  led  up  to  a  First  Cause.  The  con- 
clusion is  wholly  illegitimate  for  many  reasons.  If 
for  convenience  of  expression  we  divide  the  ascent 
to  a  First  Cause  into  distinct  steps,  the  causes  in 

1  Natural  Theology,  pp.  40-43. 


Physical  Objections,  Zj 

each  step  will  be  the  exact  equivalents  of  those  which 
precede  it  and  those  which  follow  it.  No  move- 
ment backward  or  forward  alters  the  causes  dealt 
with,  either  in  quantity  or  quality.  It  discloses  them 
as  divided  and  combined  in  a  great  variety  of  ways, 
as  assuming  many  new  and  striking  appearances, 
but  never  as  different  either  in  nature  or  amount 
from  what  they  have  always  been.  An  ascent, 
therefore,  no  matter  how  far,  puts  no  change  on  the 
face  of  the  facts,  and  brings  us  no  nearer  their  ulti- 
mate explanation.  If  we  stop  at  any  point  we  stop 
arbitrarily.  The  causes  we  have  chosen  stand  as 
causes  in  no  different  relations  from  those  already 
passed  over.  Equally  with  them  they  are  intermedi- 
ates between  previous  and  subsequent  causes  .  .  .  the 
energies  of  the  universe,  like  those  of  a  torrent,  come 
pouring  out  of  the  past,  and  simply  spread  out  over 
the  future  as  an  open  field." 

This  objection  assumes  in  the  first  place  the  eter- 
nity of  matter  as  self-existing,  and  does  not  regard 
it  as  a  perpetual  creation  of  the  Divine  Mind,  which 
has  already  been  suggested  as  the  opinion  of  Dr. 
Bascom,  and  which,  I  will  take  occasion  to  add, 
seems  to  me  the  most  plausible  and  the  most  proba- 
ble hypothesis  that  we  can  entertain  on  the  subject. 
But  of  this  I  have  said  all  that  I  have  time  or  occa- 
sion for,  in  the  previous  Lecture. 


88  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology, 

The  second  assumption  made  by  those  who  urge 
this  objection,  is  the  eternity  and  indestructibility  of 
force,  or  forces,  as  something  distinct  from  and  dual 
with  matter. 

I  have  already  spoken  of  this  doctrine  with  regard 
to  ^*  force  "  as  having  its  value  as  a  "  working  hy- 
pothesis." But  in  any  other  view  it  is  liable  to  very 
serious  objections.  And  even  as  a  working  hypothe- 
sis it  must  be  taken  with  the  doctrine  that  "  force  " 
has  its  two  forms  of  existence — kinetic  or  active  on 
the  one  hand,  and  latent  and  passive,  or  at  least 
quiescent,  on  the  other — when,  for  all  practical  pur- 
poses, it  becomes  no  force  at  all.  Hence  I  think  we 
may  safely  dismiss  that  theory  without  farther  con- 
sideration. 

The  laws  of  causation  and  the  classes  of  causes  are 
pretty  well  understood.  Aristotle,  with  that  won- 
derful sagacity  that  never  forsook  him,  teaches  and 
repeats  in  several  places,  that,  to  a  complete  scien- 
tific comprehension  of  any  subject,  there  are  four 
causes  to  be  considered:  (i)  the  material  cause  or 
the  matter  out  of  which  anything  is  made ;  (2)  the 
forrrial  cause,  which,  in  our  modern  sense  of  words, 
means  the  specific  character,  although  in  his  day 
a  formal  cause  was  always  an  "  idea  "  in  the  Platonic 
sense  of  the  word,  or  a  **  form  "  in  the  later  scholas- 
tic  sense;    (3)   the   efiicient  cause,  or   that  which 


Physical  Objections.  89 

produces  the  object ;  and  (4)  the  final  cause.  This, 
in  reference  to  moral  agents,  is  the  purpose  or  aim 
which  the  agent  had  in  mind  in  producing  the  object. 
But  in  a  more  general  sense,  and  without  implying 
personal  agency  at  all,  it  would  mean  the  uses  of  the 
object  or  possibly  the  effects  which  it,  considered  as 
a  cause,  produces. 

Bacon  ^  recognized  these  four  classes  of  causes  or 
heads  as  topics  of  investigation,  and  thought  that 
the  knowledge  of  the  material  and  formal  causes  of 
things  constituted  the  proper  sphere  of  Natural 
Philosophy  or  Physical  Science,  and  that  an  inquiry 
into  the  other  two — efficient  and  final  causes — ^be- 
longed more  properly  to  the  department  of  the 
Metaphysical  Sciences. 

But  with  the  careful  study  and  use  of  the  Induc- 
tive Method,  and  the  conditions  and  laws  of  scien- 
tific investigation,  it  was  found  that  each  event  had 
more  than  one  cause  acting  at  the  time  of  its  pro- 
duction, of  which  notice  must  be  taken,  and  in  like 
manner  no  one  cause  ever  acted  without  contribu- 
ting to  the  production  of  more  than  one  effect.  This 
led  to  the  idea  of  an  equivalence  of  the  sum  of  the 
causes  and  the  effects,  as  a  fundamental  principle  of 
scientific  investigation. 

This  doctrine  of  the  equivalence  of  causes  and  ef- 

1  Advancement  of  Learning,  B.  Ill,  c.  iv. 


90  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

fects  led  to  a  recognition  of  what  is  called  '*  residual 
phenomena,"  which  has  been  the  basis  of  many  of 
the  most  important  discoveries  in  modern  science. 
These  principles  of  scientific  investigation  have  been 
carefully  studied  and  well  stated  by  such  men  as 
Whewell/  Sir  J.  F.  W.  Herschel,^  John  Stuart  Mill,^ 
and  Professor  W.  Stanley  Jevons.* 

But  the  law  or  principle  has  no  application  to  the 
question  before  us.  We  are  not  now  seeking  for 
the  full  scientific  comprehension  of  anything ;  but 
we  are  trying  to  find  whether  there  was  a  First  Cause 
of  all  things  or  not. 

The  two  purposes  are  totally  difTerent,  both  in 
their  aims  and  in  the  principles  that  should  guide 
the  inquiry.  Hence  mistakes  or  omissions  that 
would  be  fatal  in  the  one  case,  may  be  only  the  wise 
disembarrassment  that  would  relieve  us  of  what 
would  prove  only  a  useless  and  unnecessary  encum- 
brance in  the  other. 

I  see  an  oak  growing  before  me.  It  is  small  and 
has  just  started  out  of  the  ground.  If  I  were  intent 
on  the  pursuit  of  scientific  knozvledge  only,  I  should 

1  Whewell,  Philosophy  of  the  Inductive  Sciences,  Pt.  II,  Book 
xiii. 

2  Sir  John  F.  W.  Herschel,  Preliminary  Discoicrse  cm  the 
Study  of  Na  tura  I  Ph  ilosophy, 

3  John  Stuart  Mill,  System  of  Logic,  B.  III. 

4  W.  Stanley  Jevons,  The  Principles  of  Science,  B.  I,  c.  vii,  B. 
II,  c.  xi,  and  B.  IV. 


Physical  Objections.  91 


begin  with  considering  the  conditions  of  the  soil,  the 
climate,  and  the  moisture  on  which  the  germination 
of  the  acorn  and  the  growth  of  the  shrub  had  been 
dependent.  But  my  object  being  quite  other  than 
mere  natural  science,  I  begin  by  seeking  the  cause 
in  another  direction,  and  perhaps  in  another  sense 
of  the  word.  I  start  with  the  acorn.  I  have  no 
doubt  it  was  produced  by  an  oak  tree ;  and  this  tree 
in  turn  grew  from  an  acorn,  and  so  on,  until  we 
come  to  the  time  when  there  was  neither  oak  nor 
acorn  on  this  earth;  and  I  ask  who  or  what  then 
existed  as  the  acting,  creating  Cause  ? 

Or  I  may  begin  with  the  fact  of  sunlight,  and  ask 
about  the  sun.  I  know  now,  as  thinkers  in  the  past 
did  not  always  know,  that  the  sun  has  not  always 
existed.  Whatever  may  be  said  about  the  eternity 
of  matter  and  the  indestructibility  and  conservation 
of  forces,  I  know — and  nobody  denies — that  there 
was  a  time  when  there  was  no  such  combination  of 
matter  and  forces  as  makes  up  the  sun  which  we 
now  have ;  and  I  ask,  naturally  and  "legitimately, 
what  was  before  the  sun  ?  what  was  its  cause  ?  who 
was  its  creator  ? 

In  this  line  of  investigation  and  inquiry  occurs  no 
question  of  the  "  equivalence  of  causes  and  effects," 
whatever  that  may  mean.  And  I  have  no  hesita- 
tion or  difficulty  in  admitting,  if  that  will  at  all  re- 


92  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

lieve  the  difficulty,  that  I  might  pursue  the  investi- 
gation through  many  Hnes  of  causes  and  of  causa- 
tion, acting  in  different  ways  and  with  different 
senses  for  the  word  cause.  But  they  would  all  con- 
verge at  last  in  One,  Who  is  supreme  and  the  sum 
of  all  causes  and  causation,  as  from  another  point  of 
view  He  is  the  sum  and  comprehension  of  all  being. 

From  this  point  of  view  I  can  have  no  hesitation 
in  admitting  their  doctrine  of  the*"  equivalence  of 
causes  and  effects."  It  rather  helps  my  argument, 
for  the  universe  without  God  is  the  sum  of  the  efTects, 
and  He,  as  First  Cause,  is  the  sum  of  causes;  and 
by  this  law  He  must  be  adequate  and  equal  to  [the 
causation  of]  all  the  effects.  I  say  equal  to  the 
causation  of  all,  for  this  is  obviously  the  only  point 
of  comparison  or  co-measurement  that  is  possible  in 
the  case.  And  this  ''equivalence,"  or  adequacy, 
gives  us  the  attributes  of  goodness,  wisdom  and 
power,  just  to  the  extent  to  which  they  are  manifest- 
ed in  nature — the  works  of  creation  around  us  or  in 
the  course  of  human  history. 

2.  The  other  form  of  the  objection  is  of  a  different 
character,  and  much  more  widely  diffused  among 
thinking  men.  In  fact,  there  are  but  few,  if  any, 
who  have  not  met  with  it.  It  is  that  the  argumen- 
tation from  effect  to  cause  to  prove  a  beginning 
and  a  First  Cause  of  all  things,  is  ineffectual  because 


Physical  Objections.  93 

it  has  no  natural  or  logical  stopping  place.  When 
we  arrive  at  our  so-called  First  Cause,  the  question 
may  still  be  asked,  as  they  allege,  and  asked  as  per- 
tinently, and  pursued  with  as  much  force,  as  before, 
who  or  what  caused  this,  your  so-called  first  cause ; 
what  was  before  Him  ? 

This  objection  may  be  found  in  the  writings  of 
Sir  William  Hamilton  and  John  Stuart  Mill,  to  name 
no  others.  Dr.  Bascom,  in  the  work  referred  to,  as 
will  be  seen  in  the  quotation  just  given,  yields  to  it, 
apparently,  as  though  he  thought  it  fatal  to  this 
Hne  of  reasoning. 

It  is  much  easier  to  show  the  logical  fallacy  on 
which  this  objection  is  founded  than  to  do  away  with 
the  evil  effects  it  has  produced  far  and  wide  upon 
the  minds  of  men;  the  former  being,  as  I  think, 
comparatively  easy,  while  the  latter  is  a  work  of 
labor  and  tact  and  perseverance,  which  will  often 
prove  ineffectual  after  we  have  done  all  that  it  is  in 
our  power  to  do. 

Now,  the  fundamental  mistake  of  these  men  who 
either  make,  or  are  troubled  by,  this  objection,  is  in 
supposing  that  we  affirm  that  *'  every  thing  had  a 
cause."  Even  so  shrewd  a  philosopher  as  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton  makes  this  mistake,  and  John  Stuart 
Mill,  when  commenting  on  Hamilton's  words,  re- 
peats it  without  dissent  or  apparent  consciousness  of 


94  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

it.  He  says  '*  the  alleged  impossibility  of  conceiv- 
ing any  phenomena  of  the  universe  to  be  uncaused, 
applies  equally  ...  to  the  First  Cause  itself"^  And 
in  his  posthumous  work^  he  says :  *'  It  would  seem, 
therefore,  that  our  experience  instead  of  furnishing 
an  argument  for  a  First  Cause  is  repugnant  to  it." 

But  the  doctrine  is  not  that  every  thing\id.di  a  cause, 
but  that  every  effect  had  a  cause. 

Whatever  we  know  to  be  an  effect  we  know,  in 
the  very  act  of  knowing  it  to  be  an  effect,  to  have 
had  a  cause ;  and  we  believe  in  the  reality  and  na- 
ture of  the  cause  just  to  the  extent  that  we  believe 
in  the  reality  of  the  effect  and  know  it  to  be  an 
effect. 

If,  now,  there  is  anything  which  we  know  by  any 
means  whatever,  without  knowing  it  to  be  an  effect, 
we  know  it,  to  that  exte^it,  and  so  long  as  we  know 
it  in  that  way  ojtly,  as  a  first  cause. 

And  this  is,  in  substance,  my  answer  to  their  ob- 
jection. Effects  only  have  causes,  and  causes,  as 
such,  do  not  call  for  or  demand  belief  in  their  causes. 

When  the  French  astronomer  Leverrier  discovered 
the  perturbations  of  the  planet  Herschel,  he  knew 
them  to  be  an  effect,  and  that  there  was  for  them  a 

1  Examination,  etc.,  Vol.  II,  p.  37. 

2  Three  Essays  on  Religion,  p.  142  and  following,  MiLL  repeats 
his  objection  even  after  he  has  admitted  that  there  are  first  causes  in 
the  strict  and  proper  sense  of  the  word. 


Physical  Objections.  95 

cause,  which  at  the  time  and  for  the  time  was  a  first 
cause.  He  knew  it  only  as  producing  the  observed 
effect.  He  supposed  it  to  be  a  mass  of  matter  as  yet 
undiscovered  in  the  heavens,  and  the  telescope  soon 
made  it  an  object  of  immediate  observation.  Then 
it  was  classed  among  the  other  cosmical  masses  that 
are  regarded  by  the  common  consent  of  mankind  as 
effects,  or  created  things. 

Mill,  in  his  Posthumous  Essays  on  Theism  (p.  143 
and  following),  has  recognized  and  admitted  this 
doctrine.  The  example  he  gives  is  water.  We 
know  this,  like  every  other  chemical  compound, 
to  be  an  effect,  the  result  of  the  union  of  chemical 
elements  that  could  not  have  been  so  united  in  the 
earliest  stages  of  the  material  universe,  or  at  any 
rate,  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  evolution  in 
mundane  affairs.  In  view  of  the  newly  discovered 
doctrine  of  the  Corelation  and  Conservation  of  Force ^ 
he  sees  his  way,  apparently,  to  the  admission  of  first 
causes,  without  the  acknowledgment  of  a  Personal 
First  Cause  of  all  things.  These  elements,  as  the 
oxygen  and  hydrogen  of  water,  he  says,  are  not 
known  to  have  had  any  beginning  to  their  existence, 
and  may  hence  properly  be  regarded  as  first  causes. 

Now,  in  this  order  of  retrogression  from  any  given 
or  assumed  effect,  we  must,  of  necessity,  come  some- 
where at  some  time  to  an  object  which  we  know 


g6  The  Methods  of  Natuj'al  Theology. 

only  as  a  cause,  and  as  the  cause  of  the  last  object, 
which  we  have  known  in  any  such  way,  or  by  any 
such  means,  that  we  know  it  to  be  an  effect.  Hence, 
at  this  point  and  with  this  object,  we  may  stop  and 
study  this,  as  yet  unobserved  object  which  we  know 
only  as  cause,  as  the  French  astronomer  did,  and 
learn  what  we  can  of  the  nature  and  mode  of  its  ex- 
istence, its  modes  of  action,  and  its  ways  of  mani- 
festation. 

And  if  there  is  anywhere  a  cause  that  is  or  was 
before  an  effect,  then  there  must  be  somewhere  a 
Cause  before  Which  there  was  no  cause  and  no 
act  of  causation.  Any  possible  concatenation  of 
cause  and  effect,  and  any  law  of  causation  or  of 
causal  sequence,  involves  this  result  as  an  absolute 
necessity ;  so  that  if  there  be  no  First  Cause,  there  is 
nothing  that  can  be  called  an  effect  anywhere ;  no 
consecution  of  cause  and  effect ;  no  law  of  causation. 

Now  it  is  quite  true,  as  Mill  claims,  that  so  far  as  the 
sixty-four  or  five  chemical  elements  are  concerned, 
we  see  nothing  in  them  to  imply  that  they  are  cre- 
ated effects — that  they  are  not  eternal  as  God  Him- 
self But  we  do  know  that  there  was  a  time  in  this 
material  universe  when  they  were  not  united  or 
acting  upon  each  other  as  they  now  do  in  forming 
and  perpetuating  the  mineralogical  compounds  of 
which  this  earth  is  made  up.     Hence,  as  I  have  ar- 


Physical  Objections.  97 

gued,  the  necessity  of  something  besides  them,  some- 
thing of  a  nature  different  from  theirs — something 
capable  of  spontaneous  activity,  and  possessed  of  infi- 
nite wisdom  and  power  to  set  them  into  activity,  and 
begin  the  present  order  of  things ;  thus  the  existence 
of  God,  if  not  as  the  Creator  of  all  things  visible  and 
invisible,  is  proved  in  the  capacity  of  First  Cause 
and  Organizer  of  what  we  now  see  in  the  world  or 
the  universe  in  the  process  of  evolution. 

The  solution  of  the  difficulty,  so  far  as  Mill  is  con- 
cerned, is  in  the  fact  that  he  uses  the  word  cause  in 
two  senses.  In  the  passage  just  quoted  it  is  evident 
from  the  context  that  he  means  by  causes  not  the 
*' substantial  objects,"  oxygen,  etc.,  but  only  the  acts 
of  uniting,  and  in  this  sense  he  is  doubtless  correct ; 
for  we  cannot  conceive  of  any  union  without  some 
"object"  or  "substantial  reality,"  to  use  his  own 
words,  to  be  united,  and  something  or  somebody 
acting  as  cause  to  unite  them.  But  Mill  uses  the 
word  "  cause  "  to  denote  both  the  act  of  uniting  and 
the  agent  that  produces  the  union ;  thus  perpetrat- 
ing the  fallacy  in  diction  which  in  logic,  we  call 
technically,  ambiguous  middle. 

Now  this  Being  is,  from  the  very  nature  of  the 
case,  like  the  chemical  elements  in  this  at  least : 
there  is  nothing  in  His  nature  or  in  what  we  know 
of  Him  to  suggest  that  He  is  an  effect,  or  requires  a 
cause  for  His  existence. 


98  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology 

But  unlike  them  He  must,  from  the  nature  of  the 
case,  be  spontatieoiisly  active.  He  can  have  no 
periods  of  "  absolute  rest,"  or  if  He  has.  He  must  be 
able  sua  sponte,  by  His  own  will  and  from  Himself 
alone,  to  start  into  action,  to  begin  anew  a  state  of 
activity.  He  must  be  in  this  respect,  at  least,  to- 
tally unlike  all  material  objects,  atoms,  molecules, 
or  masses,  and  like  nothing  that  we  know  of  but  the 
human  mind  itself 

These  causes  and  effects  constitute  a  series  like 
the  successive  stages  of  evolution.  If,  however,  one 
objects,  as  Comte,  Lewes  and  "  the  positivists  "  do, 
that  we  know  nothing  of  causation,  and  have  no 
right  to  affirm  it  in  any  case,  or  speak  of  anything 
as  a  cause,  I  reply  that  we  have  no  need  to  do  so 
for  the  purposes  of  our  argument.  We  may  treat 
these  phenomena  as  mere  events  in  the  order  and 
sequence  of  time  and  the  result  will  be  the  same. 

Every  series  must  have  five  elements  :  a  first  term 
^,  a  rate  of  change  dy  a  number  of  terms  n,  a  last 
term  /,  and  a  sum  of  all  the  terms  s.  Now  with  any 
three  of  these  the  others  may  be  found.  But  let  the 
algebraist  try  and  see  what  he  can  do  with  any  of 
the  formulae  if  ^,  the  first  term,  is  thrown  out  and 
becomes  not  the  mathematical  zero  as  in  the  series 
o,  I,  2,  3,  4,  but  ontologically  nothing — so  that  there 
is  no  first  term.     In  that  case  there  can  be  no  sec- 


Physical  Objections.  99 

ond  term,  no  succession,  and  no  number  of  terms, 
no  sums  of  terms,  and  in  fact  no  series. 

The  same  will  be  the  result  if  he  assumes  that  the 
number  of  terms  as  well  as  the  last  term  and  the 
sums  of  the  terms  is  infinity.  He  can  do  nothing 
with  the  symbol  of  infinity  in  his  formulae  in  place 
of  /  or  n  or  s.  He  can  neither  add  nor  substract  it. 
He  can  neither  multiply  nor  divide  by  it.  It  indi- 
cates to  him,  in  fact,  as  surely  as  the  absence  of  a 
first  term,  that  there  is  no  series. 

This  applies,  of  course,  only  to  acttial  series.  Se- 
ries may  be  theoretically  infinite — that  is,  they  may 
be  of  such  a  nature  that  there  was  actually  and  in 
fact  no  term  before  which  there  might  not  have  been 
another ;  and  no  one  so  late  that  there  may  not  yet 
be  another  in  the  same  series,  although  that  other 
has  not  yet  come  into  being.  But  this  is  not  and 
cannot  be  the  case  with  any  actual  series  of  any 
ontological  facts  or  events. 

But  as  I  have  said,  it  is  much  easier  to  expose  the 
fallacy  logically,  than  to  do  away  with  the  injuri- 
ous impression  it  has  made  on  the  minds  of  those 
in  whom  it  has  gained  a  lodgment.  Like  many 
another  deeply-rooted  and  long-cherished  error,  it 
clings  very  tightly  to  its  hold  upon  us.  It  is  like  a 
case  of  momentum  in  which  we  begin  to  move  on 
in  any  direction  rapidly,  and  seeing  no  occasion  to 


100         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

stop  at  any  particular  point,  we  either  keep  on  at 
the  original  pace  or  we  come  to  a  stop  with  such 
violence  as  to  cause  unpleasant  results. 

We  live  in  the  midst  of  things  that  are  transient 
and  temporary.  We  are  so  much  accustomed  to 
think  of  them  all  as  effects — that  we  cannot  easily 
realize,  however  undeniably  we  can  prove — that  there 
is  or  can  be  anything  that  is  cause,  without  being 
effect  or  the  product  of  anything. 

Mill  bases  our  belief  in  causation  and  expecta- 
tion of  a  cause  where  we  see  a  result  on  habit  formed 
by  long  continued  "  association  of  ideas."  I  base  it 
on  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  observed  object  or 
event.  On  his  theory  when  we  arrive  at  the  First 
Cause  the  force  of  habit  leads  us  to  inquire  for  its 
cause,  and  the  inquiry  is  as  pertinent  and  well 
grounded  as  at  any  previous  step.  But  on  my 
theory,  whenever  we  have  reached  a  conception  of 
that  in  which  we  can  see  no  evidence  of  previous 
causation — no  indications  of  its  being  an  effect — the 
mind  is  satisfied,  and  will  see,  on  a  moment's  reflec- 
tion the  unwisdom  and  the  unreasonableness  of  ask- 
ing for  its  cause.  If  in  all  our  scrutiny  into  its  na- 
ture as  a  cause  we  find  nothing  to  suggest  its  tran- 
sitoriness,  its  production  in  time,  there  is  nothing  in 
the  case  to  either  suggest,  or  to  justify,  the  question 
as  to  its  cause. 


Physical  Objections.  lOi 

We  have  seen  from  another  line  of  argument  that 
we  must  stop  somewhere.  I  think  we  see  now  where 
we  must  stop  and  the  reason  why  we  must  stop  there 
in  our  search  for  a  First  Cause  of  all  things. 

The  belief  in  the  existence  of  God  is,  I  have  no 
doubt,  with  the  great  majority  of  mankind  a  matter 
of  mere  instinct,  or  of  sentiment,  or  it  may  be  the 
result  of  early  training.  But  yet  we  nowhere  see 
Him  as  we  see  ourselves  in  consciousness,  or  as  we 
see  the  objects  around  us,  by  the  organs  of  sense- 
perception.  Hence  the  necessity  for  reasonings  like 
what  we  have  been  pursuing. 

But  what  we  can  hope  to  produce  in  this  way  needs 
to  become  something  more  than  a  matter  of  intellect. 
It  needs  to  become  a  matter  of  the  heart  and  of  the 
life,  as  vital  and  as  influential  too,  in  the  control  of 
our  actions  and  our  thoughts,  our  plans  and  our  pur- 
poses, as  the  consciousness  of  our  own  existence  or 
our  sense  of  Hability  to  pains  and  pleasures,  that 
controls  us  in  the  affairs  of  our  daily  lives. 

This  I  say  will  be  for  many  the  natural,  and  per- 
haps for  some  persons  the  only  possible  course.  But 
for  the  great  mass  of  mankind  no  questions  regard- 
ing the  existence  and  attributes  of  God  ever  arise; 
the  idea,  the  instinct  in  their  hearts  is  there,  and  the 
earnest  appeals  of  the  preacher,  the  sadder  experi- 
ences of  life,  call  it  out  and  into  activity  in  a  way 


102  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

that  they  know  not  and  for  the  most  part  do  not 
care  to  know.  They  beheve,  and  beHeving,  they 
obey,  and  following  on  they  are  transformed  in  their 
lives  and  in  the  spirit  of  their  minds,  until  they  come 
to  know,  through  the  enlightening  influences  of  the 
Holy  Spirit,  that  the  things  that  have  been  told  them 
are  indeed  true  and  of  God. 

Hence  I  hold  as  cleared  and  vindicated  from  all 
reasonable  objections  that  the  method  of  reason- 
ing from  effects  to  cause  and  to  a  First  Cause,  from 
the  things  that  we  see  to  the  unseen  God  and  Crea- 
tor of  all,  is  perfectly  legitimate  and  irrefragable. 

The  conclusion,  therefore,  seems  inevitable : 

1.  If  there  is  any  relation  of  cause  and  effect,  or 
any  sequence  of  causes  and  effects,  there  must  be  a 
First  Cause  whose  character  and  attributes  are  mani- 
fested in  His  works. 

2.  Or,  without  assuming  any  relation  of  cause 
and  effect,  if  there  is  so  much  as  a  sequence  of  events 
one  after  another  in  the  order  of  time,  there  must 
have  been  a  first  event.  If  this  event  was  the  act  of 
a  spiritual  agent  then  he  was  a  person  and  acted 
spontaneously.  If  it  was  only  a  motion  or  action 
in  mere  matter,  there  must  have  been,  nevertheless, 
a  Personal  Agent  to  cause  that  action.  This  the 
law  of  inertia  necessitates,  and  in  either  case  God  is 
proved  to  have  existed  before  all  things. 


Physical  Objections.  103 

Then  to  the  objections  to  the  method  of  Natural 
Theology,  which  doubters  urge  on  the  ground  of 
the  theory  of  Evolution,  I  answer : 

1st.  We  are  in  the  midst  of  a  process  of  develop- 
ment from  the  lower  up  towards  the  higher,  and  we 
have  not  yet  (in  your  view)  got  beyond  or  higher 
than  the  production  of  man.  But  certainly  it  is  pos- 
sible that  there  should  be  many  orders  of  beings 
higher  than  man,  even  a  One  Who  is  Supreme,  and 
exclusive  of  all  others  of  the  same  order  because  He 
is  Supreme.  These  higher  orders,  even  the  High- 
est, being  possible,  must  exist  as  products  of  Evo- 
lution unless  there  is  some  One  who  is  above  Evo- 
lution, controlling  its  productions  and  guiding  its 
course. 

2d.  Evolution  itself  is  not  and  cannot  be  an  eter- 
nal process  without  beginning  or  end.  The  present 
evolution,  in  the  midst  of  which  our  lot  is  cast,  had 
a  beginning  and  will  come  to  an  end ;  and  both  be- 
ginning and  end  are  **  dead  points  "  through  which, 
and  out  from  which,  there  is  no  possible  escape  with- 
out the  agency  of  some  Being,  Who  is  distinct  in 
His  existence,  and  different  in  His  character,  in  many 
important  respects,  from  any  of  the  material  sub- 
stances or  forces  of  which  the  objects  in  the  visible 
universe  are  constituted. 

3d.  There  have  been  occasions  all  along  In  the 


1 04  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

earth's  life-history  when  something  has  occurred, 
which,  although  not  necessarily  implying  any  change 
in  the  laws  of  nature  or  any  violation  of  them,  did, 
nevertheless,  imply  and  prove  the  intervention  of  an 
Agent  different  in  kind  and  in  modes  of  operation, 
from  any  and  all  of  the  material  forces,  whether 
chemical  or  mechanical,  that  are  known  to  the  phys- 
ical sciences,  or  are  recognized  in  our  speculations 
concerning  the  origin  and  causes  of  the  phenomena 
of  nature. 

I  claim,  therefore,  that,  so  far  as  Evolution  is  con- 
cerned, or  the  advocates  of  Evolution  can  have  any- 
thing to  say  to  the  contrary,  we  have  a  right,  in 
accordance  with  our  natural  instincts,  and  the  com- 
mon sense  and  the  common  sentiments  of  mankind, 
to  regard  these  phenomena  of  nature  as  manifesta- 
tions of  thought  and  purpose  and  as  thus  proving 
the  existence  of  Him  Whom  we,  as  Christians,  ac- 
knowledge, worship  and  adore  as  God,  Who  is  over 
all  blessed  forever. 


LECTURE  III. 

METAPHYSICAL  OBJECTIONS;  COMTKS,  AND SPEN 
CER'S  THEORIES  OF  KNOWLEDGE. 

Matt.  VI,  23.     If  the  light  that  is  within  you  be  darkness,  how  great  is  that 
darkness ! 


METAPHYSICAL  OBJECTIONS. 

In  the  last  Lecture  I  grouped  together  and  con- 
sidered the  more  obvious  objections  to  the  objective 
or  a  posteriori  Method  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  underneath  these  objections,  as  the  soil  on 
which  they  grow,  and  from  which  they  derive  their 
nutriment  and  support,  there  are  other  doctrines  of 
a  different  character,  which  we  shall  now  have  occa- 
sion to  consider.  They  lie  at  the  foundation  and 
starting  point  of  the  a  priori  method  indeed ;  but 
they  are  equally  subversive  of  the  objective  or  a 
posteriori  method,  unless  they  can  be  shown  to  be 
without  any  sufficient  foundation. 

The  objections  which  we  have  to  consider  under 
this  general  division  of  our  subject  are  four  in 
number. 

1st.  The  first  is  that  there  is  no  soul  or  immor- 
tal part  in  man  ;  or  if  there  is,  we  have  no  means  of 
knowing  it,  or  knowing  anything  about  it. 

2d.  The  second  is  that  all  our  knowledge  is  only 
relativity,  and  mere  personal  opinions  or  impres- 
sions. 


io8  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

3d.  The  third  is  that  any  line  or  means  of  argu- 
ment by  which  we  would  seek  to  prove  the  existence 
of  God,  or  attain  a  knowledge  of  His  attributes,  in- 
volves a  fallacy  in  form  which  must  be  fatal  to  any 
certainty  in  the  conclusion. 

4th.  And  finally,  we  have  the  doctrine  that  all 
knowledge,  or  pretended  knowledge,  is  based  on 
mere  assumptions,  or  at  least  upon  contradictions, 
which  are  of  such  a  nature  that  we  may  as  well  and 
as  successfully  maintain  any  one  of  them  as  its  op- 
posite, and  its  opposite  as  well  as  itself. 

Surely  here  is  a  good  array  of  challenges,  or  ob- 
jections, to  any  claim  that  we  may  make  to  any 
kjtowledge,  or  even  so  much  as  well-founded  opinion, 
on  any'of  the  subjects  that  are  the  most  deeply  inter- 
esting or  the  most  vitally  important  to  man. 

The  first  and  second  I  will  consider  in  this  Lecture ; 
the  other  two  will  remain  to  form  the  subject  of  the 
next  Lecture  in  the  course. 

I.  Natural  Theology  begins  with  either  assuming 
as  admitted,  or  claiming  to  prove  as  a  result,  that 
man  is  or  has  a  spiritual  soul — living  in  a  material 
body — that  the  soul  has  an  **  inner  light,"  or  a  **  Hght 
within,"  by  which  it  knows  something  of  itself,  and 
its  destiny,  something  of  the  God  Who  made  it,  and 
to  Whom  it  is  subject,  both  in  this  life  and  in  the 
life  to  come. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  109 

Our  Lord  spoke  of  "  a  light  within  us/"'  and  com- 
pared it  to  the  eye.  As  by  the  eye  we  see  and  know 
external  things,  so  by  the  **  light  within  "  we  see  and 
know  spiritual  things. 

This  "light  that  is  within  us  "  we  know  and  call 
by  various  names.  A  slight  inversion  of  the  words 
gives  the  famiHar  form  of  ''inner  hght."  It  corres- 
ponds, in  many  respects,  to  what  Theologians  and 
Christians  very  generally  call  ''  faith,"  when  the  word 
is  considered  as  denoting  a  subjective  act,  faculty, 
or  mental  process,  rather  than  an  objective  system 
of  doctrines  that  are  believed  and  held  by  an  act  of 
faith. 

But  for  the  purposes  of  philosophy  it  is  known 
rather  by  such  words  as  "  reason,"  "  intuition,"  or 
''insight" — "the  insight  of  reason."  It  is  some- 
times called  Xoyoz  and  sometimes  vo-qaiZ  by  the 
Greek  philosophers.  It  is  thus  related  to  the  Noil- 
mena  which  St.  Paul,  and  after  him,  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, contrast  with  phenomena^  or  things  that  are  seen 
by  the  eyes. 

In  its  moral  relations,  this  "  light  that  is  within  " 
us  is  known  as  conscience  ;  and  the  two,  Conscience 
and  Reason,  in  the  absence  of  any  special  Revela- 
tion, constitute  the  best,  and,  in  fact,  the  only,  guide 
we  can  have  to  duty  and  happiness  in  this  world ;  as 
well  as  our  only  encouragement  to  hope  for  anything 
better  hereafter. 


1 1  o  The  Methods  of  Natural  TJuology. 

But  there  are  those  who  deny  this  inner  light 
altogether. 

Thus  Comte  says  :  ^  "It  pretends  to  accomplish 
the  discovery  of  the  laws  of  the  human  mind  by  con- 
templating it  in  itself  Such  an  attempt  cannot  suc- 
ceed at  this  time  of  day."  And  again  (p.  461): 
"  As  for  this  fundamental  principle  of  interior  obser- 
vation, it  would  certainly  be  superfluous  to  add  any- 
thing to  what  I  have  already  said  about  the  absurdity 
of  the  supposition  of  a  man  seeing  himself  think." 
This  he  thinks  takes  away  "  the  last  phase  (or  ground) 
of  theology  "  (p.  ii). 

Herbert  Spencer  adopts  the  same  view,  and  urges 
it  against  Sir  William  Hamilton  and^  Dean  Mansel. 
"  The  cognition  of  self,  properly  so  called,"  he  says 
(§  20),  "  is  absolutely  negatived  by  the  laws  of 
thought ;  .  .  .  the  mental  act  in  which  self  is  known 
implies,  like  every  other  mental  act,  a  perceiving 
subject  and  a  perceived  object.  If,  then,  the  object 
perceived  is  self,  what  is  the  subject  that  perceives  ? 
Or  if  it  is  the  true  self  that  thinks,  what  other  self 
can  it  be  that  is  thought  of  ?  ...  So  that  the  per- 
sonality of  which  each  is  conscious,  and  of  which  the 
existence  is  to  each  a  fact  beyond  all  others  the  most 
certain,  is  yet  a  thing  which  cannot  truly  be  known 


'^Positive  Philosophy  f  vol.   I.,  p.  ii  and  p.  461.     I  quote  from 
Martineau's  translation. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  iii 

at  all;  knowledge  of  it  is  forbidden  by  the  very- 
nature  of  thought." 

Now,  connect  with  the  foregoing  that  other  funda- 
mental principle  of  these  men,  "the  knowledge 
within  our  reach  is  the  only  knowledge  that  can  be 
of  service  to  us,"^  and  we  have  agnosticism  complete 
and  fully  justified,  so  far  as  any  knowledge  of  self, 
or  of  our  souls  is  concerned. 

This,  as  you  will  notice,  is  beginning  early,  and 
laying  the  foundations  broad  and  deep.  If  we  can- 
not trust  consciousness,  and  if  we  know  nothing 
about  the  self  or  the  soul,  except  what  we  can  learn 
by  consciousness,  we  cannot  be  quite  sure  whether 
we  have  souls  or  not.  Nor  can  we  be  any  more 
sure  whether  there  is  anything  in  the  mind,  or  out 
of  it,  that  manifests  to  reason  the  existence  and  attri- 
butes of  God. 

The  inference  which  both  Comte  and  Spencer 
draw  from  their  premises  is  that  we  must  begin  with 
the  study  of  the  body,  and  especially  the  brain  ;  and 
stop  there  also,  unless  we  can  in  some  way  prove 
the  reality  of  mind,  and  justify  an  appeal  to  con- 
sciousness by  a  purely  physical  or  physiological 
method,  beginning  with  the  body. 

We  do  not,  however,  get  the  full  force  of  the  ob- 
jection without  looking  a  little  further.     In  August, 

1  Spencer's  First  Principles^  %  20. 


1 1 2  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

1874,  was  delivered  Huxley's  famous  address,  in 
which  he  attempted  to  prove  that  animals  are  mere 
"  automata,"  mere  machines,  without  mind  or  soul.^ 

In  this  argument,  Huxley,  taking  advantage  of 
the  present  attainments  of  science  with  regard  to 
what  is  called  "  the  reflex  action  "  of  the  nerve  cen- 
tres, claims  that  we  can  account  for  all  that  animals 
do  in  the  whole  course  of  their  lives,  by  the  reflex 
action  of  these  three  nerve  centres — the  spinal  cord, 
the  sensorium,  and  the  hemispheres  of  the  brain. 

This  reflex  action  implies  neither  thought,  nor 
consciousness,  nor  volition.  It  is  purely  physical  in 
its  nature.  It  is,  so  far  as  this  one  point  is  con- 
cerned, precisely  what  we  call  reaction  in  mechanics. 
I  throw  a  ball  on  the  floor;  the  floor  reacts  and 
sends  the  ball  back  to  my  hands.  In  the  same  way 
any  excitation  that  is  capable  of  producing  a  sensa- 
tion in  the  nerve  centres,  is  conveyed  up  the  afferent 
nerves  to  one  or  another  of  these  centres,  and  is  re- 
turned by  it  along  the  efferent  nerves,  and  pro- 
duces a  contraction  of  the  muscles,  and  some  motion 
of  body  or  limb  ensues. 

In  this  way,  as  Huxley  argues,  we  can  account 
for  all  the  phenomena  of  animal  instinct  and  activity. 

1  Appleton's  Popular  Science  Mo7ithly,  Oct.  1874.  The  address 
has  since  been  published,  with  some  changes,  in  Huxley's  later 
Vol.,  Science  and  Culture,  p.  206-522. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  1 1 3 

And  he  extends  his  doctrine  to  man  also  ;  and  claims 
that  this  theory  explains  and  accounts  for  all  that 
appears  in  the  life  of  man  that  is  commonly  regarded 
as  implying  mind  or  soul. 

But  we  answer  to  Huxley :  Your  theory  may  be 
true  in  regard  to  animals,  and  probably  it  is ;  cer- 
tainly we  cannot  disprove  it.  But  with  regard  to 
man  it  is  far  otherwise.  Besides  the  reflex  actions 
that  you  speak  of,  we  k7iow  that  we  have  another 
class  of  acts,  which  are  of  an  entirely  different  char- 
acter. It  is  quite  true  that  an  electric  current,  for 
example,  will  produce  a  contraction  of  the  muscles 
of  the  arm  as  an  excito-motor  result ;  but  I  can  con- 
tract the  muscles  and  jerk  the  arm  in  precisely  the 
same  way  without  any  excitation  from  the  electric 
apparatus.  It  is  true  that  I  draw  back  my  head  and 
close  my  eyes  when  I  see  something  approaching 
that  may  do  me  harm,  and  that  I  do  this  involunta- 
rily, and  as  a  sensori-motor  action.  But  I  can  jerk 
my  head  and  close  my  eyes,  in  precisely  the  same 
way,  when  there  is  no  such  occasion  for  it.  It  is 
quite  true  that  you  can  make  me  laugh  in  spite  of 
myself  by  your  wit  and  drollery ;  but  then,  I  can 
imitate  that  laughter,  so  far  as  mere  outward  appear- 
ance is  any  indication,  when  I  feel  Uke  anything  but 
laughter.  And  herein  I  have  abundant  proof  of 
something  in  my  own  experience  that  is  more  than 


1 14         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

mere  reflex  action ;  something  that  imphes  thought 
and  consciousness  and  volition  ;  something  that  im- 
phes a  mind  that  can  act  originally  and  spontane- 
ously; and  not  only  by  way  of  mere  reflex-action 
or  reaction,  as  do  all  the  masses  of  mere  matter. 

But  how  do  we  know  this  ?  asks  Huxley  and  the 
agnostics.  I  answer :  I  know  it  by  my  conscious- 
ness of  what  takes  place  within,  and  they  will  ex- 
press surprise,  perhaps,  that  I  am  so  far  ''behind 
the  times  "  as  not  to  know  that  consciousness  is  not 
recognized  as  a  guide,  is  no  authority ;  that  Comte 
long  ago  said  that  it  was  absurd  to  depend  upon 
consciousness  for  anything,  and  that  no  such  ''at- 
tempt can  succeed  at  this  time  of  day."  And  Her- 
bert Spencer,  he  may  insist,  has  even  proved  it 
absurd,  twenty-five  years  ago  at  least.  "  The  cogni- 
tion of  self,  properly  so  called,  ...  is  absolutely  nega- 
tived by  the  laws  of  thought,"  implies  in  fact  a  con- 
tradiction in  terms. 

The  first  point  presented  in  the  citation  from 
Comte  occurs  in  the  midst  of  an  eflbrt  to  show  that, 
in  order  to  be  successful  in  our  inquiries,  we  must 
always  begin  with  the  study  of  the  body,  and  of  the 
brain  in  particular,  and  that  we  must  confine  ourselves 
to  this  method  at  least  until  we  can  prove  by  it  that 
there  is  something  more  than  brain,  something  be- 
sides matter  in  the  general  make-up  and  constitution 
of  man. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  115 

This  idea  of  considering  man  as  a  whole,  and 
studying  the  brain  and  its  functions  as  a  preparation 
for  the  study  of  the  mind,  had  been  begun  before 
the  days  of  Comte,^  and  has  been  pursued  with 
results  that  are  quite  far  beyond  anything  that  he 
knew,  and  very  unlike  anything  that  he  could  have 
foreseen  or  expected.  It  has  given  us  a  far  more 
precise  idea  of  what  the  body  is,  and  what  it  can  do, 
than  we  had  before  or  could  have  had  without,  and 
has  thus  added  great  force  to  the  proof  that  over 
and  besides  the  body  there  must  be  a  mind  or  soul 
in  man,  which  is  of  an  essentially  different  and  en- 
tirely distinct  nature  from  the  body,  and  may  possi- 
bly exist  without  it. 

We  accept,  therefore,  the  challenge  of  Comte  in 
this  respect,  without,  however,  entirely  conceding 
its  justice,  and  may  well  thank  God  for  this  new  Hne 
of  proof,  which  He,  in  His  Providence,  has  brought 
to  light  just  now,  when  apparently  we  stand  in  the 
greatest  need  of  it. 

Let  us  then  distinctly  understand  the  task  that  is 
before  us.  We  have  to  prove  first  that  there  is  a 
soul,  an  immaterial  soul  in  man  ;  and  secondly,  that 
consciousness,  or  conscience,  is  a  legitimate  means 
of  knowledge  concerning  it. 

1  Gall  began  to  publish  his  views  as  early  as  1791,  and  he  and 
Spurzheim  began  to  lecture  on  the  subject  in  the  principal  cities 
of  Europe  in  1805.     Comte  was  not  born  till  1798. 


Ii6         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

I.  I  begin  this  argument  by  a  line  of  proof  to 
which  these  men  certainly  cannot  object,  and  with 
the  presentation  of  some  facts  which  I  believe  are 
comparatively  new  to  the  scientific  world.  These 
facts  I  regard  as  peculiarly  forcible,  when  addressed 
to  that  class  of  persons  whom  we  have  now  chiefly 
in  mind.  They  are  the  result  of  a  series  of  experi- 
ments instituted  at  Cornell  University  for  another 
purpose.  They  were  conducted  by  men  who  did 
not  beheve  in  the  reality  of  mind  as  anything  else 
than  a  modification  of  matter,  or  a  product  of  brain 
activity.^ 

In  order  to  appreciate  the  argument,  let  me  re- 
call to  your  mind  the  fact  that  the  ''  nerves,"  as  they 
are  called,  which  are  distributed  throughout  the  sys- 
tem, consist  of  exceedingly  small  fibres,  encased  in  a 
white  sheath  or  neiLrilemma.  They  are  of  two  kinds : 
the  one  afferent,  or  centripetal,  carrying  up  stimuli 
to  the  nerve  centres  ;  and  efferent,  or  centrifugal,  car- 
rying out  from  those  centres  the  stimuli  that  produce 
muscular  contraction. 

It  is  now  well  known  and  admitted  by  all  scien- 
tific men,  that  anything  which  produces  pain  or  other 
irritation  in  any  of  the  tissues  of  the  body,  produces 
— acting  through  the  afferent  nerves — a  reflex  emo- 

1  A  report  of  some  of  the  experiments  was  published  in  the  Aineri- 
can  Journal  of  Science  and  Arts,  for  June,  1878,  pp.  413-422. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  1 1 7 

tion  from  the  gray  matter  of  the  spinal  cord.  This 
becomes  so  strong  in  many  cases  as  to  result  in  in- 
voluntary or  spasmodic  contraction  of  the  muscles 
and  a  corresponding  motion  of  the  limbs.  It  is  also 
known  and  admitted,  that  any  object  external  to  the 
body  may  act  on  the  encephalic  nerve  centres, 
through  the  organs  of  special  sense,  as  the  eye,  the 
ear,  etc.,  and  produce  reflex  action  of  what  is  called 
the  sensori-motor  kind.  But  all  these  are  purely 
physiological  phenomena.  We  may  be  conscious 
of  them  when  they  occur,  and  are  so,  for  the  most 
part.  But  they  can  occur  without  our  consciousness 
as  well.  They  may  occur  after  the  brain  proper 
has  been  entirely  removed,  and  thus  all  possibility 
of  consciousness  and  of  voluntary  action  has  been 
taken  aw^ay. 

But  the  brain,  which  is  the  organ  of  mind,  obeys 
the  same  law  in  all  of  its  reflex  action,  called  ideo- 
motor,  as  is  observed  in  the  lower  centres.  It  is 
important  to  notice  this  fact  in  connection  with  our 
present  subject. 

Let  any  one  of  us  see  or  hear  something  that  is 
exceedingly  ludicrous  or  laughable,  and  the  laugh 
comes  involuntarily  and  beyond  our  power  of  self- 
restraint,  even  though — as  will  sometimes  happen — 
very  much  out  of  place  and  unseemly.  Or  let  one 
receive  a  sudden  announcement  of  some  sad  calamity; 


1 1 8         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

the  outcry  of  grief,  and  the  flow  of  tears  will  come 
unbidden,  and  persist  beyond  our  powers  of  control. 
We  cannot  put  them  off — as  we  sometimes  do  our 
repentance — to  **  a  more  convenient  season,"  or  to 
some  chosen  opportunity.  We  do  not  and  cannot 
take  time  to  think  about  the  matter,  and  delay  our 
sadness  and  our  mourning  until  we  choose  to  give 
way  to  them.  They  come  from  a  necessity  over 
which  we  have  no  control. 

The  experiments  to  which  I  refer  were  established 
to  ascertain  the  rate  or  velocity  at  which  these  stimuli 
pass  along  the  nerves.  Thus,  if  we  apply  an  electric 
current  to  the  hand,  for  example,  the  current  passes 
up  the  afferent  nerves  to  the  gray  matter  in  the  spinal 
cord  between  the  shoulders,  and  then  passes  back 
by  the  efferent  nerves  to  the  muscles  of  the  lower 
arm,  and  a  slight  jerking  motion  of  the  hand  and 
fore-arm  ensues.  Professor  Garver  found  that  the 
current  passes  at  the  rate  of  about  ninety  feet  per 
second. 

But  he  wished  to  try  the  experiment  through  a 
longer  circuit.  He  proposed  to  give  the  signal  by 
touching  the  toe  of  the  left  foot,  and  having  the 
patient  give  the  sign,  as  soon  as  he  felt  the  touch  in 
his  foot,  by  a  motion  of  the  index  finger  of  the  right 
hand.  But  there  is  no  continuous  nerve  leading 
from  the  foot  to  the  hand ;  and  he  found  that  there 


Metaphysical  Objections.  1 1 9 

was  no  constancy  or  uniformity  in  the  time  that 
elapsed  between  the  signal  and  the  sign  that  it  was 
perceived.  Here  was  a  new  and  unexpected  phe- 
nomenon. 

To  understand  this,  let  us  suppose  a  telegraph 
wire  extending  from  New  York  to  San  Francisco, 
and  a  person  wishing  to  ascertain,  by  means  of  it, 
the  velocity  of  the  electric  current.  If  the  wire 
should  coil  around  an  insulator  there,  and  return  to 
the  operator  in  New  York,  being  a  continuous  wire, 
the  message  would  go  and  return  in  just  twice  the 
time  that  it  would  take  for  it  to  cross  the  continent. 
But  if  there  were  no  continuous  wire,  so  that  the 
message  must  needs  be  taken  off  and  re-written  at 
San  Francisco,  the  case  would  become  quite  different. 
Not  only  would  some  time  be  required  for  the  re- 
writing, but  the  operator  could  take  his  ozvn  time  for 
it.  He  could  stop  to  think,  *'  think  twice,"  perhaps, 
and  he  could  even  refuse  or  neglect  to  return  the 
message  at  all,  if  he  should  choose  to  do  so. 

Or  take  another  case.  It  is  well  known  that  some 
metals,  as  copper,  for  example,  will  conduct  electricity 
freely,  while  others,  as  platinum,  will  scarcely  con- 
duct it  at  all.  If  now  a  current  of  electricity  passes 
over  a  copper  wire  into  a  piece  of  platinum,  the 
platinum  becomes  very  hot,  or  as  we  say,  *'  converts 
the  electricity  into  heat."     Now  suppose  we  had 


1 20         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

another  wire  that  would  conduct  the  heat^  as  the 
copper  wire  conducts  the  electricity.  In  that  case 
the  operator  might  send  the  electricity  to  the  non- 
conducting platinum,  and  receive  it  back  by  the  other 
wire,  as  heat,  in  a  time  exactly  proportioned  to  the 
length  of  the  two  wires. 

So  with  the  nerve  centres.  Send  up  an  excita- 
tion to  the  gray  matter,  by  the  afferent  nerves,  and 
it  is  converted  into  emotion,  and  sent  back  by  the 
efferent  nerves,  producing  muscular  contraction,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  electric  shock. 

But  in  the  case  of  Professor  Carver's  experiments, 
there  was  no  "  through  line  "  from  the  left  foot  to 
the  right  hand,  with  a  nerve  centre  in  its  course  to 
convert  the  sensory  excitement  into  an  emotor  im- 
pulse. The  message  had  to  be  ''taken  off."  He 
found  that  there  was  an  "operator"  in  the  case,  who 
received  the  message  and  "took  time  to  think,"  and 
took  his  own  time  to  do  it  in,  before  giving,  by  his 
finger,  the  sign  which  would  indicate  that  he  felt  the 
signal  given  to  the  left  foot,  as  agreed  upon. 

Professor  Garver  says,  in  his  report  referred  to, 
(p.  422):  "It  seems  that  when  an  individual  is  ex- 
perimented upon,  as  in  the  given  cases,  he  is  con- 
scious of  being  surprised  by  the  signal,  even  when 
expecting  it.  And  sometimes  the  surprise  is  such 
that  he  forgets  to  answer  until  he  is  conscious  of 


Metaphysical  Objections.  121 

considerable  time  elapsing.  At  times  he  has  to 
'  think  twice  '  before  he  moves  his  finger  or  stipulated 
muscle." 

Here,  then,  is  proof  demonstrative  and  unanswer- 
able, that  there  is  something  in  the  brain  that  acts 
in  a  totally  different  way  and  in  accordance  with  a 
law  that  is  totally  different  from  that  in  which  the 
nerve  centres  in  the  body  act.  Here  is  something 
that  is  capable  of  self-control ;  that  can  take  time  to 
think,  can  pause,  and  think  twice  before  it  acts,  and 
then,  act  or  not,  as  it  determines  to  do ;  something 
that  can  resist  and  withstand  impulses,  and  that  can 
act,  too,  without  any  impulse  that  originates  from 
any  source  except  what  is  within  itself. 

It  seems  to  me  that  we  have  here  a  genuine  case 
of  the  application  of  the  crucial  experiment — the 
experimcjttum  crticis  of  Bacon.  The  mind  can  act 
when  it  chooses  to  act,  and  take  its  own  time  for 
acting.  It  can  start  of  itself  from  inactivity  to  action 
and  change  the  intensity  of  its  action  at  will ;  the 
brain  cannot.  Like  every  other  piece  of  matter  that 
we  know  anything  about,  it  acts,  or  rather  reacts, 
only  when  it  is  acted  upon. 

This  is  our  method  in  all  the  physical  sciences. 
The  chemist,  to  suppose  a  case,  has  pursued  his  an- 
alysis until  he  has  reduced  the  question  of  a  metal, 
we  wnll  say,  to  either  sodium  or  potassium.      He 


122  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

applies  the  spectroscope  and  gets  the  well-known 
combination  of  the  lines  which  indicates  sodium,  and 
distinguishes  that  metal  from  all  other  known  sub- 
stances. Or  he  applies  some  reagent,  as  chloride  of 
platinum.  If  the  metal  is  potassium  it  is  precipitated, 
but  if  it  be  sodium  no  such  result  follows. 

Or,  in  another  case,  in  the  examination  of  some 
rocky  mineral,  the  chemist  comes  at  last  upon  some- 
thing that  yields  none  of  the  characteristic  marks  of 
any  one  of  the  "  elements  "  yet  known  to  science, 
but  has  a  well  marked  peculiarity  of  its  own.  He 
adopts  the  conclusion  that  he  has  made  a  discovery 
and  found  something  new  that  is  not  yet  described  or 
named  in  his  scientific  books. 

The  brain  itself,  as  we  have  just  seen,  is,  in  this 
respect,  and  when  it  is  merely  a  case  of  brain  action, 
no  different  from  any  other  mass  of  matter — even 
of  //^organic  matter. 

Here,  then,  is  something  that  does  not  act  in  ac- 
cordance with  inertia^  which  is  a  fundamental  law 
and  characteristic  of  matter.  This  something,  there- 
fore, is  not  matter,  and  we  call  it  mind. 

I  regard  this  as  wholly  unanswerable  from  a  purely 
physical  point  of  view.  We  come  here  to  a  hmit  to 
the  powers  and  possibiHties  of  mere  matter.  While 
pursuing  our  investigations  along  a  purely  physio- 
logical line,  we  come  upon  something  that  is  not 


Metaphysical  Objections.  123 

physical  in  its  nature  and  mode  of  action,  and  is  not 
amenable  to  the  laws  of  matter  in  any  form.  Where 
matter  ends  there  mind  begins  to  manifest  itself,  and 
becomes  all  the  more  unmistakably  noticeable  in  its 
manifestations,  because  we  had  so  carefully  watched 
and  studied  the  phenomena  of  the  bodily  or  material 
organs. 

There  are  one  or  two  other  classes  of  phenomena 
that  serve  to  illustrate  this  argument. 

AfteV  a  day  of  labor,  with  the  body  in  perfect 
health,  we  feel  sleepy.  Every  molecule  and  tissue 
of  the  body  is  disposed  to  sleep,  and  all  the  physical 
and  physiological  conditions  indicate  sleep.  But  we 
know  that  we  ought  not  to  go  to  sleep ;  some  duty 
calls  for  watchfulness,  and  we  keep  awake  and  watch- 
ful. Now  here  is  the  body,  every  part,  particle  and 
tissue  of  it,  inclined  in  one  direction,  and  this  some- 
thing within  that  we  call  ourselves,  resists  the  body 
and  controls  the  result.  The  mind  is  different  from 
the  body  and  controls  it. 

Again,  the  well-known  case  of  Dr.  Tanner.  Here 
was  an  instance  in  which,  by  mere  force  of  will,  by 
mind  controlling  the  body,  he  fasted  and  continued 
without  taking  food  for  forty  days.  Hunger  is  a 
physical  emotion.  Soon  after  eating  the  stomach 
becomes  empty,  and  we  are  hungry.  The  unpleas- 
ant feeling  extends  until,  in  the  condition  of  perfect 


124  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

health,  every  part  and  molecule  of  the  body  that  is 
capable  of  feeling  or  of  emotion  at  all,  sympathizes 
and  suffers  with  the  organs  of  digestion.  There  is 
no  part  of  the  body,  limb  or  tissue,  to  counteract  the 
prevailing  tendency.  And  yet  for  the  full  forty  days 
he  ate  not.  The  mind,  on  the  one  side  and  alone, 
insisted,  the  body  collectively,  and  all  its  parts  sepa- 
rately acted  together  and  unanimously  on  the  other. 
It  was  body  and  mind  in  conflict,  a  deadly  conflict, 
which  if  persisted  in,  as  we  know  it  might  have  been 
persisted  in,  would  have  ended  soon  in  the  death  of 
the  body. 

Sometimes  when  one  is  on  the  whole  sleepy  or 
hungry,  he  may  be  kept  from  eating  or  sleeping  by 
the  counteracting  influence  of  some  organ  or  tissue 
that  is  in  pain  or  diseased,  and  will  not  allow  the 
rest  to  go  to  sleep.  But  in  these  cases  there  was 
nothing  of  the  kind.  It  was  the  body  as  a  whole, 
and  acting  in  its  entirety,  on  the  one  side,  urging  in 
one  direction  ;  and  the  mind,  solitary  and  alone,  act- 
ing against  the  body  in  the  other ;  and  the  mind 
triumphed  and  prevailed.^ 

1  When  these  Lectures  were  delivered,  I  skipped  from  this  place 
to  the  second  part  of  Lecture  V,  thinking  that  the  second  part  of 
this  Lecture,  Lecture  IV,  and  the  first  part  of  Lecture  V,  would 
prove  too  metaphysical  for  the  taste  and  the  patience  of  most  hear- 
ers. Fearing  that  the  same  may  be  the  case  with  the  readers,  I 
give  them  this  timely  and — as  I  think  I  may  call  it — friendly  warn- 
ing. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  12$ 

2.  Having  now  fully  met,  as  I  think  and  claim, 
the  demands  of  the  materialists,  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  mind  proceeding  and  arguing  from  a  purely- 
physical  or  physiological  starting  point,  I  proceed 
to  consider  the  second  part  of  this  subject,  and  vin- 
dicate my  right  to  use  the  subjective  or  psycholog- 
ical method,  in  which  we  can  study  the  nature  and 
phenomena  of  mind  by  means  of  consciousness  or 
that  "interior  observation  "  which  every  one  of  us  has 
it  in  his  power  to  use,  when  it  may  suit  his  purposes 
to  do  so. 

What  we  know  of  a  thing  in  any  case  depends 
upon  the  means  by  which  we  know  anything  about 
it.  I  see  this  paper,  and  by  that  process  I  know  it 
to  be  opaque  and  white.  I  feel  it,  and  by  the  sense- 
organ  of  touch  I  know  it  to  be  cold  and  hard  and 
smooth.  By  the  physiological  method  alone,  pretty 
much  all  that  we  can  know  of  the  mind,  as  we  have 
seen,  is  that  it  exists,  is  a  substantial  reality — a 
real  cause  or  agent,  and  not  a  mere  product  of  brain 
activity.  We  find,  also,  that  it  acts  spontaneously 
and  under  laws  of  its  own,  which  are  in  most  re- 
spects totally  unlike  the  laws  that  obtain  in  physical 
nature.  May  we  use  consciousness  as  one  of  the 
means  of  studying  further  into  the  nature  and  modes 
of  activity  ? 

The  men  who  object  to  this  use  of  it  do  not  object 


126         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

altogether  and  wholly  to  the  testimony  of  conscious- 
ness, and  to  every  use  we  may  be  disposed  to  make 
of  it.  They  object  to  it  only  as  a  means  of  studying 
the  soul,  its  nature  and  possible  destiny. 

While  insisting  upon  consciousness  as  a  means  of 
knowledge  for  external  objects,  Comte  and  Spencer, 
together  with  Huxley,  Tyndall,  and  others,  who 
object  to  our  using  it,  or  depending  upon  it,  as  a 
means  of  knowing  ourselves,  do  use  it,  and  depend 
upon  it  as  a  means  of  knowledge  for  other  things. 

And  in  fact  it  is  a  part  of  the  philosophy  or  the 
agnosticism  with  which  these  names  are  connected, 
that  what  we  know  and  all  that  we  know  or  can 
know  as  absolutely  true,  is  the  facts  and  states  of  our 
own  consciousness.  And  they  are  right,  so  far  at 
least:  for  our  sense-perception  is  no  means  of  knowl- 
edge except  as  we  are  conscious  of  the  acts  of  per- 
ception which  are  phenomena  or  states  of  our  own 
minds. 

Spencer  admits,  indeed,  in  the  very  passage  I  have 
quoted,  that  the  existence  of  this  self,  which  consti- 
tutes the  personality  in  each  one  of  us,  is  '*  a  fact 
beyond  all  others  the  most  certain."  I  might,  in- 
deed, stop  here  and  take  him  at  his  word.  But  I 
greatly  fear  that  if  I  should  do  so  the  poison  that 
is  in  the  statement  would  remain  and  do  its  work 
nevertheless,   and    notwithstanding   the    admission. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  127 

He,  as  Comte  before  him,  speaks  of  the  absurdity 
of  any  "  interior  observation  "  whereby  the  soul  can 
know  or  study  itself. 

But  Spencer,  as  usual,  is  more  explicit,  and  gives 
us  the  clue  to  the  true  resolution  of  his  difficulty. 
He  accepts  his  fundamental  doctrine  of  a  co-ordi- 
nation in  all  acts  of  cognition,  and,  with  a  haste  which 
is  rather  inconsiderate,  he  runs  to  the  application  of 
it  in  this  particular  case.  Says  he  (§  20)  :  **  If  the 
self — the  mind  or  the  soul — is  the  perceiving  subject, 
what  is  the  perceived  object?  a  true  cognition  of 
self  implies  a  state  in  which  the  knowing  and  the 
known  are  one — in  which  subject  and  object  are 
identified."  If  he  had  said  *' indentical,"  the  state- 
ment would  have  been  less  liable  to  misapprehen- 
sion. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  major  premise,  the 
principle  which  Spencer  assumes  as  the  ground  of 
his  assertion,  is  that  iti  all  cases  the  *'  subject "  and 
the  *'  object "  must  be  two  distinct  substantial  reah- 
ties. 

But  is  this  really  the  case  ?  I  say  "  I  strike  my- 
self." Here,  manifestly,  the  "  subject "  or  agent  and 
the  "  object "  are  one  and  the  same  thing.  Again 
I  say  ♦'!  see  myself  walking."  Here,  also,  the 
*'  subject "  or  agent  and  '*  object "  are  one  and  the 
same  thing,  unless  we  assume  that  the  mind  is  one 


128  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

thing — the  "  subject "  or  agent  that  sees — and  the 
body  that  is  seen  is  another  thing.  But  in  that  case 
we  have  an  admission  that  mind  and  body  are  two 
different  and  distinct  substances,  which  can  act  in- 
dependently, the  one  of  the  other,  and  upon  one  an- 
other ;  and  also,  that  we  have  some  means  of  know- 
ing each  of  them  separately,  and  not  the  one  through 
and  by  the  other  exclusively.  Let  us  take  good  care 
not  to  allow  these  men  to  ignore  the  admission  which 
they  have  thus  made. 

And  we  may  add  that  in  all  languages,  the  fact  of 
a  "  middle  voice  "  and  reflex  forms  for  all  transitive 
verbs,  implies  and  is  based  upon  the  universal  con- 
viction that  in  some  cases,  at  least,  ''  subject "  and 
"object"  may  be  identical.  The  Greek  middle 
voice,  the  Hebrew  hithpael,  the  French  se,  the 
German  sich,  as  well  as  the  English  self,  that  may 
be  used  as  above  after  transitive  verbs,  are  all  proofs 
of  this  fact  or  law. 

Hence,  in  this  case,  as  so  often  elsewhere,  Spencer's 
great  haste  in  making  generalizations  has  led  him 
into  a  mistake,  which  may  be  easily  pointed  out  and 
rendered  forever  afterwards  entirely  harmless. 

The  law  of  co-ordination  here  assumed  by  Spencer 
is  undoubtedly  fundamental  and  inexorable.  There 
is,  however,  one  case,  or  I  should  rather  say,  class 
of  cases,  in  which  the  co-ordinate  objects  are  not 


Metaphysical  Objections.  129 

necessarily  ontologically  different.  We  have  within 
the  easy  reach  of  all  persons  an  illustration  of  what 
I  mean.  No  one  can  ordinarily  see  his  own  eyes. 
But  let  him  look  in  a  mirror,  and  the  apparent  im- 
possibility is  accomplished.  He  sees  his  own  eyes, 
or  the  eye  sees  itself,  and  Is,  in  the  exact  words  of 
Spencer,  *^  both  subject  and  object " — both  "  seeing 
and  seen  "  in  this  intellectual  operation. 

It  Is  quite  true  that  in  this  case  we  see  the  eye  by 
reflected  light,  by  its  own  reflected  Image  of  itself 
But  It  is  true  also  that  In  consciousness,  or  that  form 
of  self-consciousness  In  which  it  is  claimed  that  the 
soul  can  see  itself  and  study  Its  own  nature  and  op- 
erations, we  see  it  and  study  it  by  reflection,  and  by 
reflected  light,  so  to  call  it.  The  mind  turns  its 
attention  in  upon  itself,  as  truly  as  the  mirror  turns 
the  light  that  goes  out  from  the  eye  In  upon  the  eye 
itself^ 

And  I  will  take  occasion  here  to  point  out  an- 
other of  Spencer's  mistakes.  And  I  do  so  not  be- 
cause It  Is  his  merely,  but  rather  because  his  Is  a 

1  I  am  inclined  to  think,  however,  that  "  the  eye  could  not  see 
itself"  unless  it  had  first  seen  something  else;  and  that  we  could 
not  see  or  think  of  ourselves  in  consciottsness,  unless  we  had  previ- 
ously cognized  and  distinctly  thought  of  something  that  is  not  our- 
selves. But  the  pursuit  of  this  subject  would  lead  into  an  abstruse 
discussion  which  the  subject  does  not  call  for,  and  which,  as  it  seems 
to  me,  the  occasion  will  not  justify. 


I30         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

great  name  with  the  class  of  philosophers  whom  I 
have  chiefly  in  mind  at  present,  and  every  statement 
of  his,  whether  admission  or  contention,  is  eagerly 
caught  up  and  made  the  ground  of  confidence  and  of 
inference,  all  of  which  tend  in  the  same  direction  as 
this  advance  towards  utter  unbeUef  and  irreligion, 
which  its  advocates  seem  very  intent  upon  accom- 
plishing. 

One  of  the  points  in  Spencer's  theory,  which  Is 
indeed  rather  implied  than  expressly  stated  by  him, 
is  that  the  mind  cannot  be  occupied  with  two  thoughts 
or  engaged  in  two  acts  at  the  same  time.  The  ob- 
jection may  be  stated  in  the  form  of  a  question  as 
follows:  *'If  the  mind  is  engaged  in  any  act  of 
thinking,  any  act  of  perception,  cognition,  memory 
or  volition,  how  can  it  be  engaged  also,  and  at  the 
same  time,  in  the  act  of  perceiving  itself,  or  thinking 
of  itself,  and  of  its  own  act  of  thinking  of,  or  per- 
ceiving, something  else  ? 

The  case  of  the  eye  will  furnish  an  answer,  so  far 
at  least  as  the  demonstration  of  the  fact  is  concerned, 
without  perhaps  explaining  the  way  in  which  the 
apparently  impossible  act  can  occur. 

While  looking  at  my  eyes  in  the  glass,  I  can  stand 
there,  if  need  be,  for  several  minutes,  both  looking 
at  my  eyes,  seeing,  and  being  conscious  all  the  while 
that  I  am  seeing  them,  and  at  the  same  time  be 


Metaphysical  Objections.  131 

thinking  of  their  structure,  their  appearance,  and 
being  conscious,  also  and  moreover,  of  the  fact  that 
I  am  thinking  of  their  appearance  and  structure. 
Now  here  is  most  certainly  a  case  that  is  within  the 
reach  of  all  that  may  be  disposed  to  try  it,  and  which, 
on  trial,  will  be  found  to  demonstrate  the  fact  that 
somehow  or  other,  explainable  or  inexplicable, 
there  is  a  process  of  ''  interior  observation  "  in  which 
a  man  can  **see  himself  think,"  and  the  mind  be- 
comes, in  the  language  of  Spencer  *'  both  subject 
and  object,"  "  the  perceiving  and  the  perceived," 
"  the  knowing  and  the  known." 

And  in  fact  what  is  assumed  here  to  be  impossi- 
ble is  occurring  all  the  while,  and  may  be  observed 
at  any  moment  of  our  conscious  wakefulness.  We 
may  be  looking  at  and  examining  some  external 
object,  and  yet  be  conscious,  all  the  while,  that  we 
are  thinking  of  something  else  as  well,  something 
that  we  will  speak  of  to  no  one,  and  quite  possibly 
something  that  no  one,  but  ourselves  and  that  God 
who  sees  and  knows  all  things,  suspects  that  we  are 
thinking  of 

I  have  already  endeavored  to  give  to  the  experi- 
ments of  Professor  Garver  great  prominence  as  a 
proof  of  the  reality  of  a  mind  or  soul  in  man,  not, 
however,  because  I  think  it  the  only  proof  we  have, 
nor  yet  because  I  regard  it  as  being  intrinsically 


132  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

stronger  or  more  convincing  than  the  other  line  of 
argument,  which  depends  exclusively  upon  con- 
sciousness, but  because  I  regard  it  as  better  adapted 
to  our  present  purpose.  It  begins  where  our  agnos- 
tics and  the  advocates  of  physical  science  claim  that 
we  ought  to  begin  ;  it  pursues  the  method  they  point 
out  as  the  only  legitimate  one.  But  it  comes  to  a 
conclusion  which  they  did  not  expect  nor  desire,  and 
one  which,  as  I  firmly  believe,  they  cannot  repudiate, 
and  from  which  they  can  find  no  way  of  escape. 

The  other  method  is  no  less  conclusive,  and  is  in 
some  respects  more  germane  to  the  subject.  It  is 
as  old  as  Descartes,  and  was  first,  so  far  as  I  know, 
formulated  by  him.  He  began  the  agnostic,  or 
skeptic  process,  and  rejected  all  opinions  until  he 
might  have  time  to  examine  into  their  foundation 
and  see  exactly  on  what  they  depended.  In  this 
process  he  professed,  and  aimed,  to  go  back  or  down 
until  he  should  come  to  a  proposition  that  he  could 
not  deny,  or  even  so  much  as  doubt.  In  this  way 
he  reached  his  famous  proposition  cogito  ergo  sum. 
He  argues^  that  this  inference  of  his  existence  did 
not  depend  on  the  differentia  or  pecuHarities  of  the 
act  of  thinking,  strictly  understood ;  the  conclusion 
from  the  act  of  doubting  or  denying  was  as  legiti- 

"^  Discourse  on  Method,  Pt.  IV,  Cousin's  ed.,  vol.  i,  p.  156  and 
following. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  133 

mate  and  as  irresistible  as  that  from  thinking  or 
affirming.  ''  If  I  doubt,"  said  he,  "■  I  cannot  doubt 
that  I  am  doubting ;  or  if  I  deny,  I  cannot  deny  or 
doubt  my  act  of  denying ;  but  from  the  one  as  from 
the  other,  and  from  the  one  as  legitimately  and  as 
inevitably  as  from  the  other  comes  the  inference  of 
my  own  substantial  existence.  And  there  must  be 
the  two,  subject  and  object,  the  me  and  the  not-me, 
and  the  one  as  real  and  as  substantial  as  the  other." 

Sense-perception  and  consciousness  are  alike,  also, 
in  this,  that  they  must  have  an  object,  and  a  sub- 
stantial object  as  well.  We  cannot  see  or  hear  ex- 
cept as  there  is  something  that  is  seen  or  heard. 
We  cannot  see  walking,  for  example,  but  what  we 
see  is  the  man  or  animal  that  walks ;  walking  is  the 
process  or  mode,  and  the  man  or  animal  is  the  thing 
that  is  seen  in  that  process  or  mode.  As  in  the  ex- 
ternal world,  there  is  no  whiteness  or  hardness  with- 
out something  that  is  white  and  hard,  so  within,  there 
is  no  perception,  no  thinking,  feeHng,  or  choosing, 
without  something  that  perceives,  thinks,  feels  and 
chooses. 

We  have,  then,  an  ''interior  observation,"  by  which 

we  know  directly  and  immediately  the  mind  and 

what  it  is  doing;  an  "interior  observation  "  for  the 

acts  and  phenomena  of  the  mind  within,  as  well  as 

an  exterior  observation  for  the  objects  around  us. 
7 


134  ^/^^  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 


And  just  as  we  are  liable,  in  our  observation  of  the 
outward  objects,  to  false  perception  and  to  mistakes 
with  regard  to  the  identity  and  the  qualities  of  ob- 
jects, to  their  nature  and  character,  even  when  there 
is  no  occasion  to  doubt  their  reality  ;  so  on  the  other 
hand,  much  occurs  within  without  our  notice,  we  are 
liable  to  mistake  the  facts  and  acts  of  our  conscious- 
ness, and  are  very  liable  to  err  in  our  analysis  of 
them  and  in  our  inferences  from  them. 

Thus  it  appears  that  in  fact  we  have  the  means  of 
a  better  and  more  immediate  knowledge  of  our  minds 
than  we  have  of  the  objects  in  the  external  world. 
In  the  words  of  Huxley:^  "The  most  elementary 
study  of  sensation  justifies  Descartes'  position  that 
we  know  more  of  mind  than  we  do  of  body ;  that 
the  immaterial  world  is  a  firmer  reality  than  the  ma- 
terial. For  sensation  is  known  immediately.  So 
long  as  it  persists  it  is  a  part  of  what  we  call  our 
thinking  selves,  and  its  existence  Hes  beyond  the 
possibility  of  doubt.  The  knowledge  of  an  objective 
or  material  cause  of  the  sensation,  on  the  other  hand, 
is  mediate  ;  it  is  a  belief,  which  in  any  given  instance 
of  sensation,  may,  by  possibility,  be  devoid  of  foun- 


1  Sensation  and  Sensiferotis  Organs,  in  Appleton's  Popular  Sci- 
ence Monthly,  May,  1879,  p.  93.  The  same  essay  with  modifica- 
tions, in  Science  and  Culture,  p.  253.  I  quote  from  the  Pop.  Sc. 
Monthly. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  135 

datlon.  It  may  arise  from  the  occurrence  of  appro- 
priate molecular  changes  in  the  nerve  or  in  the  sen- 
sorium,  by  the  operation  of  a  cause  distinct  from  the 
affection  of  the  sense-organ  by  an  external  object. 
Such  subjective  sensations  are  as  real  as  any  others, 
and  as  distinctly  suggest  an  external  object,  though 
the  belief  thus  generated  is  a  delusion."  But  of 
course  the  internal  state,  and  so  the  mind  in  which 
it  occurs,  is  no  delusion,  or,  as  Huxley  says,  *'  it  Hes 
beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt." 

I  quote  Huxley  the  more  gladly  and  in  preference 
to  other  authorities,  because  he  is  commonly  con- 
sidered as  belonging  to  the  school  of  philosophers 
whose  views  I  am  criticising,  and  in  most  respects 
he  does  undoubtedly  belong  to  that  school. 

This  advance  in  Physical  Science,  from  which  the 
materialists  expect  and  claim  so  much  for  their  cause, 
helps  us  in  more  ways  than  one.  I  have  referred 
to  it  as  affording  a  means  of  demonstrating  the  ex- 
istence of  a  mind  or  soul  in  man,  which  is  a  substan- 
tial reality  and  a  spontaneously  acting  agent  or 
cause. 

I  turn  to  some  facts  that  have  been  established  by 
the  line  of  investigations  and  experiments  for  another 
matter  which  is  of  interest  to  us  in  our  present  un- 
dertaking. 

The  facts  and  laws  with  regard  to  reflex  action 


136         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

have  enabled  us  to  make  a  new  classification  of  the 
motives  and  to  see  more  clearly  some  of  the  laws 
of  their  influence  upon  our  acts  of  choice. 

We  have  three  classes  of  motives :  (i)  the  lower  or 
the  appetites  that  arise  out  of  the  condition  of  the 
body.  (2)  The  affections  which  originate  in  some 
mental  act  or  state.  (3)  The  rational  emotions,  like 
those  of  conscience  and  religion.  The  appetites  are 
impulsive  in  their  natures — they  grow  more  intense, 
like  hunger,  until  they  are  gratified,  and  then  cease  to 
exist.  No  man  is  hungry  after  he  has  eaten  all  he 
wants.^ 

The  affections,  on  the  other  hand,  do  not  become 
extinct  by  exercise,  they  are  more  likely  to  become 
stronger ;  this  is  still  more  surely  the  case  with  the 
ethic  emotions — the  impulse  to  duty. 

From  these  facts  we  derive  two  very  important 
results. 

The  first  is  that  we  are  capable  of  increasing  the 
force  or  intensity  of  our  effort,  at  will. 

Suppose,  for  example,  there  is  something  on  the 
floor  that  is  offensive  to  me.  I  stoop  down  to  pick 
it  up  and  toss  it  out  of  the  window.     This  I  do  with 


1  Or  possibly  some  of  our  philosophers  who  are  so  much  smitten 
with  the  doctrine  of  **  the  indestructibility  of  force"  would  prefer 
to  say  that  the  hunger  has  not  ceased,  it  has  only  become  "  latent  " 
for  the  time  being. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  137 

the  impression  that  it  weighs  but  a  few  ounces.  But 
I  find  it  weighs  several  pounds.  I  ''  put  to  the  more 
strength,"  until  I  accomplish  the  object.  But,  mean- 
while, the  motive  occasioned  by  the  offensiveness  of 
the  object  has  not  increased  or  changed  at  all.  The 
object  is  no  more  offensive  than  it  was. 

Now  this  increase  of  force  or  effort  at  will  is  what 
no  mere  mass  of  matter  can  do.  And  this  is  one  of 
the  facts  of  consciousness  that  serves  to  distinguish 
the  mind  from  matter  and  to  prove  and  illustrate  the 
freedom  of  will. 

The  next  fact  is  that  we  do  often  follow  the  weaker 
through  the  higher  motive,  acting  in  a  direction  con- 
trary to  the  stronger,  and  lower.  The  appetites,  as 
we  have  seen,  are  lower  and  more  in  the  nature  of 
passions  than  the  affections  or  the  dictates  of  con- 
science. But  we  often  follow  conscience  in  disre- 
gard of  the  appetites. 

The  case  may  be  illustrated  by  a  phenomenon  in 
physical  science.  If  I  strike  a  ball  and  send  it  up- 
wards, the  blow  is  the  greater  force  for  the  moment 
and  the  ball  goes  up ;  but  gravity  is  stronger  in  the 
end,  and  the  ball  comes  down  at  last.  We,  however, 
unlike  the  ball,  can  resist  from  the  first,  and  go  no 
one  step  in  the  direction  of  the  appetite,  which  is 
the  lower,  and  for  the  moment  the  stronger  motive. 

II.  The  next  point  that  I  have  to  consider  is  the 


138  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

doctrine  that  we  know  nothing  of  things  in  them- 
selves, and  that  all  knowledge  is  only  relative. 

Passages  from  the  writings  of  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton are  cited  as  authority  for  this  doctrine,  and  in 
fact  he  is  usually  regarded  as  the  originator  of  this 
view  of  the  nature  and  foundations  of  human  knowl- 
edge. 

Herbert  Spencer,  however,  adopts  it,  enlarges  upon 
it,  and  makes  it  the  subject  of  one  entire  chapter  in 
his  First  Principles  (Part  I,  c.  iv).  He  says :  "  The 
reality  existing  behind  all  appearances  is  and  ever 
must  be  unknown " ;  and  not  only  cites  Hamilton 
as  saying  that  *'  with  the  exception  of  a  few  late  Ab- 
solutists in  Germany,  this  is  the  truth  most  harmo- 
niously held  by  philosophers  of  every  school,"  and 
Spencer  himself  says :  *'  To  this  conclusion  almost 
every  thinker  of  note  has  subscribed." 

I.  The  theory  of  perception  and  the  question  how 
we  perceive  the  objects  around  us,  has  indeed  occu- 
pied the  attention  of  thoughtful  men  and  philoso- 
phers from  the  times  of  Plato  to  our  own  day.  Dur- 
ing the  Middle  Ages  there  had  grown  up  a  notion 
of  certain  properties  or  essences  of  things,  which  may 
be  considered  as  distinct  from  the  things  themselves. 
Descartes^  gave  this  theory  a  lucid  exposition  when 

1  Meditations :  Meditation  Second,  Cousin's  Ed.,  Vol.  I.,  p.  259. 
"And  yet  what  do  I  see  of  this  crowd  of  men  as  I  look  down  from 


Metaphysical  Objections.  139 

he  compared  the  properties  to  the  clothes  one  may 
have  on.  By  this  one  appears  black  or  white,  pos- 
sibly a  nobleman  or  a  peasant.  And  as  he  would 
say,  we  never  can  see  the  man  himself,  but  only  the 
clothes  he  has  on,  so  we  never  see  the  object,  the 
"  thing  itself,"  but  only  the  properties  that  surround 
it  and  cover  it  up  so  that  we  see  it  never,  but  only 
them. 

Locke  had  said :  *'  If  these  external  objects  be  not 
united  to  our  minds  .  .  .  and  yet  we  perceive  their 
original  qualities  in  such  of  them  as  singly  fall  under 
our  senses  ...  it  is  evident  that  some  singly  imper- 
ceptible bodies  must  come  from  them  to  the  eyes,  and 
thereby  convey  to  the  brain  some  motion  which  pro- 
duces those  ideas  which  we  have  of  them  in  us,"^  as 
the  means  of  perception  of  external  objects. 

These  "imperceptible  bodies"  or  particles — or 
something  analogous  to  them — Kant  regarded  as  the 
matter  or  material  out  of  which  our  ideas  of  objects 
are  made.  But  he  also  held  that  while  the  mind 
might  be  thus  receiving  the  matter  or  "  conte?tts,''  as 
he  calls  it,  of  our  ideas  of  things  from  the  things 
themselves  in  the  external  world  in  this  way,  he 

the  window,  but  the  hats  and  cloaks  that  might  cover  artificial  ma- 
chines, which  only  move  themselves  by  springs  ?  qui  ne  se  remue- 
roient  que  par  res  sorts, 

1  Essay  on  Human  Understanding,  B.  II.,  c.  viii.,  $  12. 


140         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

held  also  that  the  mind  itself  was  the  active  agent  in 
their  formation,  and  furnished  the  form  or  schema, 
so  that  it  depends  on  the  mind  itself,  rather  than 
upon  the  external  objects  themselves,  what  sort  of  an 
idea  we  form  of  them.  The  idea  thus  formed  he 
called  the  phenomena,  the  appearance,  which  the  thing 
has  in  our  minds.  These  "appearances  of  things," 
or  our  ideas  of  them,  as  he  held,  make  up  and  limit 
our  knowledge;  the  " things-in-themselves,"  ding 
an  sich,  as  he  called  them,  are  mere  matter  of  guess 
and  conjecture ;  we  knozv  nothing  about  them. 

But  from  his  psychology  there  could  be  in  the 
mind  ideas  or  phenomena — that  is,  "  appearances  " — 
of  such  things  only  as  we  can  perceive  by  the  bodily 
senses,  and  hence  we  have  in  this  sense  of  the  word 
ideas  of  material  objects  only.  I  say  in  this,  which 
is  the  English  sense  of  the  word  idea;  for  Kant  would 
scarcely  call  these  mental  acts  ideas  at  all.  He  pre- 
fers to  use  the  word  to  denote  such  objects  as  can 
have  no  visible  representation,  as  time,  space,  etc. 

It  is  but  due  to  Kant,  however,  to  add  that 
he  included  the  "  things-in-themselves  "  among  the 
"  noumena,"  or  objects  of  thought.  He  included  the 
Supreme  Being,  or  God,  in  the  same  class  of  objects. 
And  it  results  from  his  philosophy,  and  passages  can 
be  cited  from  his  writings  to  prove  it,  that  he  regarded 
the  existence  of  God  as  being  as  certain  and  as  rest- 


Metaphysical  Objections.  141 

ing  on  the  same  kind  and  means  of  knowledge  as  the 
existence  of  the  external  world  around  us,  or  of  any 
one  of  the  objects  within  it.  Neither  the  one  nor 
the  other  could  be  regarded,  in  his  opinion,  as  be- 
ing immediately  known,  as  phenomena,  that  is,  as 
appearing  to  the  mind,  but  only  as  noumenal — re- 
alities lying  beyond  and  outside  of  consciousness. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  adopted  the  notion  that  was 
prevalent  in  his  time,  that  in  perception  we  do  not 
see  the  objects  themselves,  but  only  their  properties, 
the  color,  the  form,  etc.,  with  which  they  are  clothed 
and  covered  up.  Hence,  he,  too,  adopted  the  ex- 
pression (ding  an  sich)  thing  in  itself,  which  Kant's 
theory  had  made  necessary  and  to  which  it  had  given 
a  peculiar  and  very  significant  meaning.  But  in  the 
case  of  Hamilton,  I  can  see  no  necessity  for  such  an 
expression.  Nor  can  I  see  that  it  makes  any  differ- 
ence with  our  method  of  argument,  whether  his 
theory  of  perception  is  true  or  not.  I  certainly  think 
that  it  is  not  true.  But  all  that  we  ask,  all  that  we 
need  or  assume,  as  the  basis  of  our  argument,  is  the 
existence  and  reality  of  the  objects  around  us  as  they 
are  seen  by  us  and  as  they  appear  to  us. 

But  the  very  act  of  perception  implies  the  reality 
of  the  object  perceived.  And  so  Hamilton  taught. 
He  insisted  upon  this  view  with  great  emphasis.^     In 

1  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense,  Appleton's  Ed.  of  **  The  Philoso- 


142         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

this  I  agree  with  him,  although  I  should  not  explain 
the  matter  as  he  does.  He  makes  the  perceived 
object  a  matter  of  consciousness.     I  think  it  is  not. 

But  the  act  implies  the  object.  We  say,  "  I  per- 
ceive the  paper."  If,  now,  the  paper  does  not  ex- 
ist, is  nothing,  the  proposition  becomes  "  I  perceive 
nothing,"  which  is  equivalent  to  ''  I  do  not  perceive." 
The  act  of  perception  is  not  performed. 

In  this,  perception  differs  from  imagination  and 
memory.  In  mental  acts  of  these  two  kinds  we 
think  of  the  object  without  its  presence,  and  possibly 
without  its  reality.  But  perception  is  one  thing ; 
false-perception,  imagination,  and  memory  are  oth- 
ers, and  perception  differs  from  them  in  that  it  im- 
plies the  reality  of  its  object  as  they  do  not.  And 
it  results  from  the  law  of  co-ordination  that  percep- 
tion must  be  as  real  as  an  act  of  the  mind,  and  as  a 
matter  of  consciousness  as  either  memory  or  imagi- 
nation. If  there  were  no  real  perception  we  should 
have  no  such  idea  and  no  such  name,  any  more  than 
the  blind  would  have  names  for  colors,  or  the  deaf 
words  denoting  sounds. 

Theories  of  perception  have  been  vitiated,  from 
Descartes  down,  by  a  theory  of  the  relation  of 
substance   and   properties ;    the'  theory  makes   the 

phy  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,"  p.  31,  also  p.  173.  Lectures  on 
Metaphysics,  Lects.  XII.,  XIII.,  and  XIV. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  143 

properties  as  substantial  as  the  substances  them- 
selves. It  supposes  that  the  properties  are  things 
that  lie  upon  and  cover  up  the  substance,  as  a  man's 
hat  and  coat  cover  his  body.  Hence  the  doctrine 
is  expressly  declared  as  a  fundamental  principle  that 
we  do  not  perceive  the  objects  themselves,  but  only 
their  properties. 

But  the  whiteness  and  hardness  of  this  paper — 
though  properties  of  the  thing  itself — are  not  things. 
They  are  not  envelopes  or  coverings  of  the  real  sub- 
stance. It  does  not  underlie  them.  What  we  see 
is  the  substantial  thing  itself  It  is  white  and  hard  ; 
but  the  whiteness  and  the  hardness  we  do  not  per- 
ceive, and  in  supposing  that  we  do  so,  we  make 
them  to  be  substances  and  not  mere  properties,  as 
we  had  professed  to  regard  them. 

These  truths  are  so  obvious  that  they  need  only 
to  be  stated  to  secure  the  assent  of  everybody.  It 
is  only  when  the  mind  is  intent  on  something  else, 
that  this  old  mediaeval  error  creeps  in  like  a  sort  of 
survival  d^nd  does  its  work  on  the  course  of  our  specu- 
lations, and  leads  us  to  a  result,  which  is  the  same 
as  though  we  had  not  ever  rejected  the  dogma.  We 
still  speak  of  the  sun's  rising  and  setting,  as  though 
its  motion  was  the  cause  of  the  alternations  of  night 
and  day,  although  the  scientific  world  have  long  since 
abandoned  that  view.      Nevertheless,  we  all  of  us 


144         1^^^^  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

have  to  unlearn  it  with  the  beginning  of  our  educa- 
tion. 

2.  The  other  point,  "  the  relativity  of  our  knowl- 
edge," is  more  serious. 

It  seems  to  me  that  we  have  here  the  old  ques- 
tion of  Plato's  day  revived.  He  contended  some- 
times that  if  there  is  such  a  thing  as  insight,  rorfffi^, 
or  diavoia  there  must  be  i7tiarr]}J-ri  or  true  knowl- 
edge; at  other  times,  as  in  the  Timceus  (§25),  if  there 
is  any  true  knowledge  iniarrifxr}  as  opposed  to  mere 
impression  and  individual  beliefs,  doB^a^  there  must 
be  not  only  rofjGiS  or  insight  as  a  means  of  that 
knowledge,  but  also  both  voov/xeva  or  things  that 
are  known  by  insight,  and  rorjra,  truths  absolutely 
known  concerning  them.^ 

Or  to  put  this  contrast  in  its  psychological,  rather 
than  its  logical  or  ontological  point  of  view,  Plato, 
as  we  have  seen.  Lecture  L,  began  by  drawing  a 
sharp  distinction  between  the  things  that  we  know 
and  are  led  to  contemplate  by  "  the  eyes  "  and  ''  the 
seeing  of  the  eyes,"  ojujAacTiv  xai  oipei  on  the  one 
hand,  and  by  insight  and  reason,  or  reasoning  on  the 
other.  And  in  the  TimcBus,  %  IX.,  XXL,  XXV., 
and   others,    Plato   combines   the   two,   and   speaks 

1 1  introduce  these  words  in  the  Greek  because  they  have  an 
etymological  connection  which  gives  them  an  argumentative  force 
that  cannot  be  well  retained  or  exhibited  in  any  mere  translation. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  145 

of  vorjaii  }X£ra  Xoyov,  and  then  proceeds  to  say- 
that  in  consequence  there  must  be  realities  that  are 
not  seen  by  the  eyes,  dvaia^rira,  but  are  known  to 
insight  alone,  voov/xeva  /^ovov,  which  are  unchange- 
able in  their  nature,  ael  nara  ravrd  ov,  which  are 
the  same  always,  and  for  all  rational  or  intelligent 
beings. 

I  think  it  is  undoubtedly  true  that  we  have  in  what 
is  generally  called  knowledge  the  two  elements,  one 
of  absolute  certainty  and  the  other  of  mere  relativity, 
mere  personal  opinion  or  impression.  But  the  state- 
ment that  all  knowledge  is  merely  relative,  like 
most  of  the  others  which  I  have  had  occasion  to 
criticise,  has  two  or  more  meanings,  in  one  of  which 
at  least  it  is  usually  quite  true,  and  in  the  others  it 
is  clearly  false. 

If  by  the  relativity  of  knowledge  we  mean  to  say 
or  imply  that  knowledge  is  only  of  the  relations  of 
things  one  to  another,  we  should  hardly  feel  inclined 
to  question  the  doctrine.  Even  in  mathematics  the 
truths  that  make  up  our  knowledge,  express  rela- 
tions, possible  or  real,  of  objects  one  to  another. 

Every  proposition  must  have  a  subject  and  a  predi- 
cate. These  two  terms  are,  for  the  most  part,  ex- 
pressed or  represented  by  names  which  denote  the 
objects  we  are  thinking  and  speaking  about,  and 
between  which  a  relation  Is  affirmed  or  denied.     All 


146  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

the  other  words  in  the  proposition,  of  whatever  parts 
of  speech,  as  verb,  adjectives  or  adverbs,  are  used 
merely  to  denote  the  relations  that  exist,  or  that  we 
wish  to  assert  as  existing,  between  those  objects : 
"  the  earth  moves  around  the  sun,"  "  the  table  stands 
on  the  floor,"  "  the  man  rides  in  the  carriage,"  etc. 
To  this  extent  all  knowledge  is  relative.  And  if 
this  is  what  and  all  that  is  meant  by  the  relativity 
of  k7towledge,  nobody  can  dispute  it. 

But  in  another  sense  the  statement  is  intended  to 
assert  that  nothing  is  absolutely  true  ;  that  all  truths 
are  only  relative  to  us,  and  that  any  statement  can 
be  regarded  as  true  only  i?t  relation  to  lis  individu- 
ally. 

This  doctrine  results  from  a  too  hasty  generaliza- 
tion of  some  facts  that  had  attracted  the  attention  of 
some  of  the  great  philosophers  of  our  century. 

I  see  an  object  before  me ;  it  is  red.  But  what  is 
redness  ?  Of  course  the  object  may  change  its  color 
and  cease  to  be  red  without  losing  its  identity. 
Moreover,  redness  may  not  be  precisely  the  same 
thing  for  two  persons.  But  what  is  more  important, 
there  might  be  a  change  in  my  eyes,  or  in  my  brain, 
so  that  the  object  would  appear  to  be  of  a  color  dif- 
ferent from  that  which  it  now  appears  to  have,  with 
no  change  in  the  object  itself.  Hence  redness  is  said 
to  be  relative,  and  the  word  to  denote  only  a  relation 
between  me  and  the  object. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  147 

Or  let  us  take  another  example :  the  fluid  that 
feels  warm  to  our  hand  when  it  is  cold,  may  feel 
cold  to  us  when  our  hand  is  warm.  The  water  on 
which  the  autumn  leaf  floats  before  the  wind  is  as 
solid  to  the  leaf  as  the  rock-quarry  on  which  stands 
the  hut  of  the  hunter,  or  as  the  pavement  is  to  our 
feet  as  we  go  about  our  daily  round  of  business  or 
pleasure.  And  thus  at  first  sight,  and  with  only  a 
hasty  glance  at  a  few  examples,  all  knowledge  does 
seem  to  be  only  relative,  one  thing  for  one  person, 
and  in  one  relation,  and  quite  another  for  other  per- 
sons and  in  other  relations ;  nothing  the  same  to  all, 
or  certain  for  anybody. 

Now  this  is  true  of  most  of  what  we  know  of  the 
properties  of  external  objects,  but  is  not  true  of  all. 
Take  form  for  example.  The  objects  I  see  around 
me  are  of  various  forms,  round,  square,  and  irregu- 
lar, and  of  great  varieties  of  irregularity.  But  their 
form  is  absolute.  No  change  in  me,  in  my  eyes  or 
my  brain,  can  cause  them  to  be  of  a  different  form. 
With  a  change  of  position  or  of  medium,  they  may 
indeed  seem  to  have  a  form  different  from  that  which 
they  now  appear  to  me  to  have.  But  they  are  of 
the  same  form  still,  with  no  change  in  the  things 
themselves.  Their  form  is  absolute,  and  the  same 
for  all  beings  that  can  see  them. 

So  with  their  individuality  or  separateness.     I  see 


148  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

two  objects.  They  are  distinct  and  separate.  This 
is  no  idea  that  is  relative  to  me.  It  is  true  that  from 
defect  in  our  organs  of  vision  we  sometimes  see 
things  **  double  "  ;  but  never,  that  I  know  of,  do  we 
see  two  things  as  one  when  we  can  see  them  dis- 
tinctly at  all.  But  however  we  may  see  them  they 
are  distinct  and  separate. 

Now  here  we  have  the  basis  of  most,  if  not  of  all 
of  the  sciences.  In  form  we  have  the  basis  of  geome- 
try ;  in  individuality,  after  abstracting  the  properties  y 
we  have  the  basis  of  arithmetic  and  the  science  of 
numbers ;  and  with  the  properties  we  have  the  ground 
of  that  classification  of  objects  with  which  science 
begins,  and  on  which  it  ultimately  depends. 

It  is  especially  worthy  of  note,  also,  that  all  the 
sciences  that  deal  with  objects  in  the  concrete,  as 
botany,  zoology,  mineralogy,  geology,  astronomy, 
etc.,  base  their  classifications  chiefly  on  the  form  of 
objects  rather  than  on  any  other  of  their  properties, 
which  are  only  accidental  in  an  ontological  point  of 
view,  since  they  may  be  different  for  different  per- 
sons, and  even  for  the  same  person  under  different 
circumstances,  as  in  the  case  of  the  water  just  spok- 
en of. 

There  is  still  another  aspect  of  this  doctrine  of 
*'  the  relativity  of  all  knowledge,"  which  deserves  a 
passing  notice.      It  is  claimed  that  we  can  know 


Metaphysical  Objections.  149 

a  thing  only  as  it  is  in  relations  with  other  things, 
but  what  it  is  absolutely  or  would  be  if  it  were  in  no 
such  relations,  we  do  not  know. 

It  is  indeed  quite  true  that  we  know  of  nothing 
except  as  it  is  in  relations.  Nor  do  I  think  that  this 
can  be  regarded  as  a  very  serious  matter.  What- 
ever exists,  if  indeed  there  is  more  than  one  thing 
existing,  must  exist  in  relations  to  other  things. 
Some  of  these  relations  are  accidental,  and  others 
are  permanent  and  essential ;  and  permanent  be- 
cause they  are  essential.  This  is  the  case  with  all 
the  mathematical  relations.  It  is  the  case  also, 
though  to  a  less  extent,  with  those  relations  on  which 
the  classifications  on  which  all  scientific  knowledge  is 
based,  on  the  one  hand,  and  those  natural  classifica- 
tions, on  which  all  possible  use  of  language  depends, 
on  the  other. 

What  we  want  to  know,  then,  is  these  very  rela- 
tions, and  the  knowledge  of  these  relations  is  all  the 
knowledge  that  can  be  of  any  use  to  us.  In  the 
midst  of  them  we  live  here.  In  the  midst  of  some 
of  them  at  least,  we  must  live,  if  we  are  to  live  at 
all,  hereafter.  Our  relations  to  things  of  time  and 
sense  may  indeed  pass  away.  But  we  have  rela- 
tions of  a  higher  kind  that  are  eternal ;  as  eternal  as 
God  and  Heaven  itself     These  cannot  pass  away. 

But  speculations  about  the  way  in  which  things 


150         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

would  appear  if  they  were  not  in  relations  to  one 
another  can  have  no  practical  or  scientific  value. 
For  if  the  time  has  ever  been,  or  shall  ever  come, 
when  anything  shall  exist  that  is  so  absolute  as  to 
be  in  no  relations  with  other  things,  there  will  be 
either  nothing  to  be  seen  or  nobody  to  see  it. 

I  have  already  spoken  of  those  who  would  deny 
or  question  the  reality  of  the  existence  of  substantial 
objects  around  us  whose  existence  is  independent 
of  our  thought  and  of  our  will.  The  skepticism  or 
agnosticism  of  these  men  gives  rise  to  another  phase 
of  what  is  sometimes  called  "  the  relativity  of  knowl- 
edge." If  these  objects  exist  only  for  us,  in  relation 
to  us,  and  as  we  create  them  or  conceive  them  to  be, 
they  are  most  surely  only  relative  to  us. 

But  by  the  necessities  of  co-ordination  there  must 
be  two  objects — the  subject  and  object — the  perceiv- 
ing agent  and  the  perceived  object — in  every  act  of 
perception  or  cognition.  And  this  object  cannot  be 
mere  matter  in  general,  nor  the  outward  world  as  a 
whole.  It  must  be  some  one  individual  object,  and 
the  individual  objects  as  they  are  seen  one  by  one 
individually. 

This  results  from  the  necessity  for  co-ordination. 

But  as  a  matter  of  psychology,  as  we  have  seen, 
perception  is  a  distinct  act,  and  different  in  its  essen- 
tial nature  from  either  imagination  or  memory.     It 


Metaphysical  Objections.  1 5  i 

is  an  act  of  which  we  are  conscious.  Hence  if  any 
one  should  deny  his  consciousness  of  the  act  of  per- 
ception, he  would  be  virtually  proclaiming  himself 
consciously  unconscious°of  something  that  he  is  con- 
scious of,  or  unconsciously  conscious  of  something 
that  he  knows  nothing  about;  and  in  either  case, 
much  like  the  man  that  should  vociferously  proclaim 
himself  speechless. 

But  it  is  claimed  that  these  laws  and  conditions  of 
knowledge  depend  upon  classification,  and  that  "  the 
First  Cause,"  ''  the  Absolute,"  "  the  Infinite,"  can- 
not be  in  any  class,  cannot  be  *'  conditioned  "  and 
"  related  "  to  other  things  so  that  "  the  relativity  of 
knowledge  "  excludes,  at  all  events,  the  knowledge 
of  God.^  It  is  indeed  perfectly  true  that  whatever 
we  cognize,  we  must  cognize  under  the  law  of  co- 
ordination ;  and  whatever  we  think  or  speak  about, 
we  must  think  of  and  name  under  the  laws  of  classi- 
fication, and  by  referring  to  some  class.  Hence  we 
think  and  speak  of  God  as  a  Being — one  among 
many — and  we  call  Him,  by  way  of  distinction,  the 
Supreme  Being ;  or  if  these  men  prefer  it,  as  the 
Infinite  Being,  the  Absolute  Being.  We  also  think 
of  Him  as  a  cause,  and  call  Him  the  First  Cause. 
I  can  therefore  see  no  force  in  their  objection,  al- 

1  Herbert  Stencer' s  J^irs^  FnnctJ>/es,  $-24,  p.  81,  and  follow- 
ing. 


1 5  2  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

though  Herbert  Spencer  makes  a  great  account  of 
it  in  his  chapter  on  the  ^^  Relativity  of  Knowledge'' 

But  what  is  meant  by  these  men  when  they  speak  of 
*'  the  relativity,  the  absolute  relativity  of  all  knowl- 
edge," is  often  only  the  uncertainty  of  knowledge. 
This  I  think  is  eminently  the  case  with  the  first  part 
of  Spencer's  argument  just  referred  to.  This  is  ob- 
vious on  a  slight  inspection  of  §  23. 

Now  in  all  "  knowledge  "  there  is  undoubtedly  an 
element  of  uncertainty.  Call  it  by  this  name  and 
all  men  will  understand  what  you  mean ;  and  all 
men  who  have  had  any  cautious  experience  in  deal- 
ing with  human  affairs,  or  in  the  pursuits  of  scien- 
tific truth,  will  appreciate  and  admit  the  truth  of 
what  we  say.  But  ''relativity"  is  another  kind  of 
a  word.  It  is  of  vague  import  and  very  uncertain 
application. 

If,  however,  we  will  make  another,  and,  as  I  think, 
better  analysis  of  the  phenomena  that  Spencer  dis- 
cusses in  the  Section  of  his  First  Pi'inciples  to  which 
I  have  just  referred,  we  shall  come  to  a  very  differ- 
ent and  a  much  more  satisfactory  result. 

Knowledge  may  be  considered  as  made  up  of  two 
elements,  "facts"  and  ''principles." 

Facts  we  may  know  for  a  certainty,  but  we  never 
comprehend  any  one  of  them  completely  and  thor- 
oughly.    I  know  the  fact,  for  instance,  that  some 


Metaphysical  Objections.  153 

years  ago  an  apple  seed  was  planted  in  a  certain 
place  in  the  soil.  I  know  the  fact  that  it  grew  to  be 
a  tree,  blossomed  in  the  spring  and  bore  fruit  m  the 
autumn  following.  Now  we  may  call  this  one  fact 
or  many — a  series  of  facts — as  we  please.  We  k7iow 
the  facts  as  certainly  as  we  know  our  own  existence, 
as  certainly  as  though  we  were  omniscient.  But  we 
understand  and  comprehend  it,  or  them,  as  we  choose 
to  regard  them,  but  very  imperfectly.  There  is 
much  of  uncertainty,  something  of  relativity,  and 
very  likely  some  thing  of  error  and  mistake  in  what 
we  think  we  know  and  call  our  knowledge  with  re- 
gard to  it. 

But  in  regard  to  principles,  strictly  so  called,  there 
is  no  such  element  of  error,  uncertainty,  or  relativity. 
Take  as  examples  for  illustration  the  axioms  of 
geometry.  They  are  said  to  be  self-evident.  But  at 
all  events  we  know  them  for  a  certainty  and  we 
cornpreheftd  them,  too,  perfectly — comprehend  them 
as  well — with  profoundest  reverence  be  it  said — as 
Omniscience  itself,  does  or  can  do. 

Now  such  first  principles  or  self-evident  axioms 
underlie  all  branches  of  science  and  scientific  knowl- 
edge, and  are  either  expressly  stated  or  tacitly  as- 
sumed in  every  book  that  is  written  that  is  intended 
to  teach  anything — nay,  in  every  statement  that  is 
made  with  the  intention  of  asserting  a  truth.     The 


154         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 


physicist  assumes  that  inert  matter  cannot  start  from 
rest  to  motion,  or  change  its  rate  of  motion,  of  itself 
The  chemist  assumes  that  elements  not  in  action  on 
each  other  will  not  begin  to  act  without  something 
outside  of  them  changing  their  relations  to  each  other; 
and  that  he  cannot,  in  any  possible  analysis  or  syn- 
thesis that  he  can  make,  either  create  or  annihilate 
and  destroy  one  atom  of  the  matter  that  comes  into 
his  crucibles  or  in  any  way  under  the  manipulations 
of  his  hands. 

Now  of  these  two  elements,  facts  and  first  princi- 
ples, all  knowledge,  properly  so  called,  is  made  up. 
In  what  we  call  the  inductive,  or  a  posteriori  sciQncQs, 
the  sciences  that  depend  on  observation,  the  element 
of  facts  enters  the  most  largely  and  forms  the  largest 
as  well  as  the  most  conspicuous  part.  But  in  the 
pure  mathematics,  the  element  of  fact  scarcely  enters 
at  all.  The  truths  are  obtained  by  demonstration 
from  (i)  the  axioms  and  (2)  definitions,  exhibiting 
the  7tatJire  of  the  things  we  reason  about,  entirely 
abstracted  from  their  accidents;  so  that  so  long  as  our 
reasoning  is  without  fault  or  fallacy,  the  conclusions 
are  as  certain  and  without  intermixture  of  uncer- 
tainty or  "relativity"  as  the  axioms  themselves. 

We  may  then  grant  these  agnostics  their  philoso- 
phy of  "  the  relativity  of  knowledge,"  so  far  as  facts 
show  that  it  is  only  relative,  and  still  have  enough 


Metaphysical  Objections.  155 

left  for  all  the  purposes  of  our  argument.  We  have 
as  much  and  all  that  these  advocates  of  the  physical 
or  positive  sciences  have  or  can  have  for  their  own 
use.  If  we  gain  all  the  certainty  they  can  have,  or 
if  they  will  concede  to  us  as  much  certainty  as  they 
claim  for  themselves — their  facts,  their  theories,  and 
their  speculations  in  their  various  stages  and  degrees 
— it  is  all  we  ask  for  our  own  purpose  and  use.  All 
men  believe  or  know  that  there  are  the  two  bodies 
in  space,  the  sun  and  the  planet  Venus.  Most  men 
know  or  feel  very  sure  that  there  will  be  another 
transit  of  Venus  in  June,  A.  D.  2004.  Now  if  they 
could  be  made  to  feel  as  sure  that  there  is  a  God 
Who  has  created  us  and  all  things  in  heaven  and  on 
earth,  visible  and  invisible,  and  If  they  could  be 
brought  to  feel  as  sure  that  there  is  a  life  to  come 
and  a  day  of  judgment  at  the  close  of  this  life,  as 
they  do  of  the  coming  transit  of  Venus,  it  would  be 
all  that  we  could  hope  or  desire  as  a  doctrine  of 
mere  Natural  Theology.  It  is,  in  fact,  vastly  more 
than  we  expect  to  be  able  to  accomplish  by  our 
method. 

But  the  facts  are  as  sure,  the  foundation  is  as  se- 
cure for  us  as  it  is  for  them. 

The  methods  of  the  sciences  are,  in  their  essential 
elements,  one  and  the  same  for  all.  There  are  four 
steps  or  stages :  observation,  analysis,  classification. 


1 5  6  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

and  inference.  And  at  each  of  these  stages  error 
and  mistake  are  possible.  In  the  first  stage  we  have 
observation — observation  of  (i)  external  objects  by 
sense-perception,  and  (2)  observation  of  internal 
phenomena,  or  the  acts  and  states  of  the  mind,  by- 
consciousness.  And  here,  as  we  have  seen  and  ad- 
mitted, we  are  very  liable  to  mistake — both  in  the 
mind  and  in  nature — in  consciousness  and  in  the 
perception  of  the  objects  we  think  we  see. 

In  the  analysis  and  classification  of  our  facts,  the 
methods  are  somewhat  difTerent,  and  we  are  liable 
to  errors  of  different  kinds  in  the  two  branches  of 
study,  the  study  of  mind  and  the  study  of  matter. 

In  making  our  inferences  the  laws  of  logic  are  the 
same  for  both  departments  of  knowledge.  In  the 
one  direction  we  prove  the  reality  of  mind,  the  ex- 
istence of  God,  and  the  doctrine  of  His  Moral  Gov- 
ernment, by  the  same  methods  and  with  as  much 
certainty  in  our  conclusions,  as  in  the  other  direc- 
tion, we  prove  the  existence  of  the  objects  in  the 
world  of  matter,  the  fact  of  universal  gravitation, 
or  the  theory  of  evolution. 

The  methods  are  in  their  essential  features  the 
same.  The  certainty  is  the  same  in  the  one  case  as 
in  the  other,  so  far  as  the  mere  grounds  of  logic  and 
evidence  are  concerned ;  so  far  as  our  opinions  and 
inferences  are  a  mere  matter  of  thought  and  intellect. 


Metaphysical  Objections.  157 

But  in  so  far  as  the  results  in  the  two  cases  are  a 
matter  of  the  heart  and  of  sentiment,  they  are  not 
the  same.  We  begin  with  the  objective  method. 
We  observe  external  objects  almost  from  the  mo- 
ment of  our  birth.  We  are  always  with  them,  and 
they  with  us.  We  test  our  opinions  and  theories  by 
fact  and  experience  daily.  But  in  the  other  direc- 
tion we  begin  to  observe  and  study  the  facts  of  our 
mental  activity  only  at  a  later  date.  We  all  find,  at 
first  at  least,  a  great  difficulty  in  grasping  hold  of 
them  and  keeping  them  steadily  under  our  gaze, 
long  enough  to  study  them.  We  can  make  no  dia- 
gram or  model  of  them  ;  we  can  have  no  dried  speci- 
mens, or  preserved  preparations  to  aid  us  in  our 
effort  to  get  a  clear  conception,  and  form  a  careful 
analysis  of  the  phenomena  which  we  have  to  study. 

It  is  no  wonder,  therefore,  that  material  objects 
should  seem  the  most  familiar  and  real  to  us.  Many 
of  us  have  never  heard  of  the  facts  and  truths  of 
mind.  And  many  more  who,  in  this  age  of  irre- 
ligion  and  unbelief,  have  never  been  accustomed  to 
hear  the  truths,  or  to  practice  the  duties  of  religion. 
Hence,  while  there  all  seems  familiar,  here  all  seems 
new  and  strange,  and  to  some  extent  improbable,  if 
not  even  impossible. 

One  contrast  more.  The  facts  and  truths  of  sci- 
ence impose  no  restraint  upon  our  thoughts  and 
8 


158  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 


actions — none,  that  is,  except  such  as  we  have  already 
learned  to  accept  without  complaint  or  murmur. 
But  the  truths  of  religion  open  for  us  a  new  world, 
and  put  a  view  and  an  estimate  upon  our  life,  our 
duties  and  our  relations  here  that  are  new  and  quite 
unfamiliar  to  our  minds.  This  new  view  calls  for 
exertion,  for  self-denial,  for  sacrifices  here  and  now, 
as  the  means  to  a  glory  which  eye  hath  not  seen 
nor  ear  heard,  nor  heart  of  man  conceived,  which 
can  be  fully  attained  only  through  the  mercy  of 
God  and  the  grace  of  our  Lord  Jesus  Christ,  His 
most  Blessed  Son  and  our  only  Saviour  and  Re- 
deemer, in  that  world  to  which  we  are  all  hastening, 
and  for  which  this  was  designed  and  created  chiefly 
if  not  only  as  a  means  of  preparation. 


LECTURE  IV. 


LOGICAL  OBJECTIONS ;    HAMILTON'S  ''NO  PROOF 
OF  THE  infinite;'  KANT'S  ''ANTINOMIES:' 

Mark  XI,  35.     Take  heed  therefore  that  the  light  that  is  within  be  not  dark- 
ness. 


LOGICAL  OBJECTIONS. 

I  closed  the  last  Lecture  without  taking  advantage 
of  the  opportunity  which  it  afforded  me  of  saying 
something  of  the  benefits  of  early  Christian  educa- 
tion and  its  relation  to  the  general  subject  before  us. 

The  prophet  Jeremiah^  foretold  a  time  when  "  God 
would  "  put  his  laws  into  the  hearts  of  the  people 
and  write  them  in  their  minds,  and  St.  PauP  refers 
to  this  prediction  as  about  to  be  fulfilled  in  the 
Christian  Dispensation. 

I  think  this  implies  something  more  than  the  mere 
hearing  and  learning  so  as  to  remember  the  words 
of  divine  truth.  It  rather  describes  that  process 
with  what  we  are  now  familiar,  and  by  which  these 
truths  come  to  be  acquired  instincts — a  sort  of  sec- 
ond nature — as  the  result  of  heredity  and  long  use. 

It  is  now  a  fact  well  known  to  modern  science 
that,  while  man  has  nattu^al  instincts  like  the  brutes, 
a  large  share  of  those  he  now  possesses  are  the  re- 
sult of  education.     Those  which  constitute  the  dif- 

1  Jeremiah,  xxxi.,  33,  34.  2  Hebrews,  x.,  16. 


1 62         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

ference  between  the  savage  man  of  the  woods  and 
forests  and  the  civilized  man  of  the  farms  and  of  the 
cities,  are  of  this  kind.     Those  which  constitute  the 
difference  between  the  men   and  women  of  these 
modern   Christian  communities  and  the  men  and 
women  of  ancient  heathen  civilizations,  are  also  of 
this  kind,  and  have  been  acquired  under  the  guiding 
and  controlling  influence  of  Christianity.     They  be- 
gin in  voluntary  acts,  performed  from  choice  and 
conviction,  and  most  often,  not  without  self-denial, 
sacrifice  and  danger.    These  acts  are  repeated  by  per- 
severing effort  until  they  become  fixed  habits,  and 
they  are  transmitted  by  the  law  of  heredity  to  the 
offspring.      In  this  way  the  virtues  of  these  early 
believers  have  become  so  much  a  matter  of  habit 
and  of  course  with  us,  that  we  forget  that  men  and 
women  have  not  always  been  such  as  we  now  see 
them,  or  that  we  are  indebted  to  what  Christianity 
has  done  for  us,  for  this  most  beneficent  change. 
Virtues  which  were  then  scarcely  so  much  as  thought 
of,  which  people  were  neither  expected  to  have  nor 
respected  for  having,  have  now  come  into  vogue  and 
are  regarded  as  indispensable  to  respectability  in 
any  social  community.      And  vices,  of  which  St. 
Paul  said  it  was  *' a  shame  even  to  speak,"^  and 
which  he  even  commanded  that  they  should  "  not  be 

1  Ephesians,  v.,  13,  v.,  and  3. 


Logical  Objections.  163 


once  named  "  among  Christians,  have  now  no  exist- 
ence and  no  name  among  us.^  Nowhere  is  idolatry 
professed  and  practiced ;  and  men,  even  if  they  are 
not  pure  and  clean  in  their  lives,  find  it  necessary 
to  pretend  and  to  appear  to  be  so,  in  order  to  keep 
their  places  in  society.  Truth  and  honor,  as  well  as 
every  social  virtue,  are  at  a  higher  standard  than 
they  were  then.  This  change  hath  God  wrought 
for  us,  and  it  is  the  result  of  religious  training  under 
the  influence  of  Christianity  and  the  Christian  church. 

I  think  I  have  a  right  to  allude  to  the  facts  of  hu- 
man history  as  furnishing  both  a  proof  of  the  exist- 
ence of  God  and  an  illustration  of  His  attributes.  I 
shall  say  something  more  on  this  subject  in  the  last 
Lecture.  But  as  germane  to  the  subject  just  alluded 
to,  called  *' heredity"  by  modern  scientists,  I  will 
take  occasion  before  going  any  further  with  my  gen- 
eral subject  to  say  a  few  words  more. 

This  is  not  the  only  case  in  which  the  attainments 
of  modern  science — attainments  which  have  been 
made  for  the  most  part  since  the  days  of  Paley  and 


1  This  great  change  in  the  moral  sense  and  instincts  of  mankind 
is  what  but  few  persons  appreciate.  Nor  have  I  ever  seen  it  pre- 
sented as  I  think  it  ought  to  be,  as  an  argument  in  favor  of  the  divine 
origin  and  claims  of  Christianity.  See,  for  an  exhibition  of  heathen 
sentiment  on  this  subject,  Mahaffey,  Social  Life  in  Greece  from 
Homer  to  Menander.  It  became  much  worse  after  Menander.  See 
also  Becker's  Charicles, 


1 64         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Butler — have  afforded  new  and  unexpected  proofs 
of  the  inspiration  and  divine  guidance  of  the  early 
writers  of  the  Scriptures  and  of  the  founders  of  the 
Jewish  and  Christian  Dispensations.  I  refer  now  to 
one  only. 

We  all  readily  see  and  acknowledge  the  wisdom 
and  necessity  of  the  isolation  of  the  seed  of  Abra- 
ham, if  there  were  to  be  kept  in  the  line  of  his  pos- 
terity the  knowledge  and  worship  of  the  one  true 
God.  But  Httle  thought,  however,  has  been  given 
to  the  opportunity  which  this  isolation  and  exclu- 
siveness  gave  to  the  law  of  heredity,  just  spoken  of, 
to  do  its  appropriate  work  among  them.  It  did  its 
work  and  made  "  a  peculiar  people  "■:— peculiar  in 
more  senses  than  one — and  that  peculiarity  became, 
in  the  generations  from  Moses  to  Christ,  so  thoroughly 
inwrought  into  their  very  natures  that  it  has  not  de- 
parted from  them  yet.  Everywhere  they  are  still  a 
pecuHar  people,  isolated  and  exclusive.^ 


1  As  showing  the  effect  of  the  discipline  of  heredity,  I  cite  the  fol- 
lowing facts,  which  are  found  in  Jewish  history :  The  tendency  to 
polytheism  and  idolatry,  hitherto  prevalent  among  all  nations,  be- 
came extinct  with  the  Babylonish  captivity.  They  have,  and  have 
had  for  two  thousands  of  years,  no  drunkards  among  their  men  and 
no  wantons  among  their  women.  They  have  no  scrofula  or  leprosy, 
though  leprosy  was  once  not  uncommon  among  them.  Cases  of 
insanity  and  idiocy  are  exceedingly  rare.  In  all  cases  of  epidemics, 
as  plague,  cholera,  scarlatina,  diphtheria,  etc.,  they  are  singularly 
exempt.     Richardson,  in  his  Diseases  of  Modern  Life,  p.  19,  and 


Logical  Objections.  165 

The  operation  of  the  same  law,  or  rather  the  in- 
fluence of  Christianity  under  the  same  law,  in  regen- 
erating^ the  race  and  transforming  them  "  into  the 
image  of  Christ,"  was  as  necessary,  and  apparently 
as  much  a  part  of  the  divine  plan,  as  the  preparation 
for  Christ's  ''  coming  "  had  been  under  the  old  Dis- 
pensation. But  geographical  or  local  isolation  was 
here  out  of  the  question.  The  gospel  must  be 
preached  to  all  nations,  and  all,  or  as  many  as  would 
Hsten  and  should  be  converted  must  be  gathered 
into  the  fold.  Hence,  in  order  that  ''heredity" 
might  have  a  chance  to  do  its  appropriate  work,  a 
Spiritual  Discipline,  not  only  as  a  means  of  enforc- 
ing the  new  modes  of  life  and  habits  of  thought 
within  the  church,  but  also  as  a  means  of  excom- 

following,  gives  the  following  statistics  by  way  of  contrast :  Deaths 
under  5  years,  Jews,  10  per  cent.,  others,  14.  Average  age,  Jezvs, 
48  years  and  9  months,  others,  36  and  1 1  months.  One  half  the 
Jews  reach  53  years  and  one  month,  of  others,  the  half  reach  only 
36  years.  Of  the  Jews,  one  quarter  live  to  be  over  70  years,  and 
of  others,  not  over  one  quarter  live  to  be  60  years  old.  Diseases  of 
the  lungs,  as  consumption,  are  exceedingly  rare.  These  are  certainly 
remarkable  results.  They  show  what  religion  and  morality — mor- 
ality upheld  and  sustained  by  religious  faith  and  discipline,  can  do 
for  man. 

1  The  word  "regeneration,"  and  its  equivalent  in  Greek,  itakiy- 
yEvedia,  occurs  but  twice  in  the  New  Testament,  and  in  the  first 
instance,  St.  Matthew,  xix.,  28,  I  think  it  refers  manifestly  to  a 
change  in  humanity  collectively  and  as  a  whole,  rather  than  to  the 
renewal  of  persons  each  in  his  individual  capacity.  The  other  place 
in  which  the  word  occurs  is  Titus,  iii.,  5. 


1 66  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

munication  and  exclusion  for  those,  who  after  due 
efforts  to  retain  and  guide  them,  and  after  all  due 
forbearance  and  patience  with  their  unavoidable  in- 
firmities and  weaknesses,  would  not  live  a  Christian 
life.  Within  the  church  they  would  be  a  means  of 
defeating  the  operation  of  this  law.  Out  of  it,  their 
influence  for  evil  in  this  line  would  be  at  an  end,  or 
work  at  least  among  those  who,  and  whose  posterity, 
were  to  pass  away ;  and  church  fellowship  and  asso- 
ciation would  be  among  those  only  in  whom  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Holy  Ghost  and  the  co-operation  of 
their  own  wills  would  be  at  work  in  the  same  direc- 
tion in  this  slow  but  sure  and  inevitable  process  of 
regenerating  humanity  and  transforming  the  believ- 
ers into  the  likenesses  of  Christ,  their  Divine  Head.^ 
Christians,  whose  eyes  and  thoughts  are  turned  in 
that  direction,  will  see  in  this,  perhaps,  a  reason  for 
the  stress  that  is  laid  upon  church  unity  and  har- 
mony among  its  members,  and,  by  way  of  contrast, 
the  severity  of  disapprobation  with  which  the  ''  sins 
of  heresy  and  schism  "  are  spoken  of,  and  the  terrl- 

1  Galton,  in  his  work  on  Hereditary  Genius,  p.  357,  and  follow- 
ing, contends  that/ww  this  point  of  view  the  institutions  of  celibacy 
and  monasticism  during  the  Middle  Ages  was  a  great  disadvantage 
to  Modern  Europe.  They  withdrew  the  most  intellectual,  the  most 
gentle,  and  the  most  refined  of  both  sexes,  as  clergy,  monks  and 
nuns,  from  the  ordinary  sphere  of  life  and  of  parentage,  so  that  the 
race  was  propagated  by  the  coarsest,  least  intellectual,  and  most 
animal  part  of  the  population. 


Logical  Objections.  167 

ble  effects  that  are  ascribed  to  excommunication  and 
separation  from  the  communion  of  the  Church. 
These  sins  tend  to  defeat  one  great  object  of  the 
Church,  the  regeneration  of  humanity  as  a  whole,  as 
effectually  as  the  sins  of  uncleanness  and  blasphemy 
prevent  the  sanctification  and  salvation  of  the  indi- 
vidual soul  of  the  offender. 

I.  But  let  us  proceed  to  our  main  subject,  the 
Logical  Objections  to  the  validity  of  the  Methods  of 
Natural  Theology,  and  the  importance  of  the  results 
which  may  be  reached  by  pursuing  them. 

I  have  considered  the  physical  objections,  and 
those  that  have  been  urged  on  grounds  of  psychology 
and  metaphysics.  And  it  is  worth  noticing  that  the 
men  who  have  urged  them  have  evidently  done  it 
for  a  purpose,  and  that  when  that  purpose  is  not  in 
view,  they  speak  and  act  in  regard  to  these  very  doc- 
trines as  though  they  held  the  common  views  of 
mankind  on  the  subjects ;  common  sense  triumphs 
over  their  philosophy. 

I.  The  point  which  I  propose  next  to  consider  is 
one  that  is  purely  logical  in  its  character.  I  will 
state  it  in  words  which  I  will  cite  from  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  although  it  is  but  due  to  him  to  say  that 
there  appears — after  a  most  careful  scrutiny — rea- 
son to  doubt  whether  in  using  these  words  he  is  ex- 


1 68         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 


pressing  his  own  views  and  is  not  rather  giving  an 
abstract  of  what  he  supposes  to  be  the  views  of  Kant. 
His  words  are  as  follows  :^  *'  Things  in  themselves, 
— Matter,  Mind,  God, — all,  in  short,  that  is  not  finite, 
relative,  the  phenomenal,  ...  is  beyond  the  verge 
of  our  knowledge.  .  .  A  knowledge  of  the  uncondi- 
tioned is  declared  impossible;  either  immediately, 
as  a  notion,  or  mediately  as  an  inference.  A  demon- 
stration of  the  absolute  from  the  relative  is  logically 
absurd,  as  in  such  a  syllogism,  we  must  collect  in  the 
conclusion  what  is  not  distributed  in  the  premises." 

I  have  said  that  in  using  these  words  Hamilton 
appears  to  be  giving  expression  to  the  views  of  Kant. 
And  yet  Hamilton  seems  to  hold  the  same  view 
himself,  and  to  accept  all  of  its  consequences.  Any- 
how in  this  matter  his  professed  disciple  Mansel  has 
accepted  this  view  and  carried  it  out  to  the  utmost 
extreme  of  statement  and  illustration.^ 

Two  things,  however,  must  be  observed. 

{a)  While  Hamilton  says  he  thinks  the  reasoning 
complicated  and  the  reduction  incomplete,  he  says, 


1  Philosophy  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  Appleton's  Ed.,  p.  458. 
The  article  was  first  published  in  the  Edinburgh  Review,  October, 
1829,  under  the  title  of  Philosophy  of  the  Cojtditioned,  and  Refuta- 
tion of  the  Various  Doctrines  of  the  Unconditioned,  especially  of 
Cousin's  Doctrines  of  the  Infinito- Absolute. 

2  Mansel,  Limits  of  Religious  Thought  Examined,  Bampton 
Lectures,  1858,  Lects.  II.  and  III. 


Logical  Objections.  169 

also,  that  *'  Kant  has  clearly  shown  that  the  idea  of 
the  unconditioned  can  have  no  objective  reality — 
that  it  conveys  no  knowledge — and  that  it  involves 
the  most  insoluble  contradictions"  (p.  459). 

{li)  In  the  second  place,  we  must  observe  that 
Hamilton's  whole  line  of  argument,  which  is  under- 
stood to  be  a  demonstration  of  the  impossibiHty  of 
any  knowledge  of  God  by  the  methods  of  Natural 
Theology,  is  based  upon,  and  is  an  illustration  of  the 
doctrine  here  enunciated  with  regard  to  ^^  any  syllo- 
gism "  that  may  be  claimed  and  used  as  proving  His 
existence  or  attributes.  Mansel  so  understood  the 
doctrine  of  Hamilton,  and  urges  it  with  great  force 
in  his  well-known  work.  The  Limitations  of  Religious 
Thought.  And  Herbert  Spencer  so  understood  and 
applied  it  in  that  criticism  of  his  which  I  have  quoted 
in  a  preceding  Lecture.^ 

And  yet  Kant  and  Hamilton  and  Mansel  were 
all  of  them  earnest  Christian  men.  One  of  them, 
Mansel,  was  a  high  dignitary  in  the  English  Church. 
And  "  the  philosophy  "  of  Hamilton  has  been  ex- 
tensively favored  and  accepted  rather,  as  I  think, 
however,  because  he  was  known  to  be  an  earnest 
Christian  believer,  than  from  any  appreciation  of  its 
intrinsic  merits.  It  is  felt  and  accepted,  without 
question,  that  the  "  philosophy  of  a  good  Christian 

1  First  Principles^  Pt.  I.,  chap.  iv. 


I/O         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology, 

man  must  be  a  good  Christian  philosophy."  But  I 
think  that  the  world  is  beginning  to  realize  the  fact 
that  in  his  concessions,  chiefly,  as  I  think,  through 
the  influence  of  Kant,  Hamilton  gave  away  the  whole 
case,  as  Kant  had  done,  in  the  hope  and  belief  that 
he  was  placing  Christianity  on  impregnable  grounds. 

It  is  well  to  note  carefully  the  terms  of  the  state- 
ment. It  does  not  say  in  precise  terms  that  any 
syllogism  that  should  claim  to  prove  "  the  existence 
of  God''  would  involve  the  fallacy  in  form  that  is 
described ;  but  only  that  every  syllogism  that  would 
prove  or  demonstrate  the  absolute,  would  involve 
such  a  fallacy.  This  distinction  is  practically  lost 
sight  of  by  our  modern  agnostics,  and  quite  possibly 
it  is  of  no  value  in  itself. 

Kant  and  Hamilton  are  two  great  names  in  all 
matters  of  logic ;  possibly  the  greatest  that  the  world 
has  seen  since  the  days  of  Aristotle.  One  therefore 
naturally  hesitates  long,  and  considers  well  his 
ground,  before  calling  in  question  any  dictum  of 
theirs. 

The  words  used  describe  what  the  logicians  call 
an  ''iUicit  process."  But  as  a  matter  of  fact  there 
can  be  no  illicit  process  of  the  minor  when  the  sub- 
ject is  an  individual  term,  as  any  word  used  to  de- 
note the  Supreme  Being  must  always  be.  Nor  can 
there  be  illicit  of  the  major  when  the  conclusion  is 


Logical  Objections.  xji 

affirmative — which  must  always  be  the  case  when 
we  predicate  any  attribute  of  God. 

It  is  perhaps,  therefore,  on  the  whole,  most  likely 
that  these  critics  had  no  definite  idea  of  the  fallacy 
which  they  intended  to  ascribe  to  the  reasoning  by 
which  we  would  prove  the  existence  of  God. 

1st.  Let  us  then  observe,  in  the  first  place,  that 
Spencer's  argument,  which  I  quoted  at  some  length 
in  the  first  Lecture,  is  not  based  on  a  syllogism,  or 
any  form  of  syllogistic  reasoning.  It  is  what  is  tech- 
nically called  an  ''  immediate  inference "  from  the 
co-ordination  and  contradiction  of  terms.  His  argu- 
ment is,  as  the  idea  of  silence  implies  that  of  sound, 
and  the  idea  of  light  implies  the  idea  of  darkness 
and  proves  its  reality  as  something  that  has  been 
cognized  and  experienced  in  some  way,  and  by  some 
means,  so  the  idea  of  **  the  finite,"  ''  the  relative," 
*'  the  conditioned,"  implies  the  idea  of  the  Infinite, 
the  Absolute,  the  Unconditioned ;  the  very  fact  of 
their  being  finite  phenomena  which  we  can  see  and 
handle  implies  the  reality  of  infinite  and  absolute 
noumenay  which  we  can  neither  see  nor  handle,  or  in 
any  way  make  subjects  of  immediate  observation. 

Observe,  he  does  not  say,  or  claim,  that  we  can 
prove y  by  any  form  of  syllogistic  reasoning,  their  ex- 
istence. Not  at  all.  He  assumes  the  ground  of  his 
argument  as  impHed  in  the  very  laws  and  possibility 


172         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

of  thought,  as  one  of  those  axioms  which  we  must 
assume  in  all  processes  of  reasoning,  and  which,  be- 
cause they  are  primary  and  self-evident,  there  can 
be  no  method  of  proving  that  will  make  them  more 
certain  than  they  were  before  we  began  our  pretended 
demonstration. 

But  in  the  next  place  I  wish  to  emphasize  the  fact 
that  in  the  a  posteriori^  the  outward  or  objective  line 
of  argument,  by  which  we  prove  the  existence  of 
God,  and  of  which  I  spoke  more  especially  in  the 
first  and  second  Lectures,  we  do  not  attempt  or  claim 
to  prove  His  existence  as  "  the  absolute,"  the  "  infi- 
nite," or  "  the  unconditioned,"  but  only  as  God,  the 
First  Cause  and  Creator  of  all  things. 

Now  it  is  certainly  one  thing  to  prove  His  exist- 
ence as  First  Cause  and  Creator,  and  quite  another 
thing  to  prove  Him  to  be  infinite  or  absolute  or  un- 
conditioned. In  the  first  case  we  are  using  terms 
that  are  technically  positive ;  terms  that  indicate  His 
existence,  by  the  very  attributes,  by  the  exercise  and 
manifestation  of  which,  we  prove  that  He  exists  at  all. 

Let  us  then  distinctly  notice  at  the  outset,  that 
the  expressions  "  the  Infinite,"  the  Absolute,"  ''  the 
Unconditioned,"  and  such  like,  are  not  terms  that  are 
at  all  adequate  or  practicable  for  the  purposes  of 
logic  and  of  reasoning.  What  we  may  say  of  any 
object,  if  we  speak  truly  and  intelligently,  depends 


Logical  Objections.  ly;^ 

upon  what  that  object  is,  its  essentia,  the  ro  ri  ?}v 
dvai  of  Aristotle,  which  is  always  indicated  by  the 
noun  that  we  use  as  its  name,  and  never  by  any 
adjective,  which  can  at  most  denote  an  additional 
differentia. 

It  is  indeed  true  that  the  differentia  becomes  part 
of  the  essentia  of  the  more  limited  subject  when 
the  adjective  is  so  joined  to  the  noun  that  the  thought 
or  the  description  of  the  object  is  incomplete  with- 
out it.  Then,  in  accordance  with  Aristotle's  dictum, 
de  onini  et  niillo,  whatever  may  be  predicated  if  the 
noun  without  the  adjective  may  be  predicated  of  it 
also  after  it  is  limited  by  the  adjective,  and  much 
more  may  be  said  after  and  in  consequence  of  such 
limitation.  Thus,  whatever  may  be  said  of  man  may 
be  said  oi  black  m.en  as  well,  and  much  besides.  But 
without  the  noun  we  have  no  subject  definitely  before 
the  mind. 

If,  now,  these  philosophers,  when  they  speak  of 
"the  Infinite,"  mean  that  incomprehensible  Being 
whom  heaven  and  earth  obey,  and  Him  only,  and 
use  this  form  of  expression  out  of  reverence  for 
the  sacred  Name,  we  can  appreciate  their  motive  and 
respect  them  all  the  more  highly  for  it.  But  we 
must  understand  what  they  mean. 

As  a  matter  of  mere  logic  it  is  evident  that  any 
adjective  may  be  used  to  qualify  more  than  one  noun. 


174         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

and  that  it  may  qualify  so  many  nouns,  and  nouns 
denoting  such  different  subjects,  that  no  one  thing 
may  be  predicated  of  them  all  except  the  adjective 
itself  Thus  we  may  speak  of  things  as  infinite  until 
all  that  can  be  said  of  them  all  is  that  they  are  infi- 
nite, not  indeed  in  number,  but  that  they  agree  and 
are  alike  only  in  possessing  this  one  property  of 
infinity.  If,  then,  we  w^ill  speak  of  *'  the  infinite  " 
as  a  subject,  all  that  we  are  authorized  to  say  of  it, 
or  them  is  that  they  are  infinite.  We  must  therefore 
understand  their  terms.  To  assent  to  their  state- 
ments without  doing  so  would  be  like  giving  an  un- 
limited letter  of  credit  to  a  spendthrift  who  neither 
knows  the  extent  of  your  resources  nor  cares  for 
your  wants  and  necessities. 

2d.  The  terms  "infinite,"  ''absolute,"  ''uncondi- 
tioned," are  certainly  negative  in  form. 

Let  us  consider  for  a  moment  what  these  terms 
mean,  and  what  is  the  process  of  thought  by  which 
we  arrive  at  them. 

What  I  see  and  handle  is  finite..  Each  object  has 
a  limit  at  which  it  begins  to  be,  and  it  extends  from 
that  Hmit  to  some  other  point  or  limit  at  which  it 
ceases  to  be  at  all.  Now  this  is  true  of  all  the  objects 
we  see.  And  we  generalize  our  observation,  and 
say  that  all  material  objects,  all  objects  that  are  seen 
in  space  must  be  finite. 


Logical  Objections.  175 

What,  then,  do  we  mean  by  saying  that  anything 
is  infinite  ?  How  shall  we  find  out  what  is  the  mean- 
ing of  the  word  ?  I  know  of  no  way  better  than 
Plato's,  his  "accustomed  method," ^  as  he  called  it. 
In  this  way  we  consider  the  several  objects  that  are 
called  by  any  one  name  and  thus  find,  if  we  can, 
what  they  have  in  common ;  and  that  will  be  the 
true,  though  the  most  general  meaning  of  the  word. 

Men  speak  of  space  as  infinite,  and  so,  likewise,  of 
time  and  of  number  as  infinite.  But  I  think  that 
the  process  by  which  they  get  at  this  adjective  is 
essentially  the  same  in  all  these  cases.  All  visible 
objects  are  finite,  and  could  not  be  seen  unless  they 
were  so.  But  we  imagine  space,  which  is  not  visi- 
ble nor  yet  tangible.  Hence  we  cannot  suppose  it 
to  end  anywhere ;  for,  fix  any  limit  as  you  please, 
and  where  you  please,  and  you  cannot  but  suppose 
that  space  extends  beyond.  Hence  we  say  it  is  in- 
finite, or  has  no  limits. 

So  with  time.  Name  any  date  or  event  and  we 
cannot  think  that  time  does  not  extend  beyond  it — 
did  not  begin  before  and  will  not  last  after  it.  Hence 
we  say  time  is  infinite. 

With  regard  to  number,  the  case  is  not  quite  so 
clear.  Cousin  has  in  fact  argued  that  there  is  an  es- 
sential difference  between  what  he  calls  the  numer- 

"^  Republic,  B.  X.,  c.  i.,  eiooBvia  j^iEQodo'i. 


1/6         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

ical  and  the  ontological  infinite.^  The  numerical  infi- 
nite should  rather,  as  he  thinks,  be  called  *'  the  in- 
definite." We  begin  by  supposing  any  sum  or 
number,  and  then  suppose  it  increased  by  addition 
or  multiplication  until  it  becomes  what  we  call  infi- 
nite. What  it  has  become,  in  fact,  is  so  large  or  so 
small  that  a  little  more  or  less  will  make  no  practical 
difference  for  the  matter  in  hand;  or  possibly  so 
large  or  so  small  that  we  cannot  tell  or  imagine  how 
large  or  how  small  it  is. 

But  Cousin  fails  to  tell  us  what  the  ontological 
infinite  is,  or  what  we  mean  by  the  word.  And  I 
doubt  very  much  whether  it  has  any  meaning  but 
the  one  above  assigned  to  it.  Now,  all  these  mean- 
ings of  the  word  are  the  same  in  their  import,  they 
relate  to  quantity ;  and  when  we  call  anything  infi- 
nite we  mean  to  say  that  it  is  so  large  that  we  do 
not  know  how  large  it  is,  and  cannot  imagine  or 
suppose  it  to  be  larger. 

The  word  "  absolute "  refers  rather,  as  I  think, 
to  quality  than  to  quantity.  We  may  say  of  water 
that  it  is  absolutely  pure ;  we  should  hardly  say  it 
is  infinitely  pure.  We  say  of  space,  as  above  noticed, 
that  it  is  infinite,  or  infinitely  large,  but  we  should 
hardly  call  it  absolutely  large. 

1  Course  of  the  History  of  Philosophy.     Course  for  1828-9,  2d  se- 
ries, Vol.  II.,  Lect.  XVIII.,  Chap,  iii.,  in  Dr.  Henry's  translation. 


Logical  Objections.  177 

But  neither  of  them  are  words  that  are  obtained 
from  any  act  of  immediate  cognition.  What  we 
cognize,  immediately,  must  be  finite,  Hmited  and 
conditioned.  If  it  is  infinite  or  absolute  it  must  be 
proved  to  be  so  by  reasoning  from  its  nature,  and 
not  from  any  direct  observation. 

We  predicate  of  objects:  (i)  that  which  we  see 
them  to  be,  and  (2)  that  which  we  can  prove  them 
to  be  by  reasoning  from  their  nature.  I  see  this 
paper,  as  opaque,  and  because  it  is  opaque  and  re- 
flects the  light.  I  feel  it  because  it  is  hard,  and  re- 
sists my  hand  when  I  press  upon  it.  It  is  limited 
or  finite,  because  both  by  sight  and  touch  I  perceive 
something  besides  it,  around  it  and  beneath  it,  which 
begins  to  be,  where  it  ends  or  ceases  to  be.  But  I 
prove  that  it  is  divisible — divisible  infinitely  or  with- 
out Hmit  if  you  please — from  its  very  nature  as  an 
object  that  is  extended  in  space;  and  I  predicate  all 
these  properties  and  say  it  is  opaque,  it  is  hard,  it  is 
extended  and  it  is  divisible,  with  equal  confidence 
and  certainty. 

Now  we  have  seen  that  we  provethe  existence  of 
God,  as  a  First  Cause,  and  as  such  He  must  be 
spontaneously  active.  We  see  that  He  must  be  in- 
telligent in  order  that  all  that  he  has  done  shall  be 
in  accordance  with  law  and  truth.  We  see  that  He 
must  be  powerful,  in  order  to  do  all  that  we  find  it 


178         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

necessary  to  ascribe  to  Him  in  the  construction  and 
course  of  nature. 

We  have  a  good  illustration  of  this  method  of  ar- 
gument in  the  discovery  of  the  planet  Neptune, 
spoken  of  in  the  last  Lecture. 

Now  in  precisely  the  same  way  we  find  God  act- 
ing spontaneously,  with  intelligence  and  power — 
great  power — and  some  one  asks,  Is  He  infinite? 
We  say  He  is  not  finite,  because  we  do  not  and  can- 
not conceive  Him  to  begm  to  be  at  any  point  of 
either  space  or  time,  or  to  extend  as  material  objects 
doy  and  of  necessity  must  from  some  one  point  of 
space  to  some  other  point.  His  omnipresence  is  not 
conceived  or  accounted  for  in  that  way.  Now,  if  we 
choose  to  denote  the  not  being  fijtite  in  this  sense 
by  the  word  *' infinite,"  then  surely  we  may  say  that 
God  is  infinite.  But  the  affirmation  is  based  on  an 
immediate  inference  from  the  meaning  of  the  word 
finite,  and  not  on  any  syllogism  that  can  involve  any 
ilHcit  process,  whether  of  the  major  or  of  the  minor, 
or  in  fact  any  other  fallacy  in  form. 

So  with  the  word  "absolute."  If  we  generalize 
our  experience  of  all  visible  and  tangible  things,  and 
say  they  are  all  effects,  dependent  on  causes  that 
preceded  them  for  their  existence,  and  upon  other 
things  still  for  the  continuance  of  that  existence,  and 
then  say  that  God  cannot  be  dependent,  like  these 


Logical  Objections.  I'jg 

objects,  on  anything  else,  either  for  an  origin  or  for 
the  continuance  of  His  existence,  and  choose  to  ex- 
press this  thought  by  the  word  "  absolute  "  and  call 
Him  absolute,  there  can  be  no  logical  impropriety 
in  so  doing ;  there  is  nothing  absurd  or  fallacious  in 
the  process. 

With  regard  to  the  word  unconditioned  we  must 
say  something  a  little  different.  In  most  respects  it 
means,  in  this  controversy,  the  same  as  the  word 
"absolute."  And  in  so  far  as  that  meaning  is  con- 
cerned, what  I  have  already  said  of  the  word  "  abso- 
lute "  is  fully  applicable  to  the  use  of  this  word  also. 
God  may  be  said  to  be  ''unconditioned"  in  the 
same  sense  as  He  may  be  said  to  be  absolute.  And 
in  fact  He  may  be  said  to  be  absolute  in  another  and 
more  popular  sense  of  the  word.  He  is  absolute  in 
that  no  one  person  or  thing  can  resist  His  will,  out- 
wit Him,  if  we  may  so  speak,  or  interpose  any  obsta- 
cle that  will  be  felt  to  be  an  obstacle  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  His  purposes. 

I  have  spoken  of  ''  absolute  "  as  relating  rather  to 
the  quality  than  to  the  quantity  of  an  object.  In 
the  discussions  to  which  I  am  referring,  however, 
the  word  is  used,  as  I  understand,  chiefly  in  reference 
to  freedom  from  restraint  and  constraint,  or  neces- 
sary conditions  and  limitations  to  His  wisdom  and 
power,     When  we  call  Him  absolute,  we  mean  that 


i8o  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

He  can  do  as  He  pleases,  is  under  no  law  or  limita- 
tion, as  I  apprehend,  rather  than  to  speak  of  the 
quality  of  His  attributes. 

But  in  regard  to  His  infinity,  we  mean  to  assert, 
as  I  conceive,  that  we  know  of  no  limit  to  the  ex- 
tent of  His  wisdom  and  power,  or  to  the  presence 
and  reality  of  His  being. 

But  the  method  of  our  proof  should  not  be  mis- 
taken. We  do  not  prove,  or  attempt  to  prove  di- 
rectly, from  the  phenomena  of  nature.  His  existence 
as  "the  Infinite  "  or  ''the  Absolute.'*  What  we  prove 
is  His  existence  as  God — a  Being  of  wisdom,  of  power, 
and  of  spontaneous  activity. 

Do  you  ask,  Is  He  infinite  and  absolute  ?  I  an- 
swer, This  depends  very  much  upon  what  you  mean 
by  the  terms.  He  is  both  infinite  and  absolute  in 
the  sense  in  which  these  attributes  can  be  inferred, 
from  what  we  know  otherwise  concerning  His  nature. 
And  that  is  all,  I  apprehend,  that  we  can  care  to 
affirm  of  Him,  and  in  that  sense  of  the  words  our 
affirmation  cannot  be  questioned  or  denied. 

But  "  unconditioned  "  has  another  element  in  its 
meaning,  or  rather  suggests  another  view  of  the  at- 
tributes and  relations  of  God.  And  in  this  sense  It 
is  used  as  the  opposite  of  the  word  "  relative,"  as 
well  as  the  opposite  of  the  word  "conditioned." 
Hence  to  be  "  unconditioned  "  in  this  sense  is  to  be 
out  of  relations  to  all  other  thincfs. 


Logical  Objections.  i8i 

We  touch  here  a  thought  that  has  occasioned  great 
trouble  to  the  metaphysicians  from  Spinoza,  at  least, 
down  to  our  own  time.  If  God  be  in  *'  conditions  " 
and  *-  relations  "  with  other  things,  those  other  things 
must  exist,  and,  as  they  argue,  they  must  be,  outside 
of  Him,  and  limit  His  existence ;  and  so  He  cannot 
be  infinite.  This  is  a  central  thought — the  germ  of 
Spinoza's  pantheism. 

Now  this  may  involve  a  mystery  which  we  can 
neither  understand  or  explain.  Certainly  I  shall 
attempt  no  explanation  of  it  here,  for  it  is  not  my 
claim  that  the  method  of  Natural  Theology  can  prove, 
or  claims  to  prove,  that  God  is  infinite,  absolute,  or 
unconditioned  in  any  sense  of  those  words  which  can 
make  their  use  liable  to  the  objections  that  Hamilton, 
Mansel  and  Spencer  have  urged  against  them.  I 
aim  to  show  only  that  this  method  of  argument 
proves  His  existence  as  First  Cause  and  Creator,  a 
Personal  Agent,  wise,  powerful  and  good,  beyond 
any  limits  that  we  can  discover  or  conceive. 

But  in  a  certain  sense  of  the  word  He  is  not  un- 
conditioned. No  object  of  thought  or  of  reality 
can  be  so.  He  is  in  the  "  condition  "  of  being  an 
object  that  is  thought  of,  and  of  whom  we  think, 
whether  we  think  of  Him  to  affirm  or  to  deny  His 
existence.  He  exists  **  in  relation  "  to  all  created 
things — the   relation  of  creator  to  things  created. 


1 82         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

He  exists  in  the  "  relation  "  to  all  phenomena  which 
we  have  denoted  by  the  word  noumenoji  as  that 
which  they  make  manifest.  And  if  either  the  doc- 
trine of  the  Christian  Revelation  or  those  of  Natural 
Theology  are  true,  He  exists  ''in  relation  to"  us  as 
our  present  Moral  Governor  and  our  Final  Judge. 
And  on  the  Christian  basis,  He  exists  in  many  most 
tender  relations  to  us — in  Christ  as  our  Redeemer — 
in  the  Holy  Ghost  as  our  Sanctifier,  to  enlighten  our 
minds  and  guide  us  in  the  paths  of  peace  and  the 
ways  that  lead  to  Heaven.  He  exists  as  all  that  can 
excite  or  inspire  noble  thoughts,  holy  aspirations,  all 
that  can  give  courage  and  hope ;  all  that  can  afford 
strength  and  give  victory  at  last. 

And  if  He  exists  at  all  He  must  be  "  conditioned  " 
and  in  some  relations  to  other  things.  He  must  be 
in  a  "  condition  "  to  be  thought  of,  to  be  loved  and 
feared,  to  be  the  creator  of  whatever  is  created,  and 
the  coeval  of  whatever  is  eternal,  if  there  is  anything 
that  is  eternal  but  Himself  If  there  is  more  than 
one  thing  in  the  universe  they  must  be  in  some  re- 
lation to  each  other  and  limited  in  logical — though 
not  necessarily  in  ontological — quantity,  so  that  the 
one  is  not  the  other,  and  they  may  be  two  or  more 
and  not  one  only.^ 

1  It  is  readily  admitted  that  any  two  objects  that  are  extended  and 
have  the  property  of  impenetrability  which  is  ascribed  to  all  material 


Logical  Objections.  183 

And  yet  Herbert  Spencer,  while  protesting  as  we 
have  seen  most  earnestly,  and,  as  I  think,  most  ef- 
fectively, against  the  inference  of  Hamilton  and 
Mansel,  derived  both  from  their  psychology  and 
their  logic  to  the  non-existence  and  unreality  of 
what  they  call  'Hhe  infinite,"  was  led  by  his  false 
psychology  both  unwisely  and  unnecessarily,  as  I 
think,  into  the  worst  feature  of  his  agnosticism,  the 
one  feature,  as  I  am  inclined  to  regard  it,  which 
made  of  him  an  agnostic  rather  than  a  devout 
Christian  believer.  He  spoke  of  God  as  included  in 
the  class  of  things  which  he  called  unknowable  and 
unknown  !  But  surely  He  of  Whom  it  may  be  said 
that  He  is  *'  omnipresent,"  "  manifest  in  every  phe- 
nomenon of  nature,"  "  working  through  its  myriad 
agencies,"  and  even  in  the  mind  of  man  himself, 
"producing  in  him"  his  highest  and  holiest  "beliefs," 
ought  not  to  be  regarded  or  spoken  of  as  altogether 
unknown  to  men.     We  have  here,  not  as  a  confes- 


substances,  do  limit  each  other,  not  only  in  logical  but  also  in  onto- 
logical  quantity,  so  that  neither  one  of  them  can  be  said  to  be  infi- 
nite in  any  proper  sense  of  the  word.  They  are  not  only  two  objects, 
but  both  of  them  are  finite  objects.  Philosophers,  however,  hold 
that  space,  which  has  not  the  material  property  of  impenetrability, 
is  infinite,  notwithstanding  the  existence  of  material  objects.  They 
are  thought  to  exist  in  space— without  limiting  it  ontologically. 
Much  more,  therefore,  may  this  be  said  of  mind,  and  especially  of 
the  Divine  Mind,  to  which  even  the  material  property  of  extension 
is  not  ascribed. 


1 84         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

slon  only,  but  as  a  contention  rather,  all  that 
Natural  Theology  claims,  or  that  its  methods  ask, — 
the  existence  of  God,  His  agency  in  nature,  His 
providence  over  all  things,  and  His  Inspiration,  if  not 
even  miracles,  in  the  only  sense  in  which  the  Bible 
claims  them,  or  in  which  theologians  have  any  occa- 
sion to  claim  or  to  assert  their  occurrence. 

The  case  is  the  same  in  all  its  essential  features, 
and  In  all  of  the  principles  of  logic  that  are  involved, 
as  what  occurs  in  our  daily  experience. 

There  is  a  man  before  me.  I  see  his  body,  but 
of  his  consciousness,  his  thoughts,  his  mind,  I  know 
nothing  except  what  Is  manifested  to  me  by  his 
words  and  his  actions;  these  are  the  phenomena 
which  manifest  to  me  what  is  yet  only  the  noiime7ion^ 
his  self  I  readily  interpret  his  words  and  actions 
to  imply  certain  thoughts,  feelings  and  purposes,  and 
these  are  the  states  and  acts  of  his  mind  or  self  By 
them  I  understand  that  he  is  a  person  and  not  a 
mere  thing;  that  he  is  wise  and  benevolent,  has 
purposes  and  aims  to  accomplish,  and  some  measure 
at  least  of  power  to  accomplish  them.  Of  course  I 
may  misunderstand  him.  And  It  Is  possible  that  he 
may  intentionally  deceive  me.  But  no  one  doubts 
the  general  result,  the  inference  that  he  is  intelligent, 
is  capable  of  purpose,  and  has  purposes  to  accom- 
plish, arrived  at  in  this  way,  however  I  may  mlsun- 


Logical  Objections.  185 

derstand  them,  or  he  may  have  deceived  me  as  to 
the  particular  thoughts  and  purposes  he  may  have 
at  the  moment. 

So  with  Natural  Theology.  The  world  and  its 
facts  and  events  are  the  phenomena  that  manifest 
unto  us  the  attributes  of  God.  Their  existence 
proves  His  creative  power.  Their  intelligibility 
proves  His  intelligence.  Their  harmony  and  the 
adaptation  of  one  to  another,  and  of  part  to  part, 
proves  His  purpose  in  their  creation,  and  their  ten- 
dency to  produce  good  results  rather  than  evil  and 
painful  ones,  proves  Him  to  be  good  and  gracious, 
as  truly  and  by  rules  of  observation  and  reasoning 
which  are  the  same,  as  those  that  guide  us  in  the 
study  of  the  character  and  purposes  of  any  of  our 
fellow  men. 

But  is  He  then  "  the  infinite,"  ''  the  absolute,"  the 
"  unconditioned  "  ?  It  depends  entirely  upon  what 
you  mean  by  these  words  when  you  ask  the  question 
or  raise  the  objection.  In  any  sense  and  in  all  the 
senses  in  which  the  words  are  positive  and  have  any 
meaning,  He  is  infinite  and  absolute.  But  in  so  far 
as  they  are  negative  or  involve  contradictions  and 
absurdities.  He  is  not  the  one  nor  the  other.  He  is 
only  good  and  wise  and  powerful,  just  and  gracious, 
full  of  mercy  and  compassion,  ''  not  willing  that  any 
should  perish,"  ^  but  rather  that  "  all  men  should  be 

1  2d  Peter,  iii.,  9. 


I S6         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

saved  and  come  to  the  knowledge  of  the  truth."  ^ 
And  to  this  end  He  not  only  spoke  in  times  past  by 
the  Prophets,  but  "hath  in  these  latter  days  sent  us 
His  Son  Jesus  Christ,  full  of  grace  and  truth,  whom 
He  hath  appointed  heir  of  all  things."^ 

The  question,  then,  is  not  whether  we  can  prove 
the  existence  of  *'  the  Infinite  "  or  *'  the  Absolute  " 
or  "  the  Unconditioned."  But  it  is  rather  whether 
we  can  prove  the  existence  of  God — not  so  much 
whether  He  is  "  infinite,"  "  absolute,"  and  "■  uncon- 
ditioned," as  whether  He  is  at  all  or  not.  And  when 
we  cognize  or  prove  His  existence,  by  the  very  act 
by  which  we  prove  that  He  is  we  prove  something 
of  what  He  is.  If  I  know  anything  directly  by  sight 
I  know  it  to  be  opaque,  extended,  of  a  certain  color. 
If  I  prove  that  God  exists  by  any  process  or  mode 
of  reasoning,  I  know  Him  to  be  that  by  which  in  the 
process  I  prove  Him  to  be  at  all,  possibly  infinite  and 
absolute,  but  certainly  First  Cause,  Creator  and 
Personal  Agent. 

II.  I  pass  now  to  the  last  part  of  this  branch  of 
my  subject :  Kant's  Antinomies. 

It  is  now  a  Httle  more  than  a  hundred  years  since 
Kant  published  his  great  work,  the  Kritik  der  reinen 
Vermcnft.     In  this  work  he  first  published  to  the 

1  1st  Timothy,  ii.,  4.  2  Hebrews  i.,  2. 


Logical  Objections.  187 

world  his  now  world-famous  antinomies.  These  are 
contradictions,  on  which,  as  he  claims,  all  knowledge 
and  all  opinions,  of  whatever  kind,  must  rest  as  their 
basis.  In  a  subsequent  work,  his  Prolegomena,  he 
repeated  his  antinomies,  with  some  slight  modifica- 
tions of  statement,  but  with  the  continued  claim  that 
they  He  at  the  foundation  of  all  that  can  be  called, 
or  claimed,  as  knowledge,  scientific  or  otherwise. 

1.  Before  he  came  to  his  antinomies  Kant  had 
worked  out  a  theory  of  perception  which  left  the 
reality  of  the  objects  that  are  perceived  in  the  ex- 
ternal world  in  doubt,  and  he  had  taught  that,  at 
best,  we  can  have  no  knowledge  of  them  as  they  are 
as  things-in- themselves  [dinge  an  sicJi\.  He  had 
also  Hmited  the  application  of  the  principle  of  Iden- 
tity and  Contradiction  to  mere  definitions,  "  analytic 
propositions,  a  priori,''  as  he  called  them.  And  then, 
as  if  to  complete  the  work  of  destruction,  he  declared 
the  doctrine  that  all  that  we  call  or  can  claim  as 
knowledge,  whether  in  science  or  religion,  rests  at 
bottom  and  for  its  only  foundation  on  one  or  an- 
other of  these  contradictions  or  *' antinomies." 

2.  The  second  point  in  Kant's  Philosophy  that 
requires  notice,  is  his  rejection  of  the  Principle  of 
Identity  and  Contradiction  for  all  synthetic  judg- 
ments. 

I  have  found  no  statement  of  his  doctrine  on  this 


1 88  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

subject,  or  of  his  reasons  for  it  except  the  brief  state- 
ment in  his  Prolegomena,  %  2,  and  this  seems  very- 
inadequate  for  so  important  a  departure  from  the 
preceding  doctrine  on  this  subject,  which  seems  to 
have  been  universally  accepted. 

Leibnitz  had  taught  that  all  the  propositions  we 
can  assert  as  truth  or  knowledge — as  distinct  from 
matters  of  faith  or  mere  belief — rest  on  the  two 
principles  (i)  Sufficient  Cause  and  (2)  Ide^itity  and 
Contradiction. 

On  the  first  depends  all  the  truths  of  history  and 
mere  science.  And  we  may  have  the  principle  under 
either  of  the  two  forms  {a)  cansa  essendi  or  the  cause 
of  its  existence,  and  (U)  ratio  cognosce7idi,  the  grounds 
on  which  we  believe  or  acknowledge  the  proposi- 
tion. 

The  Principle  of  Identity  and  Contradiction  is  the 
ground  of  all  absolute  truths.  It  is  based  on  the 
nature  of  the  subject  with  regard  to  which  the  propo- 
sition is  affirmed  and  is  obtained  by  the  two  proc- 
esses, analysis  and  demonstration. 

I  make  no  mention  here  of  the  Principle  of  Ex- 
cluded Middle,  because  I  regard  that  as  only  a  part 
of  the  means  by  which  we  apply  the  principle  of 
Identity  and  Contradiction  in  what  we  call  the  indi- 
rect method  of  proof  or  refutation. 

The  Principle  of  Identity  and  Contradiction  can 


Logical  Objections.  189 

be  easily  illustrated  sufficiently  for  our  present  pur- 
pose. Suppose  we  have  the  proposition  2+1=3. 
The  terms  are  not  apparently  identical.  But  we  can 
write  them  thus,  1  +  1  +  1  =  1  +  1  +  1,  in  which 
case  the  identity  is  apparent.-^ 

Now  this  is  true  of  every  other  proposition  in 
mathematics,  and  in  the  science  of  logic.  The  only 
question  or  difficulty  arises  out  of  our  dexterity  or 
want  of  dexterity  in  the  manipulation  of  the  forms 
of  expression.  There  is  no  difficulty  in  regard  to 
the  principle  itself 

The  same  law  holds  also  with  regard  to  some  of 
the  fundamental  ontological  questions.  I  will  in- 
stance two,  both  of  which  have  already  occurred  to 
us  in  the  course  of  these  Lectures. 

The  first  relates  to  the  reality  of  the  objects  that 
constitute  the  external  or  material  world.  Take  any 
one  of  and  each  of  them  separately  and  we  may  say 
of  it,  *'  I  perceive  it.''  But  what  is  it?  a  reality? 
If  so,  very  well.     If  not,  it  is  not-any-thing,  not-a- 


1  Or  if  we  put  tlie  statement  into  another  form,  we  get  a  proposi- 
tion to  be  tested  by  the  principle  of  contradiction.  Thus  if  we  say 
2  -[-  I  =  4,  we  may  write  iti-fl-|-l  =  l  +  i-f-i-f-i,  in  which  it 
is  obvious  on  inspection  that  the  first  term  or  member  is  not  the 
same  as  the  second ;  or,  if  this  is  true,  three  is  not  there,  and  it  takes 
three  and  something  else  to  make  three,  which  is  of  course  absurd 
and  impossible  if  we  use  the  word  "three"  in  the  same  sense  in 
both  cases. 


190         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

thing,  no-thing,  nothing.  Thus  we  have,  "  I  per- 
ceive nothing."  But  that  is  logically  equivalent  to 
"■  I  do  not  perceive."  Hence,  if  the  act  of  percep- 
tion takes  place,  and  is  not  merely  false  perception, 
imagination,  memory  or  dreaming,  the  object  per- 
ceived is  a  reality. 

Take,  again,  the  principle  of  causation.  '*  Every 
effect  has  or  has  had  a  cause."  But  the  word  effect 
impHes  that  whatever  is  properly  called  an  effect  is 
a  thing  produced  by  some  form  or  act  of  efficiency^ 
which  of  course  implies  an  effector  (if  we  may  coin  a 
word),  or  an  agent  which  caused  its  existence.  Hence 
if  there  were  no  such  agent,  there  could  have  been 
no  such  act ;  and  what  we  have  called  an  effect  was 
not  properly  so  called — it  was  not  produced  as  the 
product  of  any  previous  agency,  or  any  previously 
existing  agent. 

All  of  Kant's  demonstrations  rest  upon  and  as- 
sume this  principle ;  and  it  seems  to  be  almost  in- 
credible and  not  at  all  well  accounted  for,  that  he 
could  have  denied  and  rejected  this  principle  as  he 
did  in  the  passages  of  hi^  Prolegomena ]Vi'=A.  referred  to. 

3.  The  remaining  subject  is  the  Antinomies. 
These  Antinomies  consist  of  four  pairs  of  proposi- 
tions which  are  apparently  contradictory  each  one 
to  its  fellow  in  the  combination,  and  the  relation  of 
the  one  to  the  other — the  *'  thesis  "  to  the  "  antithe- 


Logical  Objections.  191 

sis  " — is  such  that  while  it  is  impossible  for  us  to 
believe  or  even  suppose  that  both  of  them  are  true, 
the  one  of  them  can  be  demonstrated  to  be  abso- 
lutely true  as  well  as  the  other,  which  is  its  contra- 
dictory opposite.  In  fact,  it  is  Kant's  claim  that 
both  of  the  propositions  in  each  of  the  four  pairs  can 
be  shown  to  be  absolutely  true,  leading  to  the  inevi- 
table agnostic  consequence  that  there  is  and  can  be 
no  absolute  truth  anywhere. 

Kant  saw  both  the  wide  sweep  and  the  profound 
depths  to  which  his  so-called  antinomies  extend. 
He  says :  "  There  are  four  of  them  and  only  four, 
and  they  are  natural  and  unavoidable.  There  can 
be  neither  more  nor  less,  because  there  are  no  more 
series  of  synthetic  propositions  which  limit  the  em- 
pirical synthesis."  "In  them  we  have  the  whole 
dialectical  play  of  the  cosmological  ideas  which  do 
not  allow  that  any  object  that  is  not  in  accordance 
with  them  shall  be  given  in  any  possible  experience."  ^ 
This  language  is  a  little  peculiar,  but  as  nearly  as  I 
can  construe  it  to  the  common  sense  of  mankind,  he 
means  to  assert  that  there  is  no  opinion,  truth  or 
statement,  that  can  be  made  by  man  that  does  not 
in  some  way  or  another  depend  upon,  and  assume, 

1  I  quote  from  statements  given  in  connection  with  the  statement 
of  the  Antinomies,  and  immediately  before  them  as  an  introduction 
to  them,  Vol.  II.,  p.  330,  and  following,  Rosenkrantz's  edition. 


192  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

the  truth  of  some  one  of  these  eight  propositions, 
which  he  arranges  in  the  form  of  four  pairs  of  anti- 
nomies. After  discussing  them  through  some  two 
hundred  pages  he  concludes  the  discussion  with  these 
words  :^  *' We  can  neither  endure  the  thought  nor 
yet  protect  ourselves  against  it,  that  a  Being  Whom 
we  represent  to  ourselves  as  the  Highest  among  all 
possible  things  should  say  to  Himself,  '  I  am  from 
eternity  to  eternity;  besides  Me  there  is  nothing 
except  what  exists,  is  something  [etzuas  ist'\,  through 
My  Will  [dtirch  meinen  Willeii\'  But  where  then 
am  I?  Here  everything  sinks  under  us  and  the  great- 
est Perfection  as  well  as  the  smallest,  floats  before 
the  Speculative  Reason,  without  support,  to  which 
[reason]  it  costs  nothing  to  allow  them,  the  one  as 
well  as  the  other,  to  disappear,  without  the  least 
effort  on  its  part  to  prevent  it."^ 

1  Kritik,  Works,  Vol.  II.,  p.  477. 

2  The  quotations  given  above  to  show  Kant's  appreciation  of 
the  Antithesis,  are  taken  from  the  larger  work,  **Z>z>  Kritik.^^  I 
give  here,  however,  a  few  citations,  in  the  translation  from  the 
latter  work. 

"No  metaphysical  act  or  subtlety  of  distinction  hinder  or  avert 
[verhiiten]  their  contradictory  opposition,  but  they  compel  the  phil- 
osopher to  fall  back  upon  the  first  principles  of  the  pure  Reason 
itself,"  p.  109. 

"  The  Thesis,  as  well  as  the  Antithesis,  can  be  set  forth  by  equally 
clear  and  irresistible  proofs, — and  I  pledge  myself  for  the  correct- 
ness of  these  proofs — and  the  Reason  sees  itself  divided  against  it- 
self,— a  state  of  things  at  which  the  skeptics  rejoice — while  the  crit- 


Logical  Objections.  193 

It  is  but  fair  towards  Kant,  however,  to  pause  and 
say  that  he  gives  this  only  as  the  outcome  of  Reason 
— P^/r^ Reason — the  vcsulioi speculative  Philosophy. 
But  Kant  himself  wrote  several  other  works  in  which 
he  maintained,  very  strenuously,  that  man  is  natur- 
ally a  religious  being,  and  that,  instinctively,  he  does 
believe  in  God  and  in  the  reality  of  the  objects  in 
the  world  around  us,  and  he  seems  sometimes  at 
least  to  regard  this  instinct  as  being  as  good  a  foun- 
dation for  religion  and  morality  as  the  Pure  Reason 
or  Philosophy  itself  could  be.  And  yet  the  world 
knows  but  little  of  this  part  of  Kant's  philosophy, 
while  everybody  knows  of  his  "  Antinomies  "  and 
his  Agnosticism. 

Kant  is  a  very  difficult  author  to  understand  or 
to  translate.  We  can  never  for  many  minutes  trans- 
late so  as  to  convey  precisely  the  ambiguities  that 
are  in  his  German,  nor  always  be  quite  sure  that  we 
have  given  in  English  that  one  of  the  meanings  of 
which  his  phraseology  is  susceptible  which  is  the 
best. 

But  such  was  to  be  the  sweeping  effect  of  his 
''  Antinomies."  And  from  that  day  to  this  no  logi- 
cian has  ever  been  rash  enough,  so  far  as  I  have 
seen,  to  undertake  to  show  precisely  what  and  wherein 

ical  philosopher  betakes  himself  to  reflection  with  great  uneasiness," 
p.  no. 


194         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

consists  the  fallacy  of  his  "demonstrations."  Even 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  who  was  perhaps  the  keenest 
man  in  this  respect  since  Kant's  time,  admits  them 
to  be — in  words  that  I  have  already  quoted — "  in- 
soluble," "the  most  insoluble  contradictions."^ 

These  "antinomies"  may  be  stated  thus  in  the 
best  translation  that  I  can  make  of  them : 
FIRST   PAIR. 

Thesis :  "  The  world  had  a  beginning  in  time  and 
is  limited  in  space." 

Antithesis  :  "  The  world,  in  regard  to  both  time 
and  space,  is  unhmited  "  (that  is,  had  no  beginning 
in  time  and  is  infinite  in  extent). 
SECOND   PAIR. 

Thesis  :  "  Everything  in  the  world  is  simple." 

Antithesis  :  "  There  is  nothing  in  the  world  that 
is  simple ;  but  everything  is  composite  "  (made  up 
of  parts). 

THIRD    PAIR. 

Thesis :  "In  the  world  there  are  free  and  spon- 
taneously acting  causes." 

Antithesis  :  "  In  the  world  there  is  no  liberty,  but 
all  is  bound  in  the  necessity  of  nature.*' 

1  Even  Professor  MORRIS,  in  his  little  work,  Kanfs  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason^  which  is  an  admirable  exposition  of  Kant's  doctrines, 
evades  the  subject  under  cover  of  general  statements,  as  it  seems  to 
me,  rather  gives  a  clear  and  precise  exposition  of  the  fallacy  that 
lies  in  them,  p.  236. 


Logical  Objections, 


195 


FOURTH   PAIR. 

Thesis  :  *'  In  the  series  of  causes  in  the  world  there 
is  somewhere  a  necessary  Being." 

Antithesis:  "There  is  nothing  necessary  in  the 
world  ;  but  in  that  series  of  events  that  make  up  the 
world  all  is  contingent"  (accidental  or  casual).^ 


1  I  give  these  Antinomies  in  the  original  and  in  both  forms,  the 
earlier  form  of  1781  in  the  Kritik^  Rosenkrantz's  edition,  vol.  II,  p. 
338,  etc.,  and  in  the  form  given  in  1873  in  the  Prolegomena^  vol.  Ill, 
p.  109.  The  earlier  forms  are  printed  in  the  left  hand  column,  and 
the  latter  opposite  to  them  on  the  right  hand. 

FIRST   PAIR. 

Thesis,  1781.  Thesis,  1783. 

Die  Welt  hat  einen  An-fang  in  Die  Welt  hat  der  Zeit  und 
der  Zeit  und  ist  dem  Raum  nach     dem  Raum  nach   einen  Anfang 


auch  in  Grenzen  eingeschlossen. 
""  Antithesis. 

Die  Welt  hat  keinen  Anfang 
und  keine  Grenzen  im  Raume, 
sondern  ist,  sowohl  in  Ansehung 
der  Zeit  als  des  Raums,  unend- 
lich. 

SECOND    PAIR 
Thesis,  1781. 

Eine  jede  zusaramengesetzte 
Substanz  in  der  Welt  besteht  aus 
einfachen  Theilen,  und  es  existirt 
iiberall  nichts  als  das  Einfache, 
oder  das,  was  aus  diesem  zusam- 
mengesetzt  ist. 

Antithesis. 

Kein  zusammengesetztes  Ding 
in  der  Welt  besteht  aus  einfachen 
Theilen,  und  es  existirt  iiberall 
nichts  Einfaches  in  derselben. 


(Grenze). 

Antithesis. 
Die  Welt  ist  der  Zeit  und  dem 
Raum  nach  unendlich. 


Thesis,  1783. 
Alles  in  der  Welt  besteht  aus 
dem  Einfachen. 


Antithesis. 
Es  ist  nichts  Einfaches,  son- 
dern  Alles  ist  zusammengesetzt. 


196  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Now  I  think  I  can  show,  without  going  into  any 
great  depth  of  metaphysical  profundity,  or  taxing 
you  with  any  great  effort  to  follow  me  and  compre- 
hend what  I  say,  that  there  are  really  no  "  antino- 
mies "  here;  no  "contradictions,"  ''insoluble"  or 
otherwise ;  and  that  all  the  appearance  of  contradic- 


THIRD    PAIR. 

Thesis^  1 781.  Thesis,  1783- 

Die  Causalitat  nach  Gesetzen         Es  giebt  in  der  Welt  Ursachen 

der  Natur  ist  nicht  die  einzige,     duicli  Freiheit. 

aus  welcher  die  Erscheinungen 

der  Welt  insgesammt  abgeleitet 

werden   konnen.      Es   ist  noch 

eine  Causalitat  durch  Freiheit  zu 

Erklarung   derselben    anzuneh- 

men  nothwendig. 

Antithesis. 
Es  ist  keine  Freiheit,  sondern 

Alias  in  der  Welt  geschieht  le- 

diglich  nach  Gesezen  der  Natur. 

FOURTH    PAIR. 

Thesis,  1781. 

Zu  der  Welt  gehort  etwas,  das, 
entweder  als  ihr  Theil,  oder  ihre 
Ursache,  ein  schlechthin   noth- 
wendiges  Wesen  ist. 
Antithesis. 

Es  existirt  iiberall  kein 
schlechthin  nothwendiges  We- 
sen, weder  in  der  Welt,  noch 
ausser  der  Welt,  als  ihre 
Ursache. 

It  will  be  observed  that  the  Antitheses,  as  stated  in  the  later  work» 
the  Prolegomena,  1 783,  are  much  more  brief  and  condensed,  but 
substantially  the  same  in  their  meaning  and  import. 


Antithesis. 
Es  ist  keine  Freiheit,  sondern 

Alles  ist  Natur. 


Thesis,  1783. 
In  der  Reihe  der  Weltursachen 
ist     irgend     ein     nothwendiges 
Wesen. 

Antithesis. 
Es  ist  in  ihr  nichts  nothwendig, 
sondern  in  dieser  Reihe  ist  Alles 
zufallig. 


Logical  Objections.  197 

tion  and  antinomy  there  is,  depends  upon  and  arises 
out  of  a  fallacy  in  diction.  Or  to  be  more  precise, 
the  whole  difficulty  arises  out  of  what  is  called  tech- 
nically an  Ambiguous  Middle,  using  the  term  in  its 
broader  signification. 

I  do  not  offer  this  solution  as  a  mere  conjecture, 
or  as  merely  something  that  viay  be  said  by  way  of 
answer  or  demurrer  to  his  conclusion.  But  I  ex- 
amine his  illustration  and  argument,  his  Beweis  and 
his  Anmerkimgen,  and  find  that  there  are  the  two 
senses  which  he  attached  to  the  terms,  one  of  them 
in  one  proposition  and  the  other  sense  in  the  other 
proposition. 

Allow  me  to  explain  in  a  few  words  precisely 
what  I  mean  by  an  Ambiguous  Middle. 

We  say,  "  Feathers  are  light ;  light  comes  from  the 
sun,"  and  the  ambiguity  of  the  word  "  light "  is  ob- 
vious. We  say,  ''  Money  will  buy  whatever  is  for 
sale ;  a  two  shilling  piece  is  money."  Here  the 
ambiguity  is  slightly  different  in  form,  but  it  is 
equally  obvious  on  a  moment's  thought  of  what  the 
premises  must  mean  in  order  that  assent  may  be 
given  to  them  at  all. 

Take  one  more  example.  We  eat  what  we  buy 
in  the  market,  but  we  buy  raw  meat  in  the  market, 
therefore  we  eat  razv  meat,  or  eat  our  meat  raw. 
Here,  again,  the  ambiguity  is  apparent  on  a  Httle 
consideration. 


198  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  in  the  case  of  Kant's  "  antinomies  "  these  am- 
biguities do  not  He  on  the  surface  so  as  to  be 
obvious  on  a  mere  inspection.  It  is  quite  true,  in- 
deed, that  we  might  conjecture  or  suspect  them, 
from  a  mere  inspection  of  the  language  Kant  has 
used.  That,  however,  could  hardly  be  regarded  as 
any  satisfactory  exposition.  We  must  inspect  the 
proof  which  he  gives  in  order  to  see  whether  our 
suspected  ambiguity  is  really  involved  in  and  lies  at 
the  foundation  of  his  reasoning.  And  this  is  what 
I  propose  now  to  do. 

To  take  his  "antinomies"  in  order,  and  consider 
them  one  by  one  in  detail.  I  begin  with  the  thesis 
of  the  first  pair.  It  reads,  **  The  world  had  a  begin- 
ning or  has  a  beginning  in  time  and  is  Hmited  in 
space  "  that  is,  it  is  not  infinite  in  either  respect, 
but  has  its  limits  and  bounds. 

By  the  words  "  the  world  "  in  this  case  he  means 
the  objects  and  events  that  we  see,  the  world-series, 
weltreihe,  as  he  calls  it.  He  argues,  as  I  have  done, 
that  these  events,  occurring  one  after  another,  con- 
stitute a  series,  in  which  there  must  have  been  from 
the  very  nature  of  every  aetiial  series,  a  first  term — a 
term  before  which  there  was  no  other. 

In  regard  to  the  objects  in  the  world  he  holds  that 
as  each  one  of  them  is  limited  no  one  of  them  can 
be  infinite,  nor  yet  can  any  addition  or  multiplication 


Logical  Objections.  199 


of  them  make  infinity.  Hence  the  world,  in  this 
sense  of  the  word,  is  limited ;  the  weltreihe  Is  finite 
both  in  time  and  space. 

But  in  the  "  antithesis  "  "  the  world  is  said  to  be, 
in  regard  to  both  time  and  space,  infinite."  Kant 
here  uses  the  words  ^'  the  world  "  to  denote  the 
world-idea,  the  weltinhegriff,  as  he  calls  it.  And 
his  argument  is  that  the  world  as  a  series  of  events 
implies  Sometliing  Whose  existence  is  not  an  event 
in  the  world  (the  weltreihe)  and  Whose  presence  is 
not  by  extension  from  one  limit  or  point  to  another, 
some  Being  Who  is  eternal  without  succession  of 
time — no  older  than  He  was — and  whose  presence 
is  an  omnipresence  without  relations  to  space  or 
place  such  as  finite  or  material  things  have. 

Now  in  all  this  Kant  is  but  presenting  the  same 
line  of  argument  as  I  have  been  stating  and  illus- 
trating in  these  Lectures.  The  world  considered  as 
what  it  is  is  finite,  but  when  considered  as  including 
all  that  it  implies — that  is,  as  the  universe — it  includes 
something  that  is  infinite,  not  limited  by  time  and 
space. 

In  the  second  pair  the  '*  Thesis  "  is  in  these  words : 
'*  In  the  world  everything  is  simple,"  but  for  "antithe- 
sis "  he  has,  "  In  the  world  there  is  nothing  simple, 
but  everything  is  composite." 

In  discussing  this  pair  I  propose  to  take  up  and 
consider  the  antithesis  first. 


200         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

His  line  of  argument  and  illustration  is  the  one 
that  is  usually  pursued  to  prove  the  "  infinite  divisi- 
bihty  of  matter"  and  of  space.  Whatever  is  ex- 
tended may  be  divided  into  two  parts ;  these  parts 
again  into  other  and  smaller  parts  and  so  on  ad  in- 
fantum. Kant  is  here  obviously  speaking  of  me- 
chanical or  mathematical  division.  And,  in  this 
vieWy  nothing  is  so  small  that  it  may  not  be  con- 
sidered as  made  up  of  parts  into  which  it  may  be 
divided,  and  so  it  may  be  said  to  be  theoretically 
divisible. 

The  word  that  is  common  to  both  propositions, 
and  on  which  the  supposed  antinomy  depends,  is 
"  simple,"  einfach,  in  German. 

We  have  seen  what  he  meant  by  it  in  the  "  An- 
tithesis." But  when  we  come  to  consider  his  argu- 
ment and  illustration  for  the  "  Thesis,"  we  find  he 
means  by  the  term  something  very  different.  He  is 
now  referring  to  logical  division. 

The  example  which  Kant  cites  and  dwells  upon 
mostly  is  the  self  or  the  person.  '*  I,"  he  says,  **  am 
einfach  or  simple.  I  cannot  be  divided  into  two 
persons,  nor  yet  into  any  two  parts  of  one  person." 
He  also  cites  space  as  an  example.  "■  We  cannot," 
he  says,  *'  divide  space  into  parts.  We  should  only 
make  two  spaces,  which  are  integral  objects  and  not 
parts  of  space  [Nun  besteht  der  Raum  nicht  aus 
einfachen  Theilen,  sondern,  aus  Raumenl. 


Lo'gical  Ohjectiojis.  201 

What  he  says  of  self  is  easily  understood  and  ap- 
preciated. Space,  however,  is  a  less  tangible  object 
to  deal  with. 

His  hne  of  remark  and  argument  in  regard  to  self 
may  be  extended  to  all  things  considered  as  indi- 
viduals in  a  class.  We  divide  genera  into  species, 
and  species  into  individuals.  But  we  can  go  no 
farther  with  our  division  in  this  direction,  not,  how- 
ever, because  the  objects  have  become  so  small,  but 
because  they  are  individuals;  because  each  of  them 
is  one  and  not  two.  I  can  divide  this  pen  mechanic- 
ally into  parts.  But  I  cannot  divide  it  logically  into 
two  or  more  pens — two  or  more  individual  objects 
of  the  same  species ;  not  because  it  is  so  small,  but 
because  it  is  onCy  and  not  more,  and  division  would 
not  give  us  pens,  but  only  parts  of  a  pen.  It  is  re- 
garded, therefore,  simple  {einfacJi)  in  one  sense  of 
the  word  and  not  in  the  other. 

In  considering  the  third  pair,  I  take  up  the  ''  an- 
tithesis "  first,  also.  It  is,  ''  In  the  world  there  is 
no  liberty,  but  all  is  nature." 

Here  the  line  of  argument  is  such  as  is  usually 
employed  to  prove  the  regularity  and  uniformity  of 
the  phenomena  of  nature.  Whatever  comes  into 
being  had  a  cause ;  a  cause  or  a  combination  of  them, 
that  were  adequate  to  the  effect.  These  causes  act 
uniformly,  as  inert  matter  of  necessity  must  act.     No 


202  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 


piece  or  mass  is  able  to  originate  any  action  except 
as  it  is  acted  upon ;  no  one  can,  of  itself,  vary  the 
intensity  with  which  it  acts.  By  "  the  world,"  there- 
fore, Kant  means  in  this  case  the  world  of  inorganic 
matter  exclusive  of  human  beings. 

But  in  the  Thesis,  which  is,  **  In  the  world  there 
are  causes  that  act  through  liberty,"  Kant  evidently 
means  the  world  including  human  beings.  For  in 
the  soul  of  man,  as  he  argues,  there  is  freedom  and 
spontaneity  of  action.  He  appeals  to  his  own  con- 
sciousness and  says  he  finds  there  *'  a  dynamical  first 
beginning  of  actions,  which  has  no  dependence  at 
all  upon  the  causality  of  any  preceding  one ;  that 
is,  it  does  not  in  any  way  follow  from  [as  having 
been  caused  by]  it."  And  this  freedom  or  spon- 
taneity is  opposed  to  the  law  of  cause  and  effect 
which,  as  he  says,  ''prevails  everywhere  in  nature," 
meaning  by  that  term  the  material  world. 

But  surely  here  is  no  contradiction.  There  is, 
however,  a  manifest  ambiguity  in  the  use  of  the 
words  "the  world."  In  the  one  case  he  means  the 
world  includifig  man,  and  in  the  other  the  world 
exclusive  of  man. 

In  the  fourth  pair  I  shall  continue  my  usual  method 
and  take  up  the  antithesis  first,  ''  There  is  nothing 
necessary  in  the  world ;  but  in  the  series  of  events 
that  make  up  the  world  all  is  contingent."     In  the 


Logical  Objections.  203 

earlier  work,  the  Kritik,  this  was  stated  somewhat 
differently.  '*  There  exists  nowhere,  either  in  the 
world  or  out  of  it,  as  its  cause,  anything  whose  ex- 
istence is  necessary."  I  think  the  change  in  the 
phraseology  is  important,  as  indicating  some  change 
in  Kant's  views.  But  in  any  case,  his  argument 
must  be  taken  to  indicate  what  he  meant  by  the 
terms  he  used  in  the  proposition  he  was  trying  to 
prove. 

The  important  word  here  is  that  which  I  have 
translated  **  contingent."  In  the  German  it  is  zufdl- 
lig.  It  may  mean  either  that  which  is  regarded  as 
having  come  into  existence  by  chance  without  any 
antecedent  cause  producing  it,  or  that  whose  exist- 
ence is  of  no  great  importance ;  or  in  the  still  more 
strict  sense  of  the  word,  that  the  existence  of  which 
is  not  the  result  of  any  design  and  purpose,  and  so 
purely  accidental. 

But  when  reasoning  to  prove  this  proposition, 
Kant  takes  '*  in  the  world  "  to  mean  the  material 
world,  the  world  of  visible  and  tangible  objects,  and 
he  reasons,  as  any  advocate  of  modern  science  might 
do,  that  every  thing  had  a  cause  and  occurs  uni- 
formly in  accordance  with  law,  and  every  thing  has  a 
place  and  use,  and  that  there  is  nothing  that  is  not 
thus  produced  ;  nothing  by  chance,  nothing  without 
a  possibility  of  its  explanation  by  reference  to  ascer- 
tained or  ascertainable  causes  and  laws. 


204  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

And  in  this  se7ise  of  the  woi'ds  "  the  world  "  there 
is  no  occasion  that  I  know  of  to  dissent  from  his 
views. 

In  the  thesis,  however,  which  is,  "  In  the  series 
of  causes  in  the  world  there  is  somewhere  a  neces- 
sary Being,"  that  is,  a  Being  whose  existence  is 
neither  caused  nor  yet  contingent,  Kant  takes  the 
words  "  the  world  "  as  he  did  in  the  antithesis  of  his 
first  pair  to  denote  the  whole  world  or  universe. 
And  he  argues,  as  I  have  done,  that  the  very  suc- 
cession of  cause  and  effect  and  the  law  of  causation 
imply  a  First  Cause,  which  is  an  uncaused  cause, 
whose  existence  is  "  necessary "  in  that  It  or  He 
cannot  be  supposed  to  be  non-existent.  Whatever 
is  contingent  and  dependent,  implies  something  that 
is  absolute  and  necessary  on  which  it  can  depend 
and  from  which  it  derived  its  being.  Without  some- 
thing absolute  and  necessary  there  can  be  nothing 
that  is  contingent  and  dependent.  The  very  idea  is 
absurd  and  impossible. 

Thus  taking  the  second  pair,  which  I  will  now 
consider  the  first  in  the  logical  order,  we  have  the 
commonly  accepted  doctrine  with  regard  to  the  ob- 
jects in  nature,  namely,  that  they  are  individuals, 
and  divisible  into  parts  mechanically  and  perhaps 
chemically,  and  yet  they  are  grouped  everywhere  into 
genera  and  species,  each  and  every  one  of  them  be- 
ing logically  and  individually  simple  or  einfach. 


Logical  Objectio7ts.  205 

If  we  take  the  other  three  pairs,  the  thesis  of  the 
first  and  the  third,  and  the  antithesis  of  the  fourth, 
together,  they  affirm  that  the  world  of  visible  objects 
and  phenomena  is  limited  in  time  and  space,  moves 
on  in  accordance  with  uniform  laws,  and  no  one 
event  comes  by  chance  or  without  its  adequate  cause 
and  meaning.  Taking  the  other  parts  we  have  all 
the  foundation  for  a  Natural  Theology  that  we  can 
reasonably  ask,  the  freedom  of  the  human  soul  and 
the  existence  and  attributes  of  God. 

There  is  another  solution  of  Kant's  "  Antinomies  " 
which  I  feel  obliged  to  suggest,  which,  although 
however  commendable  on  the  score  of  ingenuity  and 
charity,  will  not,  I  fear,  stand  criticism. 

Kant  wrote  after  Locke's  famous  doctrine  that  all 
ideas  are  derived  from  sensation  had  begun  to  pro- 
duce its  legitimate  effects.  He  was  alarmed,  and 
sought,  as  Reid  had  done  in  Scotland,  to  arrest  the 
evil  consequences  that  were  becoming  everywhere 
apparent.  Now  we  may  suppose — and  to  suppose  it 
is  all  we  can  do — that  what  Kant  really  meant  to 
say  was  that  if,  looking  at  things  from  Locke's  stand- 
point and  the  basis  of  sensationalism,  we  take  the 
thesis  of  the  first,  and  the  antithesis  of  the  second, 
third,  and  fourth  pairs,  they  are  undoubtedly  and 
demonstrably  true.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  we 
look  at  their   opposites,  the   antithesis  of  the  first 


2o6         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

pair  and  the  thesis  of  the  second,  third,  and  fourth 
pairs  from  the  standpoint  of  innate  or  a  priori  ideas, 
or  as  I  should  say,  from  the  standpoint  of  an  insight 
into  the  naticre  of  things^  they  also  are  seen  to  be 
absolutely  true.  Hence  as  a  refutation  of  Locke  and 
Condillac,  they  are  unanswerable. 

But  Kant  apparently  never  saw,  what  I  have  en- 
deavored to  show,  that  the  controlling  words  in  the 
Antinomies  have  different  meanings  in  the  respective 
pairs,  arising,  no  doubt,  from  the  different  points  of 
view  from  which  the  two  philosophers  regard  them.^ 


1  I  have  intimated  in  the  text  that  it  is  possible  that  Kant  may 
have  intended  these  '*  Antinomies  "  as  a  refutation  of  Locke's  theory 
of  the  origin  and  nature  of  knowledge.  He  certainly  has  not  made 
it  clear,  nor  has  he  hardly  left  it  possible  for  us  to  maintain  that  he 
so  regarded  them  or  that  such  was  in  any  way  a  part  of  his  inten- 
tion in  giving  them  forth  to  the  world.  Had  that  been  his  object, 
or  had  he  clearly  seen  what  I  have  attempted  to  show,  it  is  impos- 
sible that  he  could  have  given  utterance  to  the  thought  in  the  texts 
of  the  Lecture,  or  to  that  which  I  have  just  cited  from  the  Prolego- 
mena, 

But  in  the  Prolegomena  there  appear  passages  that  look  as  though 
Kant  himself  had  some  glimpse  of  the  solution  that  may  be  offered 
to  his  difficulties ;  thus  he  says  : 

"  If  we  suppose  the  necessity,  which  we  everywhere  find  in  nature, 
relates  only,  to  the  things  as  they  appear,  or  their  appearance  to  us, 
and  that  freedom  belongs  to  the  things  themselves  [dinge  an  sich 
selbst],  there  arises  no  contradiction,"  p.  114. 

"The  necessity  which  we  see  in  nature  must  be  the  condition 
after  which  the  efficient  causes  are  known  to  be  causes.  But  liberty, 
on  the  other  hand,  if  it  is  the  cause  of  certain  phenomena,  must  be 
in  respect  to  them  a  power  which  can  begin  to  act  of  itself,  or  spon- 


Logical  Objections.  207 

I  can  well  imagine  that  you  will  be  surprised  at 
this  result,  and  ask,  "  Is  this  all  ?  can  it  be  possible 
that  Kant  deceived  himself  and  has  for  these  decades 
of  years  misled  the  world  in  this  way,  by  these,  so 
obvious  sophisms  ?  "  And  I  answer,  it  is  all.  It  is 
now  more  than  forty  years  since  I  first  made  my 
acquaintance  with  Kant's  great  work.  I  have  had 
occasion  to  recur  to  it  often  since,  and  just  now,  with 
reference  to  this  very  solution  of  what  Hamilton  has 
pronounced  *'  insoluble  contradictions,"  I  have  re- 
read the  whole  discussion  over  carefully  again,  and 
I  have,  therefore,  no  hesitation  in  saying  that  this 
is  all.  And  I  think  that  we  have  here  a  true  and 
satisfactory  solution  of  what  has  been  quite  generally 
accepted  as  giving  away,  in  advance,  the  whole 
foundation  of  knowledge.  Natural  Theology  in- 
cluded. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  eliminate  the  ambiguities 
and  regard  the  eight  propositions,  not  as  constituting 
four  pairs  of  antinomies,  but  rather  as  eight  distinct 
propositions,  asserting,  as  they  certainly  do,  the  most 

taneously  (j;;^(?«/t'),"  p.  115.  *'In  the  former  case  the  conception 
of  causality  is  a  conception  of  natural  necessity ;  in  the  latter,  a 
conception  of  freedom,"  p.  116,  note. 

'*  It  can  be  said  without  contradiction,  that  all  the  acts  of  rational 
beings,  in  so  far  as  they  are  phenomena  or  matters  of  experience, 
are  subject  to  the  same  necessity  as  the  phenomena  of  nature;  but 
the  same  acts,  when  considered  in  relation  to  the  rational  being  and 
his  acts,  are  free,"  p.  117. 


2o8  TJie  Methods  of  Natural  TJicology. 

fundamental  principles  of  all  knowledge,  we  have  a 
broad  foundation  well  laid  and  established,  as  it 
seems  to  me,  beyond  further  doubt  or  controversy. 

I  think,  therefore,  in  conclusion,  that  we  may  claim 
that  there  is  no  valid  objection  against  the  method 
of  Natural  Theology,  and  that  the  nightmare  of  ag- 
nosticism under  which  philosophic  minds  have 
groaned  for  these  many  years,  has  had  nothing  for 
its  foundation  or  cause  but  a  few  obvious  mistakes 
in  psychology  or  palpable  sophistries  in  logic. 

We  have  seen  that  evolution  does  not  fully  ex- 
plain any  of  the  observed  phenomena  of  nature.  It 
is  but  a  process  and  not  a  cause.  It  needs  some- 
thing to  work  upon  and  something  besides  itself  to 
carry  it  on.  The  word  may  be  a  good  name  to  de- 
note the  Divine  Method  in  so  far  as  it  denotes  a 
method  at  all,  that  is,  in  so  far  as  objects  in  nature 
have  successive  stages  and  are  evolved  out  of  those 
that  precede  them.  But  there  are  gaps  and  chasms 
in  the  order  of  nature  which  no  theory  of  mere  evo- 
lution, without  the  agency  of  God,  has  yet  been  able 
to  fill  or  to  explain.  And  thus  the  phenomena  of 
nature  show  that  this  Supreme  Being,  this  First 
Cause  and  Creator,  must  be  a  Lawgiver.  The  laws 
of  nature  are  His  modes  of  operation,  and  the  same 
phenomena  suggest,  too,  in  more  ways  than  one, 
miracles,  so  as  to  make  the  belief  in  them  easy  and 


Logical  Objections.  209 

probable  on  the  presentation  of  a  fit  occasion  and 
sufficient  evidence. 

And  I  think  we  may  safely  say  that  we  have 
found  nothing  in  our  review  of  the  other  class  of 
objections,  whether  psychological,  logical  or  meta- 
physical, to  interfere  with  or  cause  distrust  of  the 
inference  drawn  from  the  observed  constitution  and 
course  of  nature. 

And  thus  whatever  we  see  or  our  hands  can  touch 
in  nature,  is  a  manifestation  of  God,  of  His  nature 
and  attributes,  His  will  and  purposes  concerning  us. 
And  all  things  which  we  can  see  or  know  we  may 
regard  as  the  work  of  His  hands,  or  the  gifts  of  His 
grace ;  to  be  received  with  gratitude  if  they  are 
favorable  and  conducive  to  our  enjoyment,  and  to 
be  submitted  to  with  resignation  and  patience  if 
they  are  sent  for  our  chastisement,  or  to  turn  our 
feet  into  the  ways  of  righteousness  and  peace. 

My  convictions  in  regard  to  the  fundamental 
principles  of  Modern  Agnosticism  took  a  very  earn- 
est form  at  an  early  day  of  my  life,  and  that  earnest- 
ness has  been  growing  in  intensity  with  at  least  forty 
years  of  study.  And  if  I  were  called  upon  to  point 
out  the  three  greatest  epochs  of  evil  in  human  history, 
the  three  greatest  strategetic  devices  of  the  Adver- 
sary of  all  good,  and  the  Enemy  of  the  souls  of  men, 
I  should  name  as  'dx^  first  that  scene  in  Eden  when 


2 1  o  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

he  persuaded  our  first  parents  that  there  was  no 
harm  in  doing  wrong ;  and  as  the  second,  that  early 
scene  in  the  history  of  our  race  when  he  persuaded 
men  from  their  simple  monotheism  into  polytheism, 
with  its  many  gods,  and  the  doctrine  that  nQcessa- 
rily  results  from  it,  that  one  religion,  or  form  of  re- 
ligion, is  as  good  as  another,  and  that  none  is  as 
good  as  the  best,  if  only  the  devotees  like  it  as  well. 

But  the  third  great  movement  in  the  same  direc- 
tion— and  it  seems  to  me  that  it  must  be  the  last — 
was  the  diffusion  among  speculative  minds  of  those 
doctrines  in  psychology  and  logic  from  which  the 
present  agnosticism  and  irreligion  has  come,  as  an 
inevitable  result. 

The  first  of  these  great  delusions  made  Bethlehem 
and  Calvary  necessary ;  the  second  has  cost  the  race 
many  thousand  years  of  degradation,  misery  and 
struggle  for  recovery,  and  the  third  may  possibly  yet 
come  to  be  regarded  as  that  fuller  manifestation  of 
Antichrist,^  which  began,  indeed,  in  the  Apostles' 
days,  but  which  is  to  attain  its  fullest  manifestation 
and  power  only  in  much  later  times.  Time  and  the 
future  alone  can  tell  what  will  come  of  it  in  the  end. 
But  this  we  know  and  may  feel  well  assured  of,  that 
He  Who  "bringeth  to  naught  the  counsel  of  princes" 

^  2  Thessalonians,  ii.,  8. 


Logical  Objections.  2 1 1 

and  '' maketh  the  divines  mad,"  will  triumph  in  His 
own  good  time. 

Well  may  we  say  in  the  words  of  Him  Whose 
right  it  is  to  rule  and  to  guide  all  men  :  '*  If  the  light 
that  is  within  you  be  darkness,  how  great  is  that 
darkness  ?  Take  heed,  therefore,  that  the  light  that 
is  within  be  not  darkness." 


LECTURE  V. 


THE    MISUSE     OF    ABSTRACTIONS;     THE    ATTRI- 
BUTES  OF  GOD;   HIS  PERSONALITY. 

Cor.  II,  8.     Beware  lest  any  man  spoil  you  through  philosophy  and  vaindeceit^ 
after  the  traditions  of  men. 


THE  PERSONALITY  OF  GOD. 

There  is  a  deeper  ground  for  the  modern  agnos- 
ticism and  the  objections  to  the  Methods  of  Natural 
Theology  than  any  I  have  yet  reached,  a  sort  of 
sub-soil,  down  into  which  it  sends  its  tap-roots,  and 
from  which  it  may  draw  nourishment  and  support 
when  all  other  means  of  supply  shall  have  been  cut 
off,  or  have  failed  altogether.  To  this  I  wish  to 
devote  a  few  words  before  proceeding  with  the  main 
topic  of  this  Lecture,  which  is  the  Attributes  and 
Personality  of  God. 

St.  Paul,  when  writing  to  his  son  Timothy,  and 
through  him  to  all  subsequent  ages,  thought  he  had 
occasion  to  speak  of  the  danger  that  comes  from 
"science  falsely  so  called."  He  adds,  however,  the 
quahfication,  as  it  seems  to  me,  as  if  he  was  sure  that 
there  could  be  no  danger  then,  now  or  ever  from 
anything  that  is  science  truly  so-called.  But  when  he 
speaks  of  the  danger  of  being  spoiled  "  through  phil- 
osophy," he  adds  no  such  Hmitation  or  qualification  to 
his  warning.     But  he  adds  the  words  "  vain  deceit," 


2 1 6         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

as  if  he  had  but  little  hope  of  any  philosophy  that 
would  not  partake  largely  of  that  character.  How- 
ever, be  this  as  it  may,  I  think  that  any  one,  in  view 
of  the  past,  will  be  disposed  to  say  that  the  warning 
was  not  without  sufficient  occasion. 

To  prepare  the  way  for  what  I  wish  to  say  on  this 
subject,  the  final  topic  of  this  Lecture,  I  will  turn 
aside  here  for  a  moment  and  call  to  mind  a  few 
of  the  results  that  have  been  attained  by  the  study 
of  the  history  and  the  philosophy  of  language. 

It  has  been  found  that  language  is  both  a  product 
and  a  producer  of  thought.  It  is  probably  the  case 
that  most  of  the  opinions  that  men  hold  have  been 
produced  in  their  minds  by  the  language  and  the 
form  of  expressions  by  which  the  thoughts  of  other 
people  have  been  conveyed  to  them,  not  merely  by 
language  in  general,  but  by  the  peculiar  forms  of 
expression  that  were  used. 

We  say,  for  example,  **  the  sun  rises  " ;  and  it  is 
quite  easy  for  us  who  have  the  use  of  our  eyes  to 
see  how  that  form  of  expression  came  into  use.  But 
the  blind,  who  have  never  seen  the  phenomenon 
that  is  indicated  by  these  words,  ascribe  the  motion 
to  the  sun  none  the  less  on  account  of  the  fact  that 
they  have  never  seen  the  occurrence  they  speak  of. 
We  say  the  sun  gives  light  to  the  earth,  and  imme- 
diately, though  unconsciously,  we  imagine  light  as 


The  Perso7tality  of  God.  217 

a  substance  that  can  be  given  or  sent  forth  from  one 
body  to  another.  We  say  the  fire  sends  forth  heat, 
and  straightway  we  think  of  heat  as  some  impon- 
derable, invisible  substance  that  passes  through  the 
air  and  enters  whatever  becomes  warmed  by  the 
burning  mass  which  we  call  the  fire.  And  in  this 
way  most  of  our  early  opinions  are  formed. 

In  all  the  languages  of  modern  times  the  words 
and  phrases  which  we  use  were  introduced  before 
we  were  born.  They  convey  to  us,  or  rather  re- 
produce in  us,  not  only  the  facts,  but  the  theories 
and  explanations  of  the  facts  which  were  adopted 
by  the  men  who  first  observed  the  facts  or  formed 
the  theories.  These  facts  and  theories  remain  as 
our  opinions  until  we  begin  to  observe  and  think  for 
ourselves.  For  the  most  part,  and  on  most  subjects, 
they  remain  with  most  men  as  their  opinions  through 
their  lives. 

Let  us,  therefore,  look  at  the  history  and  develop- 
ment of  language  for  a  moment. 

The  first  human  vocabulary  consisted  of  very  few 
words,  each  of  which  was  probably  used  indifferently 
as  either  noun,  adjective  or  verb.  In  course  of  time 
some  of  these  primitive  roots  become  particles,  hke 
our  conjunctions,  prepositions,  etc.  I  have  to  do 
now  with  those  only  that  remained  and  continued 
to  be  used  as  verbs  or  nouns. 


2i8  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

And  first  I  will  speak  of  the  nouns  or  the  words 
that  denote  the  things  that  we  speak  of. 

All  nouns  seem  to  have  been  at  first  individual, 
personal,  or  proper  names.  Soon,  however,  they 
became  general  or  common,  and  denoted  no  longer 
an  individual  object,  but  a  class — technically  a  genus 
— as  man,  dog,  beast,  etc.  This  was  the  result  of 
the  mental  process  of  generalization. 

But  another  process  began  very  soon  in  the  course 
of  the  reflective  mental  activity  of  man.  This  was 
the  process  of  abstraction,  and  it  produced  from 
verbs  and  adjectives,  abstract  nouns  that  denote  mere 
modes  and  properties.  Soon  these  abstractions  were 
objectified  and  made  the  objects  of  thought,  as  from 
to  live,  life ;  from  white,  whiteness,  etc.  But  in  the 
earliest  stages  of  all  languages,  as  Coxe  has  well  re- 
marked, '*  men  had  no  abstract  terms."  ''They  had 
formed  no  notions  oi prudence,  of  thought  and  intel- 
lect, of  slavery  and  freedom.  They  spoke  only  of 
the  man  who  was  strong ;  who  could  point  out  the 
way  to  others  or  choose  one  thing  out  of  many  ;  of 
the  man  who  was  bound  to  another,  or  who  was 
able  to  do  as  he  pleased."^ 

The  development  and  formation  of  abstract  terms, 
however,  began  very  early,  and  came  i-nto  extensive 
use  in  all  the  dialects  of  civilized  man. 

1  Tales  of  Greece,  Introduction,  p.  13. 


The  Personality  of  God.  2 1 9 

Abstract  terms,  in  the  strict  and  proper  sense  of 
the  word,  denote  only  the  properties  and  modes  of 
things  which  have  been  made  objects  of  thought, 
and  not  things  themselves.  But  in  many  cases  these 
abstractions  are  *'  objectified  "  and  treated  as  con- 
crete realities;  they  thus  become  fictions,  and  in 
this  way  they  have  played  a  most  important  part  in 
the  origin  and  progress  of  speculation.  I  suppose 
that  no  one  will  seriously  contend  at  this  day  that 
the  *' ideas"  of  Plato ^  were  anything  but  fictions. 
The  same  must  be  said  of  what  is  so  much  talked  of 
in  modern  times  as  the  "  mental  faculties.'"  No  one 
supposes  or  will  admit,  when  we  ask  him  the  ques- 
tion directly,  that  they  sustain  any  such  relation  to 

1  Reid  says,  Intellectual  Fozvers,  Prelim.  Essay,  Chap.  I, 
*'  When  in  common  language  we  speak  of  having  an  idea  of  any- 
thing, we  mean  no  more  by  that  expression  than  thinking  oi  it." 
"  But  philosophers  conceive  of  an  idea  that  is  in  the  jnind ;  .  .  .  this 
is  the  philosophical  meaning  of  the  word  idea.  .  .  I  believe  ideas 
taken  in  this  sense  to  be  a  mere  fiction  of  philosophers,"  Hamilton's 
Ed.,  vol.  I,  pp.  225,  226. 

In  the  early  part  of  this  century  Cousin  has  expressed  {Coins  de 
VHistoire  de  la  Philosophie.  Cours  de  1829.  Legon  22,  vol.  II,  p. 
385.  Wright's  translation,  vol.  II,  p.  339.  Dr.  Henry's  '*  Co2isin''s 
Psychology,''^  pp.  280,  282,  285)  the  doctrine  of  modern  philosophy 
very  emphatically.  He  says,  *'If  by  ideas  be  understood  some- 
thing real,  which  are  intermediate  between  things  and  the  mind, 
I  say  there  are  absolutely  no  ideas  ;  there  is  nothing  real  but  things 
and  the  mind  with  its  operations."  Again,  "There  are  in  nature 
neither  propositions  nor  ideas."  And  once  more,  "  There  are  then 
indeed  no  innate  ideas  really  existing,  because  there  are  no  ideas  " 
in  the  Platonic  sense  of  the  word. 


220         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

the  mind  as  the  bodily  organs,  the  heart,  lungs,  etc., 
do  to  the  body.  And  yet  all  our  use  of  language 
implies  such  a  relation.^ 

But  in  the  physical  sciences  these  fictions  come  to 
deserve  more  consideration  in  view  of  our  present 
object.  From  "  hot "  as  an  adjective  we  get  **  heat  " 
as  an  abstract  term,  and  thus  *'  heat "  the  fiction  that 


1  Locke's  foresight  and  warning  on  this  subject  are  both  interest- 
ing and  instructive  (^Essay,  B.  II,  c.  xxi,  §  6).  He  says,  **  The 
ordinary  way  of  speaking  is,  that  the  understanding  and  the  will  are 
two  faculties  of  the  mind ;  a  word  proper  enough  if  it  is  used  as  all 
words  should  be,  so  as  not  to  breed  any  confusion  in  men's  thoughts, 
by  being  supposed  (as  I  suppose  it  has  been)  to  stand  for  some  real 
beings  in  the  soul  that  performs  those  actions  of  understanding  and 
volition."  Again  ($  17)  he  says,  "However  the  name  faculty 
which  men  have  given  to  this  powder  called  the  will  ...  yet  the  will, 
in  truth,  signifies  nothing  but  a  power  or  ability  to  prefer  or  choose. 
If  it  be  reasonable  to  suppose  and  talk  of  faculties  as  distinct  things, 
that  can  act  (as  we  do  when  we  say  the  will  orders  and  the  will  is 
free),  it  is  fit  that  we  should  make  a  speaking  faculty  and  a  walking 
faculty  and  a  dancing  faculty,  by  which  those  actions  are  produced, 
which  are  but  several  modes  of  motion ;  as  well  as  make  the  will 
and  understanding  to  be  faculties  .  .  .  and  we  may  also  as  well  say 
that  it  is  the  singing  faculty  that  sings  and  the  dancing  faculty  that 
dances,  as  that  the  will  chooses  or  that  the  understanding  conceives. 
This  way  of  talking,  nevertheless,  has  prevailed,  and,  as  I  guess, 
produced  great  confusion.'*  The  fault  has  been,  as  he  says,  that 
"  the  faculties  have  been  spoken  of  and  represented  as  so  many  dis- 
tinct agents."  He  illustrates  the  matter  still  further  by  supposing 
one  to  ask  what  it  is  that  digests  our  food,  and  some  one  answers, 
"  the  digestive  faculty,"  instead  of  saying  the  stomach.  Or  if  one 
asks  by  what  means  we  move,  some  one  should  say  by  **  the  motive 
faculty,  which  is  to  say  that  the  ability  to  digest  is  the  organ  of 
digestion,  and  the  ability  to  move  is  the  means  and  instincts  of 
motion." 


The  Personality  of  God.  221 

is  spoken  of  as  one  of  the  seven,  eight,  or  ten  "  forces  " 
with  which  evolutionists  think  they  can  explain  all 
the  phenomena  of  the  material  universe  without 
''the  hypothesis"  of  a  God  who  shall  be  regarded 
as  Creator  and  Superintending  Providence,  a  Worker 
of  miracles,  an  Inspirer  of  thought  or  the  Author  of  a 
Revelation  that  can  be  binding  upon  the  conscience 
and  wills  of  men. 

The  earliest  form  of  the  verb  was  the  active  voice. 
But  very  soon  there  came  into  use  reflexive  forms 
as  in  the  Hebrew  Hithpael  and  the  Greek  Middle 
Voice,  which  from  its  very  form  indicated  and  de- 
clared not  only  that  the  act  had  been  performed,  but 
also  that  it  terminated  in  the  agent,  as  ''  I  strike 
myself" 

The  next  form  that  was  developed  was  the  passive 
voice,  as  it  is  called.  Men  learned  at  an  early  day 
in  their  progress,  that  many  events  occur  and  become 
apparent,  the  cause  of  which  is  not  known  to  the 
observer.  Hence  a  feeling  of  the  necessity  for  some 
form  of  expression  that  would  assert  the  observed 
fact  without  saying  anything  about  the  cause.  The 
vexed  and  vexatious  question,  "Who  struck  Billy 
Patterson  ? "  occurred  early  in  the  experience  of 
mankind,  and  developed  the  feeling  of  a  necessity 
for  some  form  of  the  verb  that  would  assert  the  fact 
without  incurring  the  risk  or  the  responsibihty  of 
saying  who  performed  the  deed.     Hence  the  passive 


222  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

voice,  "  he  was  struck."  And  this  became  ever  after 
the  form  of  caution  and  non-committal,  and  the  mid- 
dle voice  gradually  went  out  of  use  as  a  distinct  form 
of  the  verb  among  all  the  European  nations ;  and 
whenever  we  have  occasion  for  it,  we  avail  ourselves 
of  a  reflexive  pronoun,  as  self  in  English,  se  in  French, 
and  sich  in  German. 

These  reflex  forms  are  in  common  use  in  French 
and  German,  and  indicate  a  frame  of  mind  or  form 
of  mental  activity  quite  unlike  that  to  which  we  are 
accustomed  who  speak  the  English  language,  and 
many  of  them  seem  very  odd,  and  even  absurd, 
to  us. 

Thus  in  a  recent  work  on  physiology,  written  in 
the  French  language,  the  following  examples,  beside 
many  others  that  might  be  cited,  occur  within  a 
very  few  pages :  ''  Ligneous  tissues/^r;;/  themselves^' 
'' \Y^iQr  forms  itself  in  the  tissues,"  ^'carbonic  acid 
gas  forms  itself  in  the  lungs  during  respiration," 
"  heat  transforms  itself  into  muscular  movement ;  " 
the  *'  ligneous  tissues,"  *' water,"  and  "carbonic  acid  " 
are  indeed  real  causes,  and  are  denoted  by  concrete 
terms.  But  assuredly  they  do  not  ''form"  or  ''make 
themselves." 

A  German  writer  settles  the  much  disputed  ques- 
tion of  the  origin  of  the  soul  by  saying,  "  Souls  form 
themselves  (sich  aiisbilden)  from  the  constituents  of 


The  Personality  of  God.  223 


the  body."  This  may  do  for  a  myth,  but  it  is  not 
science  or  philosophy.  Nor  does  it  seem  to  me  to 
be  very  good  poetry. 

I  cite  but  one  example  more.  Montesquieu,  in 
speaking  of  certain  social  conditions,  says  that  when 
these  occur  among  young  people  "  a  marriage  zvill 
make  itself'  [il  se  fait  tin  mariage\  Now  this 
may  be  true  in  France  and  of  the  French.  But 
among  English-speaking  people  marriages  are  made 
by  the  parties  to  the  contract,  and  there  is  usually 
too  much  that  is  interesting,  if  not  vexatious  and 
discouraging,  to  allow  them  to  forget  that  they  were 
the  principal  agents  in  bringing  about  the  happy 
result. 

But  such  forms  of  expression  are  of  so  frequent 
occurrence  in  French  and  German  books  that  they 
appear  to  excite  no  surprise,  and  they  seldom  at- 
tract attention.^ 


1 1  cite  one  more,  the  distinction  of  nouns  in  reference  to  gender. 
In  the  old  European  languages — the  Latin  and  the  Greek — besides 
some  regard  to  the  sex  of  the  objects,  the  distinction  was  based 
chiefly  on  the  form  and  termination  of  the  words.  But  in  the  mod- 
ern French  there  is  no  neuter  gender,  and  all  nouns  are  either  mas- 
culine or  feminine.  In  German,  beyond  objects  in  the  animal 
world,  where  gender  is  a  reality,  the  words  are  also  distributed  be- 
tween the  three  genders,  chiefly  in  reference  to  their  form.  In  Eng- 
lish, however,  no  word  is  of  any  one  gender  on  account  of  its  form. 
The  names  of  inanimate  objects  are  always  neuter  and  others  often 
and  to  a  considerable  extent    change  form  to  suit  the  gender,  as 


224         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  I  think  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  such  forms 
of  expression  are  injurious  to  the  mental  culture. 
They  imply,  and  as  I  think  they  tend  to  promote,  a 
want  or  clearness  of  insight  into  the  true  causes  and 
the  laws  of  the  phenomena  they  describe. 

When  an  object  is  before  us,  it  exists  already  in- 
dependently of  any  volition  or  mental  action  of  our 
own.  We  see  it,  if  it  is  visible,  and  feel  it  if  it  is 
within  the  reach  of  our  hands.  It  existed  before 
these  acts  of  ours,  and  is  the  cause  of  those  sensa- 
tions by  means  of  which  the  acts  of  perception  are 
performed.  Other  persons  cognize  the  object  as 
well  as  ourselves,  and  it  is  the  same  thing  to  us  and 
to  them  and  for  all  observers ;  and  hence  the  ideas 
or  notions  formed  of  it  will  be  the  same,  or  very 
nearly  the  same,  for  all.  But  if  not,  the  object  is 
appealed  to  to  verify  and  to  correct  those  ideas. 

If  we  generalize  the  ideas  thus  formed,  it  is  done 
by  the  omission  or  ehmination  of  properties  that  are 
peculiar  to  individual  objects  and  retaining  those  that 
are  common  to  all  the  objects  we  include  in  one 
class  and  denote  by  a  common  name.  But  the  proc- 
ess is  one  of  exclusion  or  elimination  of  properties, 
and  not  one  of  addition  or  increase.     We  include  in 

actor,  actress,  master,  mistress,  etc.  This  peculiarity  of  modern 
European  languages,  as  well  as  the  orthography  of  the  English,  will 
have  to  be  changed  before  the  millenium  is  fully  realized. 


The  Personality  of  God.  225 

the  general  term  or  idea  no  property  that  was  not 
obvious  in  the  objects  that  we  thus  class  together. 

And  all  the  terms  thus  obtained  are  concrete 
terms,  the  general  no  less  than  the  individual  or 
proper  nouns. 

But  if  we  fix  our  attention  upon  some  one  of  the 
properties,  modes  or  actions  of  the  objects  thus  per- 
ceived, we  objectify  it  and  make  it  an  object  of 
thought.  And  thus  the  idea  we  form  of  it  is  denoted 
by  an  abstract  term,  as  whiteness,  hardness,  etc.  In 
this  case  the  mental  activity  precedes  the  object  of 
thought,  and  in  fact  creates  it. 

The  ontological  difference  between  the  objects  de- 
noted by  abstract  and  those  denoted  by  concrete 
terms,  is  easily  pointed  out,  and  when  once  seen,  it 
is  seen  to  be  of  the  most  fundamental  importance. 

Thus  take '*  whiteness."  We  cannot  imagine  or 
suppose  it  to  exist  without  or  apart  from  some  thing 
that  is  white.  But  take  any  white  thing  and  we  can 
imagine  or  suppose  it  to  be  of  some  other  color,  and 
so  on  with  all  the  objects  in  the  world  until  we  come 
to  think  of  a  world  in  which  there  is  nothing  that 
is  white  and  no  whiteness.  So  of  life ;  we  cannot 
imagine  or  suppose  it  to  be  a  reality  distinct  and 
apart  from,  some  thing  that  is  living  or  alive.  But 
we  can  imagine  a  world  or  a  universe  such  as  this  is 
supposed  to  have  been  in  its  nebulous  state,  with  no 
living  thing  in  it. 


226  The  Methods  of  Nattu'al  Theology. 

Hence  we  call  those  objects  of  thought,  properties 
or  modes,  which  we  cannot  suppose  to  exist  or  think 
as  existing,  except  as  properties  or  modes  of  some- 
thing which  w^e  regard  as  substantial.  And  we  re- 
gard those  as  substances  which  we  can  think  of  as 
existing,  not  indeed  without  properties,  modes  or 
relations  of  some  kind,  but  with  properties  and  rela- 
tions different  from  those  they  now  have. 

Thus  if  we  take  all  the  objects  of  thought  that  are 
denoted  by  abstract  terms,  we  can  apply  the  test 
above  indicated  to  them  all,  one  at  a  time  and  sepa- 
rately, and  imagine  a  world  in  which  that  one  is  not 
present;  but  we  cannot  imagine  a  world  in  which  it 
could  be  present  without  something  else,  some  sub- 
stantial thing  of  which  it  is  a  mode  or  property. 

It  will  thus  be  seen  that  the  difference  between 
the  two  classes  of  objects  of  thought  is,  for  all  onto- 
logical  purposes,  quite  fundamental;  substantial  reali- 
ties are  the  things  that  God  has  made,  while  the 
world  of  abstractions  is  purely  the  creation  of  man 
himself 

So  far  as  the  primary  and  simple  properties  of 
objects  are  concerned  there  is  comparatively  little 
danger  of  error ;  but  in  regard  to  the  more  compli- 
cated relations  of  objects  the  danger  becomes  very 
great.  It  is  hardly  possible  that  any  two  persons 
will  understand  such  terms  alike,  and  very  likely  no 
one  will  understand  them  right. 


The  Personality  of  God.  227 

If  now  we  will  analyze  the  sentences  where  the 
departures  from  the  literal  use  of  languages  which 
represents  objects  as  they  are  and  events  as  they 
occur,  or  at  least  appear  to  be  and  to  occur,  we  shall 
find  that  we  have  (i)  the  suggestion  of  some  events 
that  never  occurred,  and  (2)  the  ascription  of  others 
to  causes  that  have  no  effective  existence  anywhere. 

In  a  very  interesting  and  instructive  scientific 
work  which  I  have  just  read,  the  author  says  of  the 
sun,  that  ''  it  throws  up  immense  quantities  of  mat- 
ter in  a  gaseous  form,  which  passes  miUions  of  miles 
into  the  open  space  and  then,  cooling  by  the  radia- 
tion of  its  heat,  it  becomes  vapor  or  dust,  and  falls 
back  in  an  intensely  luminous  condition,  constitut- 
ing, perhaps  the  photosphere,  which  is  all  that  we 
see  of  the  sun."  But  I  ask  what  becomes  of  the 
heat?  He  answers,  ''It  is  radiated  into  spaced 
But  the  question  arises,  is  heat  a  thing  that  can  be 
radiated  ?  Is  there  any  act  of  radiation  ?  You  ac- 
cept, I  suppose,  the  modern  doctrine  that  heat  is 
only  "  a  mode  of  motion."  How  can  a  "  mode  of 
motion  "  be  radiated  ?  What  actually  occurs  is,  the 
matter  becomes  cooled.  In  what  way,  perhaps  you 
may  not  be  prepared  to  tell  us.  But  the  explanation 
you  give  assumes  what  is  confessedly  false.  You 
have  embarrassed  science  by  the  recognition  of  an 
event  that  never  occurred  and  a  substance  that  exists 
nowhere. 


228         TJie  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  I  have  been  feeling  for  some  time  that  you 
will  ask,  what  has  this  to  do  with  your  subject  ?  I 
answer,  much  every  way.  I  have  been  trying  to 
prepare  the  way  for  a  satisfactory  presentation  and 
a  fair  appreciation  of  the  criticism  I  have  to  make. 
And  with  this  I  will  now  proceed. 

I.  In  the  first  place,  this  use  of  language,  or  rather 
the  philosophy  out  of  which  it  grew  and  which  it 
tends  to  perpetuate,  takes  from  our  argument  all 
foundation,  and  leaves  us  nothing  to  stand  upon. 

I  have  alluded  to  this  fact  before  in  a  preceding 
Lecture.  Suppose  we  agree  with  the  Evolutionist 
in  accepting  his  postulate  of  matter  in  existence  in 
a  gaseous  or  nebulous  state,  as  he  supposes  it  to 
have  been,  and  we  ask  him  who  or  what  shall  start 
into  condensation  this  inert  mass  and  begin  the 
process  of  evolution.  He  thinks  the  answer  easy 
enough.  It  may  have  been,  he  says,  gravity,  or  it 
may  have  been  chemical  affinity.  Either  would 
bring  the  other,  and  with  them,  revolution  on  an 
axis,  and  with  the  condensation  which  the  affinity 
would  produce,  there  would  come  heat  and  light 
and  electricity,  and  we  have  at  once,  or  at  least  very 
soon,  all  the  ''  forces,"  so-called,  that  Spencer  asks 
for  as  a  means  of  explaining  all  that  has  occurred 
since. 

But  ''  gravity  "  and  "  affinity,"  what  are  they  for 
real  causes  ?     The  terms  are  clearly  abstract  in  form 


TJie  Personality  of  God.  229 

and  appearance.  Are  they  real  causes  or  only  modes 
in  which  something  or  Somebody  else  acts  ?  If  not 
real  entities  we  have,  by  referring  to  them,  no  ex- 
planation of  the  phenomena,  no  account  of  what 
actually  occurred ;  or  rather  we  have  words  and  a 
form  of  expression  which  suggest  what  did  not  oc- 
cur, and  call  into  existence  and  activity  agents  that 
have  no  independent  effective  existence  and  cannot 
act  at  all  or  anywhere.^ 

So  when  the  first  living  thing  appeared  on  the 


1  Force,  as  the  word  is  here  used,  is,  in  fact,  as  purely  a  fiction  as 
any  one  of  the  gods  of  heathen  mythology.  We  use  the  word  as  a 
concrete  term  when  we  speak  of  wind  and  water  as  forces  used  to 
propel  machinery.  But  in  this  connection  the  word  is  abstract.  We 
speak  of  "  the  force  with  which  the  earth  attracts  the  moon,"  but 
the  force  is  not  a  thing,  a  reality  distinct  from  the  two — earth  and 
moon.  It  is  not  even  a  property  of  either  of  the  objects,  but  only  a 
quality,  or  quantity  rather,  of  their  action,  the  one  upon  the  other. 
We  might  with  as  much  propriety,  in  a  purely  philosophical  point 
of  view,  speak  of  any  other  abstraction  in  the  same  way.  Whiteness, 
for  example.  It  can  neither  be  increased  nor  diminished,  only  when 
the  snow  melts  the  'whiteness  becomes  invisible.  Or  of  light. 
When  night  comes  on  there  is  just  as  much  light  as  before  only  it 
cannot  be  seen ;  it  has  in  fact  become  darkness.  So  force  that  is 
'*  latent  "  or  only  "potential  "  is  a  force  that  vtay  be,  but  is  not  now ; 
for  all  practical  purposes  it  is  non-existent — purely  nothing. 

In  this  view,  the  doctrine  of  "  the  indestructibility  of  force  "  is 
about  the  same  as  if  one  should  maintain,  as  a  part  of  his  philosophy, 
the  uniformity  of  the  width  of  that  *'  imaginary  line  "  which  we  call 
the  Equator;  and  insist  that  it  neither  is,  nor  can  be  wider  in  one 
place  than  in  another;  that  it  never  can  have  been  either  broader 
or  narrower  than  it  is  now  in  any  period  of  past  geological  time.  If 
any  one  should  undertake  to  maintain  such  a  doctrine  I  do  not  think 
that  we  should  care  to  dispute  him. 
II 


230         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

earth — (the  current  philosophy  would  say  when 
**  life  first  appeared^'  or  "  made  its  appearance  ") — 
we  have,  indeed,  an  unusual,  and,  at  that  time,  an 
unprecedented  combination  of  the  four  elements, 
oxygen  and  hydrogen,  carbon  and  nitrogen.  But 
how  did  the  new  compound  become  a  living  being  ? 

If  we  may  speak  of  "  life  "  as  something  that  was 
before  "  latent  in  matter  "  or  as  existing  somewhere 
else,  and  as  then  coming  into  the  new  chemical  com- 
pound as  a  fifth  element,  we  do  indeed  say  some- 
thing that  is  "verbally  intelligible.'*  But  is  life 
something  that  exists  independently  of  any  living 
thing,  and  can  act  and  vivify  what  was  before  and 
otherwise  inert  and  lifeless  ? 

Or,  finally,  when  man  made  his  appearance,  whence 
and  how  came  the  soul  or  mind  ?  Does  that  con- 
sist of  mere  abstractions  ?  Is  it  only  intelligence 
and  memory  and  will  ?  or  is  it  a  substantial  some- 
thing that  understands,  and  remembers  and  wills, 
and  which,  when  it  comes  into  the  human  body, 
makes  an  intelligent  human  being  ?  We  believe  it 
to  be  a  substantial  thing  that  comes  into  the  body  or 
is  created  in  it  and  makes  of  the  body  a  living  man. 
Otherwise  it  must  consist  of  mere  abstractions. 

And  this  is  what  our  modern  men  of  science  pro- 
pose to  make  it.  In  fact,  there  has  been  a  growing 
tendency  in  this  direction  since  Locke's  time.  Hume 
declared  it  to  be  "  but  a  bundle  or  collection  of  per- 


The  Personality  of  God.  231 

ception  or  impressions."^  Lewis  calls  it  an  "ab- 
straction,"^ Dr.  Hammond^  calls  it  "a  force  devel- 
oped by  nervous  action,"  like  *'  heat  or  electricity." 
John  Stuart  Mill  says,  ''  Mind  is  nothing  but  the 
series  of  our  sensations,"*  and  he  adds  on  a  subse- 
quent page  that  "  this  series  of  feelings  "  is  aware  of 
itself.''  But  yet  he  adds  (p.  256)  that  ''our  notion 
of  mind  is  a  notion  of  a  permanent  somethings  con- 
trasted with  the  perpetual  flux  of  the  sensations,"  "  a 
something  which  we  figure  as  remaining  the  same, 
while  the  particular  feelings  through  which  it  reveals 
its  existence  change." 

Precisely  so.  And  this  "something  "  it  was  which 
Professor  Garver's  experiments  disclosed,  and  which 
we  always  find  as  that  which  not  only  "  underlies  " 
sensations,  but  perform  the  acts  of  thinking.^ 

1  Hume's  Essay  on  Humatt  Nature,  vol.  I,  p.  233. 

2  Lewes,  Problems  0/ Life,  vol.  I,  p.  281. 

3  The  Brain  not  the  only  organ  of  the  Mind. 

4  Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton'' s  Philosophy,  vol.  I,  pp. 
253,  258. 

5  A  third  view  makes  mind  mere  "force."  Thus  Dr.  Hammond 
in  The  Brain  not  the  Sole  Organ  of  the  Mind,''''  says,  p.  5,  **  By  the 
term  mind,  I  understand  a  force  developed  by  nervous  action.  It 
bears  the  same  relation  to  the  gray  nerve  tissue  that  heat,  or  elec- 
tricity, or  light  does  to  chemical  or  mechanical  action."  "Why 
mind  should  result  from  the  functionation  of  the  gray  nerve  tissue," 
etc.,  etc. 

This,  as  I  have  said,  may  be  conceived  and  understood — though 
it  can  be  regarded  as  true  only  in  a  modified  sense — of  thought. 


232  The  Methods  of  Natu7'al  Theology. 

For  all  these  acts  of  perceiving,  thinking  of,  which 
these  philosophers  admit  that  we  are  conscious,  and 
which  they  claim  to  regard  as  the  immediate  objects 
of  consciousness  are — like  evolution  itself,  of  which 
we  have  had  so  much  to  say — only  processes,  only 
and  merely  processes.  They  are  not  causes,  forces, 
or  agents ;  they  are  not  substances  that  can  exist  by 
themselves.  There  can  no  more  be  thinking  with- 
out a  something  that  thinks,  than  there  can  be  evo- 

But  it  cannot  be  understood  of  mind.  The  one  is  an  agent,  the 
other  a  product  or  mode.  The  one  is  denoted  by  an  abstract  term, 
the  other  by  a  concrete  term.  Replace  the  word  **  I,"  or  ego,  by 
what  is  here  taken  for  its  synonymn,  and  the  absurdity  becomes 
apparent  at  once.  We  have  for  "I  think,"  "thought  thinks," 
for  **I  choose,"  "choice  chooses."  Thought  without  a  thinker 
is  as  impossible  as  creation  without  a  creator,  writing  without  a 
writer. 

And  I  do  not  think  that  Dr.  Hammond  really  believed  his  own 
definition.  He  certainly  did  not,  if  he  understood  its  meaning. 
The  title  of  his  address  is.  The  Brain  not  the  Sole  Organ  of  the 
Mind.  Now  if  he  had  been  treating  of  heat  and  of  the  sun,  he  cer- 
tainly would  not  have  said  the  Sun  not  the  Sole  Organ  of  the  Heat. 
But  rather,  as  I  suppose,  "  the  Sun  not  the  only,  or  sole  source  of 
heat." 

And  yet  Dr.  Hammond  professes  to  regard  mind  and  heat  as  be- 
longing to  the  same  kind  of  entities — both  to  be  denoted  by  abstract 
terms,  although  he  uses  the  one,  "  mind,"  as  concrete. 

Nor  is  it  true  that  thought  and  volition  are  produced  by  *'  nerve 
activity  "  alone,  and  without  something  besides,  as  the  cases  cited 
in  the  first  part  of  the  third  Lecture  prove.  There  is  *'  a  something 
else "  that  sometimes  excites  and  controls  nerve  action,  and  is 
sometimes  controlled  by  it.  And  the  two,  although  for  the  most 
part  in  harmony,  are  sometimes  antagonistic  to  each  other. 


The  Personality  of  God.  233 

lution  without  something  that  causes  and  produces 
the  evolution  as  well  as  a  subject  matter  that  is 
evolved.  These  men  use  the  word  mind  as  though 
it  were  the  logical  equivalent  of  the  word  thought. 

Nor  do  the  substantial  objects  of  the  material 
world  fare  any  better.  ''  Matter,"  says  Stuart  Mill/ 
**  may  be  defined  a  permanent  possibility  of  sensa- 
tion," and  this  definition  he  repeats  in  several  places 
as  though  it  were  the  result  of  much  deliberate  con- 
sideration. 

But  the  "  possibihty  of  sensations  "  must  be  in  ns, 
where  the  sensations  are  produced,  and  where  only 
they  can  be  real.  And  if  that  is  all  that  there  is  of 
"  matter  "  and  material  objects  in  his  philosophy,  we 
cannot  wonder  that  he  finds  nowhere  any  satisfactory 
proof  of  the  existence  and  attributes  of  God.^ 

Herbert  Spencer,  to  escape  the  argument  from 
the  nature  of  matter  to  the  existence  of  God,  says,^ 
**  Our  conception  of  matter  reduced  to  its  simplest 
shape  is  that  of  co-existent  positions  that  offer  re- 
sistance."    But  positions  !  what  are  they  for  causes  ? 

1  Exatnination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton'' s  Philosophy,  vol.  I,  pp. 
243,  264,  and  elsewhere. 

2  Mill,  however,  speaks  of  matter  in  one  place  (p.  271)  as  the 
"permanent  cause  of  sensations."  But  he  does  this  apparently 
without  any  consciousness  of  the  incompatibility  of  the  two  state- 
ments. 

3  First  Principles,  Pt.  I,  $  ^l- 


234  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Does  he  mean  things  in  position,  or  atoms  in  rela- 
tion to  and  acting  upon  one  another?  If  so  his 
pretended  definition  is  but  a  subterfuge,  or  way  of 
an  attempted  escape  from  the  deistic  argument.  If 
not,  he  means  nothing,  and  his  pretended  philoso- 
phy evanishes  into  nothing  and  mere  senselessness. 

John  Stuart  Mill  gives  us  another  illustration. 
Besides  the  definition  of  matter  already  given  he 
says,^  "  When  a  physical  phenomenon  is  traced  to 
its  cause,  that  cause,  when  analyzed,  is  found  to  be 
a  certain  quantum  of  force  combined  with  certain 
collocations."  But  Mill's  **  collocations "  are  no 
better  than  Spencer's  **  positions,"  and  no  worse. 
They  are  out  of  the  possibility  of  argument.  Does 
he  then  mean  atoms  that  are  collocated  and  acting 
on  each  other  with  force  more  or  less  ?  If  so,  we 
have  all  that  we  ask ;  if  not,  his  words  are  senseless. 

Herbert  Spencer  asks,  as  all  that  he  needs  to  ex- 
plain tlie  universe,  these  five  elements  or  postulates, 
Matter,  Motion,  Time,  Space  and  Force.  But  mo- 
tion is  only  a  mode  and  no  "  substantial  reality." 
Time  and  space,  if  anything  more  than  mere  "  fic- 
tions," are  only  conditions.  But  force,  what  is  that  ? 
the  word  is  ambiguous,  and  in  this  ambiguity  lies  its 
power  for  use  (shall  I  say  mischief?)  in  this  connec- 
tion.    We  speak  of  wind  and  water  and  steam  as 

1  Theism,  p.  144. 


The  Personality  of  God,  235 

forces  that  propel  machinery,  and  we  speak  of  them 
as  the  forces  of  nature,  or  natural  forces.  In  this 
way  we  are  accustomed  to  the  word  as  a  concrete 
term,  and  are  not,  therefore,  shocked  or  surprised 
at  its  use.  And  if  Spencer  means  to  use  the  word 
in  this  way,  what  he  means  by  force  and  what  his 
philosophy  demands  is,  and  can  be,  nothing  less 
than  God  Himself,  the  God  in  whom  we  as  Christians 
believe. 

But  the  word  has  another  logical  quality,  and  in 
this  lurks  the  mischief  We  say  the  earth  attracts 
the  moon,  and  attracts  it  with  a  certain  force.  We 
call  that  force  gravity,  and  in  fact  Spencer  has  left 
us  no  escape  from  this  meaning,  for  he  says  that  this 
force  exists  and  acts  in  seven  different  forms  and 
under  as  many  different  names.  Heat,  Light,  Electrici- 
ty, Magnetism,  Cohesion,  Affinity,  and  Gravity.  All 
of  these  are  abstract  terms,  and  they  denote  either 
"mental  abstractions"  or  fictions,  such  fictions  as 
are  needful  in  science,  although  no  "  substantial  re- 
ahties  "  of  which  I  will  say  a  few  words  more  soon. 

Hence  force,  if  it  is  not  God,  is  either  a  fiction  or 
an  abstraction,  a  mere  mode  or  degree  of  the  motion, 
and  the  motion  itself  is  only  a  mode  of  the  matter, 
so  that  all  that  Spencer's  postulates  amount  to,  when 
reduced  to  their  substantial  value,  is  matter  in  mo- 
tion or  moving  with  a  certain  force.     And  of  course 


236  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

if  it  moves  or  is  in  motion  at  all,  it  moves  with  a 
force  greater  or  less  according  to  the  rate  of  motion. 
But  Who  or  What  put  it  in  motion  ?  Surely  not 
the  motion  itself.  Nor  yet  force  in  his  sense  of  the 
word;  for  so  understood  it  is  but  the  mode  or  degree 
of  the  motion,  the  force  of  the  motion,  or  better  still, 
the  force  of  the  moving  matter. 

And  thus  we  have  for  Spencer's  system  of  the 
universe  one  reality,  matter,  and  four  abstractions  or 
fictions  to  one  reality.  And  perhaps  this  is  about 
the  portion  of  truth  to  fancy,  of  worth  to  worthless- 
ness,  that  future  generations  will  be  willing  to  ac- 
cord to  his  speculations. 

Now  it  is  obvious  that  this  use  of  abstract  terms 
leads  us  at  once  into  a  region  of  fancy  and  of  mysti- 
cism, where  anything  can  be  affirmed  and  nothing 
can  be  successfully  denied  or  contradicted  ;  since  the 
"  philosopher  can  retire  into  a  nebulosity  of  words 
and  phrases,  where  no  logic  can  follow  him  and  no 
sagacity  can  detect  him." 

Every  philosopher  with  whose  works  I  am  ac- 
quainted makes  complaint  and  enters  his  protest  in 
one  form  or  another  against  the  use  or  abuse  of  ab- 
stract terms.  To  cite  only  one,  a  notable  case  on 
more  accounts  than  one,  I  will  refer  to  John  Stuart 
Mill.     He  says,^  "  All  experience  attests  the  strength 

1  Examination,  etc.,  vol.  I,  p.  247. 


The  Personality  of  God.  237 

of  the  tendency  to  mistake  mental  abstractions,  even 
negative  ones,  for  substantive  realities."  And  yet 
this  same  philosopher  resolves  both  matter  and  mind 
into  mere  abstractions,  as  we  have  just  seen,  defin- 
ing the  one  "  as  nothing  but  the  series  of  our  sensa- 
tions," and  the  other  as  "  a  series  of  feelings  which 
is  aware  of  itself."  But  surely  "sensation"  and 
''feeling"  are  abstract  terms — '';;^^;//^/ abstractions," 
therefore,  I  suppose,  as  I  know  of  no  other  kind. 

We  sometimes  meet  with  a  man  whose  use  of 
language  very  soon  satisfies  us  that  he  is  color  blind. 
It  is  said — I  do  not  know  how  true  it  is — but  it  is 
said  that  persons  with  a  good  ear  for  music  often  be- 
come unable  to  distinguish  between  harmony  and 
melody  on  the  one  hand,  and  discord  on  the  other, 
by  having  their  organs  of  hearing  habitually  and  for 
a  long  time  accustomed  to  hear  discordant  sounds. 

We  know  something  hke  this  to  be  the  case  with 
the  moral  sensibiHty.  He  that  carefully  studies  the 
right  and  wrong  of  acts  and  sacredly  and  earnestly 
regards  and  obeys  the  dictates  of  conscience,  becomes 
not  only  strong  to  do,  but  quick  and  clear-sighted 
to  see,  what  is  right  and  becoming  for  him  to  do. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  that  neither  tries  to  see,  nor 
makes  any  effort  to  do,  what  is  right  soon  loses,  to 
a  great  extent,  if  not  wholly,  the  power  to  distin- 
guish right  from  wrong,  as  well  as  the  sensibility  to 


238  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

feel  and  appreciate  the  difference  between  them  and 
the  importance  of  doing  right  when  it  has  been 
pointed  out  to  him. 

These  facts  indicate  and  illustrate  a  law  of  human 
nature.  And  it  is  applicable  in  the  case  before  us. 
The  habitual  use  of  language,  such  as  I  have  de- 
scribed, tends  to  confuse  that  insight  into  the  nature 
and  relations  of  things  upon  which  all  science  that 
is  not  '*  falsely  so  called,"  and  all  philosophy  which 
is  not  mere  ''  vain  deceit,"  must  depend.  It  fills  the 
pathway  of  the  earnest  thinker  with  obstacles.  It 
raises  questions  and  problems  where  there  need  be 
none.  It  makes  atheism  easy.  It  enables  men  to 
hold  and  to  defend  themselves  in  holding  any  opin- 
ion that  caprice,  constitutional  idiosyncracy,  personal 
ambition  or  self-interest  may  incline  them  to  adopt 
and  proclaim  as  their  own. 

All  the  nouns  that  may  be  used  to  denote  the 
things  of  which  we  speak  may  be  referred  to  five 
classes:  (i)  those  that  denote  material  objects  or 
matter ;  (2)  those  that  denote  souls  or  personal  be- 
ings or  mind;  (3)  those  that  denote  ^<5.f/r^<;//^;^.y/  (4) 
those  that  denote  xtcogmz^A  fictions ;  and  (5)  the 
One  Name  or  the  many  names  that  denote  the  One 
Supreme  Being. 

Of  the  third  class,  abstract  terms,  I  have  said  all  that 


The  Personality  of-  God.  239 


is  necessary  to  indicate  their  character.     They  de- 
note no  objects  that  we  need  to  take  into  account 
in  oui  investigation  of  the  facts  and  phenomena-  of 
nature  for  the  purpose  of  finding  therein  the  indica- 
tions of  the  existence  and  attributes  of  God.     They 
have  their  use,  and  their  use  cannot  be  dispensed 
with  in  any  cultivated  language,  nor  in  any  discus- 
sion of  scientific  questions.     But  denoting  only  prop- 
erties, modes  or  affections,  the  objects  they  denote 
can  have  no  substantial  existence,  can  be  no  real 
causes,  and  can  neither  afibrd  nor  help  us  to  any 
adequate  explanation  of  the  existence  of  anything. 
Our  only  concern  with  them  in  this  connection, 
therefore,  is  to  see  that  they  do  not  lead  us  into  a 
"  vain  deceit "  where  most  of  all  we  need  a  sound 
philosophy  and  science  that  is  7iot  falsely  so  called.^ 

1  It  is  always  comparatively  easy  to  replace  abstract  terms  by  their 
logical  equivalents.  To  do  this,  convert  the  noun  into  its  adjective 
form  and  place  after  it  some  noun  that  is  most  appropriate.  The 
word  *' thing"  will  always  answer,  although  a  term  of  much  nar- 
rower comprehension  is  often  preferable.  Thus  take  the  proposi- 
tion, «* light  comes  from  the  sun."  Replace  "light"  by  "lumin- 
ous"  and  put  things  or  matter  after  it  and  we  have  "luminous 
things  or  matter  comes  from  the  sun."  If  the  proposition  asserts 
precisely  the  same  in  this  form  as  it  did  before  the  word  is  not  ab- 
stract. Otherwise  it  is  to  be  so  regarded.  So  with  "  sound  travels," 
etc.  For  sound,  put  "sonorous  bodies,"  and  we  see  at  once  the 
difference. 

This  law  turns  to  our  account  in  another  way.  As  I  have  said, 
many  philosophers  in  these  latter  days  profess  to  regard  the  word 


240  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Of  the  next  class  in  order,  the  fourth,  fictions,  it  is 
necessary  to  say  a  few  words.  They  consist  for  the 
most  part  of  "  objectified  abstractions "  used  as 
though  they  were  reahties.  In  some  cases,  however, 
they  are  purely  factitious,  as  Descartes  called  them  ; 
and  Kant,  agreeing  with  Descartes  in  this,  has  called 
them  by  the  same  name,  and  the  word  has  come 
into  general  use.  But  in  any  case  they  denote  no 
substantial  reahties,  no  real  causes. 

As  belonging  to  this  class  I  would  name,  by  way 
of  illustration,  the  Equator,  which  is  a  mere  ''  im- 
aginary hne  "  used  for  some  very  necessary  pur- 
poses in  geography  and  several  other  sciences.  As 
belonging  to  the  same  class  we  have  the  parallels  of 
latitude,  the  tropics,  and  the  meridians  of  longitude. 
They  are  not  realities  on  the  globe  like  the  rivers 
and  mountains,  and  yet  they  are  of  inestimable  value 

mind  as  an  abstract  term.  But  test  it  by  our  rule,  and  say  "the 
mind  thinks  " — put  it  "  mental  substance  thinks  "—and  the  mean- 
ing is  seen  at  once  to  be  precisely  the  same  as  when  the  statement 
was  in  the  first  form  ;  whence  we  infer  that  mind  is  only  a  name  for 
mental  substance,  and  not  a  mere  abstraction. 

In  many  cases,  however,  we  should  fail  to  get  all  the  meaning 
that  isjntended  in  a  passage  when  this  use  of  abstract  terms  or  fic- 
tions prevails.  Suppose  we  say  "sound  travels,"  etc.  By  the 
method  already  indicated  we  find  that  "sound"  is  but  an  abstrac- 
tion or  a  fiction.  But  suppose  we  regard  the  language  as  a  meta- 
phor and  complete  the  implied  comparison,  and  we  have  "the  re- 
sult is  the  same  as  if  sound  were  a  reality  and  did  travel  at  such  and 
such  a  rate." 


The  Personality  of  God.  241 

in  discussing  questions  of  geography  and  the  situa- 
tions of  places  and  things  on  the  surface  of  the 
earth. 

Of  the  same  kind  of  realities  are  also  the  point, 
the  line,  etc.,  as  used  in  geometry.  No  realities 
exactly  corresponding  to  their  definitions  exist  or 
can  exist  among  the  realities  of  nature. 

To  the  same  class  of  objects,  as  I  think,  must  be 
relegated  those  two  much  discussed  subjects,  time 
and  space. '  No  realities  exist  or  can  exist  that  agree 
entirely  with  our  ideas  of  them.  The  one  is  sup- 
posed to  extend,  without  any  other  property  but  its 
extension,  indefinitely  in  all  directions — never  acting 
as  cause — having  no  impenetrability,  and  offering  no 
resistance  either  to  our  hands,  by  way  of  touch,  or 
to  masses  that  are  supposed  to  be  moving  in  it,  and 
whose  infinity  is  not  supposed  to  be  limited  by  ob- 
jects that  are  regarded  as  existing  in  it.  And  much 
the  same  may  be  said  of  time — with  proper  limita- 
tions with  regard  to  the  nature  of  the  way  of  its  extent 
— which  is  sometimes  called  protensioft,  or  rather, 
extension. 

And  if  we  adopt  what  Tyndall  has  declared  to  be 
the  "  modern  idea  "  of  scientific  men  with  regard  to 
them,  we  must  relegate  to  the  same  category  those 
so-called  forces  of  nature,  light,  heat,  etc.,  on  which 
Herbert  Spencer  depends  for  his  explanation  of  the 


242         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

universe.  The  sun  is  luminous,  and  we  speak  of 
light.  Bodies  are  hot,  and  we  speak  of  heat;  and 
find  it  exceedingly  convenient  to  regard  heat  and 
light  as  imponderable  substances  that  may  be  emit- 
ted, reflected,  radiated,  refracted,  absorbed,  etc.  But 
in  this  modern  view  they  are  no  *'  substantial  reali- 
ties "  ;  no  real  causes  or  efficient  agents  of  any  of 
the  events  that  occur  as  phenomena  either  in  life  or 
in  nature.^ 

We  have  then,  after  eliminating  abstractions  and 
fictions,  the  former  as  denoting  only  properties  and 
modes,  with  no  substantial  existence,  and  the  latter 
as  mere  creations  of  fancy  for  the  sake  of  convenience 
in  discussing  questions  of  science  and  of  philosophy, 
which,  however,  are  no  "  real  causes,"  only  the  three 
classes  of  objects  remaining  to  be  considered,  namely, 
(i)  material  objects,  (2)  mental  objects,  (3)  the  one 
Supreme  Being. 

1  In  most  languages  there  is  no  distinction  made  in  their  syntax 
or  other  laws  and  usages  between  abstract  and  concrete  nouns.  In 
English,  however,  the  difference  is  well  marked.  We  use  the  arti- 
cle before  concrete  terms,  as  when  we  say,  •*  the  heart  beats," 
"  the  lungs  expand."  But  if  we  are  using  an  abstract  term,  we  do 
not  use  the  article  before  it  unless  it  is  followed  by  the  preposition 
"of"  or  some  limiting  clause  as,  "the  whiteness  of  snow, ''^  "the 
heat  that  comes  from  the  sun,''''  etc.  Before  the  mere  fictions,  how- 
ever, we  use  the  article,  as  when  we  speak  of  "the  equator,"  "the 
point,"  "the  hne,"  etc.  Of  course  there  are  some  exceptions  or 
doubtful  cases,  such  as  "  time  "  and  "  space."  They  are  hardly  ab- 
stractions, and  yet  we  do  not  use  the  article  before  them  except 
when  the  word  is  followed  by  a  limitation,  as  "  the  space  of,"  etc. 


I 


The  Personality  of  God.  243 

In  this  I  leave  the  case  of  plants  and  animals  out 
of  the  enumeration  designedly,  because  I  do  not 
wish  to  either  assume  or  reject,  in  this  connection, 
Huxley's  doctrine  that  animals  are  mere  ''automata." 
If  they  are  so  they  belong  to  the  first  class  named 
above,  although,  as  Huxley  would  doubtless  con- 
tend, and  all  must  admit,  the  phenomena  of  animal 
sensibility  and  reflex  action  present  some  cases  that 
are  not  in  exact  accordance  with  the  laws  of  action 
and  reaction  in  inanimate  nature.  They  present,  how- 
ever, no  facts  of  spontaneity,  such  as  we  see  in  man 
and  the  mind  everywhere. 

If,  on  the  other  hand,  one  prefers  to  hold  to  the 
old  view  that  animals  have  consciousness,  intelligence 
and  voluntary  action,  they  must  be  included  in  the 
second  class  I  have  named  above. 

The  three  classes  of  objects  are  distinguished  as 
follows : 

I.  Material  objects  may  be  seen  by  the  eye,  or, 
if  they  are  not  visible,  they  may  always  be  felt,  as  is 
the  case  with  some  of  the  gases,  by  the  touch  of  the 
hand,  and  their  presence  is  indicated  by  pressure  and 
an  effort  at  condensation. 

2d.  Then  in  the  second  class  we  have  minds  or 
souls,  as  in  man.  These  are  not  supposed  to  be 
susceptible  to  cognition  by  the  senses,  but  are  mani- 
fest to  each  one  for  himself  in  his  consciousness ;  and 


244  ^^^^  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

as  existing  in  other  persons,  they  are  manifest  through 
their  influence  upon  the  body  and  their  control  of 
the  bodily  organs. 

I  have  spoken  of  minds  or  souls  as  in  man.  There 
may  be  souls  in  brutes  and  there  may  be  other  or- 
ders of  intelligent  beings  above  or  below  man,  as 
demons  and  angels.  But  these  are  questions  that 
are  of  no  importance  to  my  present  purpose,  and  so 
I  leave  them  without  discussion,  and  shall  so  shape 
what  I  have  to  say  that  it  will  make  no  difference 
which  way  one  decides  with  regard  to  them. 

3d.  And  finally  we  have  the  One  Supreme  Being 
Whom  we  call  God.  And  in  this  class,  if  class  it 
can  be  called,  there  is  and  can  be,  as  we  believe,  but 
one  Being. 

Let  us  consider  each  of  these  classes  of  objects 
separately  by  way  of  resuming  the  object  that  is 
more  immediately  before  us — the  existence  and  at- 
tributes of  God. 

Objects  in  the  first  class  named  above  have  well 
defined  limits  to  their  actions  and  modes  of  causa- 
tion. Without  going  at  all  into  detail — and  the  de- 
tails would  make  up  the  whole  body  of  scientific 
facts,  truths,  and  laws — we  can  easily  indicate  the 
outline  that  limits  their  agency.  This  limits,  also, 
the  use  we  may  make  of  them  in  our  attempts  at 
explaining  and  accounting  for  the  phenomena  that 


The  Personality  of  God.  245 

fall  under  our  observation  in  the  study  of  nature. 
This  is  the  law  of  inertia. 

It  may  be  well  to  state  this  law  in  outline.  This 
can  be  done  in  three  propositions. 

1st.  Whatever  is  at  rest,  if  anything  is  ever  really 
so,  will  remain  at  rest  until  moved  or  put  in  motion 
by  some  object  acting  as  cause  or  force  outside  of 
itself. 

2d.  Two  elements  that  are  not  in  a  state  of  chem- 
ical action  on  each  other  will  not  begin  to  act  until 
they  are  acted  upon  by  something  else  that  changes 
their  condition  or  relation  to  one  another. 

3d.  Two  substances  acting  upon  each  other,  as 
the  earth  and  the  moon,  by  gravity,  or  oxygen  and 
hydrogen  in  the  molecules  of  water,  will  not  and 
cannot  vary  the  intensity  or  force  with  which  they 
act,  spontaneously  and  of  themselves,  without  some 
change  in  their  condition  or  in  their  position,  in  re- 
lation to  one  another. 

Now  this  is  the  nature  of  matter,  the  limit  to  the 
activity  or  agency  of  all  mere  material  objects,  whether 
particle  or  planet,  atom,  molecule  or  mass.  The 
law  is  inevitable  and  inexorable ;  without  it  not  a 
general  fact  or  law,  or  a  truth  of  any  one  of  the  nat- 
ural sciences  could  be  affirmed — there  could  be  no 
natural  sciences. 

But  when  we  come  to  objects  of  the  second  class, 


246  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

we  find  a  different  nature — we  encounter  spontaneity 
of  action.  It  is  not  merely  that  man  is  always  or 
for  the  most  part  active ;  for  this  is  very  likely  the 
case  with  every  atom  and  every  mass  of  inorganic 
matter.  But  we  find  here  action  of  another  kind, 
and  under  an  entirely  different  law.  Explain  it  as 
you  will,  no  one  denies  or  doubts  the  fact.  And 
with  this  spontaneity  we  find,  also,  intelligence,  rea- 
son, memory,  and  choice,  as  the  result  of  delibera- 
tion. Explain  the  phenomena  as  we  will,  and  in- 
clude in  this  class  animals  or  exclude  them  from  it, 
as  the  theory  you  adopt  may  incline  you  to  do,  ad- 
mit or  deny  the  existence  of  demons  below  man  in 
the  moral  scale,  or  angels  that  are  above  him,  as 
you  may  find  reason  for  doing,  there  is  in  any  case 
no  denying  or  doubting  that  we  find  these  pecul- 
iar phenomena  in  the  life  and  activity  of  man.  And 
they  are  characteristic  of  him,  they  constitute  for 
him  a  distinguishing  mark,  and  indicate  for  him  a 
nature  that  is  essentially  distinct  from,  and,  as  we  say, 
above  that  of  any  of  the  masses  of  mere  inorganic 
matter. 

But  the  moment  we  attempt  to  account  for  the 
observed  phenomena  of  nature,  we  find  occasion  for 
something  higher  than  mere  matter;  something 
higher,  also,  than  mere  primordial  nebulous  matter 

When  the  atoms  of  man. 


The  Personality  of  God.  247 


first  began  to  combine  and  move,  there  was  a  neces- 
sity, as  we  have  seen,  and  as  evolutionists  admit,  for 
something  besides  these  atoms.  The  law  and  nature 
of  inertia  prevailed  then  as  now,  or  they  were  not 
matter,  but  mind  or.  spirit ;  this  law  of  inertia  ruled 
then  as  now,  with  inevitable  force  and  inexorable 
uniformity.  Man  was  not  there,  nor  was  he  in  ex- 
istence then,  to  start  them  into  motion  and  activity. 

And  besides  this,  the  occasion  called  for  some- 
thing far  beyond  the  intelligence  and  power  of  man. 
Even  now  he  knows  and  can  at  most  understand 
but  very  little  of  what  was  then  done  ;  and  many  of 
the  things  which  were  then  done,  and  which  he  un- 
derstands and  explains,  or  thinks  he  does,  he  lacks 
the  power  to  perform. 

Now,  as  we  have  seen,  spontaneity  and  inertia  are 
respectively  the  differentia  of  mind  and  matter.  So, 
undoubtedly,  there  is  some  one  characteristic  of  God 
which  constitutes  for  Him  an  essentia  (and  I  use  the 
word  here  in  its  technical  sense),  and  essential  dis- 
tintion  and  difference  between  Him  and  either  human 
beings,  on  the  one  hand,  or  mere  inanimate  objects 
on  the  other.  And  as  man  has  many  things  in  com- 
mon with  matter,  so,  doubtless,  God  has  many  things 
in  common  with  man.  He  is  intelligent,  and  spon- 
taneous in  His  activity,  as  men  are,  so  that  men  are 
said  to  have  been  created  in  His  image  or  likeness. 


248  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  besides  and  beyond  all  the  attributes  which  He 
may  have  in  common  with  man  constituting  our 
hkeness  to  Him,  there  is  and  must  be  something 
that  constitutes  essentially  His  divinity,  His  ovaia, 
for  which  we  have  at  present,  perhaps,  no  name. 
Of  this  we  see  manifestations  in  His  omnipresence 
and  foreknowledge,  as  we  call  it  for  want  of  a  better 
name.  Herbert  Spencer  says,  as  we  have  seen,  that 
since  "  we  are  obliged  to  regard  every  phenomenon 
as  a  manifestation  of  His  Power,  we  are  obliged  to 
regard  this  Power  [or  Being]  as  omnipresent." 
But  omnipresence  cannot  be  effected  by  extension 
from  one  place  to  another,  for  whatever  is  extended 
is  of  necessity  limited,  and  has  form  and  outline. 

So,  too,  Whoever  is  omniscient  cannot  be  wise  and 
know  things  as  we  do.  His  thoughts  cannot  have 
had  a  beginning  in  time  as  all  our  thoughts  must 
have.  For  thoughts  and  events  cannot  come  and 
go  as  they  do  for  us  and  with  us.  He  to  Whom 
events  come  and  go  in  the  order  of  succession  and 
time,  was  once  young  and  is  now  growing  old.  But 
God — with  the  utmost  reverence  be  it  said — is  no 
older  than  He  was. 

All  this  may  pass  our  powers  of  comprehension, 
and  doubtless  it  does,  but  it  is  nevertheless  proved 
to  be  true  and  constitutes,  or  rather  grows  out  of, 
that  which  constitutes  His  distinctive  characteristic, 


The  Personality  of  God.  249 

as  inertia  does  that  of  material  objects,  and  as  spon- 
taneity of  action  does  that  of  human  minds. 

And  yet  while  spontaneity  is  a  differentia  and 
characteristic  of  mind  as  contrasted  with  matter,  it  is 
not  a  ground  of  distinction  between  man  and  God. 
And  in  fact  it  is  a  fundamental  law  of  logic  that 
when  we  have  three  co-ordinates  it  is  impossible  to 
find  a  property  which  will  be  a  differentia  of  any 
two  when  compared  with  each  other  that  will  not  be 
common  to  both  of  the  other  two.  Otherwise  there 
could  be  no  three  distinct  species  in  any  proper 
classification  of  objects. 

Getting  rid  of  abstractions  and  of  fictions,  when- 
ever the  cause  of  scientific  truth  demands  it,  we  get 
rid  of  what  Tyndall  calls  ''  the  slave  labor  "  of  the 
so-called  imponderable  agents.  We  clear  the  field 
of  all  purely  mythological  creations  of  fancy,  and  we 
have  the  world  of  matter  with  its  masses  and  mole- 
cules acting  directly  and  immediately  on  one  another 
— the  world  of  mind  with  each  individual  soul  acting 
in  a  visible  body,  but  acting  under  the  law  of  free- 
dom and  spontaneity,  and  above  all  and  over  all. 
One  God,  a  Supreme  Being,  a  Creator  and  First- 
Cause. 

In  this  we  begin  with  the  seen,  and  pass  to  thei 
unseen,  the  limited  and  the  temporal,  and  then  pass' 
to  the  recognition  of  Something  that  is  infinite  and 
eternal. 


250  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Our  chief  dependence  in  this  Hne  of  investigation 
and  argument  is  upon  the  idea  of  causation  and  the 
relation  of  cause  and  effect. 

It  may  be  that  some  of  us  have  never  considered 
the  wide-spread  and  fundamental  character  of  this 
principle.  All  knowledge  of  objective  or  substan- 
tial reaHty  depends  upon  it. 

In  mathematics,  we  assume  the  unit,  the  point, 
the  line,  etc.,  and  deducing  from  them,  by  insight 
into  their  very  nature,  certain  self-evident  axioms, 
as  we  call  them,  we  proceed  to  demonstrate  the 
truths  that  are  not  at  first  self-evident.  Thus  if 
three  straight  lines  meet  in  three  points  they  make 
a  triangle,  and  we  can  demonstrate  from  this  con- 
ception of  the  nature  of  the  triangle  all  the  truths 
of  trigonometry.  But  the  triangle  is  an  ideal  figure, 
a  fiction,  and  we  cannot  prove  by  any  means  or 
methods  known  to  pure  mathematics,  that  there 
is  any  object  that  is  triangularly  shaped  in  this 
world  or  anywhere  else  in  the  universe  of  real 
objects. 

But  for  our  knowledge  of  reality,  everywhere,  we 
depend  on  the  principle  or  idea  of  causation.  I 
know  that  this  paper  or  this  book  exists  only  as  it 
produces  or  causes  within  me  the  sensations  of  color, 
form,  etc.,  by  means  of  which  I  perceive  the  object. 
And  the  same  is  true  of  all  the  properties  of  which 
a  knowledge  is  gained  by  the  six  senses. 


The  Peasonality  of  God.  2  5 1 

And  then  we  learn  other  properties  of  bodies  as 
we  see  them  acting  on  one  another,  and  causing  the 
changes,  mechanical  or  chemical,  which  we  see 
around  us.  And  without  such  action  and  change 
we  learn  nothing  of  these  relative  properties  of 
objects. 

So,  too,  with  mind.  We  know  it  only  as  it  acts 
as  agent  or  cause,  producing  those  phenomena  of 
thought  and  feeling  and  will,  that  we  are  conscious 
of  within  us.  And  only  as  it  thus  acts  as  cause  or 
agent  do  we  know  nothing  of  it  except,  perhaps,  what 
we  may  learn  of  it  by  the  physiological  method 
spoken  of  in  the  first  part  of  the  third  Lecture. 

The  same  is  true  with  regard  to  the  First  Cause. 
We  know  Him  to  exist  and  we  know  of  Him — His 
attributes  and  modes  of  action — just  as  we  do  of  all 
other  things,  by  what  He  does,  and  with  as  much 
certainty,  so  far  as  our  knowledge  extends.  What- 
ever we  cannot  account  for  by  ascribing  it  to  mere 
matter  because  all  matter  is  inert;  and  whatever 
we  cannot  account  for  by  referring  it  to  the  agency 
of  man,  who,  though  not  inert,  is  yet  ignorant  and 
weak  and  limited  in  time  and  space,  we  ascribe  to 
God,  Who  is  not  inert,  and  Who  is  neither  ignorant 
nor  weak;  or  rather,  we  thus  prove — starting  from 
the  same  facts  and  pursuing  the  same  method — that 
there  is  a  Being  who  is  neither  inert  nor  ignorant 


252         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

nor  weak,  nor  yet  confined  by  limitations  and  con- 
ditions of  time  and  place.  And  this  result  we  attain 
as  surely  as  we  can  prove  and  as  certainly  as  we  can 
know  that  there  is  the  power  of  thought  within  us, 
stars  over  our  heads,  or  the  earth  beneath  our  feet. 

The  method  is  one  and  the  same  in  all  the  cases. 
The  process  may  be  longer  and  the  steps  more  in 
number  in  one  case  than  in  the  other  two ;  just  as 
in  mathematics  the  steps  are  more  numerous  and 
the  process  of  reasoning  is  often  much  longer  in  the 
more  remote  conclusions  than  in  the  earlier  propo- 
sitions in  algebra  and  geometry.  But  the  conclusion 
is  no  less  certain  for  any  one  who  fully  understands 
the  methods  and  the  process.  Hence,  if  there  is  a 
cause,  an  immediate  cause  anywhere,  there  must  be 
a  First  Cause  somewhere.  And  He  must  be  eter- 
nal and  everywhere  present. 

This  I  say  as  a  matter  of  mere  logic  and  reason- 
ing. But  the  assent  to  this  doctrine,  and  the  reali- 
zation of  it  in  our  hearts  and  Hves  is  quite  a  differ- 
ent matter.  It  depends  upon  processes  and  means 
that  are  entirely  different  from  logic  and  mere  rea- 
soning. He  that  will  do  His  will  shall  know  of  the 
doctrine,  and  know  it,  too,  by  that  knowledge  which 
is  of  the  heart  and  not  of  the  head  and  the  mind 
alone. 

I  have  alluded  in  a  former  Lecture  to  the  impor- 


The  Personality  of  God.  253 

tant  psychological  fact  that  we  depend  mostly  for  our 
knowledge  of  objects  around  us  upon  the  two  senses, 
sight  and  touch.  By  what  we  thus  gain  we  are  able 
to  imagine  objects  as  they  are,  and  thus  we  get  that 
sense  of  reality  which  accompanies  our  thoughts 
about  them. 

And  I  sometimes  think  that  our  relation  to  God, 
so  far  as  the  sense  of  the  reality  of  His  existence  is 
concerned,  considered  in  a  purely  intellectual  point  of 
view,  is  very  much  as  would  be  that  of  a  man  in  re- 
lation to  external  objects,  who  has  not  either  of  these 
two  important  senses,  sight  and  touch.  He  could 
hear  the  sounds  they  make,  as  we  do.  He  could 
smell  the  odors  that  they  give  off  and  that  are  wafted 
to  him  on  every  breeze  that  he  inhales.  But  the 
objects  themselves,  he  sees  not  and  cannot  see  Their 
form  and  solidity  he  knows  not,  for  he  cannot  feel 
them ;  he  cannot  touch  them  with  his  hands,  nor  yet 
has  he  any  of  Ithat  **  muscular  sense,"  as  it  is  some- 
times called,  by  which  he  can  feel  their  hardness, 
their  solidity,  and  their  ability  to  resist  his  pressure. 
He  could  have  no  idea  of  them.  He  could  form  no 
conception  of  their  form  or  shape  ;  he  could  not  im- 
agine how  they  would  look  or  feel  or  in  what  man- 
ner they  exist.  And  yet,  he  is  always  hearing  their 
sound  and  their  voice.     He  perceives  their  varying 

and  ever-changeful  odors,  although  themselves  he 
12 


254         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

sees  not  and  cannot  see ;  he  feels  not  and  cannot 
feel.  And  yet  to  him  they  are  real.  And  I  doubt 
not  he  could  cultivate  a  sense  of  their  reality  that 
would  in  time  come  to  be  equal  to  that  which  we 
now  have. 

Considered  as  a  mere  speculative  dogma,  there 
are  but  very  few,  if  any,  persons  that  deny  the  ex- 
istence of  God  or  avow  themselves  atheists  or  mere 
blank  materialists.^  Their  chief  objection  is  to  the 
acknowledgment  of  the  personality  of  God  and  the 
exercise  of  a  Moral  Government  over  them.  This 
is  the  obstacle  that  always  and  everywhere,  and  in 
every  human  heart,  stands  in  the  way  of  our  appeals 
and  of  our  logic,  of  our  reasoning  and  of  our  entreaty. 
And  it  stands  there  until  something  which  you  may 
call,  if  you  please,  an  interposition  of  divine  grace, 
occurs  to  bend  the  will  and  bring  it  into  subjection 
to  Christ.  And  in  my  opinion,  not  even  by  Christian 
education,  however  early  begun,  and  however  sys- 
tematically and  unremittingly  persisted  in,  not  even, 
as  I  think,  when  preceded  by  and  based  upon  the 
grace  of  Holy  Baptism,  do  we  altogether  and  wholly 
remove  this  obstacle  out  of  the  way  before  the  child 

1  Thus  Tyndall,  r/Va///y  (Fragments  Ed.  1878,  p.  459),  "In 
tracing  these  phenomena  through  all  their  modifications,  the  most 
advanced  philosophers  of  the  present  day  declare  that  they  ultimately 
arrive  at  a  single  Source  of  po^ver,  from  which  all  vital  energy  is 
derived." 


The  Personality  of  God.  255 

comes  to  be  old  enough  to  renew  and  ratify  the 
promises  that  were  made  in  his  name,  or  for  him, 
when  he  was  received  by  the  minister  of  Christ  as 
"  a  child  of  God  and  an  inheritor  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Heaven."  If  the  child  lives  to  come  to  that  age 
he  must  voluntarily  submit  and  consciously  choose 
to  do  the  will  of  God  rather  than  to  follow  the  de- 
vices and  desires  of  his  own  heart  and  pursue  the 
dictates  of  his  own  will. 

This,  however,  is  a  moral  obstacle,  or  cause  of 
disinclination  to  the  recognition  and  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  Personality  of  God  with  which  we  are 
not  here  specially  concerned. 

There  is,  however,  an  influence  of  a  mere  intel- 
lectual character  which  comes  more  directly  in  the 
way  of  these  Lectures,  and  to  which,  in  closing  this 
Lecture,  I  refer. 

We  all  form  an  idea  of  the  Supreme  Being  in  our 
early  years,  whether  from  the  pious  teachings  of 
parents  and  sponsors,  or  from  the  chance  expressions 
we  happen  to  hear  in  the  market  places  and  by- 
ways of  life.  The  idea  we  thus  form  is  very  human. 
We  imagine  God  as  having  a  human  form  and  a 
visible  abode,  and  quite  likely  as  possessed  of  human 
passions,  caprices,  and  infirmities,  such  as  we  see 
men  have.  But  as  we  grow  up  and  reflect  on  the 
subject,  we  soon  come  to  see  that  He  can  have  no 


256         The  Methods  of  Natter al  Theology. 

human  **form,  parts  or  passions."  He  cannot  be 
said  even  to  have  a  throne,  or  to  sit  upon  one,  ex- 
cept figuratively.  To  be  omnipresent  He  must  be 
invisible  to  the  bodily  eyes ;  to  be  omniscient  He 
must  have  modes  of  thought  entirely  unlike  our  own 
and  beyond  our  comprehension. 

We  thus  find  it  necessary  to  get  rid  of  the  idea 
of  a  bodily,  visible  form,  and  of  a  local  habitation 
for  Him  who  is  God  over  all. 

But  this  is  not  all.  We  derive  our  idea  of  per- 
sonahty  from  the  observation  and  study  of  man. 
And  we  are  accustomed  to  reckon  as  among  its  ele- 
ments man's  infirmities  and  weaknesses,  and  quite 
possibly  their  caprices  and  their  sins,  and  whatever 
we  least  respect  and  are  most  Hkely  to  hate.  And 
in  popular  phraseology  these  peculiarities  are  often 
spoken  of  as  constituting  *'  the  personality  "  of  the  in- 
dividual. 

And  in  this,  I  think,  lies  the  greatest  difficulty  of 
the  case.^ 

1  Tyndall,  after  having  admitted  that  **  the  most  advanced  "  phil- 
osophers in  tracing  the  phenomena  of  nature  find  at  last  a  ^^ single 
Source  of  power,^^  says,  Fragments  Ed.  1878,  Introduction,  p.  336, 
"When  I  attempt  to  give  the  Power  which  I  see  manifested  in  the 
universe  an  objective  form,  (?)  personal  or  otherwise,  it  slips  away 
from  me,  declining  all  intellectual  manipulations.  I  dare  not,  save 
poetically,  use  the  pronoun  '  He '  regarding  it.  I  dare  not  call  it 
Mind.  I  refuse  to  call  it  even  Cause.  Its  mystery  overshadows 
me;  but  it  remains  a  mystery,  while  the  objective  (?)  forms  which 


The  Personality  of  God.  257 


Let  us  then  inquire  what  really  constitutes  per- 
sonahty  ?  What  is  its  essence,  and  what  are  only 
its  accidents  ? 

Persons  and  things ;  these  are  the  two  great  and 
co-ordinate  subdivisions  of  all  objects  that  have  sub- 
stantial reahty.  Things  are  inert ;  persons  are  more 
or  less  spontaneous  in  their  activity.  Spontaneity 
of  action  implies  intelligence,  to  understand  and 
know  what  one  is  doing,  and  that  consciousness 
which  acts  of  intelligence  always  implies.  It  implies 
sensibility,  also,  or  the  susceptibility  to  feeHngs,  or 
motives,  as  distinct  in  their  nature  and  different  in 
their  mode  of  action  from  the  *'  forces  "  that  operate 
in  nature  and  upon  mere  inorganic  matter.  It  im- 
plies the  power  of  purpose  and  final  cause,  that  Is, 
the  working  for  ends  and  aims  of  which  the  agent  is 
conscious,  and  for  which  he  can  direct  his  energies 
and  powers,  and  for  which,  also,  he  can  to  some  ex- 
tent make  use  of  and  direct  the  objects  and  forces 
of  nature. 

Now  when  this  intelligence  is  Hmlted  and  imper- 
fect, there  will  be  changes  of  purpose  according  to, 
and  as  resulting  from,  increase  of  knowledge  with 

my  neighbors  try  to  make  it  fit,  simply  distort  and  desecrate  it." 

It  is  manifest,  I  think,  that  by  ^^  objective  form  "  he  means  a  visi- 
ble, bodily  form,  and  that  when  he  speaks  of  ''personal,'"  he  has  in 
mind  human  personality,  with  a  form  that  is  somewhat  like  that  of 
human  beings. 


258  TJie  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

regard  to  the  object  that  is  pursued,  as  well  as  in 
the  choice  of  the  objects  of  pursuit.  And  persons 
of  very  weak  minds  may  be  very  changeful  because 
they  have  no  fixed  purpose. 

And  so,  too,  persons  of  imperfect  character  and 
changeful  feelings  may  change  their  course  because  of 
a  change  in  their  feelings.  All  improvement  in  char- 
acter implies  some  change.  Repentance  is  a  change 
that  comes  from  consciousness  of  guilt  and  wrong 
doing.  When  we  come  to  hate  the  evil  we  have 
been  accustomed  to  do,  we  change  our  course,  be- 
come inconsistent  with  our  past  selves,  and  we  may 
seem  to  others  as  giving  evidence  of  great  weak- 
ness. 

All  these  elements,  however,  are  but  the  accidents 
of  personaHty ;  connected  with  it  as  we  see  it  in  our 
fellow-men  more  or  less,  and  conspicuous  in  them. 
But  neither  weakness  nor  wickedness,  neither  caprice 
nor  ignorance,  are  essential  to  personality.  They 
rather  mar  than  make  it.  They  indicate  that  the 
being  whom  they  characterize  is  yet  far,  very  far, 
from  the  perfection  which  he  can  and  ought  to 
attain. 

And  yet  it  is  these  very  accidents  of  personality, 
these  faults  and  imperfections,  these  signs  of  either 
weakness  or  wickedness,  that  the  objectors  to  the 
personality  of  God  seize  upon  as  the  ground  of  their 
objections. 


The  Personality  of  God,  259 

Herbert  Spencer  says/  speaking  of  our  progress 
in  philosophy  and  scientific  knowledge,  **  As  fast  as 
experience  proves  that  certain  familiar  changes  al- 
ways happen  in  the  same  sequence,  there  begins  to 
fade  from  the  mind  the  conception  of  a  special  per- 
sonality, to  whose  variable  will  they  were  before  as- 
cribed. And  when,  step  by  step,  accumulating  ob- 
servations do  the  like  with  less  familiar  changes,  a 
similar  modification  of  belief  takes  place  with  respect 
to  them." 

Here  we  have  the  whole  thing  told,  and  the  rea- 
sons for  it  fairly  given.  A  "  variable  will "  is  taken 
as  the  essential  constituent  and  the  only  infallible 
proof  of  personahty.  And  as  we  do  not  see  this 
manifested  in  the  phenomena  of  nature,  these  men 
conclude  that  the  Nouinenon  that  underlies  and 
"  works  in  all  the  phenometia  of  nature,"  cannot  be 
a  personal  Being. 

Now,  undoubtedly  these  mere  accidents  of  per- 
sonality, as  we  see  it  in  man,  are  among  the  most 
conspicuous  and  striking  manifestations  of  that  which 
constitutes  the  difference  between  human  beings 
whom  we  call  persons  and  those  lifeless  objects 
around  us  which  we  call  things.  And  often  it  is 
that  the  more  capricious  and  abnormal  these  quali- 

1  First  Principles,  Part  I,  $  29. 


26o  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

ties  are,  the  more  strikingly  do  they  manifest  their 
"  personahty." 

But  assuredly  He  that  is  Omniscient  need  not 
change  or  vary  His  plans  to  meet  any  unforeseen 
emergency.  In  the  constitution  and  course  of  nature 
there  can  be  nothing  that  was  not  foreseen  and  per- 
fectly understood  from  the  first  by  Omniscience. 
And  He  Who  is  perfectly  good  and  unchanging  in 
His  nature  can  have  no  occasion  to  change  His  pur- 
poses there  where  there  is  no  power  of  choice  or  spon- 
taneity of  action  to  call  for  a  change  of  purpose  or 
of  measures. 

Hence  there  is  nothing  in  the  regularity  and  uni- 
formity of  nature  to  mihtate  against  the  doctrine  of 
the  Personahty  of  God  the  First  Cause ;  nothing  to 
prevent  the  so-called  forces,  gravity  with  the  rest, 
from  being  regarded  as  only  the  constant  exertions 
of  His  will  and  purpose  in  the  world  He  has  created. 

It  is  in  the  world  of  moral  and  accountable  beings 
alone — in  the  world  where  there  is  power  of  choice 
and  spontaneity  of  action,  there  only  and  alone — 
that  we  must  look  for  change  of  purpose  and  of 
measures.  When  man  repents,  God  relents  and 
forgives.  When  man  errs,  God  instructs,  by  con- 
science in  the  inward  man  and  by  His  Prophets  in 
the  community  at  large.  In  the  early  ages  He  did 
as  any  wise  parent  does  and  must  do*;   He  adapted 


The  Personality  of  God.  261 

His  instructions  and  His  institutions  to  the  infancy 
and  youth  of  humanity,  their  moral  notions  and  their 
powers  of  spiritual  apprehension.^  And  the  full 
measure  of  His  truth  and  grace  came  only  in  these 
latter  ages,  and  were  manifested  in  all  their  fullness 
when  the  fullness  of  time  had  fully  come,  in  the  Per- 
son of  the  Son  of  Mary,  His  Blessed  Son,  and  our 
only  Redeemer  and  Saviour. 

The  whole  objection  to  the  Personality  of  God, 
therefore,  in  so  far  as  it  has  any  intellectual  basis, 
grows  out  of  what  we  call  technically  the  fallacia 
accidcntiSj  the  fallacy  of  accidents.  It  mistakes  cer- 
tain mere  accidents  of  personality  for  what  is  essen- 
tial to  personality  itself;  and  not  finding  manifesta- 
tions of  these  accidents  in  the  phenomena  of  nature 
or  anywhere  in  the  works  which  we  ordinarily  as- 
cribe to  Him  as  First  Cause  and  Efficient  Agent  in 
nature,  these  persons  deny  His  personality  altogether. 

But  we  might  as  well  deny  that  man  is  man  on 
account  of  the  color  of  his  hair  or  because  he  might 
happen  to  have  no  hair  on  his  head  at  all. 

And  this  is  perhaps  all  that  these  men  mean  when, 
in  denying  the  personality  of  God,  they  say  it  is  only 
because  they  mean  to  ascribe  to  Him  and  they  do 


1  See  Mozley's  Ruling  Ideas  in  Early  Ages  for  some  admirable 
thoughts  well  expressed  on  this  subject. 


262  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

it  as  a  means  of  ascribing  to  Him  ''  some  thing  that 
is  higher  than  personaUty." 

Herbert  Spencer  says,  indeed,  a  Httle  farther  on 
in  the  discussion,  "  Those  who  espouse  this  alterna- 
tive position  make  the  erroneous  assumption  that 
the  choice  is  between  personahty  and  something 
lower  than  personality ;  whereas  the  choice  is  rather 
between  personality  and  something  higher." 

But  person  and  thiitg  are  co-ordinates,  both  logic- 
ally and  ontologically — a  co-ordinate  pair.  Like 
odd  and  even  in  numbers,  what  is  not  the  one  must 
of  necessity  be  the  other.  Person  or  thing,  one  or 
the  other,  therefore,  whatever  exists  at  all  must  be. 

Or  if  any  one  should  say  that  there  are  three 
classes,  we  might  then  have  the  three,  animals, 
things  and  persons.  But  it  will  make  no  difference 
with  our  argument,  since,  at  any  rate,  persons  are 
higher  than  either  of  the  other  two  classes.  And  if 
we  omit  from  our  idea  of  personality  wickedness  and 
weakness,  ignorance  and  caprice,  as  mere  accidents, 
we  can  form  no  conception  of  anything  that  is  higher 
than  a  person.  And  if  one  says  that  we  may  have 
proof  of  the  existence  of  that  of  which  we  can  have 
no  idea  or  conception  he  is  using  language,  the  force 
and  meaning  of  which  he  does  not  understand.  If 
we  know  a  thing  by  sense-perception,  we  know  it 
by  its  sensible  properties.     If  we  know  anything  by 


The  Personality  of  God.  263 

consciousness  it  is  the  mind  within  us,  and  we  know 
it  by  its  activities.  If  we  know  anything  by  the  law 
or  process  of  causation,  we  know  it  by  its  adequacy 
to  the  effects  it  has  produced.  Hence  in  any  view 
we  cannot  know  that  anything  exists  without  know- 
ing something  of  what  it  is. 

And  even  Spencer  admits  all  that  is  here  implied,^ 
— even  though  he  calls  God  the  Unknowable,  he 
confesses  that  we  know  that  He  is  omnipresent — 
that  He  is  active  in  all  the  phenomena  of  nature,  is 
present  in  our  minds  as  the  inspirer  of  all  our  highest 
thoughts  and  noblest  aspirations.  And  surely  we 
have  in  this  all  the  essential  constituents  of  person- 
ality, even  the  highest  personality,  that  than  which 
there  can  be  nothing  higher. 

With  all  this  considered  it  can  be  only  a  question 
of  words  whether  we  call  this  Being  "  the  Unknow- 
able," or  the  God  Whom  Christians  love  and  adore. 

Hence  I  think  we  may  safely  conclude  that  all 
the  arguments  and  all  the  methods  of  argumentation 
by  which  we  claim  to  prove  the  existence  of  God, 
proves  also  His  Personality. 

If  God  acted  before  all  other  actions  and  events, 
before  all  things,  He  certainly  must  have  acted  from 
Himself,  or  spontaneously.  The  first  action  could 
have  been  no  reflex  action  like  what  we  see  in  the 

1  First  Principles y  Part  I,  $$  27  and  34. 


264         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

nerve-centres  of  man  and  animals,  nor  yet  any  mere 
reaction  such  as  we  see  In  the  phenomena  of  inor- 
ganic, Hfeless  matter.  In  the  First  Cause,  action 
could  be  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  of  these  two 
kinds.  Hence  our  argument  proves  as  fully  and  as 
certainly  that  the  First  Cause  must  have  been,  and 
and  must  be  still,  a  Personal  Agent,  as  it  proves  that 
He  exists  at  all. 

Of  course  we  cannot  ask  or  expect  to  come  to  any 
adequate  conception  of  the  character  and  attributes 
of  God.  His  mode  of  being,  of  thought  and  of  ac- 
tion, are  beyond  our  comprehension.  This  we  must 
distinctly  admit  and  realize. 

Nor  is  such  a  comprehension  necessary  for  either 
Natural  Theology  or  practical  religion.  We  do  not 
get  such  a  comprehension  even  of  the  fundamental 
facts  and  principles  of  the  sciences,  not  even  in  those 
that  we  regard  as  the  most  certain  and  the  most 
exact. 

And  yet  there  is  a  way  of  looking  at  the  subject, 
which,  for  these  many  years  past  has  been  of  great 
service  to  me. 

I,  a  finite  being,  see  the  objects  around  me  from 
one  point  of  view  alone.  One  is  on  the  right  hand, 
another  on  the  left,  one  before  me  and  another  is 
behind  me. 

But  now  suppose  I  could  see  these  objects  all  at 


The  Personality  of  God.  265 

once,  ^iwd  from  all  points  of  space  at  the  same  time, 
as  if  I  were  omnipresent  I  certainly  could  do.  It  is 
easy  to  see  that  in  that  case  there  could  be  no  here 
and  there  for  these  objects,  no  "on  the  right "  or 
"  on  the  left,"  no  one  before  or  behind  me.  In  a 
word,  there  could  be  no  space- relations  in  or  be- 
tween them  and  myself 

In  the  same  way  I  consider  myself  finite  in  the 
matter  of  mental  comprehension.  I  have  a  thought 
now.  I  had  another  a  moment  ago;  but  that  is 
gone  now.  Another  will  come,  perhaps,  in  a  mo- 
ment. But  they  all  come  and  go,  and  hence  the 
idea  of  time  and  of  a  past  and  a  future  and  of  a  suc- 
cession in  time. 

But  suppose  my  mind  were  so  comprehensive  that 
I  could  have  all  my  thoughts  and  all  ideas  present 
at  once,  and  at  all  times,  in  consciousness,  as  must  be 
the  case  with  one  who  is  omniscient  and  eternal. 
Is  it  not  certain  that  there  would  be  in  that  mind  no 
time-relations,  no  "before"  and  no  "after,"  just  as 
in  the  former  case  there  could  be  no  space- relations, 
no  idea  of  space  ?  This  is  doubtless  beyond  imagi- 
nation, and  hardly  conceivable.  But  it  may  help  us 
to  believe  what  St.  Peter  says,  when  he  declares,  in 
speaking  of  God,  "  that  with  Him  one  day  is  as  a 
thousand  years  and  a  thousand  years  as  one  day." 

The  great,  the  eternal  I  AM,  may  always  speak  in 


266         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

the  present  tense  of  whatever  was,  is,  or  is  to  come, 
considered  in  relation  to  man  and  to  human  affairs. 
God,  then,  is  a  person  incomprehensible  in  His 
nature  and  mode  of  existence ;  but  so  like  us,  or 
rather  we  are  so  made  in  His  image,  that  we  con- 
ceive of  Him  under  forms  and  modes  more  or  less 
anthropomorphitic.  In  this  we  are  all  essentially 
alike.  We  differ  in  degree  only.  From  the  feeblest 
infancy  of  the  lisping  child  up  to  the  broadest  pow- 
ers of  comprehension  ever  attained  by  man,  we  think 
of  Him  to  some  extent  as  acting  under  limitations 
which  we  can  easily  show  do  not  belong  to  His 
nature ;  we  speak  of  Him  as  passionate,  as  angry, 
as  changeful  in  His  purposes.  Something  of  this 
kind  is  necessary  to  give  a  sense  of  reality  to  our 
idea  of  Him  and  to  make  His  name  a  power  in  its 
influence  upon  our  thoughts  and  our  feelings.  A 
God  too  far  removed  from  us  is  practically  no  god 
at  all.  Abstractly  and  absolutely  the  Personality 
of  God  is  one  thing  and  incomprehensible,  but  it  is 
a  fact  none  the  less.  Practically  it  is  a  different  thing 
for  each  individual ;  according  to  his  powers  of  com- 
prehension, and  his  spiritual  culture  or  lack  of  cul- 
ture. Let  us  begin  by  regarding  Him  as  wise  and 
good  and  holy,  and  as  we  grow  in  wisdom  and  holi- 
ness the  idea  will  ever  move  on  towards  perfection, 
leading  us  on,  and  drawing  us  by  the  power  of  its 


TJie  Perso7iality  of  God.  267 

might,  towards  that  state  of  being  which  we  can 
always  approach  but  never  fully  attain  unto. 

God  is  an  infinite  person.  And  by  the  expres- 
sion we  mean  only  that  He  is  one  Whose  presence 
is  not  limited  by  time  or  bounded  by  space,  whose 
intelligence  knows  all  things,  whose  power  is  ade- 
quate to  all  things  so  that  He  can  give  His  attention 
to  and  take  care  of  all  things,  from  the  greatest  to 
the  least,  from  the  suns  and  constellations  that  roll 
in  heavenly  space,  to  the  sparrow  that  flutters  and 
falls  to  her  inevitable  death ;  from  the  proudest 
earthly  potentate  that  sets  Him  at  defiance,  to  the 
humblest  soul  that  sins  and  repents,  turning  to  Him 
with  a  cry  for  mercy.  To  all  and  for  all  He  is  not 
only  God  and  Creator,  but  a  Father  and  Friend  as 
well ;  a  Father  and  Friend  Who  never  slumbers  nor 
sleeps;  Who  faints  not  and  is  never  weary,  and 
Whose  mercies  never  fail. 


LECTURE  VI. 

MIRACLES  AND  INSPIRATION  AS   OCCURRING  IN 
NATURE  AND  INDICATED  IN  EXPERIENCE. 

Luke  XII,  56,  57.     Ye  can  discern  the  face  of  the  sky  and  of  the  earth  .... 
why  then  do  ye  not  even  of  yourselves  judge  what  is  right? 


MIRACLES  AND  INSPIRATION. 

At  the  beginning  of  these  Lectures  I  spoke  of  two 
methods  in  Natural  Theology — the  one,  the  outward 
method,  beginning,  as  it  Is  commonly  stated,  with  the 
objects  in  the  outward  world,  leads  back  to  a  First 
Cause  and  Creator ;  the  other,  beginning  with  the 
facts,  laws  and  conditions  of  thought,  leads  to  the 
idea  of  a  Supreme  Being,  Who  is  necessarily  exist- 
ing, is  spontaneously  active,  but  Who  nevertheless 
does  not  act  under  the  conditions  and  limitations  of 
time  and  space  as  human  beings  do. 

I  might  have  said  then,  and  I  take  occasion  to  say 
now,  that  this  latter  method  branches  off  at  a  very 
early  stage,  perhaps  one  might  say  at  the  very  be- 
ginning, into  two  entirely  different  channels,  the  one 
of  which  may  be  called  the  purely  intellectual  or 
logical  method,  and  the  other  the  method  of  senti- 
ment and  instinct.  I  have  thus  far  pursued  the  first 
of  these  two  methods ;  the  latter,  however,  has  been 
in  vogue  of  late  years  and  seems,  in  fact,  to  be  grow- 
ing in  favor.     The  argument  is  that  man's  wants 


272  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

and  instincts  demand  a  belief  in  some  such  Being 
and  that  these  elements  of  our  nature  constitute  a 
ground  for  belief  and  action  which  is  as  legitimate 
as  any  other. 

President  Porter,  in  his  late  work,  **  Science  and 
Sentiment^''  has  put  this  argument  in  the  strongest 
light  that  I  have  seen.  The  late  lamented  Professor 
Dimon,  in  his  "  Lowell  Lectures,"  "  The  Theistic 
Argument ^^  has  exhibited  the  argument  at  greater 
length.  And  in  fact  all  the  later  "apologies  for 
Christianity "  that  I  have  seen  are  in  this  Hne  of 
thought.  And  I  have  no  disposition  to  criticise  or 
to  disparage  in  the  slightest  degree  that  line  of  ar- 
gument. 

But  I  should  only  express  my  conviction  if  I  were 
to  say  in  the  words  of  President  Porter  (p.  21),  "  The 
heart  can  neither  love  nor  trust  what  the  head  dem- 
onstrates to  be  untrue."  And  this  means,  as  I  ap- 
ply the  words,  that  if  we  cannot  vindicate  our  belief 
by  the  other  method,  and  leave  it  to  rest  on  senti- 
ment and  the  felt- wants  of  humanity  alone,  it  is  not 
likely  to  be  much  respected.  Men  of  the  agnostic 
school  are  likely  to  say  as  Tyndall  has  said :  ^ 
'*  If,  abandoning  your  illegitimate  claim  to  knowl- 
edge, you  place  with  Job  your  forehead  in  the  dust 
and  acknowledge  the  authorship  of  this  universe  to 

1  Appleton's  Popular  Science  Monthly,  ^zn.,  1879,,  p.  2S8. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  273 

be  past  finding  out — if  having  made  this  confession, 
and  relinquished  the  views  of  the  mechanical  theo- 
logian, you  desire  for  the  satisfaction  of  feelings 
which  I  admit  to  be  in  great  part  those  of  humanity 
at  large,  to  give  ideal  form  to  the  Power  that  moves 
all  things — it  is  not  by  me  that  you  will  find  objec- 
tions raised  to  this  exercise  of  ideality,  when  con- 
sciously and  worthily  carried  out." 

So,  then,  these  men  will  allow  us  to  have  our  re- 
ligion if  we  ask  it  only  as  an  amusement,  a  favor  or 
as  a  "  comfort "  in  our  weakness.  But  if  we  claim  for 
it  any  foundation  in  truth,  or  any  binding  force 
upon  conscience,  they  will  interpose  to  prevent  it. 

Revelation  without  inspiration  is  impossible  ;  and 
inspiration  itself  is  of  the  nature  of  a  miracle. 

A  revelation,  in  any  proper  sense,  must  be  a 
communication  from  a  personal  being.  It  must  be 
made  to  the  minds  of  men.  It  must  be,  in  its  first 
stage,  an  act  or  influence  that  is  exerted  inwardly 
and  upon  the  mind.  It  may  then  become,  through 
the  words  of  the  inspired  man,  a  revelation  or  dis- 
closure to  others. 

Truths  received  by  immediate  insphation  may  be 
communicated  by  words  and  outward  signs  to  oth- 
ers, and  thus  become  the  means  of  stimulating,  ele- 
vating and  guiding  the  minds  of  men  and  of  com- 
munities of  men  almost  indefinitely. 


2/4  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Now,  to  begin  in  our  accustomed  method,  we  start 
with  recalling  to  mind  the  facts  already  noticed,  that 
there  are  among  those  that  are  daily  and  hourly  fall- 
ing under  our  observation,  these  two  classes;  the 
one  the  facts  of  nature  produced  by  inert  causes, 
atoms,  molecules  or  masses  acting  on  each  other  in 
accordance  with  physical  laws ;  and  the  other  class, 
constituting  what  we  call  voluntary  acts,  acts  that 
cannot  be  accounted  for,  and  which  nobody  attempts 
to  account  for,  without  recognizing  the  agency  of 
man  as  something  different  from  mere  physical  or 
inert  matter. 

The  acts  of  the  first  great  class  are  all  reducible 
to  law.  They  can  be  stated,  if  I  mistake  not,  in 
mathematical  formulae.  But  in  any  case,  all  these 
acts  come  under  the  domain  of  what  we  call  natural 
or  physical  law,  and  the  law  is  such  that  we  can, 
alike,  reproduce  the  past  and  predict  the  future,  with 
little  or  no  possibility  of  a  mistake  or  of  any  excep- 
tion from  the  rule. 

But  in  human  action  it  is  otherwise.  Here  man 
chooses  how  he  will  act,  and  acts  to  some  extent  as 
he  chooses  or  pleases  to  act.  Hence  no  science — 
neither  psychology  nor  mathematics — can  tell  how 
a  man  will  act  until  the  act  itself  has  become  a  fact 
accomplished  and  so  a  part  of  the  history  of  the 
past. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  275 

Hence  the  two  domains,  Moral  Philosophy  and 
Natural  Philosophy,  in  the  broadest  acceptation  of 
their  meaning,  are  marked  off  and  outlined  from 
each  other,  by  an  insuperable  barrier.  They  are  dif- 
ferent in  their  first  principles  and  starting-point,  and 
ever  diverging  more  and  more  widely  from  each 
other  because  of  the  ever  increasing  influence  of 
spontaneity  in  the  one,  of  which  there  is  nothing, 
not  even  the  beginning,  in  the  other. 

Miracles  are  from  their  very  nature  voluntary  acts, 
performed  by  a  personal  agent  or  being.  And 
hence,  too,  as  I  think,  every  voluntary  act,  every 
act  that  arises  from  spontaneity  is  of  the  nature  of  a 
a  miracle ;  something  unforeseen  by  science,  some- 
thing that  cannot  be  accounted  for  on  scientific  prin- 
ciples, if  we  insist  upon  using  the  words  "science" 
and  "  scientific  "  with  exclusive  reference  to  7iatnral 
science.  Something  is  done  for  a  purpose  and  with 
a  view  to  an  end  such  as  could  not  or  would  not  be 
accomplished  in  the  ordinary  course  of  nature  with- 
out the  intervention  of  mind,  whether  by  evolution 
or  otherwise.  Miracles  are  the  acts  of  Personal 
Agents  and  not  the  products  of  physical  forces. 

Miracles  are  in  their  very  nature  relative.  When 
there  was  no  living  thing,  growth  and  locomotion 
would  have  been  regarded  as  both  incomprehensible 
and  miraculous,  if  there  had  been  a  crystal  capable 


2/6         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

of  intelligence  to  see  and  think  about  such  phe- 
nomena. 

So,  too,  in  a  world  of  intelligent  beings  where 
all  are  deaf  the  man  that  could  hear  would  be  all  the 
time  performing  what  would  be  regarded  as  miracu- 
lous. 

And  even  any  of  the  phenomena  of  inanimate 
matter,  if  it  should  occur  only  once,  and  we  should 
be  unable  to  assign  to  it  any  adequate  cause  or  give 
it^  any  satisfactory  explanation,  would  be,  in  the 
estimation  of  all  men,  a  miracle. 

Thus  if  we  look  from  mere  matter  up  to  animal 
life,  or  from  the  level  of  mere  animal  life  up  to  the 
intelligent  voluntary  activity  of  man,  we  see  in  either 
case  a  region  of  miracles. 

Now,  omitting  for  the  present  the  element  of 
rarity  and  novelty  in  the  occurrence,  what  we  find 
common  to  all  the  events,  that  are  or  would  be  called 
miraculous,  is  the  intervention  of  a  force  or  being 
that  is  higher  than  that  which  is  found  to  be  active 
in  the  region  below. 

What  I  want  to  have  specially  noted  is  that  in  all 
this,  so  far  as  we  have  thus  gone,  there  is  no  con- 
travention, suspension  or  violation  of  the  laws  of 
nature,  in  the  phenomena  which,  as  we  have  seen, 
would  be  regarded  as  miraculous  in  these  various 
cases. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  277 

In  the  phenomena  of  animal  organization  and  life 
there  is  no  violation  or  departure  from  the  laws  of 
chemistry  and  mechanics,  but  there  is  a  new  force 
at  work  combining  the  elements  and  using  the  laws 
in  ways  that  had  not  been  before  observed. 

So  in  human  life  and  voluntary  action,  the  laws  of 
nature  prevail.  There  is,  however,  a  new  force- 
the  human  mind — guiding  them.  And  although  it 
cannot  suspend  or  counteract  those  laws,  it  can  give 
new  directions  and  new  combinations  to  their  modes 
of  activity,  so  that  results  that  could  not  occur  in 
nature  without  such  an  agent,  are  all  the  while  oc- 
curring with  his  presence  and  constitute  what  we 
regard  as  the  sphere  of  human  action. 

We  have  already  gotten,  as  I  trust,  something  of 
an  idea  of  the  sphere  and  characteristics  of  human 
action.  We  have  seen  that  its  phenomena  imply, 
besides  physical  strength,  something  of  intelligence, 
purpose,  and  spontaneity  of  action.  But  the  mind, 
which  is  the  substance  of  these  attributes,  is  only 
a  force  in,  and  acting  upon  and  among,  the  inert 
masses  of  matter,  and  always  in  subordination  to 
their  nature  and  the  laws  of  inert  matter.  This 
nature  and  these  laws  man  does  not  and  cannot 
change.  He  may  violate  the  laws,  but  if  he  does 
so  he  suffers  the  penalty.     He  cannot,  however, 

suspend  the  law  ;  and  they  will  not  show  mercy  or 
13 


278         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

favor,  forbearance  or  forgiveness,  to  any  one  who 
transgresses  them. 

But  this  does  not  explain  away  all  miracles ;  it 
only  proves  the  necessity,  in  order  to  a  true  miracle, 
that  there  should  be  an  adequate  agent,  a  nodtis  deo 
dignns.  If  God  be  present,  all  things  are  possible. 
In  this  view  the  Incarnation,  the  miraculous  Con- 
ception and  the  Resurrection  of  the  body  itself,  al- 
though miracles  of  the  most  marvelous  kind,  are 
seen  to  be  possible  to  a  Divine  Agency. 

One  method  of  procedure  would  be  to  assume 
some  one  act  that  is  acknowledged  to  have  been 
miraculous  if  it  occurred ;  and  prove  its  occurrence 
historically.  And  this  method  must  be  pursued,  I 
apprehend,  by  those  who  undertake  to  discuss  and 
present  the  Evidences  of  Christianity.  But  my  ob- 
ject is  of  a  different  nature.  It  is  to  prove  that  even 
the  phenomena  of  nature  present  us  proof  of  mira- 
cles ;  so  that  from  a  right  view  and  a  thorough 
comprehension  of  the  facts  of  nature,  we  should  be 
led  to  expect  miracles  rather  than  look  upon  them  as 
impossible,  as  our  modern  agnostics  do,  or  as  too 
improbable  to  admit  of  any  satisfactory  historic 
proof,  as  Hume  and  the  infidels  of  his  day  professed 
to  do. 

And  it  is  quite  possible  that  my  statements 
with  regard  to  the  nature  of  miracles  and  of  the 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  279 

principles  that  are  necessary  to  prove  and  account 
for  their  occurrence,  will  not  be  all  that  is  necessary 
for  one  who  is  writing  concerning  the  miracles  that 
have  actually  occurred  as  recorded  in  the  Old  and 
the  New  Testament. 

As  I  have  said,  miracles  are  relative,  and  as  much 
that  is  considered  as  miraculous,  when  regarded 
from  our  point  of  view,  ceases  to  be  so  when  looked 
at  from  a  higher  level,  so  much  that  is  and  will  be  re- 
garded as  miraculous  in  one  age  will  cease  to  be  so 
regarded  in  another. 

There  is  reason  for  Comte's  division^  of  the  history 
of  the  human  progress  into  three  stages.  They 
occur  in  the  life  of  every  man  as  well  as  in  the  prog- 
ress of  the  history  of  the  race.  They  may  co-exist 
to  some  extent,  and  they  are  in  any  case,  as  I  think, 
to  be  regarded  rather  as  having  a  logical  than  a 
chronological  basis ;  they  certainly  overlap  and  reach 
into  each  other  chronologically,  so  as  to  co- exist  the 
one  with  another ;  and  to  some  extent  all  three  of 
them  exist  together,  both  in  the  life  of  the  individual 
and  in  the  history  of  the  race. 

The  first  stage  Comte  calls  the  ^^  theistic  "  or  "  the 
theological  "  ;  the  second  the  "  metaphysical "  or 
the  philosophical,  and  the  third  the  "  positive  "  or 
scientific. 

1  Introdtiction,  Vol.  I,  pp.  2-7,  Martineau's  Edition. 


28o         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

In  the  earlier  or  theological  stage,  men  knew  but 
very  little  of  science,  and  were  intensely  religious. 
Hence  they  ascribed  nearly  all  the  phenomena  of 
nature  to  an  immediate  Divine  Agency,  and  this 
made  nearly  every  occurrence  a  miracle  in  their 
estimation. 

We  now  know  a  thousandfold  more  of  this  age 
than  we  did  when-  Comte  wrote.  We  know  that 
men  were  then  "  unconscious  monotheists  " — saw 
God  everywhere  and  in  everything.  We  know  now, 
too,  how  their  ** unconscious  monotheism"  developed 
into  a  pantheism,  with  its  pecuHar  cult  and  forms 
of  nature  worship;  or  into  polytheism,  with  its 
myths,  its  temples,  and  its  idol  images,  and  finally 
its  fetichism. 

With  the  progress  of  time,  however,  man,  having 
noticed  the  uniformity  and  the  regularity  with  which 
many  events  recur,  ceased  to  wonder  at  them.  The 
idea  of  a  uniformity  in  nature  with  which  man  could 
not,  and  God  or  the  gods  would  not  interfere,  began 
to  prevail.  In  this  way  a  large  share  of  the  phe- 
nomena of  nature  passed  over  from  that  class  that 
were  regarded  as  of  divine  origin,  or  as  implying 
direct  personal  agency,  into  the  class  that  excited  no 
wonder  and  called  for  no  gratitude  in  thus  account- 
ing for  these  phenomena. 

And  these  early  philosophers,  like  the  impetuous 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  28 1 

youth  of  our  day  who  aim  to  be  wise  before  their 
time,  instead  of  the  slow  and  cautious  process  of 
observation  and  induction,  hastened  to  conclusions 
and  resorted  to  creations  of  fancy.  They  found  in- 
vention easier  and  far  more  expeditious  than  dis- 
covery. 

But  in  the  third  stage,  as  Comte  describes  it,  phil- 
osophers begin  to  be  more  skeptical.  They  begin 
to  see  that  the  creations  of  fancy  are  rather  fictions 
than  facts,  and  lead  to  a  mythology  rather  than  to  a 
scientific  knowledge  of  anything.  Then  comes  the 
age  of  '*  positive  philosophy,"  when  men,  rejecting 
all  idea  of  divine  interference  and  all  the  abstractions 
and  fictions  of  the  metaphysicians,  give  themselves 
up  to  the  study  of  facts  in  the  more  cautious  method 
of  scientific  induction,  in  which  they  will  accept 
nothing  as  matter  of  science  nor  believe  anything  as 
matter  of  faith  that  they  cannot  test  by  experiment 
and  observation. 

Now  this  historic  review  has  a  relation  to  the  sub- 
ject before  us  that  is  very  pertinent.  In  the  first 
stage  all,  or  nearly  all,  was  miracle.  In  the  second 
nothing  was  miraculous,  because  all  things  were  ex- 
plained either  by  mythology  or  referred  to  abstrac- 
tions. And  in  either  case  and  alike  they  were  under 
the  control  of  him  who  undertook  to  explain  them. 
Nothing  was  easier  than  to  invent  myths,  unless  it 


282         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

were  to  create  a  new  abstraction  that  will  do  the 
work  for  us.  And  thus  no  fact  or  phenomena  could 
be  seized  upon  or  used  as  a  means  to  prove  the  ex- 
istence of  God. 

But  with  the  *'  new  age/'  the  "  positive  "  age,  the 
age  of  exact  science,  we  are  in  a  different  position. 
We  know  now  what  matter,  whether  it  acts  as  atoms, 
molecules  or  masses,  can  do ;  or  rather  we  know  the 
limits  that  mark  off  certain  things  that  it  cannot  do. 
Within  the  range  of  what  it  can  do,  there  may  re- 
main, and  there  doubtless  does  remain,  a  well  nigh 
infinite  amount  of  truth  and  fact  yet  to  be  discovered. 
But  we  know  the  limits  to  that  domain,  the  bounda- 
ries of  activity  which  it  can  never  pass. 

I  have  pointed  out  in  a  preceding  Lecture  and 
somewhat  insisted  upon  one  such  act  or  event  in  the 
past  history  of  the  earth.  We  may  as  well  call  it 
creation,  for  if  the  Self-Existent  First  Cause  did  not 
then  call  matter  into  being  from  nothing,  He  cer- 
tainly did  act  to  set  its  inert,  and  at  that  time,  inact- 
ive atoms  into  motion  and  activity.  From  a  state 
of  **  universal  death  "  and  **  perfect  equilibrium  or 
rest,"  He  caused  the  atoms  to  begin  to  act  directly 
upon  each  other ;  and  the  result  was  molecules  and 
masses,  with  heat  and  light,  affinity  and  cohesion, 
and  gravity  of  masses,  as  ''  modes  of  motion^'  mere 
phenomena  of  their  activity. 


Miracles  and  htspiration.  283 

And  this  was  a  MIRACLE  in  the  very  highest 
sense  that  we  can  attach  to  the  word. 

I  consider  this  proposition  proved  beyond  any 
further  need  of  argument.  Of  course  the  proof  may 
need  explanation,  reiteration,  and  illustration,  until 
it  shall  have  become  familiar  to  the  mind  and  its 
force  is  fully  realized.  We  have  then  the  existence 
of  God  as  a  Creator  and  a  Miracle  Worker,  proved 
by  an  argument  which  I  think  is  as  rigorous  in  its 
logic  and  as  inevitable  in  its  conclusions  as  any  one 
of  the  Propositions  of  Euclid. 

With  this  I  think  we  leave,  at  least  I  am  wiUing 
to  admit  that  we  leave,  the  ground  of  absolute  cer- 
tainty and  enter  upon  that  of  probability — a  proba- 
bility approaching  more  or  less  nearly  to  absolute 
certainty  as  the  case  may  be. 

And  here  two  fields  open  before  us.  The  one  is 
the  field  of  nature  as  it  appears  to  us  in  its  present 
phenomena  and  in  its  past  history  as  disclosed  to  us 
by  the  geologist  and  palaeontologist;  and  the  other  is 
the  field  of  human  history.  Of  the  first  I  will  speak 
in  this  Lecture  and  reserve  what  I  have  to  say,  or 
rather  what  I  shall  have  time  to  say  of  the  other,  to 
the  next  Lecture. 

And  for  the  purposes  of  this  Lecture,  as  well  as 
for  those  of  the  next  Lecture,  I  want  to  have  it  un- 
derstood that  I  think  I  have  a  right  to  claim,  and 


284         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

that  I  do  claim,  that  there  is  a  presumption  in  favor 
of  the  doctrine  I  am  about  to  attempt  to  prove,  aris- 
ing from  what  we  have  already  proved  concerning 
the  existence  and  attributes  of  God.  Plato  argued, 
as  I  have  before  said  (Lect.  I),  that  it  was  absurd  to 
suppose  God,  such  as  we  know  Him  to  be,  both 
in  intelligence  and  in  activity  and  power,  to  be  either 
indifferent  to,  or  inactive  in,  the  affairs  of  this  world, 
and  more  especially  the  affairs  of  men.^  Aristotle,^ 
also,  as  we  said,  Lect.  II,  held  that  God  is  essentially 
active,  and  is  virtually  the  active  cause  and  force  in 
all  of  nature's  phenomena,  that  it  is  contrary  to  His 
nature  to  suppose  that  He  could  be  otherwise. 

And  it  seems  to  me  but  fair  to  assume  from  what 
we  have  seen  that  He  is  essentially  active  in  His 
nature,  and  that  having  begun  a  work  with  evident 
purpose.  He  will  continue  to  carry  it  on  to  its  final 
and  foreordained  result,  and  to  go  on  with  our  dis- 
cussions, with  a  strong  presumption  in  our  favor 
derived  from  this  source. 

I.  The  first  case  I  will  cite  as  coming  under  this 
head,  is  the  appearance  of  the  first  living  thing  on 
this  earth.  I  have  already  spoken  of  this  occurrence 
in  a  preceding  Lecture,  and  do  not  intend  to  repeat 
what  was  then  said. 

The  combination  of  the  four  elements,  oxygen, 

»  De  Legibtcs,  B.  X,  c.  xi.  2  Metaphysics,  B.  XI,  c.  vi. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  285 

nitrogen,  carbon  and  hydrogen,  called  protoplasm, 
is  known  to  be  an  exceedingly  unstable  compound. 
It  cannot  exist  at  a  temperature  much  above  the 
boiling  point  of  water.  And  if  I  mistake  not,  no 
chemist  has  yet  been  able  to  produce  it  by  any 
process  that  is  merely  chemical  or  mechanical  or 
both  combined.  Nor,  as  I  understand  the  matter, 
can  it  be  kept  together  long,  except  on  the  condi- 
tion that  the  compound  is  either  a  living  being  or 
so  intimately  connected  with  some  living  organism 
as  to  be  preserved  by  that  connection  from  the  in- 
evitable dissolution  that  would  follow  its  separation 
and  elimination  from  the  system,  or  its  death.i 

I  am  well  aware  that  claims  have  been  set  up  and 
are,  or  were  a  few  years  ago,  being  pushed  with  a 
good  deal  of  persistence,  of  the  reality  of  what  is 
called  "spontaneous  generation." 

This  is  the  name  given  to  a  process  by  which 
it  is  claimed  that  living  beings  of  the  lowest  order 
can  be  produced  without  any  living  parentage,  the 
process  consisting  in  taking  some  animal  or  vegeta- 
ble tissue,  reduce  it  to  a  jelly  or  a  pulp  and  putting 
it  into  a  jar  which  is  afterwards  hermetically  sealed, 
with  no  atmospheric  air  in  it  except  such  as  has  been 
heated  to  at  least  the  boiling  point.     It  is  claimed 

1  Perhaps  I  ought  to  make  an  exception  of  those  eases  in  which 
living  tissues  are  preserved  by  the  arts  and  agency  of  man,  as  des- 
iccation, etc. 


286         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

that  in  this  case  there  could  be  no  germ  of  a  living 
thing  in  either  the  air  or  the  pulp,  so  that  if  animal- 
culse  make  their  appearance  it  must  be  a  case  of 
spontaneous  generation — animals  without  parentage. 

That  animalculse  have  appeared  under  such  cir- 
cumstances after  a  few  days  admits  of  no  denial. 
And  the  dissent  from  the  conclusion  comes  from  a 
doubt  whether  all  germs  had  been  destroyed,  and  the 
weight  of  authority,  even  including  those  who  will 
not  admit  of  any  miractdoiLS  creation,  is  against  the 
claim  of  spontaneous  generation. 

But  to  my  mind  a  more  important  fact  is,  that 
these  men,  so  far  as  I  know,  claim  to  use  and  need 
to  use  matter  that  had  once  been  organized  into  living 
tissues. 

This  fact  is  material ;  for  if  we  concede  the  fact 
of  spontaneous  generation  07it  of  such  material,  or 
if  the  efforts  to  produce  it  from  such  material  should 
ever  hereafter  prove  successful,  it  will  not  help  the 
case  of  the  unbeliever ;  since  we  are  referring  to  a 
time  when,  confessedly,  there  had  been  no  previous 
organic  tissue  out  of  whose  decayed,  or  decaying, 
protoplasm  the  new  being  could  be  produced. 

I  have  said  that  no  chemist  has  yet  been  able  to 
produce  protoplasm,  or  at  least  any  living  thing, 
whether  cell  or  tissue.  Nor  can  he  tell  how,  or  by 
what  process,  chemical  or  mechanical,  or  both  com- 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  287 


bined,  such  a  result  can  be  produced.  And  what  is 
more,  he  cannot  tell  why  he  cannot  produce  it. 

This  does  not  indeed  prove  that  its  production  was 
a  miracle,  or  the  result  of  an  act  of  immediate  Divine 
agency.  But  it  does  prove  that  scientific  men  have 
no  right  or  ground  on  which  to  deny  that  it  was  a 
miracle.  The  argument  is  all  against  them,  and  will 
remain  so  until  they  can  explain  how  the  first  pro- 
toplasm was  produced,  and  how,  having  been  pro- 
duced as  a  chemical  compound,  it  became  a  living 
being. 

Now  it  is  readily  admitted  that  this  case  does  not 
afford,  like  the  one  last  considered,  an  absolute  dem- 
onstration of  miracles  or  divine  interposition.  It  is 
readily  admitted  that  in  the  progress  of  scientific 
discovery  we  are  daily  advancing  towards  a  solution 
of  this  difficulty  in  one  way  or  the  other.  Here, 
then,  there  is  a  mere  possibility,  in  the  technical 
sense  of  the  word,  that  we  may  come  to  know  how 
to  make  living  protoplasm,  if  not  certainly  to  make 
living  beings. 

But  even  if,  in  the  progress  of  science,  such  a  re- 
sult should  be  attained,  it  will  not  impair  the  force 
of  my  argument  so  far  as  I  can  see.  Man  will  only 
come  to  know  how  to  do,  and  to  do,  what  God  did 
millions  of  years  ago,  when  there  were  no  human 
beings  to  do  it. 


288         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

And  this  is  in  accordance  with  the  general  course 
of  events.  Long  before  man  was  brought  into  ex- 
istence some  intelligent  being,  with  spontaneous  ac- 
tivity, must  have  done  a  good  many  things,  the 
likes  of  which  do  not  now  occur  at  all,  and  many 
others  which  man  can  noiv  do,  in  a  small  way.  And 
in  this  likeness  to  God  man  is  progressing  all  the 
while,  by  his  discoveries  in  science  and  in  the  useful 
arts  of  life,  no  less  than  by  his  growth  in  grace,  in 
his  moral  nature. 

But  on  the  other  hand  it  must  be  considered  also 
that  as  we  approach  this  point  there  appears  also, 
strong  indications  that  we  never  can  reach  it.  And 
these  indications  become  more  clear  and  decisive  as 
we  approach  what  seems  to  be  the  result.  Like  cer- 
tain principles  and  formulae  in  mathematics,  we  have 
experience  on  one  side  indicating  and  promising 
certain  results,  with  the  absolute  certainty  on  the 
other  that  those  results  can  never  be  realized. 

It  may  be  well  to  give  an  example  or  two  by  way 
of  illustration. 

Take  for  one  the  well-known  series  i  +  -i"  +  i  +  t 
and  so  on.  It  is  obvious  from  Inspection  that  as  we 
go  on  with  the  series  we  approach  nearer  and  nearer 
at  every  successive  step,  to  a  term  which  will  be 
zero,  and  a  time  when  the  sum  of  the  terms  will  be 
2.     But  we  know  absolutely  from  the  nature  of  the 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  289 


series,  that  no  such  result  can  ever  be  reached  in 
fact,  notwithstanding  the  confidence  and  expecta- 
tions that  may  have  been  caused  by  experience  to 
the  contrary. 

So  with  the  hyperbola.  We  know  that  with  every 
step  in  the  increase  of  the  abscissa,  we  are  actually 
approaching  the  junction  of  the  curve  and  its  asymp- 
tote. Nothing  can  be  clearer  as  a  mere  matter  of 
experiment,  or  a  posteriori  knowledge.  No  expect- 
ation founded  on  experience  alone  could  be  more 
reasonable  or  worthy  of  confidence.  And  yet  we 
know,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  that  no  contact 
is  ever  possible  between  the  two  lines. 

Now  there  are  those  who  would  affirm  that  this 
is  precisely  the  case  with  regard  to  the  production 
of  protoplasm  and  living  beings  without  either  pre- 
existing organic  matter  or  divine  intervention,  and 
so  by  a  miracle.  But  I  think  that  is  stating  the 
matter  rather  stronger  than  the  character  of  the  ar- 
gument, or  our  insight  into  the  nature  of  the  case, 
will  fairly  justify.  It  makes  undoubtedly  a  strong, 
and  an  ever-increasing  case  of  probability.  But  I 
think  this  is  all  we  can  fairly  claim  at  present,  and 
all  perhaps  that  we  shall  ever  be  able  to  claim  on 
purely  scientific  grounds.^ 

1 1  see  no  occasion  to  speak  of  this  part  of  the  argument  in 
stronger  terms  than  John  Stuart  Mill  has  done  in  his  poslhu- 


290         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

The  force  of  the  argument  is  undoubtedly  greatly 
increased  by  considering  it  in  connection  with  the 
preceding  demonstration  derived  from  the  origin  of 
motion  and  change  in  the  inorganic  matter  of  which 
the  universe  consists.  We  have  thus  proved  that 
there  is  a  Being  Who  can  thus  interpose  and  create 
a  "■  new  thing,"  do  something  unlike  what  had  ever 
been  done  before.  We  see  also  that  such  an  act  is 
entirely  consistent  with  His  character  and  attributes 
— it  is  like  Him — to  do  just  this  thing,  to  produce 
living  beings,  and  beings  of  a  higher  order  one  after 
another  on  the  earth,  in  its  progress  of  becoming  fit 
for  the  abode  of  man.  I  think  that  the  considera- 
tion creates  a  strong,  a  controlling  probability  that 
He  would  do  so. 

Tyndall,  with  the  ^*  rapt  vision  "  of  a  prophet,  may 
have  thought  he  saw  in  the  nebulous  mass  of  prezoic 
matter,  and  claim,  as  he  does  in  his  famous  Belfast 
Address,  that  he  did  "  discern  in  that  matter  .  .  .  the 
promise  and  potency  of  every  form  and  quality  of 
terrestrial  life."^     But  he  saw  nothing  of  the  kind, 

mous  work,  Theism,  p.  170.  He  says:  "As  mere  analogy,  it  [the 
argument  for  the  existence  of  God  from  nature]  has  its  weight ;  but 
it  is  more  than  analogy.  It  surpasses  analogy  exactly  as  induction 
surpasses  it.  It  is  an  inductive  argument."  '*  It  is,  for  reasons 
known  to  inductive  agencies,  the  weakest  of  the  four  [kinds  of  in- 
ductive arguments],  but  the  particular  argument  is  a  strong  one  of 
its  kind." 

1  Fragments  of  Science,  Ed.  1 8 78,  p.  524,  and  again  in  modified 
phraseology,  p.  546. 


Miracles  a7td  Inspiration.  291 

except  in  fancy  and  by  way  of  a  dream.  Eliminat- 
ing the  poetry  and  taking  the  residuum  of  fact,  what 
he  saw,  or  might  have  seen,  in  that  incandescent 
mass,  was  the  chemical  elements  of  which  organic 
beings  are  made,  and  the  fact  that  they  might  unite, 
or  rather  be  tmited,  into  protoplasm  and  living  cells. 
And  this  he  might  well  say ;  for  nobody  doubts  that 
the  material  elements  were  there ;  and  the  fact  that 
they  were,  some  of  them,  united  into  protoplasm, 
and  afterwards  became  living  animals,  has  become 
a  matter  of  geologic  history. 

But  he  has  not  told  us  how  they  became  united 
into  living  cells  and  organized  into  sensitive,  moving 
beings,  with  life  and  death,  reproduction  and  per- 
sistence of  specific  forms.  And  this  is  the  question 
which  just  now  mainly  interests  us. 

I  have  spoken  of  this  subject  before,  but  there 
seems  to  be  occasion  to  recur  to  it  again.  Three, 
and  only  three,  hypotheses  are  supposable. 

1st.  The  atoms  "acting  directly  on  each  other," 
as  he  says  they  do,  united  to  form  molecules ;  the 
molecules  acting  in  the  same  way  and  "  without  the 
intervention  of  slave  labor  "  or  any  foreign  force  or 
agency,  united  themselves  to  form  cells  and  tissues 
which,  somehow  or  other,  became  living  beings,  and 
thus  the  beings  created  themselves. 

2d.  The  next  hypothesis  is  that  hfe,  as  a  foreign 


292  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

substance  or  element  came,  somehow,  into  this  inor- 
ganic, or  rather  unorganized  mass,  united  the  ele- 
ments in  most  mysterious  ways  ^.ndi  formed  for  itself 
a  habitation  and  a  dwelling  place,  which  it  might 
continue  to  occupy  until  by  some  process,  unknown 
to  us,  it  might  choose  to  leave  the  body  it  had  formed 
to  the  decay  which  results  as  soon  as  life  is  gone, 
from  the  natural  repugnance  of  those  elements  to 
remain  united. 

3d.  The  only  other  supposition  is  that  God  united 
the  elements  and  made  of  them  when  He  had  so 
united  them,  living  creatures,  with  life  as  "  a  mode 
of  motion,"  a  mode  of  being  and  existence  only ; 
just  as  is  the  case  with  color  and  temperature, 
density  and  form. 

The  second  of  these  hypotheses  which,  in  the 
words  already  quoted  more  than  once,  are  "  verbally 
intelligible,"  is  ruled  out  by  the  advance  of  mankind 
to  what  we  have  called  the  ''  positive  "  stage,  the  age 
of  exact  science.  We  are  left,  therefore,  to  our 
choice  between  the  two,  the  1st  and  the  3d,  with  the 
probabilities,  considered  from  a  purely  scientific 
point  of  view,  preponderating  immensely  to  the  lat- 
ter ;  preponderating,  in  fact,  so  far  as  to  amount  to 
what  we  call  a  moral  certainty. 

And  that,  if  it  so  occurred,  was  certainly  a  mira- 
cle.    At  any  rate  it  was  an  event  which,  like  the 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  293 

Incarnation  and  Atonement,  occurred  then  once 
for  all.  It  had  not  occurred  before ;  it  has  not  oc- 
curred, so  far  as  we  know  or  have  reason  to  believe, 
since.  There  was  good  reason  why  it  did  not  occur 
before ;  there  is  no  reason,  so  far  as  we  know  or  can 
imagine,  why,  if  there  is  any  natural  tendency  in 
the  elements  so  to  unite,  there  have  not  been  con- 
stantly occurring  such  unions  from  that  time  to  this. 
The  conditions,  the  physical  conditions,  all  the  con- 
ditions except  that  of  time,  or  mere  chronology  in 
the  progress  of  the  ages,  must  have  occurred  many 
millions  of  times  since  the  first  living  cell  appeared 
on  the  face  of  the  earth,  and  yet  no  such  event  is  on 
record  or  known  to  have  occurred. 

It  is,  I  think,  a  well  established  principle  of  science, 
that  whatever  nature  has  done  man  can  do  in  his 
turn  when  he  comes  to  know  the  laws  and  condi- 
tions on  which  the  event  occurred  in  the  course  of 
the  world's  history.  This  is  what  we  are  doing  all 
the  time  by  our  "experiments."  We  know  of  no 
condition  in  nature,  whether  of  heat  or  cold,  of 
drouth  or  moisture,  that  has  occurred  in  the  past, 
on  any  scale  however  large  or  small,  that  man  can- 
not reproduce  on  a  small  scale  in  his  laboratories 
now.  He  has  solidified  hydrogen  by  his  cold.  He 
can  produce  heat  sufhclent  to  resolve  the  most  sta- 
ble compounds  into  their  component  elements.     But 


2  94         ^/^^  Methods  of  NaUn'al  Theology. 

he  has  found  as  yet  no  way  to  produce  living  proto- 
plasm. This,  so  far  as  we  yet  know,  God  only 
can  do.^ 

2.  I  turn  now  to  another  branch  of  the  subject, 
different  in  some  respects,  though  kindred  In  others. 

Until  quite  recently  it  was  the  belief  of  nearly 
all  men  that  all  the  animals  that  make  up  a  species 
were  descended  from  one  pair ;  and  that  the  de- 
scendants of  any  one  primitive  pair,  constituted  one 
of  the  classes  of  animals  recognized  in  Natural  His- 
tory as  a  species. 

This  view  was  thought  to  imply.  In  the  case  of 
the  primitive  pairs  of  each  species,  a  special  crea- 
tive act,  which  was,  of  course,  of  the  nature  of  a 
miracle. 

But  In  these  latter  days  it  Is  claimed  that  Evolu- 
tion accounts  for  the  origin  of  species,  and  that  there 
has  been  no  creative  act,  no  interposition  to  produce 
the  protoplasts  of  a  new  species,  since,  at  latest,  the 
origin  of  protoplasm.  ^ 

But  to  this  claim  I  Interpose  the  following  objec- 
tions : 

1  The  old  heathen  poet,  LUCRETIUS,  though  a  thorough-going 
Evolutionist,  felt  none  of  the  modern  difficulties  on  the  subject. 
He  said  that  in  the  earliest  times  crescebant  uteri,  ten'ce  7'adicibiis,  apH, 
and  that  when  the  children  had  been  born  in  these  flowers  of  the 
plants,  the  earth  poured  forth  from  its  open  veins  or  pores  a  liquid 
like  milk  just  as  women  do  now  from  their  breasts,  and  thus  "  the 


Miracles  ajtd  Inspiration.  295 

1st.  There  is  no  proof  and  no  dainty  so  far  as  I 
have  seen,  that  any  new  *'  species  "  has  actually  been 
produced  under  human  observation  or  within  the 
sphere  of  human  knowledge.  Evolution,  therefore, 
when  considered  in  this  point  of  view,  can  be  con- 
sidered as  nothing  more  than  a  mere  hypothesis,  a 
mere  conjecture  awaiting  proof  For  it  is  readily 
admitted  that  evolution  and  development  may  take 
place  in  the  successive  stages  of  the  same  individual, 
with  no  change  of  the  individuality,  however,  and 
without  creating  so  much  as  a  presumption,  or  a 
probability,  or  even  a  plausible  conjecture  that  by  the 
same  process  one  individual  could  be  changed  into 
another,  or  transformed  from  one  species  into  another 
with  difference  of  kind. 

I  am  well  aware  that  questions  may  be  raised  here 
as  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  species.^     I  ask  no 

earth  afforded  nourishment  for  the  infants,"  Book  V,  hne  808  and 
following. 

1  There  is  much  ambiguity  in  this  controversy  in  the  use  oi  the 
word  ^^  species. ^^  In  Logic  the  word  may  be  used  to  denote  any 
class,  and  any  class  will  be  either  genus  or  species,  just  according 
to  the  point  of  view  from  which  we  regard  it.  But  in  Natural  His- 
tory is  is  quite  otherwise.  A  certain  class  is  called  a  species,  and 
any  one  who  should  call  it  anything  else,  as  genus  or  variety,  would 
exhibit  thereby  either  an  ignorance  or  a  disregard  of  the  established 
usage. 

There  are,  however,  two  other  terms  that  are  of  importance  in 
this  connection,  **  varieties  "  and  ''hybrids."  A  variety  is  a  sub- 
species, and  may  possibly  be  as  well  marked  and  as  permanent  in 


296         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

odds  on  this  score.  I  use  the  word  in  the  same 
sense  as  these  scientific  men  do  themselves  whenever 
they  are  talking  or  writing  Natural  History,  Botany 
or  Zoology,  and  are  forgetful,  for  the  moment  at 
least,  of  the  exigencies  of  their  controversey  with 
"  the  theologians."  And  I  say  that  no  one  of  them 
has  claimed,  so  far  as  I  have  seen  or  heard,  the 
origination  of  what  he  calls,  or  claims  to  have  called, 
a  new  species,  within  the  historic  period  and  under 
human  observation. 

We  know  very  well  that  great  diversities  and  con- 
stantly increasing  diversifications  are  all  the  while 
occurring  under  the  influences  which  Darwin  has 
so  weM  described  among  men  and  animals  under 
domestication. 

It  may  be  well  to  dwell  on  this  point  for  a  mo- 
ment. 

And  as  the  first  example,  I  will  cite  that  of  the 
Machin  family,  known  as  the  '^porcupine  man."  ^ 

its  characteristics  as  a  species.  Varieties  can  undoubtedly  be  pro- 
duced and  have  been  produced  under  our  observation  by  (i)  perpetu- 
ating some  congenital  peculiarity,  as  in  the  case  of  the  Ancon  sheep, 
or  (2)  by  a  much  slower  process  like  what  Darwin  describes. 

Hybrids  are  the  result  of  crossing  and  intermixture  of  different 
species.  It  is  doubtful  if  they  ever  occur  in  the  natural  condition, 
and  their  permanence  or  perpetuity  anywhere  is  much  doubted,  and 
even  strenuously  denied.  See  Quatrefages,  Human  Species,  B. 
I,  chaps,  vii  and  viii. 

1  Pritchard,  Natural  History  of  Man,  Noyes'  Edition,  Vol.  I, 
p.  86,  etc. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  297 

He  was  covered  with  a  coat  of  quills  like  a  porcu- 
pine. More  than  half  his  children  and  a  part  of  his 
grandchildren  also  inherited  this  peculiarity  from 
him.  Had  this  trait  been  ''  cultivated  "  by  the  well 
known  process  of  ''  inter-breeding,"  it  would  have 
become  the  characteristic  of  a  variety,  if  not  of  a  dis- 
tinct species  of  the  human  race,  as  well  fixed  and 
permanent  as  the  color  of  the  negro's  skin  or  the 
shape  of  the  Mongol's  head  and  eyes. 

As  another  case,  we  have  what  is  known  as  the 
"  Ancon  "  sheep.  The  first  animal  of  this  variety 
was  born  in  Massachusetts,  1791.^ 

He  was  characterized  by  very  short  legs.  By 
inter-breeding,  a  variety  was  produced  which  came 
to  have  a  permanent  type  and  would  have  lasted  to 
this  day,  doubtless,  if  it  had  not  been  superseded  by 
a  more  valuable  variety  of  sheep. 

Again,  in  the  Falkland  Islands  and  other  places, 
the  horses  soon  become  very  much  undersized,  mere 
ponies,  and  remain  so  as  long  as  they  continue  on 
the  islands. 

Now  if  one  chooses  to  call  all  the  diversifications 
and  varieties  which  thus  arise  from  congenital  pecul- 
iarities, **  environment,"  climatic  and  other  physical 
influences  of  the  kind,  cases  of  evolution,  to  dispute 
him  would  be  only  a  dispute  about  words. 

1  Darwin,  Variation  of  Animals  and  Plants  Under  Domestica- 
tion, Vol.  I,  p.  104. 


298  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Nevertheless,  these  congenital  peculiarities  or 
marks  are  to  a  large  extent  unexplained  and  inex- 
plicable on  any  purely  scientific  grounds.  They 
may  be,  for  aught  we  know,  or  are  ever  likely  to 
know,  the  means  which  God  uses  to  diversify  the 
animal  and  vegetable  kingdom. 

But  this  does  not  explain  the  origin  of  those  more 
fundamental  and  permanent  traits  that  divide  off  the 
groups  that  Naturalists  call  Species  and  Genera. 

Evolution,  as  established  by  experience  and  ob- 
served fact,  does  not  cover  the  whole  ground.  And 
to  ask  that  it  shall  be  considered  or  accepted  as  do- 
ing so  in  this  state  of  the  discussion  is  to  beg  the 
whole  question,  and  that,  too,  while  facts  and  con- 
siderations of  the  most  stubborn  and  unyielding 
character  stand  against  it. 

3..  My  third  point  is  based  on  the  discrepancy 
between  the  Zoological  and  the  Geological  Series. 

The  advocate  of  Evolution,  from  a  purely  Zoolog- 
ical point  of  view,  will  refer  you  to  the  order  of  de- 
velopment, and  arrange  the  several  species  in  that 
order.  Beginning  with  the  lowest,  the  one  that  is 
nearest  to  mere  protoplasm,  which  may  possibly  be 
the  amoeba^y  he  will  place  next  to  it  in  the  ascend- 
ing order  some  animal  so  nearly  like  it  that  you  can 
hardly  see  the  difference,  even  with  eyes  trained  to 
discern  such  things.     And  so  on  up  to  the  highest 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  299 

— man.  Even  if  there  are  some  intermediate  species 
or  "  links  "  missing,  he  will  expect  you  to  admit,  in 
view  of  the  possibility  that  they  may  yet  be  discov- 
ered, that  the  series  is  complete.  He  will  then  call 
your  attention  to  the  very  slight  differences  that  are 
observable  between  any  two  of  the  species  that  he 
has  thus  placed  together  in  the  order  of  their  ascent 
from  amoebcE  up  to  man.  And  perhaps  you  will 
find  no  difficulty  in  admitting  that  these  differences 
are  no  greater  than  you  have  often  seen  and  sup- 
posed to  have  been  produced  by  ''environment" 
and  other  elements  of  physical  causation,  which  call 
for  no  special  wonder  and  no  thought  of  miraculous 
interposition. 

If  now,  however,  we  turn  our  attention  to  the 
Geological  or  Chronological  Order,  we  find  quite  a 
discrepancy.  Let  the  Zoologist  range  his  group  in 
the  order  of  the  numbers  from  one  up  to  as  many 
thousands  as  he  may  happen  to  have,  and  it  is  seen 
at  once  from  the  Geologist's  order  of  succession  that 
these  species  did  not  make  their  appearance  in  the 
same  order  as  the  Zoologist's  classification  demands. 
Instead  of  their  making  their  appearance  in  what  is 
the  Zoologist's  order,  i,  2,  3,  etc.,  they  come  in  a 
very  different  order.  It  may  be  that  he  has  made, 
and  must  make  in  fidelity  to  his  science,  a  succes- 
sion in  which  what  the  Zoologist  calls  the  first  did 


300         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

not  appear  on  earth  until  after  what  the  Geologist  has 
called  the  fifth,  and  the  sixth  of  the  Zoologist's  order 
was  not  the  next  to  make  its  appearance  in  the  order 
of  time,  but  was  perhaps  the  fifteenth  or  twentieth 
rather.  Hence  we  have  to  account  for  the  changes, 
not  from  the  first  in  the  Zoological  Series  to  the  next 
one  above  it,  but  to  one  that  is  many  degrees  re- 
moved from  it. 

In  confirmation  and  illustration  of  this  point  I 
cannot  cite  many  examples.  I  give  a  few,  however, 
in  a  note,^  and  would  cite  a  work  by  E.  Ray  Lan- 
kester,  in  which  he  shows  that  degeneration  from 
higher  to  lower  species  is  as  indispensable  to  the 
theory  of  evolution  as  the  advance  from  the  lower 


1  I  give  the  following,  taken  from  an  unknown  author,  which  I 
believe  to  be  correct : 

"  In  the  vegetable  world  mosses  are  inferior  to  the  lycopodise 
and  ferns,  but  they  come  in  later.  Ganoids  are  among  the  earliest 
of  the  fishes,  and  yet  they  are  of  the  highest  orders.  Trilobites  are 
crustaceans  of  a  high  order,  and  yet  they  are  among  the  very  earli- 
est. Monkeys,  although  much  higher  in  the  Geological  scale,  ap- 
pear before  the  ox  family." 

The  Machairodtts  is  an  obstacle  to  any  theory  of  mere  evolution. 
It  appeared  in  several  species  in  widely  separated  districts,  as  Ne- 
braska, (N.  A.),  Brazil,  (S.  A.),  in  France,  in  Greece,  and  as  far 
east  as  India.  It  was  of  the  cat  family  Felidcs,  as  large  as  any  known 
lions  or  tigers,  more  ''specialized  "  and  perfect  in  form  than  most 
of  the  later  species.  It  appeared  early  in  the  Tertiary  at  or  near  the 
close  of  the  Eocene  period,  and  with  nothing  before  it  in  that  great 
family  from  which  it  could  have  been  derived  by  any  process  of 
mere  evolution  or  development. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  301 

to  the  higher  stages.  And  especially  would  I  refer 
to  Dawson's  "  Chain  of  Life  in  Geological  Time:' 
He  states  among  his  conclusions  this  as  6,  p.  260 : 
"  Groups  of  species  as  genera  and  orders  do  not 
usually  begin  with  their  highest  or  lowest  forms,  but 
with  intermediate  and  generalized  types,  and  they 
show  a  capacity  for  both  elevation  and  degradation 
in  their  subsequent  history."  And  he  gives  exam- 
ples of  this  throughout  the  whole  book. 

We  have  thus  seen  that  the  new  traits  and  pecul- 
iarities that  have  actually  occurred  under  human 
observation  are  not  such  as  Naturalists  regard  as 
characteristics  of  species,  or  as  constituting  what 
they  are  disposed  to  call  a  new  species  in  their  or- 
dinary mode  of  classification. 

We  have  also  seen  that  what  we  have  to  admit  as 
accounted  for  by  evolution,  is  not  the  slight  differ- 
ences that  distinguish  one  species  from  another  allied 
species  in  the  Zoological  classification,  but  the  far 
broader  and  larger  differences  that  distinguish  remote 
groups  one  from  another,  since  this  latter  and  not 
the  former  was  order  of  sequence  in  geological  times 
in  which  they  made  their  appearance. 

4.  But  I  have  another  point  still.  Dawson  says, 
the  lOth  of  his  conclusions,  "  Palaeontology  furnishes 
no  direct  evidence,  perhaps  it  never  can  furnish  any, 
as  to  the  actual  transformation  of  one  species  into 

another." 

14 


302         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  I  wish  to  add  a  more  serious  objection  still. 
Even  in  those  cases  where  we  have  a  series  or  suc- 
cession of  species,  of  the  same  genus  in  the  same  place, 
we  have  no  proof  of  lineage  or  genealogical  descent. 

It  is  claimed  that  in  the  case  of  the  Eqiiidce^  or 
horse  family,  we  have  a  good  illustration  and  proof 
of  Evolution.  It  was  to  this  series  that  Huxley  had 
reference  when  he  made  the  declaration  cited  in  the 
early  part  of  the  first  Lecture.  We  have  in  the 
Lower  Eocene  the  Eohippus,  a  small  animal  about 
the  size  of  a  fox,  with  canine  teeth,  and  three  toes 
on  the  hind  feet,  and  four,  with  the  rudiment  of  a  fifth, 
on  the  fore  feet.  After  this,  in  turn,  some  eighteen 
or  twenty  different  species,  until  we  come  to  the 
Equus  proper  in  the  Post- Pliocene  and  Modern 
period. 

But  there  is  not  the  slightest  evidence  or  proof 
that  the  later  species  were  descended  lineally  and 
genealogically  from  the  earlier.  This  is  all  presump- 
tion and  assumption.^     To  one  prepossessed  with  the 

1  The  fallacy  of  all  these  advocates  of  Evolution  consists  in  the 
assumption  of  the  Major  Premise  and  an  immense  elaboration  of  the 
Minor  Premise.  They  assume  that  whenever  there  has  been  a  suc- 
cession of  species  in  geological  time  in  the  same  place,  there  has 
been  evolution  or  derivation  of  the  latter  from  the  former  species. 
The  proof  of  the  Minor  Premise — that  is,  cases  of  succession  with  a 
progress  towards  a  higher,  or  possibly  a  lower  type — is  abundant 
and  beyond  doubt  or  question.  In  fact  it  never  needed  much  proof. 
But  the  question  is,  after  all,  as  to  the  Evolution  in  the  case.     Did 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  303 

theory  of  Evolution,  it  may  indeed  seem  the  most 
likely  or  the  most  natural  way  in  which  the  change 
could  have  occurred,  or  the  latter  and  more  perfect 
species  could  have  come  into  existence. 

But  the  presumption  is  not  all  on  their  side. 

If  we  look  to  the  Ohio  valley  we  see  a  race  of 
white  men  there  now.  A  few  hundred  years  ago 
there  were  only  the  redskin  Indians,  and  a  few  centu- 
ries before  that  the  Mound  Builders  inhabited  the 
same  region.  Did  the  redskins  descend  from  the 
Mound  Builders  ?  That  is  not  generally  supposed 
to  have  been  the  case.  And  we  know  that  the  pres- 
ent white  race  are  not  genealogical  descendants  from 
the  redskins,  by  evolution  or  otherwise.  And  yet 
we  have  just  as  much,  and,  as  I  think,  rather  more 
reason  for  thinking  and  asserting  that  the  whites 
descended  from  the  Mound  Builders,  though  the 
redskins  than  that  the  Protohippus  and  the  Equus 
of  the  Nebraska  strata  descended  from  the  Eohippus 
or  the  Orohlppus  of  the  Lower  Eocene. 

Nor  is  this  all.  Scores  of  cases  may  be  cited  in 
which  one  species  of  undomestlcated  animals  have 
appeared  and  driven  away  a  kindred  species  and 
then  occupied  their  habitat.  I  remember  two  that 
have  occurred  within   my  own  observation.     The 

the  latter  species  descend  genealogically  from  the  earlier  ?  This  is 
what  yet  lacks  proof.  And  yet  it  is  a  point  which  most  evolution- 
ists fail  to  see  ;  or  seeing  it,  fail  to  appreciate. 


304  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

"  barn  swallow  "  of  my  boyhood  days  has  been  driven 
away  by  a  bird  of  the  same  family,  with  very  differ- 
ent habits,  but  so  like  to  my  old  favorite  that  the 
one  cannot  be  distinguished  from  the  other  without 
rather  close  observation.  So,  too,  I  can  remember 
the  time  when  the  rats  that  were  the  pests  of  my 
father's  granary,  were  the  English  black  rats.  Now 
not  one  of  this  species  is  to  be  found  in  the  neigh- 
borhood ;  they  have  been  replaced  by  the  Norway 
rat  or  wharf  rats,  as  we  called  them  when  they  first 
made  their  appearance. 

Now,  in  view  of  such  facts,  there  naturally  arises 
a  doubt  whether  Professor  Marsh's  series  of  the 
Equidcs  do  present  a  case,  whether  as  proof  or  as  il- 
lustration, of  the  evolution  of  a  higher  species  from 
one  that  is  much  lower  in  the  scale,  and  further  down 
towards  the  primitive  protoplasm  and  amcehcB.  Nay, 
as  I  claim,  the  presumption  is  wholly  against  the 
theory.  We  have  no  case,  as  Dawson  says,  of  the 
evolution  or  derivation  of  one  species  from  another, 
that  has  actually  beeti  made  KNOWN  to  tis,  either  by 
perso7ial  observation  of  the  change  or  by  palceonto- 
logical proof  that  it  actually  occurred.  But  we  have 
as  matter  of  observation  and  of  history,  many  in- 
stances of  species  succeeding  species  or  varieties, 
one  after  another  in  the  same  locality,  by  displace- 
ment and  superposition,  and  not  one  by  evolution 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  305 

It  seems  to  me,  therefore,  that  we  must  hold  to 
our  old  doctrine  of  special  interpositions — of  mira- 
cles— with  the  origination  of  each  species  of  animals 
from  the  earliest  dawn  of  animal  life  until  the  most 
recent  times. 

Many  lines  of  investigation  tend  to  show  that 
there  is  a  limit  to  the  possibilities  of  variation  among 
the  progeny  of  any  one  pair.  There  are  limits  in 
affairs  which  nature  does  not,  and  apparently  will 
not,  and  which  at  any  rate  man  cannot,  pass  over. 
Subject  individuals  to  gentle  influences  as  they  grow 
up,  and  they  yield  and  are  moulded  by  them  to 
some  extent.  Let  the  influences  become  more  vio- 
lent and  the  subjects  of  them  die. 

But  even  if  long  continued  they  soon  reach  their 
limit.  As  Bouverie  Pusey  has  well  shown,^  if  in- 
fluences of  this  kind  could  cause  the  beak  of  the  rock- 
pigeon  to  grow  from  a  quarter  of  an  inch  long  to 
the  length  of  five-eighths  of  an  inch,  in  the  last  200 
years,  there  is  yet  a  limit  to  the  length  which  the 
beak  can  be  made  to  attain.  Under  no  possible 
circumstances,  by  no  combination  of  influences,  and 
in  no  length  of  time,  can  it  be  made  to  reach  the 
length  of  four  or  five  inches,  to  say  nothing  of  sev- 
eral feet.  Est  modus  in  rebus.  There  is  a  limit  in 
the  very  nature  of  the  case,  in  all  human  affairs,  and 
in  all  the  affairs  of  nature  as  well. 

1  Permanence  and  Evolution,  p,  15  and  following. 


3o6         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

In  mere  inorganic  matter  and  the  changes  that 
have  taken  place  in  it,  the  case  is  otherwise.  If  the 
bed  of  the  sea  is  found  to  have  been  elevated  a  foot 
in  a  century,  we  have  a  basis  on  which  we  may  com- 
pute the  elevation  in  a  million  or  any  other  number 
of  years.  Or  if  we  know,  by  any  means,  how  fast 
a  deposit  is  increasing  in  depth,  we  have  an  element 
for  calculating  vast  periods  of  past  time. 

But  it  is  not  so  with  hving  organic  beings.  The 
child  grows  at  a  certain  rate  in  infancy,  but  he  soon 
reaches  his  utmost  limit  of  size.  And  so  it  is  with 
the  development  of  any  part  or  organ  of  a  living 
body.  Great  length  of  time  does  not  seem  to  be 
much  more  effective  than  a  shorter  period. 

There  seems  to  be  a  limit  or  a  boundary  surround- 
ing and  hedging  in  the  posterity  of  every  pair,  over 
which  no  influence  of  nature,  and  no  violence  or 
caprice  of  man,  can  ever  carry  them.  As  they  ap- 
proach these  outer  Hmits,  individuals  become  infer- 
tile ;  and  when  they  reach  them  they  become  abso- 
lutely sterile. 

No  origination  of  what  is  recognized  as  a  new 
species  is  known  to  have  occurred  in  the  human 
period  or  in  any  past  period  of  the  world's  history. 

There  are  groups — call  them  species  or  what  you 
will — between  which  no  interproduction  has  occurred 
so  far  as  we  know,  and  between  which  none  is  be- 
lieved to  be  possible. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration,  307 

And  interproduction  between  even  the  most  simi- 
lar species  is  infrequent,  abnormal,  and  not  likely  to 
produce  a  permanent  stock.  The  general  infertility 
of  hybrids  is  acknowledged  by  all. 

And  now  just  in  proportion  as  the  knowledge  or 
influence  of  these  facts  increases,  and  they  are  gain- 
ing very  fast  just  now,  so  fast  does  the  "  probability  " 
of  divine  interpositions — miracles — all  along  the  geo- 
logical history  of  the  earth  from  the  azoic  age  to  the 
close  of  the  tertiary,  at  least,  increase  and  grow 
towards  an  absolute  certainty. 

It  would  thus  seem  that  while  there  have  been 
great  departures  from  the  type  of  the  original  stock 
in  many,  perhaps  in  most,  species,  there  are  limits 
and  bounds  which  this  process  of  variation  cannot 
pass. 

Take  the  domestic  dog  for  an  example.^  So  far 
as  we  know  he  appeared  with  several  other  of  man's 
best  friends  and  companions  about  the  point  in  geo- 
logical time  that  man  did.  For  six  thousand  years 
he  has  been  the  companion  and  trusted  friend  of 
man  ;  more  completely  domesticated  and  more  thor- 
oughly subject  to  man's  influence  probably  than  any 
other  animal.  We  have  seen  him  under  all  possible 
variations  of  physical  "  circumstances,"  *'  influences  " 

1  See  Wallace,  Contributions  to  the  Theory  of  Natural  Selection^ 
p.  293. 


3o8  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

and  "environments,"  in  climates  as  cold  as  the  ice- 
age,  and  in  those  that  are  as  hot  as  the  carboniferous 
or  the  early  Tertiary ;  in  regions  as  dry  as  Sahara, 
or  as  moist  as  Mesopotamia  and  the  banks  of  the 
Amazon ;  as  high  as  St.  Bernard,  and  as  low  as 
Holland.  We  have  seen  man  petting,  coaxing, 
**  interbreeding  "  and  doing  everything  that  ingenuity 
could  suggest  or  violence  enforce.  And  we  have 
dogs  indeed ;  dogs  in  great  variety,  from  the  small- 
est terriers  and  spaniels  up  to  the  Newfoundland, 
the  Chinese  pug,  the  Italian  greyhound,  the  bulldog, 
and  the  Dalmatian  coach  followers,  the  ferocious 
bloodhound  and  the  gentle,  affectionate  setter.  But 
they  are  all  dogs,  nevertheless.  With  all  that  man 
can  do ;  with  all  the  aid  of  most  bountiful  nature, 
and  these  thousands  upon  thousands  of  generations 
of  dog-Hfe  and  periods  of  reproduction,  we  have  had 
as  yet  nothing  but  dogs — varieties  of  the  dog  spe- 
cies. These  influences,  no  one  of  them  nor  yet  all 
of  them  combined,  have  as  yet  produced  or  *'  evo- 
luted,"  from  dog  parentage,  a  cat  or  a  rabbit,  a 
guinea  pig  or  a  squirrel — not  even  so  much  as  a  rat 
or  a  mouse — ridictilus  imcs. 

I  think  the  case  must,  therefore,  be  considered  as 
hopeless,  and  the  argument  in  our  favor  about  as 
strong  as  demonstration  can  make  it ;  as  strong,  at 
least,  as  reasonable  men  expect  or  ask  in  the  practi- 
cal affairs  of  daily  life. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  309 

Having  said  so  much  in  this  one  direction,  it  is 
but  fair  that  I  should  say  that  I  have  no  intention  to 
deny  Darwin's  great  law  known  as  '*  the  struggle  for 
Hfe  with  the  survival  of  the  fittest."     In  fact,  I  do 
not  see  how  any  one  with  his  eyes  open  and  his 
thoughts  about  him  can  deny  it.     There  are  born 
into  the  world  a  given  number,  we  will  suppose,  of 
rabbits  in  one  spring.     To  Hve  they  must  (i)  escape 
enemies  and  (2)  get  food.     Now  doubtless  whatever 
makes  one  of  these  puny  animals  the  best  able  to  do 
these  two  things  makes  him  "  the  fittest "  to  live — 
that  is,  the  best  fitted — and  so  the  most  likely,  to 
Hve  and  be  a  progenitor  next  season.     And  thus  by 
the  law  of  heredity  his  posterity  would  be  better 
**  fitted  "  to  survive  and  perpetuate  the  species  than 
the  ofispring  of  those  who  had  been  his  inferiors  in 
this  respect.     And  thus  we  have  an  improvement 
in  the  species  with  varying  adaptation  to  circum- 
stances and  environment^ 


1  It  is  claimed,  however,  that  there  is  a  serious  offset  to  this  line 
of  argument ;  that  while  the  peculiarities  of  each  species  of  animals 
are  for  the  most  part  favorable  to  the  animals  in  '*  the  struggle  for 
life,"  there  are  others  that  are  of  a  different  character.  The  horny 
scales  on  the  tail  of  a  rattlesnake  have  been  cited  as  an  example. 
Whenever  the  animal  becomes  excited  and  about  to  make  any  effort, 
these  rattles  make  a  noise,  and  the  noise  is  alike  a  warning  to  the 
prey  that  he  is  about  to  seize  to  satisfy  his  hunger,  and  an  invitation 
to  any  enemy  that  may  be  in  the  neighborhood  seeking  to  take  his 
life.     How,  therefore,  these  rattles  could  have  come  by  Evolution 


3 10         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  what  I  represent  as  unproved,  or  having  as 
yet  the  immense  probability,  a  probability  amounting 
almost  to  an  absolute  certainty,  against  it,  is  the 
claim  that  there  has  been  produced  in  this  way  and 
zvithotit  Divijic  i7iterve7itiony  those  more  permanent 
features  and  characteristics  which  NaturaHsts  are 
agreed  in  regarding  as  constituting  species  as  distinct 
from  the  less  important  features  which  serve  to  mark 
off  and  distinguish  mere  varieties  from  one  another. 

But  as  to  man  !  what  of  him  and  his  origin  ?  I 
introduce  what  I  have  to  say  on  this  subject  with 
the  following  words  from  Huxley,^  which,  coming 
as  they  do  rather  in  the  nature  of  an  admission  than 
of  a  contention,  are  entitled  to  great  weight :  "  Man, 
intelligent  man,  existed  at  times  when  the  whole 
physical  conformation  of  the  country  [England]  was 
totally  different  from  that  which  characterizes  it 
now.  .  .  But  when  it  comes  to  a  question  as  to  trac- 
ing back  man  further  than  [the  drift],  and  recollect 
drift  is  only  the  scum  of  the  earth's  surface,  I  must 
confess  that  to  my  mind  the  evidence  is  of  a  very 
dubious  character.  .  .  I  don't  know  that  there  is  any 
reason  for  doubting  that  the  men  who  existed  at  that 

it  is  difficult  to  see.  But  regarded  as  the  result  of  a  creative  Power, 
we  can  believe  that  they  were  added  to  the  animal  rather  for  the 
benefit  of  others  than  for  any  advantage  or  help  to  himself. 

'^Dublin  Address  m.  Apple  ton'' s  Popular  Science  Monthly,  Oct., 
1878,  p.  676. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  3 1 1 

day  were  in  all  essential  respects  [the   italics   are 
mine]  similar  to  the  men  who  exist  now." 

Here  are  two  points  for  consideration ;  each  of 
them  of  the  greatest  importance  to  our  present 
purpose:  the  one  relates  to  the  time  of  man's 
appearance  on  the  earth — his  antiquity,  and  the 
other  to  his  condition  at  that  time,  as  bearing  on  the 
question  of  his  creation  or  evolution. 

For  many  reasons  it  will  be  best  to  take  up  the 
question  of  the  date  of  his  origin  first. 

In  the  quotation  from  Huxley  we  have  it  brought 
down  to  some  period  since  the  close  of  the  Glacial 
Period.  Dawson  also  says,^  '*  The  only  necessity 
for  supposing  an  earlier  appearance  arises  from  the 
requirements  of  the  hypothesis  of  evolution." 

Nicholson  also  makes  a  similar  statement  in  re- 
gard to  the  antiquity  of  man,  referring  his  origin  to 
Post  Glacial  times,^  with  no  evidence  of  an  earlier 
date. 

It  becomes  a  very  important  matter,  therefore,  to 
determine,  if  we  can,  how  long  ago,  in  astronomical 
time,  that  Age  came  to  its  close. 

Fortunately  for  us  we  are  in  a  better  condition  to 
answer  this  question  now  than  we  were  only  a  few 
years  ago. 

'  Chain  of  Life  in  Geological  Time,  p.  239. 
2  Ancient  Life  History  of  the  Earth,  p.  365. 


3 1 2         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

The  doctrine  that  the  Ice  Age  depended  upon 
certain  astronomical  combinations,  so  ingeniously- 
urged  by  Dr.  James  Croll,  has  been  completely  dis- 
posed of  by  Wallace  in  his  recent  work,  Island  Life. 
He  has  shown  (i)  that  the  difference  in  the  amount  of 
heat  between  these  extreme  periods  is  very  small,  not 
more  than  about  three  degrees  Fahrenheit  in  the  an- 
nual average  of  temperature  for  this  latitude  in  our 
coldest  month,^  and  (2)  that  there  could  have  been 
no  ice  accumulation  or  general  glaciation  at  any  time 
in  the  past  without  (a)  greater  elevation  than  we 
have  now  in  Great  Britain  and  northeastern  North 
America,  nor  without  in  addition  to  this  {p)  a  greatly 
different  location  and  flow  of  the  ocean  currents. 

And  Tyndall  had  shown  as  long  ago  as  1865  ^  that 

1  This  is  given  by  Wallace  as  the  result  of  his  computations, 
Island  Life,  p.  123. 

2  Heat  considered  as  a  Mode  of  Motion   p.  206. 

It  has  been  estimated  (Wallace,  Geographical  Distribution  of 
Animals')  that  in  order  to  provide  vapor  enough  to  produce  the  ice 
that  covered  the  polar  regions,  the  entire  ocean  must  have  been  re- 
duced by  evaporation  2,000  feet  in  depth. 

This  computation,  however,  w^as  made  when  it  was  supposed  that 
the  Glacial  Period  was  due  chiefly  to  astronomical  causes,  and  pre- 
vailed at  the  same  time  in  both  hemispheres  alike.  The  later  view 
is  that  it  prevailed  in  the  Northern  hemisphere  only  at  that  time, 
and  did  not  extend  more  than  half  round  the  globe  ;  as  there  was 
none  in  Asia  east  of  the  Ural  Mountains,  or  in  N.  America  west  of 
the  Upper  Missouri.  This  would  reduce  the  two  thousand  feet 
probably  to  something  less  than  five  hundred.  But  that  is  enough 
to  show  that  there  must  have  been  great  heat  in  the  tropics,  as  well 
as  great  cold  nearer  the  poles,  as  Tyndall  maintains. 


Miracles  a7td  Inspiration.  3 1 3 

cold  alone  is  not  all  that  is  necessary  to  produce  gla- 
ciation.  We  must  have  heat  as  well  to  cause  the 
evaporation  that  is  necessary  to  supply  the  water 
that  is  to  form  the  ice. 

We  turn  then  to  compute  from  the  best  data  we 
have,  the  length  of  time  that  has  elapsed  since  the 
close  of  the  Ice  Period  and  the  beginning  of  the 
Present  Age.  The  best  computation  that  we  can 
make  at  present  gives  from  seven  to  nine  thousand 
years. 

And  it  seems  to  me  to  be  especially  worth  remark 
that  the  Bible  chronology,  as  given  in  the  Septuagint 
version,  is  about  the  same,  7,290  years.^ 


1  Dr.  SoUTHALL  has  considered  this  subject  very  carefully  in  his 
two  works,  **  The  Recent  Origin  of  Man  ^^^  and  in  the  more  recent 
work,  **  The  Epoch  of  the  Manwioth  and  the  Appearance  of  Man.'''* 
Both  of  these  works  have  been  ridiculed  and  scoffed  at ;  but  I  have 
seen  no  serious  attempt  of  refuting  their  conclusions. 

Dr.  Southall  disposes  in  the  first  place  of  all  the  facts  that  have 
been  claimed  as  proving  the  great  antiquity  of  man,  and  then  pro- 
ceeds to  consider  the  question  in  view  of  the  real  facts  in  the  case. 
In  what  follows  I  have  made  free  use  of  his  materials  and  am  greatly 
indebted  to  him. 

The  data  consist  of  measurements  that  have  been  made  of  changes 
that  have  taken  place  since  the  close  of  the  Ice  Period.  They  are, 
of  course,  to  some  extent,  based  on  estimates  of  rates  of  erosion  and 
accumulation.  I  have  before  me  the  results  of  such  computations 
in  eight  different  places — three  in  this  country  and  five  in  Europe. 
I  give  them  below,  with  the  names  of  the  authority,  and  the  two 
estimates,  the  highest  and  the  lowest,  where  I  have  more  than  one, 
and  an  average  of  them  all  at  the  bottom. 


Least. 
6,276 
5,300 
u 

Highest. 
12,103 
7,500 
,886 

7 

,000 

6,400 
7,000 

10,000 
10,000 

6 

,000 

7,000 

8,000 

314  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

It  must  be  remembered,  however,  that  there  was 
no  Ice  Age  in  the  north  of  Asia,  nor  much  if  any  in 


In  America.  Authority. 

St.  Anthony's  Falls,  Winchell, 

Lakes  Michigan  and  Huron,   Andrews, 
Falls  of  Niagara,  H.  S.  Williams, 

In  Europe. 
"The  Wash  "  (East  of  England),  Skertchley, 
Danish  Peat  Bogs,  Morlot  &  Lubbock, 

vSaone  Valley,  Ferry  &  Arcelin, 

St.  Nazaire  (on  the  Loire),      Kerviler, 
Solutr^  (East  of  France),        Ducrost, 

Average  of  all  the  estimates,  8,028. 

Considering  the  fact  that  these  changes  must  have  been  more  rapid 
in  the  earlier  stages  than  they  have  been  since,  it  seems  likely  that 
the  smaller  number  is  more  nearly  correct  than  the  larger.  And 
the  smaller  is  in  fact  a  little  less  than  the  Bible  chronology  as  given 
in  the  Septuagint  version,  which  is  about  7,300  years. 

Dr.  SoUTHALL,  in  his  work,  The  Epoch  of  the  AIamj?ioth  and  the 
Appearance  of  Man,  in  view  of  these  facts  and  others  like  them, 
comes  to  the  conclusion,  p.  382,  that  these  facts  indicate  only  about 
6,600  years. 

Of  course  it  is  not  intended  to  deny  that  these  astronomical  changes 
alluded  to  do  exert  an  influence  on  the  temperature,  but  only  that 
oi  themselves  and  alone  they  can  neither  produce  nor  prevent  gla- 
ciation  or  Ice  Age.  Of  these  causes  or  cycles  there  are  two:  (i) 
the  varying  eccentricity  of  the  earth's  orbit,  and  (2)  the  precession 
of  the  equinoxes.  The  first  is  very  unequal  in  its  periods  of  recur- 
rence and  may  be  connected  with  those  alternations  that  are  known  to 
have  occurred  in  the  temperature  of  the  earth  in  past  geological 
time.  Thus  it  has  been  claimed  that  the  ages  cold  and  warm  have 
succeeded  each  other  as, — printing  the  names  of  the  warm  in  ital- 
ics— Cambrian,  Silurian,  Devonian,  Carboniferous,  Permian,  Ju- 
rassic, Cretaceous,  Tertiary,  Glacial,  the  Present. 

But  in  the  other  cycle,  that  occasioned  by  the  precession  of  the 
equinoxes,  the  last  period  of  great  cold  occurred  about  10,000  years 


Miracles  mtd  htspiration.  3 1 5 

North  America  west  of  the  Missouri  river.  Hence, 
as  man  doubtless  originated  in  Southwestern  Asia 
northeast  of  the  head  waters  of  the  Euphrates  and 
Tigris,  he  may  have  existed,  and  probably  did  ex- 
ist, there  for  some  time  before  he  made  his  appear- 
ance in  Europe.  Of  this,  however,  I  need  not  say 
anything  in  this  place. 

Our  second  point  was  the  condition  of  man  at  this 
early  period,  in  its  bearing  on  the  question  of  his 
evolution  by  mere  natural  means  out  of  some  of  the 
orders  or  species  of  the  animal  world  below  man. 

ago.  And  although  there  was  no  glacial  period  in  the  north  of  Asia, 
it  was  doubtless  somewhat  colder  there  then  than  it  is  now. 

We  have  in  connection  with  this  a  similar  tradition  among  the 
early  Aryan  population,  which  is  probably  not  less  than  four  or  five 
thousand  years  old.  It  is  to  the  effect  that  their  ancestors,  who 
lived  then  in  the  high  lands  of  Hindu  Cush,  were  subjected  for  sev- 
eral hundred  years  to  great  severity  of  climate,  ten  months  of  winter 
in  the  year.  Was  this  a  tradition  of  this  cold  period  ?  If  so,  it 
would  carry  back  the  date  of  their  existence  to  something  like  ten 
or  twelve  thousand  years.  And  this  is  the  earliest  point  to  which 
any  known  date  would  seem  to  carry  it.  See,  in  reference  to  this 
tradition,  Rawlinson's  Ancient  Monarchies,  Vol.  II,  p.  432. 

Since  the  foregoing  note  was  written  I  have  received,  what  I  be- 
lieve to  be,  the  latest  work  by  Principal  Dawson,  who  is  certainly 
the  best  authority  on  this  subject  in  America,  and  as  good  as  any  in 
the  world.  The  title  of  the  book  is  Fossil  Men  and  their  Modern 
Representatives.  He  reiterates  his  statements  of  the  high  character 
of  the  earliest  men  that  we  know  anything  about  as  having  lived  on 
the  earth.  And  in  regard  to  the  antiquity  of  their  origin  he  says, 
p.  246,  **  What  evidence  the  future  may  bring  forth  I  do  not  know, 
but  that  available  at  present  points  to  the  appearance  of  man,  with 
all  his  powers  and  properties,  in  the  Post-glacial  age  of  Geology, 
and  not  more  than  from  6,cx?o  to  8,000  years  ago." 


3 1 6         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Early  man  was,  as  Huxley  says,  "  in  all  essential 
respects  "  like  the  men  of  our  age,  equal  to  the  av- 
erage of  civilized  men  in  all  that  indicates  eleva- 
tion in  the  scale  of  being  and  mental  capacity; 
they  were  far  above  the  lowest  of  the  savages  that 
we  now  meet  with  in  some  parts  of  the  world. 

We  have  thus  Huxley's  admission  rather  reluc- 
tantly made.  Dawson^  says,  **  With  such  views  the 
skeletons  of  the  most  ancient  known  men  fully  ac- 
cord. They  indicate  a  people  of  great  stature,  of 
powerful  muscular  development,  especially  in  the 
lower  limbs  ;  of  large  brain,  indicating  great  capacity 
and  resojirces.'^     (The  italics  are  mine). 

Nicholson  says,^  "  As  to  the  physical  peculiarities 
of  the  ancient  races  .  .  .  little  is  known.  .  .  Such 
information  as  we  have,  however,  .  .  .  would  lead  to 
the  conclusion  that  Post- Pliocene  man  was  in  no  re- 
spect [the  italics  are  mine]  inferior  in  his  organiza- 
tion to  or  less  highly  developed  than  many  existing 
races.  All  the  known  skulls  of  this  period,  with  the 
single  exception  of  the  Neanderthal  cranium  [which 
is  now  acknowledged  to  have  been  abnormal  and 
idiotic]  a7'e  in  all  respects  average  and  normal  in  their 
characters." 

1  Chain  of  Life,  p.  241.  See  also  Mitchell's  Past  in  the  Pres- 
ent, everywhere.  And  still  better,  Dawson's  Fossil  Men,  which 
has  been  received  since  the  above  was  written. 

2  Ancient  Life-History  of  the  Earth,  p.  364. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  3 1 7 

I  cite  but  one  more  authority  on  this  point,  and 
that  is  one  which  will  command  very  considerate 
attention,  Herbert  Spencer,  and  I  quote  at  some 
length.  He  says ^  that  "Evolution  is  commonly 
considered  to  imply  that  in  every  thing  there  is  an 
intrinsic  tendency  to  become  something  higher,  but 
this  is  an  erroneous  conception  of  it.  .  .  If  environ- 
ing circumstances  change,  the  species  changes  [in 
general  traits]  until  it  re-equilibrates  itself  with 
them.  .  .  Only  now  and  then  does  the  environing 
change  initiate  in  the  organism  a  new  complication 
and  so  produce  a  somewhat  higher  type  [species].  .  . 
When  the  habitat  entails  modes  of  life  that  are  infe- 
rior some  degeneration  results.  .  .  Direct  evidence 
forces  this  conclusion  upon  us.  Lapse  from  higher 
civiHzation  to  lower  civilization  made  familiar  during 
school-boy  days  is  further  exemplified  as  our  knowl- 
edge increases ;  .  .  .  many  large  and  highly  evolved 
societies  have  either  disappeared  or  have  dwindled 
to  barbarous  hordes  or  have  been  long  passing 
through  slow  decay ;  .  .  .  thus  then  the  tribes  now 
known  as  lowest  [note  the  word,  as  "  lowest "],  must 
exhibit  some  social  phenomena  which  are  due  .  .  . 
to  causes  that  operated  during  past  social  states 
higher  than  the  present." 

In  connection  with  this,  I  note  the  fact  that  so  far 

1  Principles  of  Sociology,  Part  II,  Chap,  viii,  $  50. 


3 1 8  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology, 

as  we  know,  so  far  as  any  discoveries  or  researches 
have  brought  any  facts  in  the  case  to  Hght,  there 
were  none  of  the  quadrumanous  animals  in  existence 
at  the  time  when  man  appeared,  from  which  man 
could  have  been  derived,  that  were  of  a  higher 
grade  or  order  than  those  that  are  in  existence  now. 

To  suppose,  therefore,  that  the  first  human  beings 
— our  ancestors — were  born  of  quadrumanous  pa- 
rentage, is  to  suppose  what  is  as  improbable,  what 
is  in  fact  as  absurd,  and  from  a  scientific  point  of 
view,  as  impossible  as  that  a  human  child  had  been 
produced  and  nursed  up  to  maturity  by  parents  be- 
longing to  any  order  of  the  present  quadrumana, 
the  gorillas,  chimpanzes,  or  orang  outangs,  of  to-day, 
or  by  any  of  the  monkeys,  apes,  or  baboons  of  the 
Asiatic  or  African  forests,  the  swamps  of  South 
America,  or  the  islands  of  the  Pacific  Ocean. 

Nor  does  there  seem  to  be  the  slightest  prospect 
or  promise  that  further  discoveries  will  bring  to 
light  anything  to  diminish  the  chasm  that  now  exists 
between  man  and  any  of  the  species  or  orders  of  the 
animal  world  below  man ;  the  tendency  and  the  pros- 
pects are  all  in  the  other  direction.  Hence  as  the 
matter  stands  now  the  descent  of  man  by  way  of 
evolution  from  any  of  the  species  of  animals  that 
now  exist,  or  that  are  known  to  have  existed  in  the 
past,  would  be  no  less  a  miracle  than  his  immediate 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  3 19 


creation  out  of  the  dust  of  the  earth,  as  most  Christ- 
ians beheve  that  he  was  created. 

We  have  seen  that  Dawson  says,  and  no  well  in- 
formed man  will  contradict  him,  I  think,  that  there 
is  no  necessity  or  reason  for  supposing  man  to  have 
been  on  the  earth  more  than  the  eight  or  ten  thou- 
sand years  that  have  elapsed  since  the  close  of  the 
Glacial  Period,  except  what  arises  out  of  the  neces- 
sity for  supporting  *'  the  hypothesis  of  evolution." 
And  I  think  we  may  now  add  that  there  is  neither 
necessity  nor  reason  for  believing  him  to  have  come 
into  existence  by  any  natural  descent  from  any  pa- 
rents  of  a  lower  species  of  animals  except  what 
arises  from  a  disposition  to  maintain  that  ''  hypothe- 
sis."    And  I  think  we  may  add  that  there  is  no 
disposition  to  matntain  thathypothesis  in  its  extreme 
or  atheistic  form,  except  what  comes  from  an  un- 
willingness, whether  conscious  or  unconscious  I  can- 
not say,  but  an  unwillingness  to  acknowledge  the 
personality  of  God  and  the  reality  of   His   moral 
government  of  the  universe. 

I  have  no  theory  to  offer  on  the  subject.  My 
present  purpose  does  not  require  that  I  should  ex- 
plain the  mode  of  man's  origin.  My  object  has 
been  rather  to  show  that  no  explanation  has  been 
offered  which  proposes  to  dispense  with  creation  and 
miraculous  interposition  that  is  at  all  satisfactory  and 
consistent  with  the  facts  that  are  known  in  the  case. 


320  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

And  if  one  should  claim  that  the  peculiar  charac- 
teristics of  humanity  came  into  existence  as  a  con- 
genital abnormity  or  monstrosity,  like  the  quills  of 
the  porcupine  man  or  the  Hmbs  of  the  Ancon  sheep, 
the  phenomena  would  not  be  explained  thereby.  We 
know  no  better  how  such  traits  are  produced  than 
we  do  how  the  first  protoplasm  became  a  living  ani- 
mal, or  how  to  make  a  man  out  of  the  dust  that  is 
beneath  our  feet. 

II.  I  come  now  to  another  branch  of  the  subject 
of  this  Lecture — Inspiration.  I  shall  treat  it  very 
briefly  and  say  the  less  of  it  because  the  topic  be- 
longs more  properly  to  a  Treatise  on  Revealed 
Religion. 

I  have  said  that  Inspiration,  in  the  sense  in  which 
I  am  now  using  the  word,  must  be  of  the  nature  of 
a  miracle  as  I  have  defined  the  term  miracle. 

I  think  that  a  strong  presumption  arises  in  favor 
of  a  belief  in  inspiration,  both  general  and  special, 
from  what  we  have  proved  with  regard  to  the  nature 
and  attributes  of  God.  We  have  seen  that  the  ma- 
terial universe  can  be  but  a  realization  of  His  thoughts 
and  purposes.  He  has  acted  on  matter,  even  if  He 
did  not  create  it,  moved  and  moulded  it  to  His  will. 
Inert  as  it  is  it  does  not  appear  to  have  any  power 
either  of  resistance   or  impenetrability  as   against 


Miracles  and  hispiration.  321 

Him.     It  is  as  plastic  and  as  yielding  as  if  it  were 
only  His  thoughts  or  volitions,  as  some  philosophers 
have  claimed,  and  He  works  in  it  and  upon  it.     He 
has    shown  His  presence  and  power,    His  agency 
and  intervention  in  physical  nature,  whenever  it  was 
necessary  to  produce  some  new  thing,  the  proto- 
plasm of  which  all  animal  tissue  is  made,  or  the  first 
pairs  of  all  permanent  species.     And  He  made  man; 
"In  His  own  image  created  He  him."     Shall  we 
hold  that  He  works  in  nature  and  in  accordance 
with  the  physical  laws,  or  rather  in  those  laws  in  the 
inorganic  world  and  not  in  the  mind  of  man  ?     He 
manifests  His  purposes,  and  works  to  do  His  will, 
in  the  instincts  of  animals ;  does  He  not  work  also 
in  the  reason  and  conscience  of  man,  the  only  ra- 
tional being  that  He  has  created  that  is  within  the 
sphere  of  our  observation  ? 

In  human  history,  also,  God  has  manifestly  a  plan 
and  a  purpose,  and  for  the  execution  of  this  purpose 
His  influence  on  the  hearts  and  wills  of  men  is  as 
necessary  as  it  was  to  start  the  primordial  chaos  of 
nebulous  matter  into  the  manifold  operations,  chem- 
ical, mechanical  and  biological,  which  were  neces- 
sary that,  in  the  process  of  evolution  and  develop- 
ment, we  might  have  the  state  of  things  in  the  midst 
of  which  we  live. 

I  like  to  quote  Herbert  Spencer  when  he  says 

21 


322  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

anything  that  is  to  my  purpose,  as  he  often  does. 
He  says/  "  He  [the  philosopher],  Hke  every  other 
man,  may  properly  consider  himself  as  one  of  the 
myriad  agencies  through  whom  works  the  Unknown 
Cause ;  and  when  the  Unknown  Cause  produces  in 
him  a  certain  belief,  he  is  thereby  authorized  to  act  out 
that  belief.  .  .  Not  as  adventitious,  therefore,  will  the 
wise  man  regard  the  faith  which  is  in  him.  The 
highest  truth  he  sees  he  will  fearlessly  utter,  know- 
ing that,  let  what  may  come  of  it,  he  is  thus  playing 
his  right  part  in  the  world,  knowing  that  if  he  can 
effect  the  change  he  aims  at — well ;  if  not — well 
also;  though  not  so  well." 

Could  the  fact  of  inspiration  and  an  overruling 
Providence  be  more  fully  declared  ?  **  The  thought 
and  behef  that  is  in  him  "  is  the  product  of  the  Un- 
known Cause — of  God — and  let  him  act  accordingly, 
and  let  what  may  come  of  it,  the  outcome  is  the  re- 
sult of  an  overruHng  Power  *'  that  is  not  ourselves 
working  for  righteousness."  He  will  overrule  and 
graciously  forgive  our  mistakes  also,  if  only  we 
will  be  faithful  to  our  convictions.  Really,  I  can 
hardly  see  how  a  Christian  man  could  have  said  this 
better.  Here  is  Inspiration  and  an  overruling 
Providence  fully  confessed. 

I  believe  there  is  no  man  who  has  lived,  or  tried 

1  First  Principles,  Part  I,  §  34. 


Miracles  and  hispiration.  323 

to  live,  a  religious  life,  who  has  not  had  a  faith  in 
such  divine  guidance  and  overruling  Providence,  a 
faith  which,  whatever  it  may  have  rested  upon  at 
first,  became  so  confirmed  by  experience  that  no 
argument,  or  Hne  of  argument,  could  shake  it.  It 
had  ^become  part  of  his  experience,  part  of  his 
innermost  consciousness,  a  part  of  his  Identity,  as 
completely  In,  and  as  Inseparable  from  it,  as  any 
fact  or  recollection  of  his  past  history. 

I  remember  an  instance  that  stands  out  among 
the  most  distinct  recollections  of  my  early  life,  which 
Is  quite  in  point.  It  was  a  bitter  cold  afternoon  of 
a  December  day.  The  steamer  Lexington  was  lying 
at  the  wharf  ready  to  start  for  New  York.  One  of 
the  greatest  men  that  our  country  has  produced  had 
occasion  to  be  In  Washington  early  the  following 
week.  He  was  on  his  way  to  the  landing  with  his 
satchel  In  hand,  ready  to  take  the  boat.  But  on  a 
sudden  the  thought  came  upon  him,  '*  I  won't  go 
to-night,  after  all."  He  turned  on  the  sidewalk, 
though  in  sight  of  the  boat,  and  went  back  to  his 
home.  He  could  give  no  reason  for  his  thought,  or 
for  the  consequent  change  of  purpose  that  ensued. 
He  went  home  and  slept  soundly  for  the  night. 
But  in  the  night,  at  sea,  when  off  the  coast  of  Rhode 
Island,  the  Lexington  took  fire,  burned  to  the  water's 
edge,  and  finally  went  down  In  fifty  fathoms  of  water. 


324         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

All  on  board,  save  two  or  three,  perished  in  the 
flames  or  were  whelmed  in  the  freezing  waters,  and 
our  friend  could  not  have  been  one  of  the  few  that 
escaped  had  he  been  on  board. 

Now  I  suppose  that  in  the  present  state  of  our 
means  of  psychological  analysis,  nobody  can  prove 
to  the  satisfaction  of  one  that  is  skeptically  inclined 
that  here  was  a  special  interposition  of  God.  And 
perhaps  it  is  best  that  we  cannot.  There  must  be 
left  a  place  and  a  work  for  faith,  if  man  is  to  attain 
the  highest  of  which  his  nature  is  capable. 

What  is  the  relation  of  the  Divine  Efficiency  to  the 
present  and  ordinary  phenomena  of  nature  must  ever 
remain,  as  I  think,  a  matter  of  speculation  and  mere 
opinion.  Two  theories  only,  as  I  think,  are  possible : 
the  one  holds,  with  Tyndall,  that  the  atoms  and 
masses  of  matter  **  act  directly  on  one  another,"  and 
the  other  holds  that  God  is  the  One  force  and  Agent; 
so  that  in  the  strictest  expression  of  the  truth,  we 
should  say  that  He  acts  in  all  action,  and  the  several 
forces,  heat,  light,  and  such  hke,  .are  but  names  for 
different  modes  or  forms  of  His  activity.  Substi 
tuting  for  the  word  God,  the  term  "  the  Unknowa- 
ble," which  seems  to  be  a  favorite  expression  with 
this  class  of  philosophers,  this  last  view  would  seem 
to  be  the  one  that  is  preferred  by  them  and  for  which 
many  very  explicit  passages  could  be  cited. 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  325 

But  when  we  come  to  consider  the  relation  of  God 
to  the  minds  of  men,  the  matter  becomes  still  more 
difficult. 

There  are  two  fundamental  differences,  each  pre- 
senting a  class  of  difficulties  of  its  own,  which  I  see 
no  way  at  present  of  overcoming. 

1st.  The  first  is,  we  have  no  certainty  that  the 
atoms  or  particles  of  matter  have  any  independent 
existence  so  as  to  be  able  to  "  act  07t  each  other  "  in 
any  proper  sense  of  the  words  instead  of  being  mere 
modes  of  God's  action.  But  with  the  minds  of  men 
the  case  is  otherwise.  Although  created  and  de- 
pendent for  the  origin  of  their  being,  they  have  now 
a  certain  independence  of  existence,  and  act,  to  some 
extent,  as  "  first  causes." 

This  we  know  of  them  by  the  very  means  by 
which  we  know  that  they  exist  at  all,  just  as  I  know 
that  this  paper  is  white  by  the  means  by  which  I 
know  it  exists  as  anything  external.  Hence,  in 
knowing  that  minds  exist  I  know  that  they  exist 
with  the  power  of  independent  spontaneous  activity. 

2d.  In  the  second  place,  mind  and  matter  are 
different  in  kind  and  are  distinguished  and  co-ordi- 
nated by  the  two  properties,  spontaneity  and  inertia. 
We  can  therefore  reason  easily  from  matter  as  inert 
to  many  things  that  mere  matter,  whether  as  atoms, 

molecules,  or  masses,  cannot  do ;  and  hence  we  have 
15 


326         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

in  certain  cases,  by  one  of  the  surest  and  best  known 
canons  of  induction,  very  certain  proof  of  the  inter- 
vention of  an  agent  that  is  different  in  kind  from 
matter. 

But  as  between  the  mind  of  man  and  God,  the 
difference,  so  far  as  our  present  inquiry  is  concerned, 
is  only  one  of  degree.  Both  are  intelHgent,  and 
both  act  with  spontaneity.  It  is  true  that  one  is 
finite  and  the  other  infinite.  But  "  finite  "  and  **  in- 
finite "  do  not  co-ordinate  them  as  objects  in  onto- 
logical  reahty.  Terms  to  be  co-ordinate  must  be  of 
the  same  logical  quality ;  if  one  is  concrete  the  oth- 
ers must  be  concrete  also  ;  if  one  is  positive  the  other 
cannot  be  negative.  But  the  terms  **  finite"  and 
"  infinite  "  do  sustain  precisely  this  latter  relation  to 
each  other ;  the  one  is  positive  and  the  other  is  nega- 
tive, in  form  at  least.  And  in  so  far  as  we  can  at- 
tach any  clear  and  comprehensible  meaning  to  the 
two  terms,  they  denote  difference  in  degree  only, 
and  not  difference  in  kind  as  co-ordinates,  whether 
logical  or  ontological,  must  always  do. 

Hence  to  find  cases  of  inspiration,  and  proof  that 
they  are  really  cases  of  inspiration,  we  are  not  to 
seek  for  or  find  something  different  in  kind  from 
what  the  mind  of  man  ordinarily  does.  On  the  con- 
trary, acts  of  divine  influence  must  be  the  same  in 
kindy  and  differ  only  in  degree  from  what  ordinarily 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  327 

occurs  in  human  consciousness.  If  man  knows 
without  inspiration,  inspiration  can  only  increase  his 
knowledge.  If  without  the  direct  agency  of  God, 
man  knows  and  can  know  something  of  the  nature 
and  attributes  of  God,  even  "  His  unseen,  or  eternal 
power  and  godhead,"  by  way  of  Natural  Theology, 
then  by  the  aid  of  inspiration  he  can  see  and  know 
more  of  the  attributes  and  purposes  of  God,  even  to 
the  tri-unity  of  His  nature,  including  the  personaHty 
of  the  Son  and  of  the  Holy  Spirit.  If  man  has 
something  of  foresight,  inspiration  can  make  him  a 
prophet,  and  enable  him  to  foretell  the  doom  of 
Babylon  and  Tyre  or  to  predict  the  birth  of  the  Son 
of  Mary  in  Bethlehem  of  Judea.^ 

The  question  then  arises,  precisely  what  can  the 
unaided  mind  of  man  do  in  these  directions,  and 
what  is  the  limit,  if  indeed  there  is  any,  beyond 
which  it  cannot  go  ?     Fix  this  limit,  settle  upon  it 

1  It  is  very  possible  that  this  and  other  statements  in  this  connec- 
tion may  be  thought  to  imply  a  theory  of  Inspiration  which  I  do 
not  intend  either  to  teach  or  to  deny  in  this  connection.  I  am  not 
writing  as  from  the  facts  and  phenomena  presented  in  the  Holy 
Scriptures,  or  to  explain  them.  I  am  writing  rather  from  the  Nat- 
ural Theology  point  of  view.  If,  therefore,  the  Scriptures  present 
instances  of  inspiration  in  which  the  prophet  had  visions  and  uttered 
words  which  he  himself  did  not  understand,  there  is  nothing  in  my 
statements,  nor  do  I  intend  to  say  anything,  that  is  inconsistent 
with  such  facts.  And  I  think  that  what  I  have  occasion  to  say  will 
serve  as  a  basis  on  which  to  erect  any  higher  view  of  inspiration 
that  may  be  found  necessary. 


328  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

so  that  all  men  will  be  agreed  in  accepting  your  de- 
termination, or  so  that  you  can  defend  it  against  all 
adversaries,  and  we  can  prove  miracles  of  inspira- 
tion, acts  of  direct  and  immediate  divine  influence 
upon  the  mind  of  man  or  within  his  mind,  as  clearly 
and  as  unanswerably  as  we  prove  acts  of  supernat- 
ural intervention  in  the  realm  of  nature,  and  upon  mere 
inert,  inanimate  matter.  But  this  will  be  difficult, 
perhaps  impossible.  At  any  rate  I  shall  not  attempt 
it ;  arguing,  as  I  now  do,  from  a  purely  Natural  The- 
ology point  of  view.  With  a  revelation  as  a  proved 
or  as  an  accepted  fact,  the  case  would  be  quite  dif- 
ferent. 

All  that  we  can  say  now  is,  therefore,  that  inspi- 
ration as  a  special  divine  influence,  acting  upon  the 
mind  of  man,  frequently  or  otherwise,  as  the  case 
may  be,  is  shown  to  be  a  possibility,  nay  a  proba- 
bility rather,  and  a  thing  to  be  expected,  looked  for 
and  welcomed,  whenever  a  special  emergency  or 
occasion  for  it  shall  occur.  But  the  fact  of  inspi- 
ration in  any  particular  case  must  be  left,  I  fear,  as 
a  matter  of  faith  and  opinion,  of  probability  and 
moral  suasion,  rather  than  demonstrated  as  a  matter 
of  scientific  or  absolute  certainty. 

And  to  me,  the  fact  so  well  known,  thanks  to  some 
of  the  more  recent  investigations  in  this  line,  that  all 
men  and  all  nations  of  men,  if  we  except  perhaps  a 


Miracles  and  Inspiration.  329 

few  of  the  least  unsophisticated  philosophers  of  the 
more  civilized  races,  have  always  believed  in  such 
communications  and  influences,  is  a  strong  proof — 
strong  enough  to  overcome,  and  more  than  over- 
come— all  the  doubt  and  distrust  on  this  point,  that 
has  been  raised,  cultivated  and  inculcated  by  mod- 
ern skepticism.  All  nations  and  all  people  have  had 
their  prophets.  All  believe  in  prophecy,  all  believe 
in  God,  and  none  of  them  believe  that  He  has  left 
Himself  without  witness.  All  gladly  acknowledge 
that  their  highest  wisdom,  their  best  thoughts,  and 
their  holiest  aspirations  are  from  Him  who  is  the 
Father  of  Spirits  and  the  Source  of  hfe  and  of  hght 
to  all  His  creatures. 

But  precisely  where  is  the  distinction  and  what 
marks  off  as  a  boundary  line  the  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings that  are  of  God  from  the  freaks  and  fancies  of 
our  own  minds,  no  one  perhaps  can  certainly  tell  in 
all  cases,  so  long  as  they  are  mere  matters  of  his  own 
consciousness. 

But  undoubtedly  experience  and  the  developments 
of  history  will,  in  time,  discriminate  between  the 
two — false-perception,  hallucination  and  the  crea- 
tions of  fancy  on  the  one  hand — all  of  which  repre- 
sent error  and  delusion — from  the  results  of  true 
and  genuine  cognition  and  insight  on  the  other. 
Tme  predictions  will  come  true,  and  be  verified  by 


330         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 


subsequent  events.  True  insight,  and  its  discoveries 
and  revelations,  will  exert  an  elevating  influence  on 
mankind,  and  form  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  men,  from 
which  all  events,  that  are  legitimately  influenced  by 
them,  will  move  on  a  higher  plane.  And  that  Some- 
thing has  been  at  work  in  this  way  in  human  history 
from  its  very  beginning  is  so  plain  that  I  cannot  see 
how  any  one  can  read  that  history  attentively  with- 
out admitting  the  fact.  With  these  facts  in  view 
we  may  say  with  a  thoughtful  sage  of  old,  *'  Surely 
there  is  a  spirit  in  man  and  the  inspiration  of  the 
Almighty  giveth  him  understanding." 


LECTURE  VII. 


PROVIDENCE  AND  MORAL  GOVERNMENT;  INCOM- 
PLETE WITHOUT  CHRIST  AND  CHRISTIANITY, 

Psalms  LXXIII,  15,  16.     Then  thought  I  to  understand  this,  but  it  was  too 
hard  for  me  until  I  went  into  the  sanctuary  of  God. 


PROVIDENCE  AND  MORAL  GOVERN- 
MENT. 

I  think  it  a  fair  inference  from  what  we  may 
consider  as  capable  of  proof  by  the  Methods  of  Nat- 
ural Theology,  as  exhibited  in  these  Lectures,  that 
there  must  be,  in  this  world  at  least,  a  Providence 
and  a  Moral  Government.  And  to  these  topics  I 
invite  your  attention  in  this,  which  is  the  last  Lecture 
in  my  course. 

And  here,  as  elsewhere  in  these  Lectures,  I  have 
aimed  not  so  much  to  set  forth  and  prove  the  doc- 
trines of  Natural  Theology  as  to  vindicate  its  Foun- 
dation and  Methods.  I  have  assumed  that  you 
know  already  pretty  much  what  has  been  said  and 
taught  by  the  great  divines,  the  noble  line  of  wit- 
nesses all  along  in  the  Christian  Church ;  and  I  have 
aimed  at  limiting  myself,  pretty  closely,  to  the  task 
I  had  undertaken,  namely,  the  vindication  of  the 
Methods  of  Natural  Theology  rather  than  its  truths. 

During  these  Lectures  I  have  said  but  little  of  the 
proof  and  illustrations  of  what  are  sometimes  called 


334         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

the  Moral  Attributes  of  God,  or  His  goodness  and 
benevolence.  I  have  directed  attention  chiefly  to  the 
two  of  His  attributes  which  are  of  a  different  order, 
namely.  His  Wisdom  and  His  Power,  and  to  the  spon- 
taneity of  His  action ;  these  are  manifested  in  those 
phenomena  of  nature  which  inert  matter  cannot  pro- 
duce, such  as  the  beginning  of  the  present  evolution, 
the  origin  of  living  protoplasm,  the  beginning  of  new 
species  in  the  vegetable  and  animal  world  and  such 
like,  which  man,  the  only  spiritual  or  spontaneously 
acting  being  whose  acts  fall  under  our  observation, 
was  not  then  in  existence  to  produce. 

But  the  goodness  of  God  must  be  chiefly  if  not 
exclusively  manifested  in  the  life  and  history  of  man. 
Here,  however,  we  encounter  the  difficulty  spoken 
of  in  the  last  Lecture.  We  deal  here  with  acts  which 
are  certainly  similar  if  not  the  same  in  kind  as  man 
can  perform  and  is  to  some  extent  constantly  per- 
forming, as  the  result  of  human  choice  and  sponta- 
neity of  action. 

Human  history  is  indeed  a  part  of  the  general 
process  which  we  call  Evolution.  But  it  can  hardly 
be  regarded  as  presenting  us  with  a  proof  of  a  Cre- 
ator like  what  we  derive  from  a  consideration  of  the 
material  universe.  But  with  this  exception,  I  think 
that  human  history  and  human  life  and  experience 
is  the  field  to  which  we  must  look  for  our  fullest  and 


Providence  ajid  Moral  Government.         335 

best  proofs  and  illustrations  of  the  Moral  Attributes 
of  God. 

Ascribe  what  you  will  to  the  influence  of  "  envi- 
ronment" and  physical  conditions,  etc., — and  their 
influence  has  certainly  been  very  great — and  ascribe 
all  that  you  can  or  may  to  the  voluntary  selection, 
and  choice  and  conscious  purpose  of  the  people, 
individually  and  personally,  or  to  their  rulers  and 
guides,  and  yet  there  remains  a  large  residuum  of 
influence  that  can  be  ascribed  to  God  only,  and  ac- 
counted for  only  on  the  supposition  that  there  is  an 
overruling  Providence  that  "  shapes  our  ends,  rough 
hew  them  how  we  will." 

Thus  in  regard  to  the  influence  of  physical  envi- 
ronment, I  think  it  perfectly  certain  that  no  such 
environment  or  influence  could,  by  any  possibility, 
have  produced  either  (i)  the  religious  instinct  in 
man  or  (2)  given  him  his  first  idea  of  God.  But 
nothing  is  more  manifest  in  history  than  the  fact 
that  such  influences  have  been  very  powerful  in  giv- 
ing form  to  man's  theism  and  his  mode  of  worship. 
It  led  from  unconscious  monotheism  to  /^/^theism 
and  to  /<?/ytheism  in  theology,  and  to  idolatry  and 
fetichism  in  worship.  It  gives  to  one's  religion  a 
gloomy  and  sombre  tone  in  some  countries  and  cli- 
mates, and  a  cheerful,  hilarious  tone  in  others. 
But  such  influences  cannot  have  given  origin  to  the 


336         TJie  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

instinct  and  the  idea  on  which  all  religion  and  the- 
ology are  based  or  out  of  which  they  have  grown. 

History  is  to  be  studied  as  a  whole,  a  grand  drama, 
whose  parts  are  consecutive  and  well  planned.  Or, 
to  change  the  figure,  as  in  the  study  of  some  great 
cathedral  or  other  structure  of  man's  skill  and  device 
we  find  much  indeed  that  is  determined  and  con- 
trolled by  the  cHmate  and  by  the  condition  and  laws 
of  nature,  in  regard  to  the  materials  to  be  used,  the 
size  and  proportions,  etc.,  of  the  building,  beyond 
any  power  of  choice  or  selection  by  the  architect  or 
the  workmen.  Set  aside  what  we  will  and  ascribe 
it  to  these  causes.  Then  again,  each  workman  has 
some  power  of  choice  and  comprehension  of  the 
work  he  is  doing ;  and  this  adds  something  to  the 
appearance  and  detail  of  the  finished  work.  But  in 
all,  above  all  and  over  all,  there  is  the  thought  and 
the  will  of  the  architect,  which  may  be  seen  more 
conspicuously,  perhaps,  than  anything  else  by  any 
one  who  looks  at  the  structure  with  anything  of  the 
eye  of  an  architect. 

And  so  in  history.  In  the  history  of  any  nation 
that  has  risen  to  civilization  and  influence,  and  still 
more  so  in  any  comprehensive  view  of  the  history 
of  man  taken  as  a  whole,  the  most  important  influ- 
ences that  have  been  at  work,  the  most  efficient 
causes,  or  cause,  in  producing  the  great  and  final 


Providence  a7td  Moral  Government.         337 

results,  cannot  be  found  in  *'  environment "  and 
**  physical  conditions,"  nor  yet  in  the  foresight  and 
choice  of  man.  Everywhere  there  are  signs  and 
proofs  of  an  intelligence  far  above  that  of  man ;  of  a 
will  and  purpose  more  persistent  and  unchanging 
than  his,  and  of  a  force  to  overcome  obstacles  and 
to  shape  the  course  of  events  that  shows  a  deter- 
mined earnestness  in  carrying  out"  a  preconceived 
plan  and  reaching  results  that  were  ordained  before 
the  foundation  of  the  world. 

I  have  no  time  to  illustrate  this  principle  fully  by 
examples.  I  cannot,  however,  resist  the  temptation 
to  refer  to  two  or  three  facts  or  laws,  as  suggesting 
most  important  influences. 

1st.  At  our  earliest  ghmpse  of  history  outside  of 
the  Bible,  man  was  already  very  far  gone  from  a 
righteousness  which,  if  it  was  not  *'  original,"  was  at 
least  ideal — a  righteousness  of  which  we  all  have 
some  conception.  We  find  many — not  all — tribes 
without  the  arts  of  civilized  life,  even  the  art  of  agri- 
culture, living  in  geographical  centres  where  the  sup- 
ply of  food  such  as  was  available  for  them  had  become 
insufficient.  A  crisis  came;  a  turning-point  had 
been  reached.  All  had  sagacity  enough  to  see  the 
importance  of  labor,  of  industry,  of  frugality  and 
economy.  Would  the  stronger  exercise  the  self- 
denial  and  make  the  exertions  which  labor  and  fore- 


338  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

sight  demanded  ?  or  would  they  Indulge  their  own 
appetites,  eat  their  fill,  and  leave  the  weaker,  their 
wives  and  children,  their  parents  and  disabled  broth- 
ers and  sisters  to  suffer  privation  and  starve  ?  If 
the  latter,  savagery,  with  all  its  beastliness  and  cru- 
elties, would  ensue  and  remain  their  condition.  But 
if  love  for  kindred  and  compassion  for  the  needy  was 
strong  enough  to  induce  them  to  impose  upon  them- 
selves the  toil  of  labor,  the  self-restraints  of  absti- 
nence, the  thoughtfulness  of  frugality,  foresight  and 
economy,  for  the  love  of  wives  and  children,  the 
weak  and  the  infirm,  there  was  a  step  in  advance, 
a  beginning  of  civilization,  and  a  higher  life. 

But  it  was  the  necessity  for  labor  that  brought  it 
about.  It  did  not  come  from  choice  or  as  a  pursuit 
of  pleasure,  nor  yet  from  any  choice  voluntarily 
made  in  view  of  the  great  benefits  to  mankind  that 
might  ensue  from  labor  and  frugality.  And  yet 
the  necessity  for  labor,  as  it  was  at  the  beginning, 
has  done  more  than  any  one  thing  else  to  promote 
that  civilization  and  moral  elevation  among  men 
which  we  enjoy  to-day.  It  has  wrought  under  the 
law  of  heredity  a  change  in  man's  nature,  so  that  he 
Is  now  constitutionally  and  instinctively  an  industri- 
ous and  working  being.  That  is,  he  will  work — all 
that  are  good  for  anything,  the  "fittest," — will  work 
volimtarily  in  view  of  the  enjoyment  which  the 
products  of  his  labor  will  bring  to  him  and  his. 


Providence  and  Moral  Goverttment.         339 

2d.  Another  point  of  suggestive  inquiry  and  con- 
sideration is  found  in  the  origin  and  nature  of  gov- 
ernment. 

As  man  is  not  naturally,  especially  in  his  savage 
state,  inclined  to  toil  and  industry,  so  he  is  not  in- 
clined to  submit  to  the  will  of  another,  for  the  good 
of  the  whole,  or  even  for  his  own  good.  The  wisdom 
and  necessity  of  submission  to  authority,  is  a  lesson 
which  he  has  learned  by  long  experience.  We 
cannot  doubt  but  that  at  first  ambition,  the  lust  of 
power,  the  disposition  to  tyrannize  over  others,  was 
more  prominent  in  the  hearts  of  those  who  assumed 
control,  than  any  more  impersonal  or  unselfish  con- 
sideration for  the  good  of  others.  But  the  mass 
submitted  of  necessity  and  because  they  could  not 
help  themselves.  And  in  this  way  they  learned 
submission  through  the  ages  past.  They  have  come 
to  see  that  loyalty,  which  was  at  first  indeed  adregem, 
and  has  only  in  these  last  years  become  ad  legem,  is 
one  of  the  first  of  virtues,  one  of  the  most  indispensa- 
ble of  mental  habits.  They  who  appreciate  it  and 
will  reverence  and  obey  law  for  the  sake  of  the  law, 
may  be  for  a  time  under  a  government  where  all 
are  poHtically  equal  before  the  law,  and  the  greatest 
amount  of  civil  liberty  may  be  enjoyed.  But  for 
all  others  some  form  of  despotism  and  tyrannical  con- 
trol is  still  a  necessity. 


340  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  men  in  the  beginning  did  not  choose  the 
submission  to  which  they  were  subjected.  Some 
of  them  may  have  seen  its  necessity,  but  most  of 
them  did  not,  nor  could  any  form  of  government  or 
administration  which  they  would  have  chosen  from 
any  appreciation  they  may  have  had  of  its  effects  on 
them  and  their  posterity,  ever  have  accomplished 
the  result  that  has  now  been  obtained. 

3d.  I  refer  for  the  last  instance  to  what  is  more 
germane  to  my  general  subject  in  these  Lectures. 

Man  is  essentially  and  everywhere  a  religious  be- 
ing. The  religious  instincts  are  the  strongest  and 
most  ineradicable  of  any  in  his  nature.^  In  quiet 
times  men  may  be  governed  and  guided  by  self- 
interest  alone.  But  for  men,  as  for  nations  and 
countries,  and  for  nations  and  countries  as  for  men, 
there  come  times  of  passion  and  excitement,  when 
the  plainest  and  most  obvious  dictates  of  self-inter- 
est and  common  sense  are  disregarded — passion 
rules  for  the  hour.  But  above  all  other  passions, 
and  as  able  to  subdue  and  control  them  all,  arises 
the  religious  instinct  whenever  it  has  been  roused  to 
a  pitch  of  intensity  which  we  call  enthusiasm,  or 


1  Even  Tyndall  says  in  words  that  are  more  energetic  than  grace- 
ful, "The  world  will  have  a  religion  of  some  kind,  even  though 
it  should  fly  to  the  intellectual  whoredom  of  spiritualism."  Frag- 
mentsy  Ed.  1878,  p.  355. 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         341 

rather,  fanaticism.  Then  is  not  only  self-interest 
forgotten,  but  all  the  angry  passions  are  put  into 
abeyance;  ambition,  pride,  and  even  resentment 
or  revenge  are  laid  aside,  and  men  sacrifice  all  but 
themselves,  and  even  themselves,  so  far  as  this  world 
is  concerned,  to  the  one  absorbing  object  of  their 
fanatic  zeal. 

Now  this  peculiarity  of  man's  nature  has  been 
used  with  tremendous  power  in  the  past  ages  of  the 
history  of  our  race.  Men  have  claimed  to  come 
from  God,  or  to  rule  and  guide  with  a  divine  mis- 
sion or  sanction.  And  not  one  of  the  governments 
of  the  past  has  arisen  or  stood  and  endured  with- 
out allying  itself  with  the  religious  sentiment  of  the 
people. 

This  sentiment  has  doubtless  given  power  and 
influence  for  evil  to  despots  and  impostors.  But  it 
has  been  one  of  the  most  efficient  and  most  indis- 
pensable means  of  maintaining  even  the  best  gov- 
ernments and  of  bringing  about  that  change  in  the 
constitution  of  man  and  the  instincts  of  humanity 
which  distinguish  the  civilized  from  the  savage  man. 
It  has  enabled  the  great  rulers  and  leaders  to  bring 
to  bear  upon  the  minds  and  hearts  of  men  a  power 
that  is  vastly  superior  to  any  of  the  threats  and  tor- 
ments they  could  inflict. 

And  this,   too,  has  been  a  means  of  elevating 


342  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

man.  It  taught  him  to  look  to  something  higher 
than  this  world  affords,  did  much  to  prepare  for  that 
"  fullness  of  time  "  when  his  thoughts  and  faith,  his 
fears  and  his  aspirations  should  be  directed  to  Him 
who  is  a  Spirit  and  who  would  be  worshiped  in 
spirit  and  in  truth,  when  bloody  sacrifices  should  no 
more  be  needed,  and  the  priesthood  should  be  chiefly 
instructors  and  guides  in  matters  of  conscience,  and 
every  one  a  **  priest  and  a  king  "  for  himself  to  God 
in  a  certain  sense,  and  that,  too,  the  most  important 
sense'  of  the  words. 

And  here  again,  that  which  has  been  the  most 
influential,  and  the  most  influential  because  "the 
most  needful  for  the  time,"  when  it  was  in  vogue, 
was  never  an  invention  of  the  men  of  the  age.  It 
was  never  wholly  or  to  any  great  extent  a  matter 
of  choice  with  the  masses  except  as  that  choice  was 
the  result  of  a  conviction  or  of  a  fanaticism  that  had 
been  enkindled  for  a  purpose,  and  that,  too,  often 
by  a  designing  impostor.  No  system  that  ever  ac- 
complished much  good  for  man  was  chosen,  kept  up 
and  continued  by  a  popular  choice,  the  majority  de- 
termining whether  they  would  have  this  man  or  this 
religion  "to  rule  over  them  "  or  not. 

Now  in  all  these  cases  it  is  obvious  that  that  which 
has  been  the  most  needed  and  has  proved  the  most 
useful  and  efiicient  in  bringing  man  from  the  degra- 


Providence  and  Moral  Governme7tt.         343 

dation  of  his  early,  not  to  say  his  first,  for  I  do  not 
believe  it  was  his  first,  condition,  has  been  some- 
thing that  has  kept  him  in  subjection,  compelled  him 
to  do  and  to  submit  to  that  which  he  would  not  have 
done  or  submitted  to  from  mere  foresight  and  choice 
without  such  necessity  or  compulsion.  The  invol- 
untary and  unwilling  submission,  however,  produced 
its  effect  in  the  altered  habits  of  the  individuals  who 
were  then  forced  to  practice  these  virtues ;  and  they 
have  been  transmitted  by  the  law  of  heredity,  spoken 
of  in  an  earlier  Lecture,  to  us  and  the  men  of  these 
latter  days. 

And  thus  we  see  that  our  modern  civilization  de- 
pends not  only  on  the  intellecttial  advance  of  the 
race  in  what  is  apparent  in  our  arts  and  sciences,  but 
there  has  been  going  on,  underneath  all  the  more 
obvious  facts  and  events  of  history,  a  gradual  change 
in  the  nature  of  man  himself.  This  change  has  been 
indeed  twofold  or  in  two  opposite  directions,  one 
downwards  towards  savagery  and  beastliness,  and 
the  other  in  all  the  civilized  races,  upwards  towards 
civilization  and  a  higher  plane  of  life. 

These  changes,  those  of  them  that  are  for  the  bet- 
ter at  least,  have  been  going  on  very  much  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  laws  which  the  evolutionists 
advocate.  There  has  been  a  Power  or  an  Influence 
at  work  in  them,   that  has  gradually  wrought  a 


344         ^/^^  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

change  in  human  nature  so  as  to  render  much  pos- 
sible now,  in  science  and  religion,  in  politics  and  in 
morals,  that  could  not  have  been  introduced  with  any 
prospect  of  success,  at  any  earlier  stage  of  human 
history.  Has  there  not  been  a  providence  in  all 
this? 

But  it  is  time  to  go  on  with  our  main  subject, 
Providence  and  Moral  Government  and  the  objec- 
tions to  them. 

The  main  points  of  the  objections  that  are  chiefly 
urged  are  two,  namely:  (i)  to  a  Personal  Provi- 
dence, and  (2)  to  the  fact  of  a  Moral  Government 
that  is  exercised  on  the  principles  of  righteousness 
and  justice  and  in  the  spirit  of  good  will  or  benevo- 
lence. 

Such  objections  discourage  prayer  and  worship, 
instill  into  the  minds  of  all  a  distrust  of  moral  prin- 
ciples and  of  any  rewards,  either  here  or  hereafter, 
for  righteous  deeds,  except  such  as  are  seen  to  be 
manifest  in  prospect  and  which,  as  is  often  supposed, 
can,  for  the  most  part,  be  secured  better  by  prudent 
foresight  and  expediency,  with  possible  trickery, 
deception,  pusillanimous  submission  to  those  in  power 
and  such  like  means,  than  by  the  nobler  means  of  a 
higher  morality. 

Of  these  Pessimists,  the  two  names  that  are  just 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         345 

now  the  most  conspicuous,  perhaps,  are  Schopen- 
hauer and  John  Stuart  Mill. 

The  pessimism  of  Schopenhauer  evidently  began 
in  personal  feeling,  and  led  to  a  theory,  such  as  only 
a  German  could  form,  from  which  his  system  results 
as  an  inference.  He  was  unhappy,  unsuccessful. 
Things  did  not  go  at  all  to  suit  him ;  and  so  he  in- 
vented a  theory  of  his  own.  Starting  from  Hegel's 
point  of  view  that  all  reality  is  included  in  the  about- 
to-be  (das  Werdend),  Schopenhauer  thought  to  im- 
prove upon  it  by  adopting  the  notion  that  Will  is 
all.  "  Matter  is  nothing  but  Force ;  Force  is  noth- 
ing but  Will  " — Will  become  apparent  as  presenta- 
tion or  Vorstelhingy  or  phenomena  in  the  mind  of 
the  thinker.  For  the  das  Werdend  of  Hegel  he 
would  substitute  das  Wollendy  mere  will-power,  or 
activity.  Thus  far  his  philosophy  is  not  so  bad  as 
many  other  systems  that  we  could  name. 

But  when  he  comes  to  practical  views,  he  over- 
looks the  fact  that  the  one  creative  Will  is  guided 
by  wisdom  or  acts  from  a  sense  of  justice  and  love. 
In  his  view,  whatever  is,  is  a  manifestation  of  will 
or  willfulness,  and  of  course  anything  and  everything 
that  has  a  will  of  its  own  is  to  be  regarded  only  as 
seeking  its  own — its  own  ends  and  pleasures.  Hence 
for  the  weaker  there  can  be  nothing  but  misery  and 
defeat. 


34^         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Schopenhauer  is,  however,  but  httle  known  among 
EngHsh-speaking  people.  The  best  known  repre- 
sentative of  pessimism  among  the  EngHsh  is  John 
Stuart  Mill.  I  shall  therefore  refer  to  him  chiefly, 
not  only  because  he  is  the  best  representative,  but 
also  because  he  presents  in  his  writings  all  the  ob- 
jections of  this  kind  that  have  be-en  presented  at  all 
and  in  fact  all,  so  far  as  I  can  see,  that  the  case 
admits  of. 

The  objection  is  easily  stated :  there  is  pain  and 
suffering  in  this  world.  If  God  could  prevent  it  and 
would  not,  there  is  an  end  to  all  idea  of  goodness 
and  justice.  If  He  would  prevent  it  and  make  all 
creatures  perfectly  happy  and  cannot,  there  is  an 
end  to  all  idea  of  His  infinite  power  or  omnipotence. 

"  If,"  says  he,i  **  the  Maker  of  the  world  can  do 
all  that  He  wills,  he  wills  misery,  and  there  is  no 
escape  from  the  conclusion.  If  He  willed  that  all 
men  should  be  virtuous.  His  designs  have  been  com- 
pletely baffled."  Again,  p.  38,  *' Not  even  on  the 
most  distorted  and  contracted  theory  of  good  which 
man  ever  framed  by  religious  or  philosophical  fanat- 
icism, can  the  government  of  nature  be  made  to  re- 
semble the  work  of  a  being  at  once  good  and  om- 
nipotent." 

1  Nature  in  posthumous  works,  p.  37. 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         347 


Again,  in  a  later  part  of  the  volume,  p.  II2,  he 
says,  "  It  is  impossible  that  any  one  who  habitually 
thinks,  and  who  is  unable  to  blunt  his  inquiring  in- 
tellect by  sophistry,  should  be  able,  without  misgiv- 
ing, to  go  on  ascribing  absolute  perfection  to  the 
author  and  ruler  of  so  clumsily  made  and  capriciously 
governed  a  creation  as  this  planet  and  the  life  of  its 
inhabitants."  *'  The  Author  of  the  Sermon  on  the 
Mount  is  assuredly  a  far  more  benignant  Being  than 
the  Author  of  Nature."  ^ 

I  presume  it  will  hardly  be  considered  as  coming 
within  the  fair  range  of  argument  to  allude  to  the 

1  Mill,  in  his  less  ^^ atm  bilious''''  moments,  thinks  that  among 
the  attributes  of  God,  as  manifest  in  nature  and  human  experience, 
goodness  or  benevolence  is  on  the  whole  predominant  over  other 
motives  of  a  different  kind.  The  pleasures  and  the  pains  have  a 
conservative  tendency,  the  pleasures  being  so  disposed  as  to  attach 
to  the  things  which  maintain  individual  and  collective  existence, 
the  pains  so  as  to  deter  from  such  as  would  destroy  it,"  Theism,  p. 
190. 

"Yet  endeavoring  to  look  at  the  question  without  partiality  or 
prejudice  and  without  allowing  wishes  to  have  any  influence  over 
judgment,  it  does  appear  [the  italics  are  mine]  that  granting  the 
existence  of  design,  there  is  a  preponderance  of  evidence  that  the 
Creator  desired  the  pleasure  of  His  creatures.  .  .  Even  in  cases 
where  the  pain  results,  like  pleasure,  from  the  machinery  itself,  the 
appearances  do  not  indicate  that  contrivance  was  brought  into  play 
purposely  to  produce  pain  ;  .  .  there  is,  therefore,  much  appearance 
that  pleasure  is  agreeable  to  the  Creator,  while  there  is  very  little 
if  any  appearance  that  pain  is  so,  and  there  is  a  certain  amount  of 
justification  for  inferring,  on  the  ground  of  Natural  Theology  alone, 
that  benevolence  is  one  of  the  attributes  of  the  Creator,"  p.  192. 


348  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

personal  character  and  habits  of  these  pessimists. 
But  yet  I  think  that  some  notice  should  be  taken  of 
it,  for  wherever  there  is  complaint  there  is  surely 
something  wrong ;  so  that  if  the  thing  complained 
of  is  not  at  fault  the  complainant  himself  is  certainly 
so,  so  far  at  least  as  the  act  of  making  of  the  com- 
plaint is  concerned.  Now  I  do  not  know  that  any 
one  of  these  complainants  has  ever  been  distinguished 
for  the  highest  moral  or  spiritual  excellence,  or  has 
even  secured  any  considerable  number  of  followers 
who  would  willingly  trust  the  affairs  of  the  universe 
in  his  hands,  with  any  expectation  that  they  would 
be  on  the  whole  any  better  managed  than  they  are 
now. 

Pessimism  has  existed  as  a  sentiment  in  sporadic 
cases,  in  all  ages  of  the  world.  Always  there  have 
been  men  and  women  who  have  felt  and  thought 
that  their  trials  and  sufferings  were  more  than  they 
could  bear. 

With  us,  and  in  all  the  higher  races,  this  view  of 
life  reaches,  in  isolated  cases,  its  proper  issue  in  sui- 
cide, when  the  victims  of  misfortune  come  to  the 
conclusion  that  not  to  be  at  all  is  better  than  to  be 
as  they  are,  or  in  any  condition  they  can  hope  to 
realize.  And  we  regard  all  such  cases  as  bordering 
upon,  if  not  already  entered  into,  that  state  of  mental 
disease  which  we  call  and  treat  as  insanity. 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         349 

Often  does  it  happen  that  their  sufferings  and  mis- 
fortunes have  come  from  no  fault  of  their  own,  no 
events  or  acts  over  which  they  had  or  could  have 
had  any  power  of  control.  Such  cases  appeal  to 
our  tenderest  sympathy  and  make  us  hesitate  in  our 
speculations  and  theories. 

And  to  my  mind,  one  of  the  saddest  things  in  all 
human  history  is  the  fact  that  the  hundreds  of  mill- 
ions in  Asia  who  are  called  Buddhists  could  have 
ever  taken  such  pessimistic  views  of  this  life  and  the 
best  that  it  can  offer,  as  to  accept  their  mysterious 
Nirvana^  as  a  boon.  Whether  we  regard  it  as  total 
annihilation  or  the  extinction  of  all  conscious  indi- 
viduality or  not,  the  result  is  the  same ;  the  case  is 
one  of  unspeakable  sadness. 

1  It  has  been  suggested  and,  as  I  think,  satisfactoi-ily  pj'oved  that 
Nirvana  did  not  mean  originally,  and  was  never  intended  to  mean, 
entire  annihilation.  The  founder  of  the  religion  had  in  view  a  two- 
fold nature  of  man  like  what  the  Christians  have  in  mind  when  they 
speak  of  *'  the  spirit "  and  *'  the  flesh  "  and  the  contrariety  between 
them,  and  by  Nirvana  the  Buddha  meant  only  the  extinction  or  annihi- 
lation of  '*  the  lusts  of  the  flesh,"  the  carnal  nature  of  man.  Hence 
it  is  only  by  a  later  perversion  that  the  word  has  come  to  mean 
entire  annihilation  of  the  conscious  being.  At  first  it  meant  resig- 
nation. **  When  a  man  can  bear  everything  without  a  word  of  com- 
plaint," says  Buddha,  "  he  has  attained  Nirvana  .  .  .  thus  is  Nirvana 
the  greatest  happiness."  See  Max  Muller,  Science  of  Religion, 
p.  142.  And  yet  I  suppose  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  great 
mass  of  the  Buddhists,  the  ignorant,  degraded  and  miserable  por- 
tion of  them  do  regard  Nirvana  as  an  utter  extinction  of  their  con- 
scious being. 

16 


350  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Now  I  have  no  skill  at  making  evil  appear  to  be 
good,  and  no  ambition  for  distinction  In  that  direc- 
tion. Nevertheless,  something  may  be  said  in  favor 
of  pain.     It  has  its  place  and  function  in  the  world. 

I  think  it  may  be  safely  said  that  pain  is  always 
a  sign  of  something  wrong,  besides  itself  It  shows 
that  something  has  been  done  that  calls  for  amend- 
ment and  remedy,  or  that  something  is  being  done, 
or  is  about  to  be  done,  that  calls  for  foresight,  cir- 
cumspection and  efforts  at  avoidance. 

In  the  lower  and  purely  physical  sphere,  pain  is 
proof  of  something  wrong,  some  disease  or  injury  to 
the  tissues  that  calls  for  attention.  And  even  when 
remedies  are  painful  it  is  only  because  they  are  in 
themselves  considered  a  violation  of  the  laws  and 
conditions  of  well-being,  the  use  and  appHcation  of 
which  can  be  justified  only  on  the  ground  that  they 
are  remedies  and  means  for  curing  or  removing  an 
evil  that  is  greater  than  that  which  already  exists. 
Hence  the  surgeon's  knife  is  as  painful  when  it  re- 
moves a  diseased  limb  or  opens  an  abscess  as  if  it 
were  used  needlessly  and  for  the  mere  purpose  of 
torture.  The  law  is  general,  and  were  this  not  so 
there  could  be  no  general  law. 

But  it  is  asked  why  should  there  be  pain  in  the 
animal  world  ?  If  there  were  no  pains  of  hunger 
and  of  dying  there  would  be  no  effort  to  secure  food 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         351 

and  to  avoid  danger ;  and  the  species  would  speedily 
come  to  an  end.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  food  were 
so  abundant  that  life  could  be  prolonged  without 
effort,  or  if  the  animal  were  to  be  spared  the  pains 
of  death  and  allowed  to  live  forever,  the  world  would 
soon  become  so  full  of  the  one  species  that  there 
would  be  no  room  for  another  and  for  a  succession 
of  the  higher  orders,  as  we  see  that  they  came  into 
existence  in  the  course  of  geological  time:  there 
could  have  been  no  evolution. 

If  now  we  raise  our  view  to  the  next  higher  plane, 
the  moral  and  intellectual,  we  find  that  the  painful, 
or  malevolent  passions  have  their  place.  When 
one  is  angry,  for  example,  there  is  sometkmg  wrong. 
Either  an  injury  has  been  done,  which,  in  the  interest 
of  righteousness  and  general  well-being,  call  for  in- 
dignation and  resentment,  or  we  ourselves  are  in  the 
wrong,  angry  without  sufficient  cause.  And  in  this 
latter  case  there  is  something  wrong  in  ourselves, 
our  own  conduct,  something  that  calls  for  a  remedy 
as  much  as  in  the  former  case,  although  the  remedy 
will  be  of  a  totally  different  kind  and  in  a  very  dif- 
ferent scene  of  action. 

Something  the  same  may  be  said  of  all  the  varied 
forms  of  the  evil  or  malevolent  passions — of  envy, 
of  hate,  of  revenge,  of  jealousy,  and  of  even  spite 
itself     They  come  of  wrong,  indicate  and  prove  the 


352  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

existence  of  wrong,  and  call  for  a  remedy  even  if 
they  do  not  always  clearly  point  out  the  proper 
remedy.  We  may  "  be  angry  and  sin  not/'  although 
we  may  be  angry  and  commit  a  great  sin.  But  the 
anger  is  always  proof  of  something  wrong,  and,  by 
consequence  of,  something  requiring  to  be  changed 
for  the  better. 

But  does  one  ask  why  there  should  be  wrong 
doing  or  the  possibility  of  it  ?  I  answer  as  the  ques- 
tion has  been  answered  so  many  times  already,  that 
without  the  possibility  of  wroiig  doing  there  could 
be  no  liberty  for  right  doing,  no  moral  freedom, 
none  in  fact  of  that  acquired  character  and  those 
higher,  nobler  virtues  which  we  all  recognize  and 
admit  to  be  the  chief  glory  and  distinction  of  the 
higher  order  of  beings.  Nobody  doubts  that  purity 
and  temperance  and  generosity  and  fidelity  and 
courage  and  magnanimity,  are  better  and  higher  and 
more  desirable  than  their  opposites.  Or  if  there  is 
anybody  that  doubts  it,  he  is  hardly  a  person  to  be 
reasoned  with  on  such  a  subject  as  this.  In  the  ex- 
ercise of  common  reason  and  right  judgment  we  all 
see  that  these  virtues  are  the  conditions  of  happiness 
in  social  life,  as  truly  as  the  laws  of  gravity,  of  chem- 
ical and  mechanical  action  are  the  necessary  condi- 
tions of  the  orderly  system  and  harmonious  ongo- 
ings of  the  material  world.      Without  them  there 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         353 

would  be  no  proof  of  the  existence  and  agency  of  a 
wise,  benevolent  and  all-powerful  Being,  whom  we 
may  worship  and  adore  as  God  over  all  blessed 
forever.  1 

And  not  only  pain,  but  even  wicked  men,  have 
a  work  to  do  in  a  world  where  wickedness  and  wrong 
exist,  which  no  other  class  of  persons  can  so  fitly  do. 
Although  not  intending  it  and  not  conscious  of  the 
fact,  they  are  doing  God's  will  and  are  in  some  cases 
the  very  "fittest"  instruments  for  doing  it  under 
the  circumstances.^ 

1  There  is  another  thought  connected  with  this  subject  that  I 
think  I  ought  to  present  for  the  consideration  of  the  reader,  and 
this  I  do  without  attempting  to  determine  how  far  it  is  true,  although 
beyond  doubt  there  is  some  truth  in  it. 

Happiness  implies  the  possibility  of  its  opposite,  unhappiness  or 
misery,  and  the  converse,  misery  or  suffering,  implies  the  possi- 
bility of  happiness ;  that  is,  they  both  imply  a  sensitive  nature.  We 
do  not  speak  of  inanimate  objects  as  happy,  nor  yet  are  they  mis- 
erable, they  are  simply  insensible. 

Nor,  as  I  think,  do  we  speak  of  one  as  happy  who  is  not  con- 
scious of  his  happiness.  We  may  regard  him  2js,  fortunate  and  even 
speak  of  such  an  one  as  happy,  but  when  we  come  to  look  into  the 
matter  carefully  I  think  we  shall  admit  that  no  one  is  happy  who  is 
not  conscious  of  being  so. 

Now  much  that  I  have  said  in  the  first  Lecture  of  co-ordination 
in  cognition  applies  here.  We  can  have  no  consciousness  or  thought 
of  happiness  except  as  it  is  co-ordinated  with  its  opposite,  pain  or 
misery. 

2  The  old  Prophet  Isaiah  had  a  very  clear  conception  of  this  law 
of  Providence,  chap,  x,  5-8 :  **  O  Assyrian,  the  rod  of  mine  anger 
and  the  staff  in  their  hand  is  mine  indignation.  I  will  send  him 
against  an  hypocritical  nation,  and  against  the  people  of  my  wrath 


354         T-^^^  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

It  would  seem,  therefore,  that  what  men  so  often 
and  so  loudly  complain  of  is  but  a  necessary  part 
of  a  system,  with  which,  perhaps,  they  are  not  alto- 
gether in  harmony,  and  which,  at  any  rate,  they  do 
not  fully  understand  and  appreciate. 

Any  attempt  to  judge  of  this  world,  in  reference 
to  the  matter  before  us,  must  assume  that  it  is  a 
means  to  some  end,  and  judge  of  it  with  reference 
to  that  end.  If  God  had  intended  it  as  a  place  for 
mere  animal  enjoyment,  or  for  the  success  of  schemes 
of  worldly  ambition,  I  have  no  doubt  He  could  have 
made  it  better  than  it  now  is ;  most  any  of  us  could 
have  done  so.  At  least  such  is  the  prevalent  opin- 
ion. Men  who  take  this  view  of  life  can  see  no 
reason  why  pain  and  ill  health  should  have  been 
made  to  follow  upon  excessive  indulgence,  or  why 
all  the  hopes,  *'  reasonable  hopes  "  they  will  call  them, 
of  ambitious  and  aspiring  men  should  not  be  re- 
alized. 

We  can  clearly  see,  however,  that  if  man  is  des- 
tined to  another  and  a  higher  state  of  existence,  and 
that  if  the  moral  and  spiritual  life  is  higher  than  the 
mere  animal  and  worldly  life,  a  world  in  which  men 
that  are,  and  intend  to  be,  devoted  to  animal  enjoy- 

will  I  give  him  a  charge,  to  take  the  spoil  and  to  take  the  prey  and 
to  tread  them  down  like  the  mire  of  the  streets.  Howbeit  he  mean 
eth  not  so  neither  doeth  his  heart  think  so  ;  but  it  is  in  his  heart  if 
destroy  and  cut  off  nations  not  afezu.^^ 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         355 

ments  and  the  pursuits  of  mere  worldly  ambition, 
would  find  themselves  best  provided  for  and  things 
most  to  their  liking  would  not  be  very  well  adapted 
to  those  who  might  have  the  higher  aims  of  life 
chiefly  in  view.  A  world  that  would  make  the 
drunkard  and  debauchee  happy  and  entirely  satis- 
fied in  their  Hne  of  enjoyment  could  hardly  be 
adapted  to  the  promotion  of  virtue  and  the  higher 
objects  and  aims  in  life. 

Now  I  am  willing  to  admit  that  I  do  not  see  how 
from  the  mere  facts  of  nature,  without  taking  into 
account  human  experience,  the  incarnation,  Christ 
and  Christianity  and  all  that  precede  it  to  prepare 
the  way  for  it,  with  all  that  has  followed  it  and  is 
yet  to  come  as  its  work.  Its  work  here  and  the  re- 
sults of  that  work  hereafter,  we  can  prove  that  God 
is  infinitely  good  or  altogether  benevolent.  We 
need  some  way  to  turn  seeming  evil  Into  real  good, 
and  a  world  best  adapted  for  spiritual  purposes 
could  not  be  satisfactory  to  those  who  are  otherwise 
disposed. 

I  cannot,  therefore,  dismiss  this  part  of  my  argu- 
ment without  Intimating  very  strongly  that  our  esti- 
mate of  this  world  depends  much,  very  much,  upon 
the  use  we  propose  to  make  of  It  and  the  kind  of  life 
we  Intend  to  Hve  In  It  while  we  remain  a  portion  of 
its  inhabitants. 


356         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

The  heathen  religions  of  the  world  may  teach  us 
an  important  lesson  on  this  subject.  The  heathen 
nations  all  believed  in  a  god,  and  for  the  most  part 
in  "  gods  many."  They  never  ascribed  to  them  a 
very  high  degree  of  moral  excellence.  They  never 
thought  them  altogether  benevolent  in  their  feehngs 
and  designs  towards  man.  And  not  only  their 
opinions  and  religious  rites  were  influenced  by  this 
view  of  the  character  of  their  so-called  gods,  but 
their  whole  life  was  tinged  by  it.  For  the  most 
part  their  religion  afforded  no  encouragement  to  a 
high  standard  of  morals,  and  little  or  no  hope  for  a 
future  life  that  could  be  in  any  important  particular 
better  than  this.^ 


1  One  of  Mill's  arguments  against  the  goodness  of  God,  as  a  proof 
of  a  want  of  either  goodness  or  power  to  do  what,  in  Mr.  Mill's  es- 
timation, would  have  been  a  far  better  thing  to  do  than  has  been 
done,  is  derived  from  the  low  state  of  civilization,  the  savagery  and 
ignorance  that  prevailed  so  long  in  the  early  ages  of  mankind  and 
still  prevails  among  such  savage  tribes  as  the  Bushmen  and  the 
Andaman  Islanders.  Mill  sees  no  reason  why  they  might  not  have 
been  made  at  once  equal  in  civilization  and  all  the  attainments  of 
modern  science,  political  economy  included,  to  modern  Englishmen, 
or  possibly  a  little  better  than  some  of  them. 

But  there  is  a  point  of  view  from  which  even  the  Bushman  and  the 
Andaman  Islander,  if  they  live  up  to  such  light  as  God  has  been 
pleased  to  give  them,  are  to  be  preferred,  in  their  lowly  and  misera- 
ble condition,  if  happiness  alone  is  to  be  regarded  as  "our  being's 
end  and  aim,"  to  the  most  advanced  Englishman,  with  his  agnosti- 
cism and  blasphemy.  They  are  happier  now  and  here,  and  have  a 
much  better  chance,  as  I  think,  for  the  "  hereafter." 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         357 

The  Jews  are  said  to  have  been  the  only  people 
that  had  any  idea  of  sin  and  ill  desert  so  that,  in  the 
light  of  this  consciousness,  they  could  see  and  ac- 
knowledge that  God  is  just  and  righteous  in  all  His 
ways,  and  good  in  all  His  dealings  with  men.^  But 
even  they  did  not,  and  could  not,  see  and  realize 
this  truth  as  we  can,  who  live  in  later  times  and  who 
now  see  in  His  Son  Jesus  Christ  the  fuller  manifes- 
tation of  His  goodness  and  love.  In  this  comple- 
ment of  the  revelations  and  manifestations  of  His 
plans  and  purposes  we  see  the  full  exhibition  of  His 
attributes,  so  that  there  is  no  longer  any  occasion, 
or  any  disposition,  to  doubt  among  those  who  have 
experienced  the  grace  which  He  brought  to  light  in 
the  Gospel. 

The  Christian  view  of  life,  when  once  thoroughly 
adopted,  changes  the  whole  aspect  of  the  case.  It 
cures  all  pessimism  and  takes  away  all  disposition  to 
complain. 

Amidst  the  sadness  and  the  sorrow,  the  disap- 
pointments and  the  discouragements  that  come  to 


1  The  Patriarch  Job  speaks  of  the  pessimists  of  his  day  as  con 
demning  God  that  they  may  "appear  to  be  righteous  themselves," 
Job,  xl,  8. 

Nor  did  the  Psalmist  become  a  pessimist  on  account  of  his  mis 
fortunes  and  sufferings.  He  could  rather  say,  **0  my  God  I  cry 
in  the  day-time,  but  Thou  hearest  not  and  in  the  night  season  I  take 
no  rest.     And  Thou  continuest  holy  O  Thou  Worship  of  Israel." 


358  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

all  thoughtful  people,  there  is  nothing  like  the  con- 
templation of  the  Hfe  and  death  of  Christ,  the  Divine 
Son  of  Man,  what  He  did  and  suffered  for  us.  The 
one  thought  takes  all  bitterness  out  of  the  heart. 
No  event  on  earth  has  exhibited  such  a  depth  of 
tragic  pathos,  none  has  had  such  power  to  touch  the 
heart  with  infinite  tenderness.  And  all  subsequent 
history,  the  experience  of  believers,  the  conversion 
of  the  heathen,  the  success  of  missions,  now,  to-day 
and  everywhere,  justify  the  divine  foresight  of  Him 
Who  said,  signifying  what  death  He  should  die, 
*'  And  I  if  I  be  lifted  from  the  earth  will  draw  all 
men  unto  Me." 

The  laws  under  which  we  live  may  be  referred  to 
several  groups,  systems  or  codes,  each  of  them  hav- 
ing some  pecuHarity  of  its  own. 

1st.  All  the  laws  of  number  and  quantity  are  ab- 
solute :  two  and  two  will  make  four,  and  will  not, 
and  cannot,  make  five,  however  much  we  may  wish 
it,  pray  for  it,  or  suffer  if  it  be  not  so  done.  Three 
straight  lines  meeting  will  make  a  triangle,  and  one 
of  the  sides  will  be  shorter  than  the  sum  of  the  other 
two. 

2d.  Some  years  ago  Whewell  made  an  argument^ 
to  show  that  in  any  possible  universe,  where  there 

1  Astronomy,  (Bridgewater  Treatise),  especially  B.  II. 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         359 

should  be  more  than  one  object,  and  it  would  not  be  a 
nniverse  without  a  good  many  more  than  one,  these 
objects  must  attract  each  other  in  a  formula  or  law 
which  we  may  express  by  the  words  ''  in  proportion 
to  their  quantity  of  matter  and  inversely  as  the 
square  of  their  distances."  I  regarded  his  argument 
as  a  success  at  the  time  and  have  seen  no  reason  to 
change  my  view  since. 

3d.  It  is  pretty  well  settled  now,  that  if  there  are 
to  be  more  than  one  material  object,  the  objects 
must  be  in  motion,  and  all  the  laws  of  motion  can 
be  determined  a  priori  and  are  in  accordance  with 
the  formulae  of  analytical  geometry  and  the  calculus. 
This  results  from  their  nature  as  inert  masses.  They 
must  also  all  revolve  around  one  another  and  around  a 
common  centre,  or  be  kept  in  motion  by  some  in- 
telligent Power,  such  as  God  alone  can  exert. 

4th.  The  laws  of  chemical  combination,  if  they 
are  not  fixed  and  determined  a  priori  as  the  laws  of 
motion  are,  as  there  seems  some  reason  for  suppos- 
ing them  to  be,  are  nevertheless  fixed ;  and  so  in  har- 
mony with  the  other  laws,  even  the  laws  of  mathe- 
matics, that  it  would  seem  that  there  can  be  but 
very  little  that  is  in  any  sense  of  the  word  arbitrary 
or  that  could  have  been  otherwise  than  it  is,  or  har- 
monize with  another  system  even  if  such  a  thing  had 
been  desirable. 


360         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

Now  these  four  systems  of  laws  make  up  most  of 
the  system  of  nature  in  which  we  have  our  earthly 
existence.  Could  they  have  been  other  than  they 
are  <?  Would  it  have  been  better  if  they  had  been 
different  ?  Is  there  anything  in  these  laws  that  miH- 
tates  against  the  doctrines  of  a  Providence  and  a 
thoroughly  righteous  Moral  Government  of  the 
world  ?  If  a  man  conforms  to  them  he  is  happy 
and  prosperous,  so  far  as  their  influence  can  make 
or  mar  his  happiness  or  his  prosperity.-  And  if  he 
is  not  in  conformity  with  them  whose  fault  is  it,  his 
or  theirs  ? 

When,  however,  we  come  to  consider  man  we 
enter  a  new  realm.  We  have  now  to  deal  with 
spontaneity  and  to  consider  actions  that  cannot  be 
reduced  to,  or  expressed  in,  the  formulae  of  mathemat- 
ics, kinds  and  modes  of  action  that  cannot  be  fore- 
seen or  calculated  a  priori. 

Let  us  now  look  at  this  system  in  which  man  is 
placed  and  of  which  he  is  a  part,  from  man  himself ^ 
as  our  point  of  observation  and  see  how  he  stands 
related  to  the  other  things  that  with  him  make  up 
the  system  of  which  he  is  part. 

Man's  body  is  made  of  the  same  chemical  elements 
as  the  other  masses  of  matter  around  him  and  is 
obedient  to  the  same  laws.  It  is  by  his  mind  or 
soul  alone  that  he  differs  from  them.     But  by  this 


Providence  a?td  Moral  Cover mnent.         361 

alone  he  can  understand  them,  and  understanding 
them  and  knowing  the  laws  by  which  they  act,  he 
can  control  them  to  a  great  extent ;  so  far,  indeed, 
that  the  whole  face  and  surface  of  nature  and  the 
course  of  its  events,  become  changed  and  totally 
differeri.t  in  consequence  of  his  presence  and  agency 
from  what  it  would  be  if  he  were  not  there.  This 
chapel,  these  seats,  and  the  waves  of  air  by  which  I 
arrest  your  attention  and  make  you  partakers  of 
my  thoughts,  are  all  the  results  of  man's  presence, 
and  would  not  be  at  all  but  for  him. 

1st.  In  the  first  place,  let  us  remember  that  man 
is  an  intelligent  being;  he  can  understand  the  nature 
of  the  things  around  him  and  the  laws  by  which  they 
act.  He  can  in  consequence  (i)  adapt  himself  to 
them  or  (2),  what  is  perhaps  far  more  important,  he 
can  control  their  operations  to  a  large  extent.  He 
cannot,  indeed,  arrest  or  suspend  the  law  of  gravity, 
but  he  can  protect  himself  against  a  fall.  He  can- 
not change  the  laws  of  heat  and  cold,  but  he  can 
build  a  fire  that  will  keep  him  from  freezing.  He 
cannot  change  the  laws  of  chemical  combination  and 
analysis ;  but  he  can  so  select  and  combine  the  arti- 
cles of  food  that  he  takes  into  his  system  that  they 
will  digest  and  be  assimilated,  instead  of  producing 
indigestion,  disease  and  death. 

In  this  way  he  can  exert  a  "  providence  "  over 


362  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

affairs,  and  for  his  own  good,  which  is  analogous  to 
that  which  God  Himself  exercises  for  us,  and  which 
is  about  as  far  above  what  the  lowest  animals  can 
do,  as  it  is  necessary  that  that  which  He  exercises 
over  us  should  be,  in  order  that  it  may  accomplish 
all  that  is  claimed  for  it  by  Natural  Theology. 

I  wish  to  emphasize  this  point  somewhat,  because 
I  am  here  speaking  not  of  supernatural  interven- 
tions by  way  of  miracles.  I  have  said  all  that  I 
propose  to  say  on  this  occasion  on  that  subject  in 
a  preceding  Lecture.  *  What  I  am  speaking  of  here 
is  the  ordinary  Providence  of  God  in  the  affairs  of 
Life.  This  has  two  branches,  (i)  the  internal,  in 
which  He  influences  the  thoughts  and  wills  of  men, 
as  in  the  example  of  the  passenger  saved  from  a 
steamboat  calamity,  cited  in  the  last  Lecture,  and 
(2)  the  other  in  the  outward  world,  exercising  there, 
as  I  have  said,  an  influence  which  is  analogous  in 
kind,  though  far  above  in  degree,  to  that  which  man 
is  constantly  exercising. 

On  this  point  I  propose  to  confirm  what  I  have 
said  by  citations  from  two  or  three  authorities,  each 
of  which  will  be  recognized  as  foremost  in  his  kind. 

Thus  Tyndall,  speaking  for  the  men  of  physical 
science,  says,  Fragments,  p.  468,  *'  The  theory  that 
the  system  of  nature  is  un(;ier  the  control  of  a  Being 
who  changes  phenomena  in  compHance  with    the 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.  363 


prayers  of  men  is,  in  my  opinion,  a  perfectly  legiti- 
mate one.  It  may  of  course  be  rendered  futile  by 
being  associated  with  conceptions  that  contradict  it ; 
but  such  conceptions  form  no  necessary  part  of  the 
theory." 

Then,  as  representing  the  metaphysicians  and 
logicians,  I  quote  John  Stuart  Mill,  Theism,  p.  136: 
"  Science  contains  nothing  repugnant  to  the  suppo- 
sition that  every  event  which  takes  place  results  from 
a  specific  [note  the  word  '  specific ']  volition  of  the 
presiding  Power,  provided  that  this  Power  adheres 
in  its  particular  volitions  to  general  laws  laid  down 
by  itself" 

Here  is  all  that  my  argument  calls  for,  and  all 
that  we  can  ask.  Herbert  Spencer,  as  we  have  seen 
several  times,  admits  all  this,  and  more  than  this. 
"  We  are  obliged,''  he  says  (§  27),  "  to  regard  every 
phenomenon  as  a  manifestation  of  some  Power  by 
which  we  are  acted  upon."  And  again  {^  34), 
**  Every  man  may  properly  consider  himself  as  one 
of  the  myriad  agencies  through  whom  works  the 
Unknown  Cause,  and  when  the  Unknown  Cause 
produces  in  him  a  certain  belief,"  etc. 

Here  the  Divine  influence  in  external  nature  is 
spoken  of  as  that  which  we  are  "obhged  to  admit," 
and  the  action  in  and  upon  the  mind  as  what  we 
may  "  properly  believe  "  and  act  upon. 


364         TJie  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

If  Spencer  would  change  his  phraseology  and  call 
Him  the  Incomprehensible  instead  of  the  Unknown 
and  the  Unknowable,  we  could  agree  with  most  of 
what  he  says  of  God,  and  he  would,  moreover,  be 
calling  Him  by  a  name  that  indicates  all  that  his 
premises  call  for  or  justify.  For  surely,  as  has  been 
well  said.  He  of  whom  so  much  may  be  said  cannot 
be  regarded  as  unknowable  or  as  altogether  un- 
known. 

2d.  In  the  next  place,  man  can  greatly  change 
himself  by  his  own  acts.  There  is  hardly  anything 
by  way  of  virtue,  moral  excellence  or  good  habits, 
that  one  may  not  acquire  and  make  of  it  a  sort  of 
second  nature  to  himself,  by  the  power  of  will  and 
self-control  which  he  possesses.  In  this  he  is  totally 
unlike  the  masses  and  molecules  of  inanimate  mat- 
ter. Nothing  that  they  can  devise  or  do  will  change 
their  nature  or  properties,  make  them  better  or  more 
adapted  to  things  that  surround  them  in  their  envi- 
ronments. What  they  were  made  to  be  that  they 
must  remain  and  continue  to  be  to  the  end. 

3d.  Then  again,  man  can  suffer.  And  here  we 
reach  the  central  point  of  our  subject.  A  thijig  falls 
and  breaks,  but  does  not  suffer  or  feel  pain.  A  man 
falls,  breaks  a  limb,  and  is  in  pain  and  suffers  disa- 
bility for  a  long  time.  This  is  a  controlling  fact, 
and  gives  significance  to  the  other  three  facts  in 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         365 

man's  constitution  and  nature  just  named,  (i)  He 
can  understand  the  laws  of  nature  and  conform  his 
acts  to  them.  (2)  He  can  control  the  operation  of 
other  things  to  some  extent  so  as  to  bring  events 
much  more  nearly  into  accordance  with  his  will  and 
judgment  as  to  what  is  right,  than  they  would  oth- 
erwise be,  and  (3)  he  can  so  mould  and  change  him- 
self as  to  bring  his  own  nature,  his  *'  second  nature," 
to  a  large  extent,  into  harmony  with  whatever  there 
is  in  "the  constitution  and  course  of  nature"  that 
he  cannot  change ;  and  he  may  thus  grow  in  strength 
and  righteousness  of  character,  to  an  extent  to  which 
we  know  no  hmit  and  to  which  probably  no  limit 
can  be  prescribed. 

Man's  relations  to  these  things  and  his  experience 
with  them  is  under  three  codes  of  laws. 

1st.  In  the  lower  there  is  no  such  thing  as  pardon, 
favor,  or  consideration  of  persons,  their  character, 
tlieir  worth  or  worthlessness,  their  aims  whether 
good  or  bad,  their  ignorance  of  the  law,  or  their 
knowledge  of  it,  their  mistakes  or  their  misfortunes. 
We  say  **  the  burnt  child  dreads  the  fire."  By  that 
bit  of  experience  he  has  learned  one  fact  and  a  law 
of  nature;  he  has  made  a  beginning  of  scientific  at- 
tainment. By  a  repetition  of  such  experiments  he 
soon  learns  that  the  recurrence  of  the  phenomena 
under  the  same  circumstances  is  uniform,  and  that 
the  operation  of  the  laws  of  nature  is  inexorable. 


366  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  he  has  acquired  a  new  instinct  also.  He  now 
dreads,  and  shrinks  from,  the  burning  taper.  He 
generalizes  and  applies  his  conclusion  and  extends 
his  instinct  to  the  burning  coals,  the  heated  iron, 
and  whatever  else  has  the  appearance  of  a  burning 
heat. 

Now  in  this  we  have  the  philosophy  of  a  large 
share  of  man's  education.  He  studies  into  and 
learns  the  laws  of  nature  and  becomes  a  man  of  sci- 
entific attainments.  He  learns  also  to  respect  and 
obey  those  laws  as  something  that  are  immeasurably 
his  superior,  something  to  which  he  must  submit 
and  conform,  or  be  crushed  and  killed  by  them. 
They  will  not  respect  him,  and  he  learns  to  respect 
them. 

But  does  he  suffer  the  consequences  every  time 
he  transgresses  nature's  laws  ?  This  is  the  law. 
The  mere  inanimate  objects  of  nature  can  make  no 
exceptions,  show  no  favor,  exercise  no  mercy  or 
forbearance.  They  are  not  intelligent  moral  agents ; 
they  have  no  power  of  choice,  no  spontaneity  of 
action. 

And  yet  I  think  it  manifest  that,  for  some  reason 
or  another,  we  do  not  suffer  the  consequence  for 
**  one  in  a  thousand "  of  our  faults  of  this  kind. 
Hundreds  go  to  sea  in  ships  that  are  unseaworthy 
and  escape,  arriving  safely  to  the  haven  where  they 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         367 

would  be.  But  by  and  by  a  ship  goes  down,  and 
some  are  lost.  All  were  offenders,  though  possibly 
most  of  them  knew  it  not.  And  yet  most  of  them 
escaped.  Few  suffered,  and  a  few  only,  what  all, 
from  a  mere  natural  point  of  view,  were  liable  to  and 
perhaps  deserved,  and  what  they  certainly  had  ex- 
posed themselves  to. 

Now  I  think  here  is  evidence  of  providential  in- 
terference and  of  goodness  in  the  exercise  of  Moral 
Government. 

They,  therefore,  who  would  exclude  pain  from  the 
universe  would  exclude  wrong  doing  and  with  it  the 
possibility  of  the  highest  excellence  and  the  crown- 
ing glory  of  the  universe.  It  has  been  suggested 
that  for  those  whose  hearts  are  evil,  the  restraint  and 
constraint  which  would  keep  them  from  doing  and 
saying  what  ought  not  to  be  done  and  said,  and 
compel  them  always  to  act  and  speak  right  and  do 
what  ought  to  be  done  whether  they  feel  like  it  or 
not,  would  be  the  worst  of  pains,  the  very  n6\aGiv 
aiGDViov  which  our  Lord  threatens  as  the  doom  of 
the  finally  impenitent.  In  this  view  those  who  com- 
plain of  the  present  constitution  of  the  universe  would 
seem  to  be  about  as  unreasonable  as  if  they  were  to 
complain  that  two  and  two  will  not  sometimes  be 
five,  or  that  a  crooked  line  will  not  sometimes  be  the 
shortest  between  two  points,  when  it  suits  their 
convenience  to  have  it  so. 


368  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

This  form  of  objection  is  very  old,  as  old  as  St. 
Augustine  at  least.  He  said  in  view  of  it  that  there 
are  some  things  which  God  cannot  do  because  He 
is  omnipotent.  Qiicedam  no7i potest  quia  oimtipotens 
est.  They  are  not  questions  of  power,  whether  of 
ommpotQnce  or  /;;^potence,  but  only  of  the  feasibility 
of  the  things  themselves.  A  space  enclosed  be- 
tween two  straight  lines  is  no  space.  The  intersec- 
tion of  two  parallel  lines  and  such  hke  fictions  are 
no  questions  or  tests  of  wisdom  or  of  power.  They 
are  not  merely  inconceivable;  they  are  simply 
nothings. 

And  this  is  in  accordance  with  the  common  sense 
of  mankind.  We  speak  of  things  as  easy  or  as  diffi- 
cult. But  when  we  so  speak  of  them  we  do  it  un- 
der the  idea  that  they  are  in  themselves  feasible, 
possible  or  practicable.  Hence  we  speak  of  those 
who  can  do  only  the  easy  things  as  weak,  whether 
in  body  or  in  mind,  and  of  those  that  can  do  the 
more  difficult  as  strong,  comparatively,  and  of  Him 
that  can  do  all  things  that  are  in  themselves  feasible 
or  conceivable,  we  say  that  He  is  omnipotent,  able 
to  do  all  things.  And  it  Is  only  when  the  thing  is 
confessedly  possible,  and  sustains  some  relation  to 
power,  that  we  so  speak  of  it  or  of  him  that  can  do 
it.  But  to  make  two  straight  lines  enclose  a  space 
is  no  more  within  the  reach  of  the  strongest,  whether 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         369 

in  mind  or  in  body,  than  of  him  who  is  the  weakest 
or  has  no  power  and  even  no  existence.^ 

We  have  seen  that  man  can  intervene  and  change 
to  some  extent  the  course  of  events.  The  forces  of 
nature  are  indeed  wild  horses,  but  man  can  tame 
them  and  make  them  subservient  to  his  purposes,  as 
well  as  destructive  of  his  life  and  happiness.  He 
can  guide  the  fire  so  that  it  will  burn  the  gas  that 
lightens  his  study,  or  the  coal  that  warms  his  dwell- 
ing, so  that  it  will  consume  the  noisome  nuisance 
of  decaying  matter  or  become  the  conflagration  of 
the  city  that  destroys  the  homes  and  lives  of  thou- 
sands of  human  beings.  But  he  cannot  make  it 
consume  the  granite  mountain  or  burn  all  the  waters 
of  the  ocean. 

And  assuredly  God  can  do  more  than  man  in 


1  There  is  much  in  Mill's  line  of  argument  that  reminds  me  of  the 
question  said  to  have  been  proposed  by  the  bewildered  Sunday 
school  boy  to  his  teacher :  *'  Please,  sir,  can  God  make  a  stone  so 
big  that  He  can't  lift  it "  ? 

I  do  not  know  what  answer  was  given  to  the  poor  boy's  question, 
but  I  presume  it  was  answered  in  some  way  to  save  the  "  infinite 
power  "  of  God. 

I  have  often  heard,  however,  among  the  unsophisticated  country 
people,  with  their  strong,  practical  common  sense,  the  remark  that 
"  God  cannot  make  two  mountains  without  a  valley  between  them." 
The  remark,  however,  was  never  regarded  by  them  as  any  impeach- 
ment of  His  attributes,  whether  His  goodness  or  His  power,  but  it 
was  intended  rather  as  a  rebuke  to  those  who  were  expecting  un- 
reasonable things. 


370         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

controlling  and  guiding  the  forces  of  nature  in  the 
production  of  events.  He  can  "  mterveiie  "  without 
"  interfering  "^-in  the  offensive  sense  of  the  word — 
to  show  mercy  and  exercise  loving  kindness.  He 
can  send  the  rain  in  time  of  need,  or  avert  the  com- 
ing pestilence,  if  to  Him  it  seems  good  to  do  so.  It 
is  idle  and  vain  to  say  that  we  know  the  laws  of 
nature  well  enough  to  deny  His  Providence  in  such 
matters.  To  say  that  He  cannot  intervene  is  imper- 
tinent and  blasphemous.  To  say  that  He  does  not 
is  mere  assumption.  Nothing  short  of  omniscience 
can  assert  a  universal  negative  of  that  kind. 

It  is  well  for  scientific  men  to  assume,  and  for  the 
purposes  of  mere  science  they  must  assume,  that 
everything  in  nature  occurs  regularly  and  as  though 
there  were  nothing  concerned  in  its  production  but 
the  forces  and  laws  of  nature — the  forces  that  we  can 
see  and  handle  and  the  laws  that  we  can  learn  by 
observation  and  generalization.  But  then  we  must 
admit,  also,  that  there  is  no  one  fact  or  event  in 
nature  that  man  knows  so  well  and  understands  so 
thoroughly  that  he  can  say  that  God  was  not  con- 
cerned as  an  Agent  in  its  production  ;  that  God  was 
not  "  acting  "  in  it,  to  use  Spencer's  expression  ;  that 
it  was  not  the  result  of  a  "specific  voHtion  "  on  His 
part,  to  use  Mill's  expression ;  or,  to  use  the  still 
stronger  one  of  Tyndall,  that  it  was  not  a  phenomenon 


Providence  and  Moral  Govermncnt.         371 

that  had  been  "  changed  "  by  Him  "  in  compliance 
with  the  prayers  of  men." 

In  this  way,  and  to  this  extent,  we  may  all  very 
properly  confess  to  an  agnosticism. 

It  is  much  more  probable,  therefore,  in  view  of 
what  we  do  know  that  He  overrules  and  guides  all 
things,  leaving  us  to  suffer  only  when,  or  as,  it  is 
for  our  own  good  that  we  should  do  so. 

For  man  will  not  learn  without  suffering.  It  is 
only  the  "  burnt "  child  that  dreads  the  fire.  And 
I  think  we  are  fast  approaching  the  conviction  that 
throughout  the  whole  realm  of  nature,  man  suffers 
in  this  way  no  more  than  is  good  for,  perhaps  no 
more  than  is  indispensable  to,  his  progress  in  knowl- 
edge and  virtue. 

2d.  I  now  reach  the  second  code  of  laws  under 
which  man  lives.  And  here  I  can  be  much  more 
brief.  In  this  domain  he  is  to  be  considered  as  in 
relation  to  his  fellow-men.  Here  we  soon  learn  that 
certain  courses  of  action  produce  good-will,  and  a 
disposition  to  respect  and  favor  us ;  while  actions  of 
an  opposite  character  produce  quite  different  results, 
such  as  loss  of  character,  of  the  respect  and  good- 
will, and  even  of  the  charity  and  forbearance  of  oth- 
ers. We  see,  also,  that  these  courses  of  action  have 
a  relation  to  moral  laws,  and  that  by  these  laws  cer- 
tain kinds  of  actions  are  seen  to  be  right  as  well  as 
pleasing  to  others. 


372         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

But  the  main  feature  of  the  case,  now  to  be  con- 
sidered, is  the  fact  that  these  agents  are  not  like  the 
mere  inert  masses  around  us.  They  are  intelligent 
moral  beings.  They  can  consider  our  case,  make 
excuses  where  excuses  are  deserved.  They  can 
show  favor  and  make  exceptions  to  the  enforcement 
of  general  rules.  They  can  exercise  forgiveness  and 
forbearance  where  none  are  deserved.  With  them 
ignorance  of  a  law  is  often  an  excuse — good  inten- 
tions are  accepted  for  right  performances.  Mistakes 
are  often  corrected  so  that-  we  get  credit  for  the 
good  which  we  intended,  instead  of  suffering  for  the 
evil  we  actually,  though  unintentionally,  wrought 
for  fellow- men.  Here  we  experience  the  interfer- 
ence and  exercise  of  a  moral  government  by  our 
fellow-men,  tempered  and  softened,  though  not 
always  so  by  compassion,  by  sympathy  and  ten- 
derest  love. 

3d.  But  we  rise  to  a  higher  region  than  this ;  to 
a  purely  spiritual  experience,  a  world  of  supernatural 
life,  in  which  a  different  law  prevails  and  religion 
forms  the  controlling  element. 

And  as  I  wish  to  connect  with  the  discussion  of 
it,  another  principle  of  a  more  general  character  and 
application,  I  will  turn  aside  for  a  few  moments  to 
consider  it. 

It  is  the  use  which  God  in  His  Providence  makes 
of  wicked  men  and  their  wicked  deeds. 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         373 

Why  sin  is  in  the  world  I  do  not  know  and  shall 
make  no  attempt  to  explain.  I  shall  not  even  offer 
a  conjecture.  But  it  is  here  ;  and  we  can  see  much 
good  that  is  accomplished  by  it,  which,  so  far  as  we 
can  see,  could  no  more 'have  been  accomplished 
without  sin  and  suffering  than  man  could  have  been 
made  to  study  into,  learn,  respect  and  use  those  laws 
of  nature  which  make  up  our  science  and  make  us 
masters  of  the  world,  subjecting  all  things  in  it  to 
our  use,  without  the  pain  that  follows  upon  the  vio- 
lation. 

And  I  put  the  two  together.  I  think  we  are  fast 
approaching  the  conclusion,  even  if  we  have  not 
yet  already  reached  it,  that  there  is  no  suffering  in 
this  world  without  some  previous  transgression  of 
some  one  or  more  of  the  laws,  moral  or  physical, 
of  nature  or  of  grace,  under  which  we  live.  Hence 
suffering,  though  it  does  not  always  fall  upon  the 
offender  himself,  is  nevertheless  always  a  sign  and 
a  reminder  of  a  law  that  has  been  broken  and  vio- 
lated, though  quite  possibly  not  yet  fully  known. 
It  is  a  hint  and  a  stimulus  to  inquiry  and  discovery. 
It  is  also  a  spur  and  an  incitement  towards  the 
formation  of  a  new  habit,  the  acquiring  of  a  new 
element  in  our  second  nature,  and  thus  bringing  us 
into  a  nearer  conformity  to  a  higher  state  of  law  and 
of  life.  We  grow  by  means  of  it,  both  in  knowledge 
17 


374         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

and  in  grace,  in  strength  of  character  and  in  nearness 
to  our  ideal  standard  of  perfection. 

Now  the  way  in  which,  both  in  history  and  in 
individual  life,  God  brings  good  out  of  evil  and 
makes  even  "  the  wrath  of  man  to  praise  him,"  is  to 
me  one  of  the  most  striking  proofs  of  Providence, 
working  for  a  purpose  in  history  and  in  the  exer- 
cise of  Moral  Government. 

Take  a  case  in  history  for  illustration,  the  cruci- 
fixion of  our  Lord.  And  in  discussing  It  I  assume 
nothing  as  to  its  dogmatic  character  or  theological 
bearing.     I  look  at  it  only  as  a  matter  of  history. 

He  was  a  just  and  holy  man,  in  whom  there  was 
no  guile,  no  cause  or  justification  for  His  death. 
Yet  His  enemies  hated  Him  most  bitterly,  and  put 
Him  to  death.  One  of  His  own  disciples  and  trusted 
friends  betrayed  him.  Of  course  the  fault,  the  mis- 
take, the  crime  and  the  guilt,  were  all  their  own. 

But  we  risk  nothing  in  saying  that  if  He  had  not 
been  put  to  death  in  some  such  manner.  His  religion 
would  never  have  taken  root  in  the  world ;  and 
the  greatest  step  In  the  advancement  of  humanity 
to  a  higher  level  and  a  cleaner  and  holier  mode 
of  life,  would  have  proved  a  failure  from  the  outset. 

Who  then  should  put  Him  to  death  ?  Who  de- 
liver Him  up  to  be  crucified  ?  Surely  no  friend 
could  do  it ;   no  loving  disciple  could  be  guilty  of 


Provide7ice  and  Moral  Government.  375 

such  a  thing.  No  one  that  feared  God  and  loved 
righteousness  above  all  things  else,  could  have 
thought  of  it.  No  devotee  of  the  doctrine  of  expe- 
diency could  ever  have  persuaded  himself  that,  in 
this  case,  the  end  would  justify  the  means.  And 
yet,  betrayers  and  murderers  were  found,  men  who 
had  no  conscientious  scruples  at  the  time,  whatever 
may  have  been  the  case  with  some  of  them,  as  Judas 
for  example,  afterwards.  God  used  them  for  the  ac- 
complishment of  his  purposes.  He  made  them  no 
worse  than  they  were,  and  if  we  may  presume  to 
judge  in  such  a  case.  He  showed  them  no  mercy  on 
account  of  the  most  blessed  results,  that  He,  by  His 
providence  and  grace,  brought  out  of  their  act. 

And  the  case  gains  unspeakably  in  breadth  of  sig- 
nificance and  in  the  depth  of  its  pathos  when  we 
view  it  in  the  light  of  the  Christian  doctrine  of  the 
Atonement  and  the  Redemption  of  mankind. 

Now  history  is  full  of  such  examples,  although,  of 
course,  on  a  vastly  smaller  scale.  In  fact,  it  seems 
sometimes  almost  as  if  God  could  not  well  get  along, 
govern  this  world,  and  work  out  what  are  manifestly 
His  purposes  in  history,  without  His  enemies  and 
the  use  He  makes  of  them  to  do  His  work.  His 
strange  work ;  just  as  it  has  been  said  of  the  Queen 
of  England,  that  she  could  scarcely  get  along  and 
administer  the  affairs  of  her  Empire  without  what 


3/6  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

has  been  facetiously  called  "  her  majesty's  opposi- 
tion," as  well  as  the  assistance  and  co-operation  of 
her  friends  and  loyal  subjects. 

But  I  must  hasten  to  my  closing  thought,  which 
is,  to  my  mind,  the  crowning  glory  of  the  whole 
subject.  It  may  be  stated  as  the  doctrine,  that  there 
is  no  pain  or  suffering  in  this  world  that  we  may 
not,  by  such  means  and  aids  as  are  always  at  our 
command,  turn  to  our  own  good. 

I  am  willing  to  admit  that  this  doctrine  cannot 
be  fully  made  out  without  the  recognition  of  a  future 
hfe  into  which  the  results  of  discipline,  if  not  the 
economy  of  rewards  and  punishments,  must  enter, 
and  in  which  growth  in  knowledge  and  in  grace  are 
possible.  And  although  I  have  not  made  any  effort 
in  these  Lectures  to  prove  the  future  life  of  rewards 
and  punishments,  as  one  of  the  doctrines  of  Natural 
Theology,  I  think,  that  in  view  of  what  has  been 
said  by  others  in  the  pursuit  of  the  methods  I  have 
been  vindicating,  I  have  a  right  to  assume  that  doc- 
trine, so  far  at  least  as  my  present  object  requires 
that  it  should  be  regarded  as  a  doctrine  of  Natural 
Theology. 

I  think,  indeed,  that  the  argument  for  a  future 
life  which  may  be  derived  from  the  facts  and  laws  I 
have  been  considering,  is  overwhelmingly  strong. 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         377 


If  we  regard  this  world  and  this  life  as  a  scene  for 
the  highest  and  the  greatest  amount  of  mere  animal 
enjoyment  for  such  a  being  as  man,  it  may  indeed 
well  be  considered,  as  Mill  has  called  it,  an  ''  igno- 
minious failure."^  But  is  it  not  wiser,  more  logical 
and  scientific,  as  well  as  a  safer  and  more  prudent 
way,  to  infer  from  all  we  know  of  God  and  of  nature, 
that  this  is  not  the  last  or  the  highest  state  of  exist- 
ence for  man  ?  Does  not  everything,  In  fact,  tend 
to  show  that  this  world  and  this  life  for  man  is  only 
a  part  of  a  far  more  comprehensive  plan  ?  a  some- 
thing hereafter  that  gives  a  new  meaning  and  im- 
portance to  all  there  is  here  ? 

And  in  this  connection  I  am  willing,  and  more 
than  willing,  to  forego  and  repudiate  what  is  some- 
times offered  by  way  of  answer  to  the  objection  to 
the  doctrine  of  a  Moral  Government  growing  out  of 
the  fact  of  suffering,  namely,  the  consideration  of  the 
insignificance  of  the  individual  man,  the  unspeakable 
nothingness  of  his  significance  and  worth  in  com- 
parison with  the  general  good  of  the  whole.  I  am 
quite  willing  to  admit  that.  In  this  respect,  each  man 
is  to  himself  infinitely  valuable.  What  good  to 
him  If  the  universe  flourishes  and  prospers  and  he 
himself  is  annihilated  and  become  extinct  ?  What 
to  him  the  happiness  of  millions,  If  he  is  consigned 

1  Theism,  p.  192. 


378  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

to  everlasting  woe  ?  to  the  regions  of  the  lost  and 
the  despised  and  damned  ?  Their  happiness  is  noth- 
ing to  him.  The  only  thought  there  can  be  which, 
so  far  as  I  can  imagine,  can  be  of  any  comfort  or 
alleviation  to  him,  is  the  thought  that  he  has  de- 
served his  doom;  that  God  is  just  and  holy  and 
merciful,  though  he  suffers  what  no  tongue  can  tell, 
no  heart  but  that  of  him  who  has  endured  it  can 
conceive.  And  the  being  that  can  entertain  such  a 
thought  under  such  circumstances  is  not  far  from 
the  kingdom  of  heaven;  and  from  all  the  ideas  and 
thoughts  that  Natural  Theology  can  suggest,  it 
is  evident  he  will  soon  be  there,  in  the  midst  of  its 
glories  and  enjoyments. 

I  cannot  tell,  or  pretend  to,  why  children  die.  In 
some  cases  we  see  that  from  circumstances  of  dis- 
ease or  deformity  life  to  them  could  be  no  scene  of 
happiness  if  it  should  be  prolonged.  In  others,  we 
see  that  they  are  taken  away  from  the  evil  to  come, 
and  in  all,  we  may  hope  that  they  only  go  before 
us,  and  earlier  than  we  do,  to  that  world  where  we 
must  all  be  gathered  at  last. 

But  to  the  kindred  question,  why  do  the  righteous 
suffer  ?  we  can  offer  a  very  different  answer.  This 
question  presents  a  problem  of  an  entirely  different 
kind. 

It  is  a  doctrine  now  well  understood  that  there  is 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         379 

no  coming  to  a  right  mind,  no  growth  in  grace,  no 
attainment  in  the  higher  qualities  of  intelligence  and 
moral  excellence,  without  a  good  deal  of  pain  and 
suffering.  This  is  a  doctrine  which,  although  Christ 
may  have  first  taught  it  to  the  world,  has  now  be- 
come confirmed  by  the  experience  and  the  philosophy 
of  the  last  eighteen  centuries. 

This  is  true  in  intellectual  growth.  The  child  gets 
its  first  lesson  in  thermotics  by  the  pain  in  the  burnt 
finger.  As  we  grow  old  we  grow  cautious.  We 
learn  to  regard  very  slight  indications  and  to  "take 
many  gentle  hints.  But  the  terrible  rod  of  chas- 
tisement is  always  there  for  the  heedless  and  the 
careless,  for  the  presumptuous  adventurer  and  the 
trifler.  And  in  this '  sphere  there  is  seldom  any 
amends  that  can  be  made,  or  any  escape  from  the 
penalty  once  inflicted.  The  palsied  limb,  the  broken 
constitution,  remain  as  both  proofs  and  penalties  of 
the  transgression. 

In  the  moral  sphere  we  meet  with  the  first  in- 
stances of  the  higher  administration  of  a  moral  gov- 
ernment. Here  repentance,  if  it  is  genuine  and  sin- 
cere, is  always  respected ;  amends  for  the  evil  done 
are  always  accepted ;  and  the  offender  may  be  re- 
stored to  the  place  in  private  affection  or  in  public 
confidence,  which,  by  his  fall,  he  had  lost.  And 
here,  too,  it  sometimes  happens  that  one  becomes 


380         The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

stronger,  both  in  character  and  in  public  confidence, 
after  his  transgression,  by  the  intensity  of  his  peni- 
tence. The  thoroughness  of  his  reform  and  the  in- 
creased comprehension  of,  and  faith  in,  the  great 
moral  principles  that  are  alike  the  foundation  of 
character  and  the  source  of  strength  and  stability  to 
all  that  is  good  and  trustworthy  in  human  life,  often 
afford  ground  for  a  confidence  that  would  not  be 
otherwise  felt. 

But  in  the  spiritual  sphere  we,  for  the  first  time, 
find  the  possibility  of  repentance,  and  amendment 
with  complete  recuperation,  and  full  forgiveness. 
We  find  more.  We  find  gain.  We  find  the  possibility 
of  turning  all  evil  into  good,  and  out  of  any  adver- 
sity, misfortune  or  suffering,  that  can  possibly  come 
upon  us,  whether  it  come  from  our  own  transgres- 
sion or  from  the  faults  and  wickedness  of  others,  we 
may  educe  the  pure  gold,  the  sparkling  gem,  the 
pearl  of  great  price  and  of  priceless  value,  spiritual 
worth;  though  we  lose  the  world,  we  gain  our  own 
souls. 

There  can  be  no  need  of  an  induction  of  exam- 
ples to  establish  this  truth.  Enough  is  to  be  seen 
in  the  experience  of  every  thoughtful  person,  enough 
in  the  life  of  every  holy  man  or  woman,  every  lofty 
and  noble  character  that  we  have  known,  to  suggest 
and  illustrate  the  doctrine  and  to  satisfy  us  of  its 
truth. 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         381 

But  here  as  everywhere,  as  in  each  of  the  other 
spheres,  the  conditions  are  the  same  :  faith  and  sub- 
mission to  the  authority  of  Him  who  ordained  the 
laws  and  still  rules  to  enforce  them. 

With  this  experience  comes  deeper  humiliation, 
more  entire  self-renunciation,  with  stronger  faith, 
more  earnestness  of  effort,  and  somehow,  nobody 
perhaps  can  tell  how,  but  there  comes  somehow  a 
strength  and  a  bounding  upwards  from  earth  and 
earthly  things  towards  heaven  and  the  highest  and 
the  holiest  that  we  conceive  of  The  very  things 
that  these  pessimists  complain  of  come  to  be  the 
very  opportunity  and  means  that  are  given  us  to 
become  spiritually  great  and  strong.  They  make 
what  the  world  most  honors.  No  man,  after  such 
an  experience,  doubts  the  goodness  of  God  or  the 
righteousness  of  His  Moral  Government.  No  one 
doubts  His  providence  over  all  His  works  or  His 
presence  wherever  a  humble,  penitent,  believing 
soul  needs  his  presence  and  help.^ 

1  Mill  rests  his  argument  chiefly  upon  the  amount  of  pain  and 
suffering  there  is  in  the  world.  But  I  doubt  very  much  whether  the 
greatest  sufferers  are  the 'greatest  complainers.  Those  whom  we 
most  respect  for  their  noble  qualities,  seldom  complain  or  even  so 
much  as  think  that  they  have  had  anything  to  complain  of.  Nay, 
we  have  read  of,  if  we  have  not  seen,  more  than  one  who  could 
"glory"  in  his  infirmities  and  "rejoice"  in  his  "tribulations," 
knowing  that  their  "afflictions  "  worked  for  them  a  far  more  ex- 
ceeding and  eternal  weight  of  glory. 


382  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

It  is  hard  to  discover,  and  still  more  painful  and 
humiliating  to  confess,  that  the  remedy  and  the 
cure  for  all  the  ills  of  this  life  is  in  ourselves  or  within 
our  reach.  True,  indeed,  this  fact  does  not  become 
entirely  clear  and  satisfactorily  demonstrated  until 
we  can  contemplate  it  as  Christians  and  from  the 
point  of  view  of  that  reconciliation  with  God  which 
He  has  wrought  through  Christ.  In  Him  is  our 
strength,  our  help,  and  our  salvation. 

But  at  any  rate  we  can  see  enough  by  the  light 
of  nature  alone,  to  justify  us  in  the  assertion  that  if 
we  will  but  make  the  right  use  of  it,  nothing  can 
occur  to  us  that  we  cannot  turn  to  our  spiritual 
gain  and  come  out  the  better  for  it  in  the  end. 

Of  course  this  solution  will  not  suit  immoral  men, 
worldly  minded  men  and  agnostics,  who  do  not 
want  to  be  anything  but  immoral  or  worldly  minded. 
But  I  know  of  no  way  of  making  the  world  suit  them 
without  first  making  of  them  something  quite  differ- 
ent from  what  they  now  are,  or  intend  to  become. 
Evidently  this  world  was  not  made  for  such  as  they 
wish  to  be,  nor  was  the  universe,  of  which  we  all 
are  parts,  arranged  for  such  a  life  as  they  propose 
to  lead,  or  for  such  an  end  of  life  as  is  the  most  and 
the  best  they  hope  for.  But  for  those  who  will  ac- 
cept it,  God  has  ordained  and  provided  something 
better  by  way  of  remedy  in  this  world  and  of  re- 
ward in  the  next. 


Pmvidence  and  Moral  Government.         383 

There  was  a  Christian  hero  once  of  old  who  said, 
"  I  can  do  all  things  through  Christ  Who  strength- 
eneth  me."  He,  as  he  assures  us,  could  rejoice  even 
in  tribulations.  I  think  that  with  the  same  help  we  can 
do  as  much.  He  knew,  and  nobody  had  tested  the 
matter  more  thoroughly,  that  ''  all  things  work  to- 
gether for  the  good  of  them  that  love  God."  There 
is  a  way  by  which  we  can  all  become  *'  the  children 
of  God  and  heirs  of  the  Kingdom  of  Heaven,"  mak- 
ing all  the  pains  and  sufferings  of  this  hfe  work  out 
for  us  an  exceeding  and  eternal  weight  of  glory.^ 

1  Mill  is  sometimes  inclined  to  take  rather  a  philanthropic  view 
of  the  existence  of  evil  and  suffering.     He  says,  Theism,  p.  185  : 

"The  imperfections  in  the  attainment  of  the  purposes  which  the 
appearances  indicate,  have  not  the  air  of  having  been  designed. 
They  are  like  the  unintended  results  of  accidents  insufficiently 
guarded  against." 

Again,  p.  193,  «*  If  man  had  not  the  power  by  the  exercise  of  his 
own  energies  for  the  improvement  both  of  himself  and  of  his  out- 
ward circumstances,  to  do  for  himself  and  other  creatures,  vastly 
more  than  God  had  in  the  first  instance  done,  the  Being  who  called 
him  into  existence  would  deserve  something  very  different  from 
thanks  at  his  hands." 

And  this  idea  of  working  with'  God  and  helping  Him  to  overcome 
the  evils  and  difficulties  that  were  too  much  for  Him  at  the  time  of 
the  creation,  seems  to  be  rather  a  favorite  thought  with  Mr.  Mill. 

But  oh,  how  different  the  spirit  from  that  of  St.  Paul,  "We,  then, 
as  workers  together  with  Him,  beseech  you  that  ye  receive  not  the 
grace  of  God  in  vain."  With  Mill,  it  is  "help  Him  because  He 
needs  help";  with  St.  Paul,  "help  Him  because  He  has  helped 
us,  and  given  His  only  begotten  Son  for  us  that  we,  through  Him, 
need  not  perish,  but  might  have  everlasting  life." 


384  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology, 

But  the  evil  complained  of  is  one  for  which  I 
know  no  other  remedy  and  for  which  I  seem  to  see 
that  there  is  a  good  reason  why  there  should  be  no 
other.  In  this  case  Evolution  cannot  help  us.  Ag- 
nosticism is  of  no  avail ;  for  whatever  else  we  may 
know  or  not  know,  there  are  evils  in  this  life  against 
which  we  are  weak,  helpless  and  hopeless,  except 
as  our  help  and  our  strength  come  from  Christ 
through  faith  in  Him  and  the  ministrations  of  His 
Gospel.  The  terms  may  not  suit  our  pride  of  in- 
tellect or  our  pride  of  heart.  The  reward  that  is 
promised  may  not  be  just  such  as  we  would  choose 
if  we  were  sure  of  getting  what  we  choose.  But 
there  is  a  Wisdom  and  a  Power  that  is  above  us, 
that  has  been  at  work  in  the  past  history  of  our  race 
and  in  ten  thousand  instances  in  our  own  lives, 
"  bringing  us  by  ways  that  we  knew  not  and  leading 
us  by  paths  that  we  had  not  known,"  to  results  that 
were  far  above,  and  far  better  than,  any  that  we 
should  have  chosen  if  the  choice  had  been  left  to 
ourselves.     Cannot  we  trust  Him  ? 

And  now,  in  conclusion,  I  think  I  have  consid- 
ered and  disposed  of  all  the  objections  that  have 
been  raised  in  these  modern  times  or  that  can  well 
be  raised  against  the  Methods  and  the  Truths  of 
Natural  Theology,  whether  physical  or  metaphysical. 


Providence  and  Moral  Government.         385 

logical  or  ontological.  These  truths,  however,  are 
at  best  of  but  very  Httle  value  to  us  or  to  mankind 
at  large,  if  we  stop  with  them.  I  confess,  however, 
that  I  have  a  much  higher  estimate  of  them  and  of 
their  value  to  mankind  than  I  should  have  had,  had 
it  not  been  for  the  testimony  which  St.  Paul  has 
borne  in  their  favor.  After  speaking  of  the  great 
truths  of  Natural  Theology  that  are  "manifest"  in 
the  works  of  creation,  even  **  the  eternal  power  and 
godhead  or  divinity  of  God,"  which  makes  those 
that  reject  Revelation  *'  without  excuse,"  he  goes  on 
to  speak  of  the  Gentiles  who  had  had  no  means  of 
knowing  the  gospel  as  "  doing  by  nature  the  things 
that  are  written  in  the  law,"  and  says  of  them,  if  I 
understand  him  rightly,  that  they  also,  following  this 
light  of  nature,  will  be  saved,  in  the  day  of  their 
final  account,  both  theirs  and  ours  alike,  through  the 
merits  of  Christ's  atoning  blood.  If,  then,  these 
truths  may  be  a  guide  to  salvation  for  those  who 
have  had  no  opportunity  to  learn  more  of  the  Divine 
Will  and  of  the  way  of  salvation  than  these  Methods 
can  teach,  they  certainly  deserve  a  higher  estimate 
than  we  should  otherwise  be  inclined  to  put  upo^i 
them. 

But  for  us,  my  brethren,  their  value,  as  I  said 
at  the  beginning  of  these  Lectures  and  now  repeat 
in  concluding  them,  consists,  as  I  think,  chiefly  in 


386  The  Methods  of  Natural  Theology. 

the  fact  that  they  lead  us  to  the  doctrines  of  Reve- 
lation, and  remove  the  objections  that  might  other- 
wise prove  insuperable  obstacles  to  the  reception  of 
Him  Whom  it  hath  pleased  the  Father  to  make  unto 
us  "  wisdom  and  righteousness  and  sanctification  and 
redemption,"  and  Whose  Name  is  *'  the  only  Name 
under  heaven  given  among  men  whereby  we  can 
be  saved." 

And  now,  after  due  thanks  to  those  fathers  and 
brethren  by  whose  favor  I  have  had  this  opportunity 
to  say  these  words  to  you,  I  desire,  if  I  have  been 
able  to  say  anything  that  will  tend  to  promote  the 
glory  of  God  and  the  more  effectual  setting  forward 
the  salvation  of  men  by  the  extension  of  the  Re- 
deemer's Kingdom,  to  render  all  gratitude  and  praise, 
all  thanksgiving  and  honor,  to  Him  who  was  and  is 
and  ever  shall  be,  God  over  all  blessed  now  and 
forevermore. 


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The  object  of  the  work  is  to  bring  together  such  words,  expressions, 
quotations,  etc.,  English  or  other,  as  are  among  the  more  uncommon  in 
current  literature,  and  require,  not  for  the  scientific  but  for  the  ordinary 
reader,  explanations,  for  the  want  of  which  the  meaning  of  a  sentence  or 
a  paragraph,  even  the  drift  of  an  argument,  is  often  missed  ;  explanations, 
moreover,  not  to  be  obtained  without  reference  to,  and  perhaps  tedious 
search  among,  a  large  and  varied  number  of  books,  many  of  them  not 
easily  accessible. 

"  This  haudsomely  printed  volume  of  520  pages  will  be  eaid  to  fill  an  empty 
niche  in  a  good  reference  library,  and  should  receive  the  attention  of  all  careful 
TeadevBy— Boston  Traveller. 

"  There  are  probably  twenty  thousand  words  in  all,  not  confined  entirely  to  the 
English  language.  Many  of  the  terms  are  technical  and  scientific,  while  others 
contain  allusions,  mythological,  historical,  and  geographical ;  in  fact,  it  is  doubt- 
ful if  any  word  has  been  omitted  which  occurs  in  ordinaiy  English  literature."  — 
Baltimore  Day. 

"We  find  in  the  new  '  Glossary  of  Terms  and  Phrases,'  edited  by  the  Rev.  H. 
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every-day  reference.  It  contains  perhaps  eighteen  or  twenty  thousand  of  the 
more  uncommon  words,  expressions,  and  quotations  current  in  literature,  with 
definitions  and  explanations  that  are,  as  a  rule,  both  concise  and  satisfactory. 
Much  of  the  information  here  collected  is  not  readily  accessible  elsewhere,  being 
outside  of  the  range  of  the  ordinary  dictionaries."— iVew  York  Sun. 

"  This  volume  is  supplementary  to  the  dictionary,  and  will  prove  a  great  con- 
venience to  all  readers  of  general  literature,  for  he  must  be  a  very  learned  man 
who  does  not  frequently  meet  with  technical  terms  and  phrases  and  recondite 
allusions  which  are  beyond  his  knowledge,  and  of  which  he  would  be  glad  to 
have  at  hand  a  means  of  obtaining  a  clearer  apprehension.  This  is  the  book  he 
needs  for  such  service."— Boston  Advertiser. 

"  It  is  a  scholarly  book,  which  scholars  will  everywhere  appreciate."— C/wcag'O 
Inter- Ocean. 

'•  The  book  might  be  called  a  universal  dictionary  of  uncommon  words  occur- 
ring in  literature,  science,  mythology,  history,  art,  etc. ;  while  many  common 
words  have  fresh  definition  and  illustration.  It  promises  to  be  a  very  useful  book 
for  constant  reference.  It  is  beautifully  printed  in  a  large  thin  octavo  of  about 
500  pages."- iV^t^  York  Observer. 


New  York:  D.  APPLETON  &  CO.,  1,  3,  &  5  Bond  Street. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  PEOPLE  OF  THE 
UNITED  STATES, 

FROM  THE  REVOLUTION  TO  THE  CIVIL  WAR. 
By  JOHN  BACH  McMASTER. 


To  he  completed  in  five  volumes.    Volume  I  now  ready.    8vo,  cloth, 
gilt  top,  $^.50. 


Scope  op  the  "Work. 
In  ike  course  of  this  narrative  much  is  written  of  wars,  conspiracies, 
and  rebellions  ;  of  Presidents,  of  Congresses,  of  embassies,  of  treaties,  of 
the  ambition  of  political  leaders,  and  of  the  rise  of  great  parties  in  the 
nation.  Yet  the  history  of  the  people  is  the  chief  theme.  At  every  stage  of 
the  splendid  progress  which  separates  the  America  of  Washington  end 
Adams  from  the  Amei'ica  in  which  we  live,  it  has  been  the  author's  purpose 
to  describe  the  dress,  the  occupations,  the  amusements,  the  literary  canons  of 
the  times  ;  to  note  the  changes  of  manners  and  morals  ;  to  trace  the  growth 
of  that  humane  spirit  which  abolished  punishment  for  debt,  and  reformed 
the  discipline  of  prisons  and  of  jails  ;  to  recount  the  manifold  improve- 
ments tohich,  in  a  thousand  ways,  have  multiplied  the  conveniences  of  life 
and  ministered  to  the  happiness  of  our  race  ;  to  describe  the  rise  and  prog- 
ress of  that  long  series  of  mechanical  inventions  and  discoveries  tvhich  is 
now  the  admiration  of  the  world,  and  our  just  pride  and  boast  ;  to  tell  how, 
under  the  benign  influence  of  liberty  and  peace,  there  sprang  up,  in  the 
course  of  a  single  century,  a  prosperity  unparalleled  in  the  annals  of  human 
affairs. 

EXTRACTS  FROM  REVIEWS. 
"  What  the  late  Professor  J.  R.  Green  did  for  his  countrymen  by  writing  his 
'History  of  the  English  People,'  Mr.  John  Bach  McMaster  has  essayed  to  do  for 
us  in  a  '  History  of  the  People  of  the  United  States,  from  the  Revolution  to  the 
Civil  War.'  The  plan  of  the  two  works  is  essentially  the  same,  but  the  American 
narrative  is  even  more  faithful  to  the  principles  upon  which  both  authors  profess 
to  write.  We  hear  less  in  it  about  wars,  treaties,  and  politics,  and  more  about 
the  manners,  customs,  ideas,  and  sentiments  of  the  great  mass  of  the  people, 
than  in  the  English  book.  The  pledge  given  by  Mr.  McMaster,  that '  the  history 
of  the  people  shall  be  the  chief  theme,'  is  punctiliously  and  satisfactorily  ful^lled. 
He  carries  out  his  promise  in  a  complete,  vivid,  and  delightful  way.  We  should 
add  that  the  literary  cxocntionof  the  work  is  worthy  of  the  indefatigable  indus- 
try and  unceasing  vigilance  v/ith  which  the  stores  of  historical  material  have 


History  op  the  People  of  the  United  States. — (Continued.) 


been  accumulated,  weighed,  and  sifted.  The  cardinal  qualities  of  style,  lucidity, 
animation  and  energy,  are  everywhere  present.  Seldom,  indeed,  has  a  book,  in 
which  matter  of  substantial  value  has  been  so  happily  united  to  attractiveness  of 
form,  been  offered  by  an  American  author  to  his  fellow-citizens. '"—iVez^  York  Sun. 
"To  recount  the  marveloas  progress  of  the  American  people;  to  describe 
their  life,  their  literature,  their  occupations,  their  amusements,  is  Mr.  McMaeter's 
object.  His  theme  is  an  important  one,  and  we  congratulate  him  on  his  success. 
His  style  is  interesting  and  lively,  and  he  gives  such  a  graphic  picture  of  our 
forefathers  that  it  is  a  pleasure  to  follow  him.  Page  after  page  of  easily-flowing 
narrative  fix  the  attention,  and  one  wonders  where  the  author  found  his  material 
for  so  elaborate  and  yet  so  entertaining  a  book.  It  has  rarely  been  our  province 
to  notice  a  book  with  so  many  excellences  and  so  few  defects."— A'ez^  York 
Herald. 

"  Mr.  McMaster  at  once  shows  his  grasp  of  the  various  themes  and  his  special 
capacity  as  an  historian  of  the  people.  His  aim  is  high,  bat  he  hits  the  mark.  His 
treatment  of  the  great  subject  is  very  able,  and  the  sincere  intentions  of  the  au- 
thor appear  on  every  page.  There  will  be  no  question  that  he  has  rescued  from 
oblivion  a  vast  mass  of  those  interesting  data  which,  small  in  themselves,  are  of 
the  greatest  value  in  reflecting  the  actual  condition  of  a  people  at  a  given  time." 
—J^ew  York  Jouimal  of  Commerce. 

"  It  ranks  with  the  '  Short  History'  of  Mr.  Green  in  its  brilliancy  of  style  and 
in  its  power  of  attracting  and  holding  the  attention  of  the  reader.  The  remain- 
ing volumes  will  be  awaited  with  eager  miQxe&V— Cleveland  Herald. 

"  I  have  had  to  read  a  good  deal  of  history  in  my  day,  but  I  &nd  so  much 
freshness  in  the  way  Professor  McMaster  has  treated  his  subject  that  it  is  quite 
like  a  new  story. ""—Philadelphia  Press. 

"Mr.  McMaster's  success  as  a  writer  seems  to  us  distinct  and  decisive.  In 
the  first  place  he  has  written  a  remarkably  readable  history.  His  style  is  clear 
and  vigorous,  if  not  always  condensed.  He  has  the  faculty  of  felicitous  compari- 
son and  contrast  in  a  marked  degree.  Whatever  may  be  said  in  criticism  of  it, 
no  one  will  impute  to  it  dullness  in  any  part.  He  has  the  power  of  enchaining 
the  attention.  Few  who  begin  this  book  will  fail  to  read  it  to  the  end,  and  the 
great  mass  of  readers  it  will  hold  as  by  a  spell.  Mr.  McMaster  has  produced  one 
of  the  most  spirited  of  histories,  a  book  which  will  be  widely  read,  and  the  enter- 
taining quality  of  which  is  conspicuous  beyond  that  of  any  work  of  its  kind.  It 
deserves  a  cordial  recognition  at  the  hands  of  those  who  are  interested  in  the 
development  of  American  literature,  and  it  will  command  its  own  passport  with 
the  people."— Boston  Gazette. 

"  In  compact,  crisp,  concentrated  statement,  we  have  the  events  of  the  first 
century  of  our  national  existence  vividly  portrayed.  The  procession  of  events  is 
marshaled  with  care,  and  it  moves  along  smoothly,  and  even  brilliantly,  in  the 
easy  flow  and  apt  statement  of  the  well-fortified  writer. ""—Boston  Commonwealth. 


For  sale  by  all  booksellers  ;  or  sent  by  mail,  post-paid,  on  receipt  of  price. 


New  York;  D.  APPLETON  &  CO.,  Publishers,  1,  3,  &  5  Bond  Street. 


HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES, 

FROM  THE  DISCOVERY  OF  THE  CONTINENT 
By  GEORGE  BANCROFT. 


An  entirely  new  edition,  partly  rewritten  and  thoroughly  re- 
vised.    To  be  completed  in  six  volumes,  octavo. 


The  author  has  made  extensive  changes  in  the  text,  condensing  in  places, 
enlarging  in  others,  and  care/ull>/  revising.  It  is  practically  a  new  work, 
emhodying  the  results  of  the  latest  researches  and  enjoying  the  advantage  of 
the  author's  long  and  mature  experience. 

The  original  octavo  edition  is  in  twelve  volumes.  The  present  edition 
will  be  completed  in  six  volumes,  octavo,  the  price  being  correspondingly  re- 
duced. Vols,  i  and  ii  now  ready.  Volumes  will  follow,  it  is  hoped,  ai 
intervals  of  four  months. 

Handsomely  printed  from  new  type.  Clotli,  uncut,  witli  gilt 
top,  $3.50;  slieep,  $3.50;  and  lialf  calf,  $4.50  per  volume. 


EXTRACTS    FROM   REVIEWS. 

"The  merits  of  Bancroft's  '  History  of  the  United  States'  are  so  well 
known  that  little  need  be  said  of  the  new  edition,  the  first  volume  of  which, 
reaching  to  1688,  has  just  been  published  in  very  handsome  form,  except  to 
point  out  the  changes  since  the  revision  of  1876.  One  of  the  most  prominent 
is  the  introduction  of  a  division  into  three  parts,  beginning  respectively  at 
1492, 1660,  and  1688.  There  has  been  less  change  in  the  accounts  of  Ameri- 
can than  of  European  matters,  but  the  most  important  addition,  anywhere, 
is  that  of  two  pages  describing  and  praising  Captain  Smith's  government  of 
Virginia.  Often,  when  there  appears  to  be  an  addition  or  omission,  there 
is  in  reality  only  a  transposition.  The  whole  class  of  changes  may  be  at- 
tributed to  greater  maturity  of  judgment,  rather  than  to  discovery  of  new 
material.  Other  changes  aim  simply  at  improvement  of  style.  The  vol- 
umes are  printed  in  the  stately  octavo  style  of  the  first  edition,  which  seems 
more  appropriate  to  such  a  standard  work  than  the  cheaper  form  of  the  other 
TQyision.^^— Boston  Advertiser. 

"  Apparently  no  new  material  of  particular  moment  has  been  inserted, 
although  several  sketches  of  famous  characters  have  been  rewritten  eitlier 
entirely  or  in  part.     The  work  as  a  whole  is  in  better  shape,  and  is  of  course 


HISTORY  OF  THE  UNITED  ST:ATE8.~{Continued.) 

more  authoritative  than  ever  hefore.  This  last  revision  will  be  without 
doubt,  both  from  its  desirable  form  and  accurate  text,  the  standard  one." — 
Boston,  Traveller. 

"  Our  examination  of  the  first  volume  leads  us  to  believe  that  the  thought 
of  the  historian  loses  nothing  by  the  abbreviation  of  the  text.  A  closer  and 
later  approximation  to  the  best  results  of  scholarship  and  criticism  is  reached. 
The  public  gains  by  its  more  compact  brevity  and  in  amount  of  matter,  and 
in  economy  of  time  and  money."— TAe  Independent  (New  York). 

"  There  is  nothing  to  be  said  at  this  day  of  the  value  of '  Bancroft.'  Its 
authority  is  no  longer  in  dispute,  and  as  a  piece  of  vivid  and  realistic  his- 
torical writing  it  stands  among  the  best  works  of  its  class.  It  may  be  taken 
for  granted  that  this  new  edition  will  greatly  extend  its  usefulness."— 7*7w7a- 
delphia  North  American. 

"  While  it  is  not  quite  true  that  the  marks  of  Mr.  Bancroft's  revision  of 
his  great  history  of  the  United  States  are  visible  on  every  page,  a  careful 
comparison  of  the  earlier  editions  and  this  shows  that  the  claim  to  improve- 
ment is  by  no  means  ill-founded.  Sometimes  whole  paragraphs  have  been 
cut  out ;  still  oftener  the  extravagances  of  a  youthful  style  have  been  care- 
fully pruned,  and  the  gain  has  been  manifest  in  sobriety  and  efiect," — 
Philadelphia  Pi'ess. 

"  The  work  is  much  improved  in  its  new  dress  and  revised  form,  and 
will  be  welcomed  by  all,  for  Bancroft's  history  of  our  country  is  still  /aetle 
princeps  among  histories  of  our  land.^^— Chicago  Tribune. 

"  Thus  far  he  has  removed  many  of  the  objections  which  stood  against 
his  history  as  a  work  of  permanent  value ;  and  there  is  a  certain  solid,  thor- 
ough, substantial  character  to  his  great  history  which  gives  it  a  permanent 
weight  in  the  world  of  letters.  The  work  now  takes  rank  with  the  best 
histories  of  the  school  of  philosophical  narrative  to  which  the  author  he- 
long^. ^^— Boston  Herald. 

"  The  edition  of  1876  exhibited  no  little  pruning  and  correction  ;  but  the 
author  has  again  gone  over  the  entire  field,  and,  with  a  care  and  devotion 
worthy  of  the  theme  and  of  his  reputation,  has  wrought  what  he  saya  must 
be  his  last  revision.  This  latest  edition  will  be  sought  by  many  who  have 
for  years  been  familiar  with  its  predecessors."— Z7i!^ca  (N.  Y.)  Herald. 


For  sale  by  all  booksellers;  or  sent  by  mail,  post-paid,  on  receipt  of  price. 


New  York:  D.  APPLETON  &  CO.,  PubUshers,  1,  3,  &  5  Bond  Street. 


A  Library  in  itself;  well  printed,  and  in  convenient  form;  trust- 
worthy, impartial,  complete,  thoroughly  American,  deeply  interesiinj,  and 
instructive. 

APPLETONS'  AMERICAN  CYCLOPEDIA, 

A  Popular  Dictionary  of  General  Knowledge. 

Edited  by  George  Ripley  and  Charles  A.  Dana.  16  vols.  Large  8vo. 
Per  vol.,  Cloth,  $5.00  ;  Sheep,  $6.00  ;  Half  Morocco,  $7.00  ;  Half 
Russia,  $8.00 ;  Full  Morocco,  or  Russia,  $10.00. 

The  American  Cyclopaedia  presents  a  panoramic  view  of  all  human  knowledge. 
In  its  volumes  is  contained  a  vast  fund  of  practical  information  on  the  Arts  and  Sci- 
ences in  all  their  branches,  including  Mechanics,  Mathematics,  Astronomy,  Philosophy, 
Chemistry,  and  Physiology;  on  Agriculture,  Commerce,  and  Manufactures ;  on  Law, 
Medicine,  and  Theology ;  on  Biography  and  History,  Geography  and  Ethnology ;  on 
Political  Economy,  the  Trades,  Inventions,  Politics,  the  Things  of  Common  Life,  and 
General  Literature. 

The  Industrial  Arts,  and  those  branches  of  Practical  Science  which  have  a  direct 
bearing  on  our  every-day  hfe,  such  as  Domestic  Economy,  Ventilation,  the  Heating  of 
Houses,  Diet,  etc.,  are  treated  with  the  thoroughness  which  their  great  importance  de- 
mands. The  department  of  Biography  Is  full  and  complete,  embracing  the  lives  of  all 
eminent  persons,  ancient  and  modern.  In  American  biography,  particularly,  great 
pains  have  been  taken  to  present  the  most  comprehensive  and  accurate  record  that  has 
yet  been  attempted.  In  History,  it  gives  no  mere  catalogue  of  barren  dates,  but  co- 
pious and  spu-ited  narratives,  under  their  appropriate  heads,  of  the  principal  events  in 
the  annals  of  the  world.  So  in  Geography,  it  not  only  serves  as  a  general  Gazetteer, 
but  it  gives  interesting  descriptions  of  the  principal  places  mentioned. 

As  far  as  is  consistent  with  thoroughness  of  research  and  exactness  of  statement, 
the  popular  method  has  been  pursued.  The  wants  of  the  people  in  a  work  of  this  kind 
have  been  carefully  kept  in  view  throughout.  By  condensation  and  brevity,  the  editors 
have  been  enabled  to  introduce  a  much  greater  variety  of  subjects  than  is  usually  found 
in  similar  productions,  and  thus  to  enhance  the  value  of  the  Cyclopaedia  as  a  work  of 
universal  reference. 

The  work  is  sold  to  subscribers  only.  It  is  in  sixteen  large  octavo  volumes,  each 
containing  about  800  pages,  fully  illustrated  with  several  thousand  Wood  Engravings, 
and  with  numerous  colored  Lithographic  Maps, 

General  and  Analytical  Index  to  the  above. 

By  the  Rev.  T.  J.  Conant,  D.  D.,  assisted  by  his  Daughter,  Blandina 
CoNANT.  Large  Svo.  810  pages.  Sold  by  subscription  only. 
Cloth,  $5.00 ;  Sheep,  $6.00 ;  Half  Morocco,  $7.00 ;  Half  Russia, 
$8.00.  

D.  APPLETON   k  CO.,  Publishers,  1,  3,  &  5  Bond  Street,  New  York. . 


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Theological  Seminary-Speer  Library 


1    1012  01008  9318 


